NAYUDU, J. :- This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Lakhimpur, Dibrugarh, dated the 31st August, 1961, awarding compensation to the respondent, hereinafter referred to as 'the claimant'. (2) The facts of the case briefly stated are as follows: The claimant Srimati Saraswati Devi is the widow of one Haradhan Chakravarty, who was an employee of the appellant here the Assam Railways and Trading Com­pany, hereinafter referred to as 'the Company'. The said Haradhan Chakravarty, hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased', was working with the Company at their colliery at Ledo as Battery Charger cum Electrician. On 1-1-bU, the day of the accident, he was on duty over the night-shift. At about 11.30 P.M. it was found that the fan of the new west mine of the colliery had stopped working and the deceased was accordingly called upon to attend to the fan and to restart the same. It is not disputed that this was part of the duties that had to be performed by the deceased as an employee of the Company. The tan house in the Company's colliery establishment supplied fresh air to the miners working inside the same, and the stoppage of such supply of air would have the effect of suffocating the miners working inside the mine, with the possibility of their being rendered unconscious and dying. The deceased al first checked up with one Ram Bahadur Chetri, the worn-man incharge of the boiler room, whether the stoppage of the fans was due to the decreased pressure in the boiler. Having satisfied himself .that the pressure in the boiler was all-right, the deceased hurried to the fanhcusc to detect the cause and to restart the fan. His way to the fan-house from the boiler room lay across rails, wagons, girders, stones, tubs, etc. As he was thus hurrying the deceased fell down and cried out 'Mago'. He tried to gel up catching hold of a nearby tub shouting for help. Thereupon two persons working on the premises came to the help of the deceased and carried him to the mouth + of the pit and from there to Bati-godown and thereafter on a stretcher to the hospital. On being taken to the hospital the deceased expired even before the doctor in­charge arrived. Thereupon two persons working on the premises came to the help of the deceased and carried him to the mouth + of the pit and from there to Bati-godown and thereafter on a stretcher to the hospital. On being taken to the hospital the deceased expired even before the doctor in­charge arrived. An inquest was held over the .body of the deceased and the same was handed over to the claimant. (3) The case of the claimant is that the deceased was in a sound state of health when he went on duty on l-1-60 at about 9 P.M., that she had been married to the deceased about 16 years back and that during that period the deceased was not suffering from any disease except occasional cough and cold and that as the deceased lost his life on account of art accident which occurred in the course of his employment with the appellant company and/ on account of that employment, she was entitled to get compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. (4) This claim of the claimant was resisted by the Company, who in their written statement, pleaded that the deceased died a natural death and not by reason of any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. It was admitted in the written statement of the Company that the deceased, when he was caned upon to restart the fan which had stopped and before h8 could attend to the same, fell on the ground and called for help. It was also stated in the written statement that in response to the deceased's call for help, the persons work­ing in the neighbourhood ran up to the deceased and saw him holding on to the side of a loaded tub for support ,and took him to the hospital after giving first aid. It was further stated that the deceased did not show any signs of ailment on the date of the accident, namely, 1-1-60. The plea of the Company in effect, therefore, was, that the deceased had died out of natural causes which had no connection with any accident that resulted out of his x employment by the Company. (5) On these pleadings the learned Commissioner framed the following points for determination: (1) Whether the application for compensation is admissible or not? The plea of the Company in effect, therefore, was, that the deceased had died out of natural causes which had no connection with any accident that resulted out of his x employment by the Company. (5) On these pleadings the learned Commissioner framed the following points for determination: (1) Whether the application for compensation is admissible or not? (2) Whether late Haradhan Chakravarty, who was an employee of the Assam Railways and Trading Company, died of an accident while on duty at night on 1-1-60 at Ledo Colliery or h*s death was due to natural causes? (6) After discussing the respective contentions in the light of the evidence adduced in the case and the submis­sions made to him, the learned Commissioner came to the conclusion that the death of late Haradhan ChaKravarty, the deceased, was a result of art accident when he was an duty , and, accordingly, awarded compensation of Rs. 2400/- which is the amount admissible under the pro­visions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, herein­after referred to as 'the Act'. (7) Two points have been taken before us by Mr. Choudhury, the learned Counsel for the Company. Firstly, that there was no accident at all, as death was due to natural causes, and, secondly, that even if it could -be said that there was an accident, the accident did not arise out of and in the course of the employment of the deceased by the Company. On the other hand Mr. Lahiri, the learned Counsel for the claimant, con­tended that it was a clear case of an accident involving the deceased's falling down when he was hurrying to perform his duty of starting the fan, which was impera­tive and very necessary in view of the dangerous conse­quences that would have ensued by not starting the tan, and as the accident occurred on the premises of the Company where the deceased