JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of execution proceedings. Brief facts necessary for consideration of this appeal are as follows. On 10-3-1913 the plaintiff decree-holder obtained a decree for money. This decree was put into execution from time to time till 17-4-194l when in the course of the execution petitions then pending there was a compromise under which Rs. 2300/- be came payable by annual instalments of Rs 50/- There was also a default clause providing for the recovery of the entire balance in case even a single instalment remained unpaid. A default did occur and Execution Case No. 26 of Samvat Year 1999 was filed on 3-8-1942. This was transferred to the Subha for execution as the decree-holder wanted the agricultural land of the judgment-debtors, in which they had Zamindari interest, to be sold. While the execution case was pending in the Court of the Subha the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act came into force. Thereupon the Subha returned the decree to the Court which had directed its transfer for execution. This petition No. 26 of Samvat Year 1999 was renumbered as No.6 of 1952. The decree-holder now applied for attachment of the compensation amount. The executing Court thereupon on 26-2-1952 directed the attachment of the compensation money as and when the same would be payable to the judement-debtors by writing to the Compensation Officer Ujjain to that effect. Reply of this was received from the Subhayat, Ujjain, by their letter dated 13-5-1952 intimating to the executing Court that the work of attachment had not commenced till then and the Tahsildar had been informed to bear this in mind when the compensation amount would be distributed. A second reminder was sent by the executing Court by its letter dated 18-11-1962. Reply of this was received from the compensation Officer Ujjain dated 25-11-1952 again intimating the same thing as before, When on 9-1-1953 the case came up for hearing the Court directed the decree-holder to produce Dakhala from the Compensation Officer as to what steps were being taken and the case was fixed for hearing on 27-3-1953. As no Dakhala was produced the execution case was dismissed on 27-3-1953. As no Dakhala was produced the execution case was dismissed on 27-3-1953. On 27-12-1955 the decree-holder submitted a fresh application for execution stating that the compensation of Zamindari eight annas share of the judgment-debtors had been attached in prior execution petition and the same had remained attached and requesting that the Deputy Compensation Officer might be asked to send the amount to the executing Court. Notice of this application was sent to the Judgment-debtors who raised the contention that the executing petition is barred by limitation under section 48 C. P. C. as this was a fresh execution petition and not a continuation of the execution case No.6 of 1952 (No. 26 of Samvat Year 1999), on behalf of the decree-holder it was contended that as there was a compromise reached between the parties in the Subhayat Court section 43 (1) (b) was applicable and the order of the Subha recording the compromise should be treated as subsequent order and 12 years should be reckoned from the date of payment fixed in the compromise. On behalf of the judgment-debtors it was contended that the Collector or the Subha to whom an execution is transferred for sale of land is not a Court and reliance is sought to be placed upon the decision of the Nagpur High Court reported in Raghoji Vs. Vithoba, 21 MPLC 220 = AIR 1939 = Nagpur 217, Second ground put forward by the decree- holder was that the execution petition dated 27-12-1955 was not a fresh petition hut was merely a continuation of the earlier petition No.6 of 1952 which had been relegated to the rcord room merely for statistical purposes. The judgment-debtors contended that it was a fresh petition. 2. The executing Court upheld the contentious of the decree-holder and directed the execution to proceed. 3. The lower appellate Court on appeal held on the first ground that there was substantial difference between the provisions of section 70 C. P. Code section 336 of the Japta Diwani Gwalior. It was the latter provision under which the Subha had acted. Sub-section (3) of section 336 Japta Diwani specifically enjoined the Subha to attempt to secure compromise between the parties before proceeding to sell the land in execution of a money decree. When therefore he acted in pursuance of the statutory power conferred upon him and secured the compromise he acted as a Court. Sub-section (3) of section 336 Japta Diwani specifically enjoined the Subha to attempt to secure compromise between the parties before proceeding to sell the land in execution of a money decree. When therefore he acted in pursuance of the statutory power conferred upon him and secured the compromise he acted as a Court. The order according the compromise was therefore a valid subsequent order within the meaning of section 48 (1) (b) C. P. C. and although the initial decree was passed in 1913 it was not barred under section 48 C. P. C. 4. As regards the second ground however it held that the execution petition dated 27-12-1955 was a fresh petition and since in the execution petition No. 26 of Samvat Year 1999 No.6 of 1952 the decree-holder had exercised his option in taking the benefit of exigibility clause the petition of 1955 which was filed 13 years after the earlier execution petition was barred by the 12 years Rule. The petition was accordingly held to be incompetent. The appeal was therefore allowed and the execution petition was dismissed. 