had to perform his duties and when he was proceeding to the fan-house in order to start the fan, the case is a straightforward one and the accident arose out of and on account of the employment of the deceased by the Company. (8) Before I deal with the respective contentions urged in this case, it would be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Workmens1 Compensation Act. (8) Before I deal with the respective contentions urged in this case, it would be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Workmens1 Compensation Act. section 3 of the Act deals with the employer's liability for com­pensation and the relevant portion thereof is extracted 'below: "3 (1)- If personal injury is caused In a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compen­sation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter: * * * * * * (2)- (If a workman employed in any employment spe-c'fied in Part A rf Sellable lii controls £ny disease specified therein as an occupational disease oeculiar *o that employment), or if a workman, whilst in the service of an employer in whose service he has been employed for a continuous period of not less than six monthe in any employment specified in Part B of Schedule III, con­tracts any disease specifisd therein as an occupational disease peculiar to that employment, the contracting of the disease shall be deemed to be an injury by accident within the meaning of this section and, unless the em­ployer proves the contrary, the accident shall be deemeu to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment. * * * * (9) Section 4 of the Act deals with the amount of compensation payable in the event of an accident which came within the scope of Section 3 of the Act. It must be noticed that the correctness of the quantum of com­pensation awarded m this case is not in Dispute. What is in dispute is the entitlement, (10) As regards the first point relied on by Mr. Chaudhuri, the learned Counsel for the Company, namely that there was no accident at all and that the death in the instant case was due to natural causes, the scope and meaning of the expression 'accident' requires to be examined. This expression 'accident' has not been defined in the Act. But the question was considered in a number of reported decisions, and it would be useful in this con­nection to refer to a few of them. This expression 'accident' has not been defined in the Act. But the question was considered in a number of reported decisions, and it would be useful in this con­nection to refer to a few of them. In 1903 AC 44J, Fenton v. J. Throley and Co., Ltd., Ford Macnaghten dealing with the scope of the expression 'accident' observed: "I come, therefore, to the conclusion that the expres­sion 'accident' is used in the popular and ordinary sense of the word as denoting an unlooked-for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed." And with reference to the particular facts of the case tha learned Law Ford observed as follows: "If a man, in lifting a weight or trying to move some­thing not easily moved, were to strain a muscle, or rick his back, or rupture himself, the mishap in ordinary parlance would be described as an accident. Anybody would say that the man had met with an accident in lifting a weight, or trying to move something too heavy for him. In the same case, Ford Shand defined the expression 'accident' as follows: "If the word 'accident' were interpreted in the Work­men's Compensation Act, 1897, or were there defined so as to bear a special limited or narrow sense only, it might be necessary to consider and examine the American authorities, which were so fully cited by Mr. Powell in his able argument. But I agree with my noble and learned friend in thinking that the words "personal injury by accident" and "accident" are used in the statute in the popular and ordinary sense of these words. I retrain from referring in detail to the language used in the different parts of the statute, because in so doing I should only be repeating what has already been said. I shall only add that, concurring as I fully do In holding that the word "accident" in the statute is to be taken in its popular and ordinary sense, I think it denotes or includes any unexpected personal injury re­sulting to the workman in the course of his employment from any unlooked-for mishap or occurrence." (11) Applying this ordinary and popular meaning to the word 'accident' to the facts of the instant case, I find from the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 for the claimant that the deceased when proceeding hurriedly to the fan house from the boiler room for the purpose of starting the fan, fell down on the way and immediately cried 'Mago' and began complaining of pain and hard breathing, and within a short time thereafter expired at the hospital. The fall is obviously an accident and that it was this fall that had caused the physical effect on the deceased which made him cry out 'Mago' and complain of pain in the chest and hard breathing. The manifestation of the physical effects of the accident was so immediate and closely consequent on the fall that it is a reasonable con­clusion to draw in the circumstances, that it was the accidental fall that had produced the physical effects of pain and hard breathing manifested by the deceased im­mediately thereafter. This conclusion receives further support from the circumstance that both according to the claimant as well as according to the Company the deceased was not suffering from any disease or complaint prior to the accident. On the materials available on record we are satisfied that the deceased died as a result of the fall that he sustained when he was proceeding towards the tan-house. 02) In this connection it is contended by Mr. Cheudhuri that there was no medical evidence in the case it establish the cause of the death and particularly that the death was due to any injury sustained by the deceased on account of the fall. He further points out that as the doctor could not examine the deceased before he expired, and as no post mortem examination was held, no material is available from which it could be concluded that there is any connection between the death and the deceased's falling down. It is true that no medical evidence worth the name is available in this case as to the exact nature of the injury sustained by the deceased which resulted in the death, but in a case of this kind where events moved very fast following the accidental fall sustained by the deceased, by his shouting 'Mago' and his immediately complaining of pain and difficulty in breathing which necessitated his being taken to the hospital where within a few minutes he expired, the absence of direct medical evidence as to the exact nature of the injury sustained by the deceased is immaterial. In my opinion, this is a case of res ipso loquitur, the thing speaking for itself. I am satisfied on the evidence available in this case and the circumstances, that the deceased had fallen on the ground, apparently as a result of some ob­struction on his way, and that it was this fall that had produced some internal injury causing intense pain fol­lowed by hard and difficult breathing, and the death, and, that, therefore, the deceased had died as a result of the accidental fall he sustained on the night 3f 1-1-60. (13) The suggestion made by the Company in this connection that the death was due to natural causes had not been substantiated by any evidence adduced on behalf of the Company. The evidence of D. W. 1 is of no as­sistance as his statements are mere hearsay as he was at the time of the accident in the lamp-house which was some 1000ft. away from the fan-house. The evidence of D. W. 2 is equally of no assistance. If at all their evidence supports the case of the claimant that the deceased met with an accident by falling down on his way to the fan-house, the evidence of D. W. 4, the Medical Superintendent of the Company, and of D. W. 5, the Senior Welfare Officer of the Company, have no bearing n the case. The evidence given by Sri Pranab Das Gupta, examined as D. W. 3 in the case, is not of much assistance inasmuch as he did not examine the deceased when he was alive, as he found him dead when he came to do the examination. The only medical officer who could perhaps have thrown some light in the case is Dr. H. C. Chakravarty, the medical officer incharge of the Company's colliery hospital, and who had examined the deceased and made entries in the hospital books. Unfortunately, the Company did not examine him as a witness in the case; nor have they produced any of the hospital books which admittedly contained entries made by Dr. H. C. Chakravarty concerning the results of the examination made by him of the deceased. This omission assumes importance, particularly in view of the suggestion made on behalf of the claimant that Dr. H. C. Chakravarty concerning the results of the examination made by him of the deceased. This omission assumes importance, particularly in view of the suggestion made on behalf of the claimant that Dr. Chakravarty had resigned from the service of the Company as he had refused to issue a false medical report as to the death of the deceased and that he resigned as a protest. It is contended by Mr. Lahiri, the learned Counsel for the claimant, that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Company for their failure to examine Dr. Chakravarty and to produce the hospital, records. It is, however, unnecessary to consider this, matter further as we are satisfied on the evidence avail­able that the death of the deceased in the case was due. to and was the consequence of the accident sustained by the deceased when he fell down on his way to the. fan-house on the night of 1-1-60. (14) In this connection a suggestion was made &y the-learned Counsel for the Company that the death of the deceased was caused by heart-failure and the possibility of the deceased having been suffering from heart disease earlier could not be excluded. At the outset it must be pointed cut that no such plea was taken by the Com­pany in their written statement before the Commissioner,, their only plea being that the death was due to natural causes. The evidence in the case, particularly of the claimant, leaves no room for doubt that the deceased was , maintaining good health throughout the period of 16 years during which the claimant and the deceased had been married, and this evidence receives confirmation from the plea in the written statement of the Company "that the workman concerned did not show signs of any ailment on the relevant date, i.e. 1-1-60." (15) In this connection Mr. Choudhuri cited a number of decisions dealing with cases where the victim of the accident had been suffering from heart disease and what effect such a history would have on the liability of the employers. Choudhuri cited a number of decisions dealing with cases where the victim of the accident had been suffering from heart disease and what effect such a history would have on the liability of the employers. It is unnecessary for me to refer to those decisions as they have absolutely no bearing on the point that arises for consideration in this appeal and parti­cularly having regard to the pleadings in the case wherein the Company never raised any plea that the death In the case was due to any heart-disease from which the deceased was suffering prior to the accident. (16) If the argument of the learned Counsel for the. Company that the death was due to heart-failure apart from any question of heart-disease, is to receive any serious consideration, it has to be pointed out that in every case of death there is heart failure and there Is not much point in contending that because death was due to heart-failure, the case is not covered by Section 3 of the Act. It is recognised that if in the course of a person's employment, and when he was actually in the performance of his duty, he dies of heart-failure, the, failure of the heart in such circumstances is Itself regard­ed as an accident. In this connection reference may be usefully made to the decision reported in Partridge Jones and John Paton Ltd. v. James (No. 2), 1933 AC 501 : 1933 All ER 316, wherein were quoted with approval the observations of Ford Collins in the case of Clover, Clayton and Co. v. Hughes, 1910 AC 242, which in turn refers to the obser­vations of Ford M'Laren in Stewart v. Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co., (1902) 5 F 120, at p. 122 extracted below: "If a workman in the reasonable performance of his duties, sustains a physiological injury as the result of the work he is engaged in............ This is acci­dental injury in the sense of the statute." It is thus clear that even if the deceased can be said to have sustained death on account of heart-failure which resulted from the fall he had in the performance of his duty, the answer is obvious, namely, that the accident and the death arose out of and occurred in the course I of the performance of his duties of the employment. (17) The only other point that requires to be consi­dered is whether the accident was in the course of the employment and arose out of such employment. It is obvious that these conditions have to be fulfilled in order to bring the case within the scope of Section 3 of the Act so as to entitle the claimant to compensation. It has not been seriously disputed before us that the acci­dent in question occurred in the course of the employ­ment. In the nature of things it could not be disputed as it is the common case of both sides that the deceased was proceeding to the fan-house for the purpose of starting the fan which had stopped, and that the job of starting the fan was part of the duties that the deceased had to perform by reason of his employment with the Company. The only other aspect, therefore, that requires to be closely examined is whether the accident in question arose out of the employment. In order to determine whether an accident could be held to have arisen out of the employment of the victim with the Company, it has been laid down in various deci­sions that the following tests would require to be ful­filled, namely, (1) that the workman was in fact employed on, or performing the duties of, his employment at the time of the accident; (2) that the accident occurred at or about the place where he was performing these duties, or where the performance of these duties required him to be pre­sent; (3) that the immediate act which led to or resulted in the accident had some form of causal relation with the performance of these duties, and such causal connec­tion could be held to exist if the immediate act which led to the accident is not so remote from the sphere or his duties or the performance thereof, as to be regarded as something foreign to them. In this connection, reference may be usefully made to - the decisions in Kondisetti Anjaiah v. T. Lakshmaiah, AIK 1961 Andh-Pra 15 and R. Kofayya v. D. Nagavaradhanamma, AIR 1962 Andh-Pra 42. In this connection, reference may be usefully made to - the decisions in Kondisetti Anjaiah v. T. Lakshmaiah, AIK 1961 Andh-Pra 15 and R. Kofayya v. D. Nagavaradhanamma, AIR 1962 Andh-Pra 42. Certain exceptions to the above are recognised by the decisions such as, cases where the accident involved a risk common to all humanity, and did not involve any peculiar or exceptional danger result­ing from the nature of the employment, or, again where the accident was the result of an added peril, to which the workman by his own conduct exposed himself, which peril was not involved in the normal performance of the duties of his employment. In the instant case we are not concerned with these exceptions, as the Company have not relied on any of them. (18) Applying the above tests, therefore, to the t present case I find that the deceased was in fact in the employment of the Company and was performing the duties of such employment at the time of the accident, it is also clear that the accident occurred on the premises of the Company's establishment where the deceased had ;to perform his duties and that the immediate act which constituted the accident was the fall of the deceased on the ground when he was proceeding to the fan-house to perform the duty of starting the fan which had stopped. In my opinion, these tests have been adequately fulfilled, in this case. (19) I shall now advert to some of the decisions cited at the Bar having bearing on the question whether the accident in the instant case could be held to have arisen on account of the employment of the deceased with the company. In Dennis v. A. J. White and Co., 191/ AC 479 a boy aged 16 was employed as a plumber's mate by the respondents, a firm of builders carrying on business in Westminster. In the course of his employment it was his duty to go upon errands to different parts of London, and on such occasions he was directed to use a bicycle belonging to the firm. On the day in question he was ordered to go on a bicycle a distance of one .mile from the firm's premises to fetch some plaster, and as he was crossing the road he came into collision with a motor car and was knocked down and his left leg was broken. On the day in question he was ordered to go on a bicycle a distance of one .mile from the firm's premises to fetch some plaster, and as he was crossing the road he came into collision with a motor car and was knocked down and his left leg was broken. The respondents denied liability to pay compensa­tion on the ground that the accident did not arise out of the employment. On these facts Ford Finlay observed as follows: "If a servant in the course of his master's business has to pass along the public street, whether it be on foot or on a bicycle, or on an omnibus or car, and he sustains an accident by reason of the risks incidental to the streets, the accident arises out of as well as in the course of his employment. The frequency or in-frequency of the occasions on which the risk is incurred has nothing to do with the question whether an accident resulting from that risk arose out of the employment. The use of the streets by the workman merely to get to or from his work of course stands on a different footing altogether, but as soon as it is established that the work itself involves exposure to the perils of the streets the workman can recover for any injury so occasioned. As it was put by Ford Parmoor in his judgment in