5. In this second appeal Mr. Patel for the decree-holder challenged the correctness of the view of the lower appellate Court. It was urged that although the petition No.6 of 1952 was disposed of on 27-3-1953 calling it as dismissal it was really a disposal for statistical purposes since nothing further was to be done therein until the compensation amount was received from the Compensation Officer Ujjain. The Court waited for a reasonable time and as it saw no immediate likelihood of receiving the amount it dismissed the petition. Such a dismissal cannot be called dismissal which puts an end to the proceedings. In fact it was pointed out that compensation amount had been received in the same execution petition number of times in instalments and had been paid to the decree-holder. The decree-holder in the present petition, it was pointed out, had specifically stated that the attachment order in the earlier execution petition was in force and the amount of compensation might be called on the strength of the same order. 6. This contention of the learned counsel is correct. In Sundaramma Vs. Abdul Khader, AIR 1933 Mad. The decree-holder in the present petition, it was pointed out, had specifically stated that the attachment order in the earlier execution petition was in force and the amount of compensation might be called on the strength of the same order. 6. This contention of the learned counsel is correct. In Sundaramma Vs. Abdul Khader, AIR 1933 Mad. 418 (FB), it was observed at page 423:- "The test to be applied for the principle of revival is that the interruption to the execution proceedings must have been due to an intermediate order which was afterwards set aside or the execution proceedings must have been rendered infructuous by some such obstacle and the interruption to the execution should not have been occasioned by any fault or laches of the applicant. This was held to be the test for applying the principle of revival. To the same effect is the decision in Raghunath Sahay Singh Vs. Lalji Singh, (1896) 23 Calcutta 397, he view taken in the decision in Narayan Govind Vs. Sone Sadashiv, (1900) 24 Bom. 345, is virtually, the same." The full Bench in this connection had referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Qamaruddin Ahmed Vs. Jawahir Lal, 32 Indian Appeals 102, which supported the above mentioned test. This Madras Full Bench decision was followed in jangli Vs. Lala, AIR 1954 Madhya Bharat 61 (63). 7. In Moidin Kutty Vs. Doraiswami, AIR 1952 Mad. 51 , it was held that where the execution petition is closed for statistical purposes any subsequent petition for securing the relief contemplated by the earlier one is to be taken to be a continuation of the earlier petition and not a fresh one. 8. It is well settled that whether in a particular case an execution petition is a continuation of the earlier one or is a fresh petition is a question of fact to be determined having regard to the entire circumstances in which the earlier petition was disposed of. The use of the word 'dismissed' or 'disposed of' is also not decisive in this regard. It is possible to conceive of cases in which event where the word used is dismissed it is still a disposal for statistical purposes and the decree-holder is really not to be blamed for not proceeding with the earlier petition and its course might have been impeded by reason something beyond his control. It is possible to conceive of cases in which event where the word used is dismissed it is still a disposal for statistical purposes and the decree-holder is really not to be blamed for not proceeding with the earlier petition and its course might have been impeded by reason something beyond his control. In such cases it will he incorrect to hold that there was termination of the earlier proceeding so as to render the Court functus officio for its purpose. 9. Applying these principles to the circumstances of the present case it is clear that in the petition No.6 of 1952 (No. 26 of Samvat Year 1999) the Court had directed attachment of the compensation amount of Zamindari interest of the judgment-debtors and had called for it as and when it would be paid. The Court waited for a reasonable time and issued reminders and each time the reply was received that the compensation amount had not become payable till then and that the officer concerned had been informed of the attachment order. It is no doubt true that in the proceeding dated 9-1-1953 the decree-holder was required to produce Dakhala as to what was taking place before the Compensation officer and he had failed to produce the same by the next date. But the order was meant merely for seeking information and could in no sense be considered to be one requiring the decree-holder to take any lawful step for securing further progress of the execution petition. The situation had not changed as regards the distribution of the compensation money and the decree-holder could do nothing. The disposal under these circumstances though the word 'dismissed' was used could only be for statistical purposes having regard to the test laid down in the afore-said decisions. This view is confirmed by the subsequent receipt of the compensation money in the earlier petition and the payment of the same to the decree-holder. 10. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of dismissal of the execution petition passed by the lower appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court directing execution to proceed is restored. The execution petition is held to be not barred under Section 48 C. P. C. and is lawful. It shall be proceeded with in accordance to law. The appellant is entitled to his costs throughout from the respondents.