Mrs. Mar­garet or Simpson v. Sinclair, (1917 AC 127) in this House, "The fact that the risk may be common to all mankind does not disentitle a workman to compensation if in the particular case it arises out of the employment. *****«* But when a workman is sent into the street on his master's business, whether it be occasionally or habitually, his employment necessarily involves exposure to the risks of the streets and injury from such a cause arises out or his employment. There is nothing in the Act about any necessity for showing that the employment involves an extra or special risk, and once it is clear, as it is in the present case, that the accident was the result of a risk necessarily incidental to the performance of the servant's work, all inquiry as to the frequency or magni­tude of the risk is irrelevant. It is quite immaterial 'whe­ther the nature of the employment involves continuous or only occasional exposure to the dangers of the streets." In the same judgment Ford Parker of Waddington observed : "The risk is inherent in the nature of the employ­ment, or, to put it in another way, if a collision occurs, a causal relationship between the employment and the collision can be properly inferred, and in default of fur­ther evidence, in my opinion, ought to be inferred by a judge of fact. Most employments have peculiar risks inherent in their nature. A person employed to Break stones runs the risk of being injured by a flying splinter. A person employed to climb a ladder runs the risk of injury from a fall. In neither case would positive evi­dence be necessary to prove that the injury by accident arose out of the employment. That it did so arise would be a legitimate inference from the nature of the em­ployment coupled with the occurrence of the accident causing the injury." Ford Parmoor in the same judgment observed : "If an accident has arisen because of something which it was the duty of the appellant to do in the course of his employment, it is not an answer to say that the same accident might have happened to any other member of the public who was doing the same thing under the same conditions." In 1917 AC 127, the claimant was employed in packing herrings by the respondent firm in Aberdeen. What happened was that a brick wall, about 20 feet high, in course of erection on ground belonging to some one elso fiut contiguous to the curing-shed of the respondent in which the claimant was employed, fell by reason of its instability on the shed with the consequence that the roof of the shed and part of its wall tumbled in, and the claimant and other workers were buried under the fallen material composed mainly of corrugated iron and rafters etc. as well as of the bricks from the wall on the adjoining property. as well as of the bricks from the wall on the adjoining property. When considering the question whether in such circumstances the claimant was entitled to compensation, Viscount Haldane observed as follows: "It will be observed that the Legislature has imposed a double condition for the liability of the employer for injury from accident, a condition that the injury must arise not only in the course of the employment but out of it. It is easy in a case like the present to determine the satisfaction of one of these conditions. The appel­lant was actually employed when the accident occurred, and she was obviously injured by an accident in the course of the employment. But did the accident arise out of the employment? As to the meaning of these words two contentions have been put forward. According to one of them the language used is satis­fied if injury has been inflicted on the workman by any accident, such as something falling on him, which would not have happened to him if his employment had not caused him to be in the place at whrch the accident occurr­ed at the time of its occurrence, the place and time having thus been conditions of the result brought into existence by the employment. Once establish this and M is said that no further causal connection need be sought." Viscount Hatdane further observed: "But where a man is ordered to work under a parti­cular roof and that roof falls in on him, it is not clear that the accident belongs to that category. If the parti­cular accident would not have happened to him had he not been employed to work under the particular roof, there seems to be nothing in the language of the Act which precludes an occurrence from being held within it which satisfies the test proposed by the first of the alter­native constructions modified to the extent I have sug­gested. The falling of the particular roof could only happen in one place, and the presence there of the person Injured was due to the employment. The question really turns on the character of the causation through the em­ployment which is required by the words "arising out of. The falling of the particular roof could only happen in one place, and the presence there of the person Injured was due to the employment. The question really turns on the character of the causation through the em­ployment which is required by the words "arising out of. * * * * * In short, my view of the statute is that the expression "arising out of the employment" is not confined to the mere "nature of the employment." The expression, in my opinion, applies to the employment as such - to its nature, its conditions, its obligations, and its inci­dents. If by reason of any of -these the workman is brought within the zone of special danger and so in­jured' or killed, it appears to me that the broad words of the statute "arising out of the employment" apply... ." (20) In Margaret Brooker v. Thomas Bortnwjck and Sons Ltd. AIR 1933 PC 225 a case from New Zealand where the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act were similar to the British Act as well as the present Act, - the facts were that the accident occurred as a result of an earthquake which resulted in the collapse of the building in which the claimants were working, the ques­tion arose whether the accident could be held to have arisen out of the employment of the victims. Quoting with approval the observations of learned Law Fords in Simpson v. Sinclair, (1917 AC 127) Ford Atkin observed: "The principle which emerges seems to be clear. The accident must be connected with the employment, must arise "out of" it. If a workman is injured by some natural force such as lightning, the heat of the sun, or extreme cold, which in itself has no kind of conation with employment, he cannot recover unless he can suffi­ciently associate such injury with his employment. This he can do if he can show that the employment exposed him in a special degree to suffering such an injury. Bui -if he is injured by contact physically with some part of the place where he works, then, apart from questions of his own misconduct, he at once associates the accident with his employment and nothing further need be con­sidered. Bui -if he is injured by contact physically with some part of the place where he works, then, apart from questions of his own misconduct, he at once associates the accident with his employment and nothing further need be con­sidered. So that if the roof or walls fall upon him, or he slips upon the premises there is no need to make fur­ther inquiry as to why the accident happened." In Abdul Rashid v. Mohanlal Ajit Saria, AIR 1955 NUC (Assam) 379, a Head Mistry in a Rice and Oil Mill who was incharge of the boiler and was working on it to put it in a proper condition, found the pipe of the boiler had to be replaced and accordingly went to the Store-room to bring out the pipe. In doing so he had to climb by the aid of loose pipes to take out the spare pipe and when getting down the pipe slipped and he fell down and got a fracture of the neck and of the left thigh bone. It was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment notwithstanding the negligent or the rash manner in which the Head Mistry was doing an act connected with and arising out of his employment The reason given in support of this conclusion was that the person concerned was acting in the interest of his work and merely underestimated the risk he was under­taking. This decision, in my opinion, has close similarity with the facts of the instant case and we feel has been correctly decided. (21) In Parwatibai v. Manager, Rajkumar Mills, Indore. AIR 1959 Madh Pra 281 it was held that if a particular acci­dent would not have happened to a workman had he not been employed to work in the particular place and con­dition, then it would be an accident arising out of the, employment. (22) Considering the legal position and the principles followed in the above 'Decision, I am satisfied that in the instant case the deceased died as a result of the accident susf3ined by him when he fell down on his way to the fan-house in the performance of the duties of his employment and that the accident occurred not only in the course of his employment by the company but also on account of the employment. As these conditions are satisfied in the instant case the claimant is entitled to compensation under the Act. The order of the learned Com­missioner is in order. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. MEHROTRA, C. J. : (23) I had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by Nayudu J. and I agree with his conclusions. (24) The facts are fully set out in his order. Haradhan Chakravarty (hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased') was an employee of the Assam Railways and Trading Company. He was working in their colliery at Ledo as Battery Charg­er cum Electrician. On the 1st January 19SO he was on duty over the night shift. At about 11.30 P.M. it was found that the fan of the new west mine of the colliery had stopped working. The deceased was accordingly called upon to attend to the fan and to restart the same, which was a part of his duty. Through the fan house fresh air is supplied to the miners working inside the mine and the stoppage of supply of air would have the effect of suffocat­ing the miners working inside the mine. At first the deceased checked up with one Ram Bahadur Chetri, the workman in charge of the boiler room, whether the stop­page of the fans was due to the decreased pressure in the toiler. After having seen that the pressure was all-right, the deceased hurried to the fan house. On his way to the fan house he fell down and cried out 'Mago'. Two persons who were working on the premises, came to the help of the deceased and carried him to the mouth of the pit and from there lo Bati-godown and thereafter on a stretcher to the hospital. He expired there before the doctor arrived. The dead-body was handed over to the claimant Srimati Saraswati Devi who is the widow of the deceased. She claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the authority has awarded the compensation against which the present appeal is filed by the Assam Railways and Trading Company Limited. (25) The case of the Company was that the deceased died a natural death and the widow was not entitled to any compensation. She claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the authority has awarded the compensation against which the present appeal is filed by the Assam Railways and Trading Company Limited. (25) The case of the Company was that the deceased died a natural death and the widow was not entitled to any compensation. (26) Section 3(1) of the Workmen's Compensator; Act (hereinafter called 'the Act') provides that if personal in­jury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the pro­visions of Chapter II of the Act. Before an employer can be made liable, the claimant has to prove that (1) the workman received personal injury by accident (2) the accident has arisen out of his employment and (3) the accident has arisen in course of his employment. (27) The word 'accident' has not been defined in the Act. As observed in the case of 1903 AC 413 by Ford Macnaghten dealing with the scope of the expression 'acci­dent' "the expression "accident'' is used in the popular and ordinary sense of the word as denoting an unlooked-for , mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed." The word 'accident' has its popular meaning. It denotes or includes any unexpected personal injury resulting to this workman in the course of his employment from any un­looked-for mishap or occurrence. The deceased died from heart failure. It has not been established by evidence that the deceased suffered from any heart disease. Th9 evi­dence shows that before his death the deceased had a sound health and never suffered from any heart disease. The heart failure thus itself can be described as 8n accidental personal injury. It was an event which happened suddenly without any previous history of heart disease and the event in the true sense is a mishap the personal injury thus was caused to the deceased by an accident. It is immaterial whether the heart failure followed the fall or the fall itself was due to heart attack. (28) Mr. It was an event which happened suddenly without any previous history of heart disease and the event in the true sense is a mishap the personal injury thus was caused to the deceased by an accident. It is immaterial whether the heart failure followed the fall or the fall itself was due to heart attack. (28) Mr. Choudhary who appears for the appellant has referred to the case of 'Ormond v. C. D. Holmes and Co., Ltd., 1937-2 All ER 795 and contends on the authority of the said decision that in order to be an accident for the purposes of Workmen's Compensation Act it is necessary to decide whether the injury would have happened what­ever the workman was doing or whether the employment contributed to it. There the workman died of a heart attack during the course of his employment but on the facts of that case it was held that it was neither an accident nor it arose out of his employment. The facts of that case were, however, entirely different. The workman was suffering from a heart disease. He had already a heart stroke and it was held in those circumstances that the workman's incapacity was due to disease, though ag­gravated by his work, but it was not possible to paint to any specific event that was responsible for this changed condition and thus there was no accident. It could not be said on the facts of that case that the heart attack was a mishap. He was already suffering from heart disease and the heart failure could not be called an accident. (29) The next question is whether it arose out of employment. The words of Section 3 in my opinion are very wide. The accident need not be the direct result of the nature of the work done by the employee. The authorities have been examined by my brother Nayudu J. and I do not refer to them in detail. In my view the ex­pression 'arising out of his employment' is not confined; to mere nature of the employment. It refers to the em­ployment as such to its nature, its conditions, its obliga­tions and its incidents. The authorities have been examined by my brother Nayudu J. and I do not refer to them in detail. In my view the ex­pression 'arising out of his employment' is not confined; to mere nature of the employment. It refers to the em­ployment as such to its nature, its conditions, its obliga­tions and its incidents. I entirely agree with my brother that the following conditions had to be fulfilled before an accident can be said to have arisen out of the employ­ment- (1) that the workman was in fact employed on, orj performing the duties of, his employment at the time oil the accident: (2) that the accident occurred at or about the place i where he was performing these duties, or where the performance of these duties required him to be present; (3) that the immediate act which led to or resulted in the accident had some form of causal relation with the per­formance of these duties, and such causal connection could be held to exist if the immediate act which led to the accident is not so remote from the sphere of his duties or the performance thereof, as to the regarded as some­thing foreign to them. The deceased was working at that time. He had t rush to start the fan on which depended the life of so many workers inside the mine. If the fan was not quickly started, there was every possibility of the miners working inside getting suffocated, if the workman while proceed­ing hurriedly to perform his duty receives personal injury due to the accident, it cannot be said that the accident did not arise out of his employment. Even in cases where a person has been suffering from heart disease, if the nature of the work has contributed to the deterioration of the heart and his death, the personal injury can be said to arise out of his employment. The case where the deceased was not suffering from any previous heart disease, is to my mind a stronger case and in such circumstances if he suddenly gets a heart attack while proceeding to perform his duty, the accident can De nothing but arising out of his employment. BUTTA, J.: (30) I have had the advantage of reading the judg­ment prepared by my learned brother Nayudu, J. With due respect I am unable to agree to the same and write my own judgment. BUTTA, J.: (30) I have had the advantage of reading the judg­ment prepared by my learned brother Nayudu, J. With due respect I am unable to agree to the same and write my own judgment. (31) The facts of the case are as follows: On 23-11-6U Srimati Saraswati Devi submitted a petition to the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur at Oibrugarn, who happened to be the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner saying that her husband Haradhan Chakraiarty died while on duty at Ledo colliery. The Additional Deputy Commissioner dis­posed of this petition and found that Haradhan Chakravarty died of an accident while on duty and directed the Assam Railways and Trading Company Limited (hereinafter called the A.R.T. Company) who were the owners of the Ledo Colliery, to pay compensation to the dependants of the deceased to the extent of Rs. 2400-'-. Three witnesses were examined on behalf of the claim­ant and five on behalf of the company. The claimant's witnesses will be hereinafter referred to as P. Ws. and the Company's witnesses as D.Ws. The first P. W. was the wife of the deceased. She deposed that her husband worked in the Power House at Ledo Colliery of the A.R.T. Company. He was drawing the weekly salary of Rs. 17.87 np. On 1-1-60 at 9 P.M. he went to work but did not return. According to her she was married to the deceased 16 years ago and during all this time he had no complaint whatsoever except occasional cough or cold. P. W. 2 Macca Fuji was working in the boiler when the accident took place, He said that deceased Haradhan used to work in the Power House as well as in the Fan House. It was his duty to start the engine in the Power House and to look after the fans also. On the night of occurrence at about 10 P.M. Macca took charge of the boiler and Haradhan took charge of the Power House. After about two hours one Kambana-dur came and informed Macca that the fans were not work­ing. According to Macca air was supplied in the mines inside from the fans and the stoppage of the fans meant black-out inside and the workers might die for want of air. Deceased Haradhan went to run the fans. After about two hours one Kambana-dur came and informed Macca that the fans were not work­ing. According to Macca air was supplied in the mines inside from the fans and the stoppage of the fans meant black-out inside and the workers might die for want of air. Deceased Haradhan went to run the fans. After 10 or 15 minutes Macca noticed that the fans were not running and then after half an hour he saw Haradhan being carried away. (32) P. W. 3 Hira Bania was another employee at the colliery. He said that he saw Haradhan moving very quickly towards the Fan House and falling down at a distance of 10 or 12 cubits from him saying "Mago" (Oh Mother). The witness did not know how Haradhan fell. Haradrian got up and caught hold of a tub which was nearby and asked for help. Then one Nakanga and one Bhupen caught hold of him and carried him to the mouth of the Tit from where he was taken to the Batigodown. Therefrom the witness along with three others carried him to the hos­pital. At the hospital Haradhan was alive but when he was put on the seat of the patient from the stretcher he expired. The witness did not notice any bloodstain or injury on the person of Haradhan. He only saw him falling down. D. W. 1 Satish Chandra Seal said that he used to work as Overman at Ledo colliery and that he was present on the night of occurrence. He said that the fan want out of order and when Haradhan went to restart it, he felt unwell and could not reach the Fan House. Someone came and informed D. W. 1 Satish about it and so he went there and asked Haradhan what had happened. Haradhan told him that he suddenly felt unwell and found it difficult to breathe. The witness asked Haradhan if he met with any accident or fall or sustained any injury, but Harachan replied in the negative. Haradhan simply said that he felt un­well suddenly. D.W. 2 Ram Bahadur was a Sardar at the colliery. He said that he went inside the colliery when the fan stopped. So he came to the Power House and found , Haradhan sitting there. He told Haradhan that the fan had stopped and Haradhan replied that it might be due to low pressure. D.W. 2 Ram Bahadur was a Sardar at the colliery. He said that he went inside the colliery when the fan stopped. So he came to the Power House and found , Haradhan sitting there. He told Haradhan that the fan had stopped and Haradhan replied that it might be due to low pressure. So both of them came and saw the boiler but found the pressure in order. So Haradhan went to restart the fan and Ram Bahadur left the Power House and was returning to the mine. Then one Bhupen came running and informed him that something had happened to Haradhan. Ram Bahadur went to Haradhan and asked him what had happened and Haradhan told him that he was feeling breatn-ing difficulties. D. W. 3 Dr. Pranab Das Gupta was the Medical Officer of the A.R.T. Company. He deposed on 3rd August, 19bi on behalf of the Company. He was at the Ledo hospital on the night of occurrence. He said that one Dr.-S. C. Chakra­varty who had resigned and gone away in the month of February, 1961, was the doctor in charge of the hospital. Dr. Chakravarty and the witness examined Haradhan when he was brought to the hospital. In his opinion it might be a case of heart attack. D. W. 4 Dr. J. C. Baird, Medical Superintendent of the A.R.T. Company deposed that Or. Chakavarty was in charge of the hospital and Dr. Pranab Das Gupta (D. W. 3) was his Assistant. He said that Dr. Chakravarty resigned his job and went away. D. W. 5 P. S. Thapa was the Senior Welfare Officer of the Company and was only a formal witness. (33) Under Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act an employer is liable to pay compensation when his workman receives a personal injury by accident arising out of and in course of his employment. The words "in course of employment" refer to the time, place and cir­cumstances under which the accident took place. In the present case the heart attack of the workman took place while he was on duty and in the premises of his em­ployers. Therefore, there is no doubt that the accident , took place in course of his employment. But Mr. Chowdhury, appearing on behalf of the Company, has put forward a two-fold argument. In the present case the heart attack of the workman took place while he was on duty and in the premises of his em­ployers. Therefore, there is no doubt that the accident , took place in course of his employment. But Mr. Chowdhury, appearing on behalf of the Company, has put forward a two-fold argument. (1) He contends that Haradhan died a natural death and it was not a case of accident at all. (2) Even if it was a case of accident, the said accident did not arise out of his employment. (34) The term "accident" has not been defined any­where but it is well settled that this expression means some unexpected event happening without design even though there may be negligence. In (1903) AC 443 the workman employed by the respondents in their machinery, ruptured himself by an act of over-exertion in trying to turn a wheel. The question arose if this was an accident. Ford Macnaghten observed as follows in this connection:- "I come therefore to the conclusion that the expression 'accident' is used in the popular an ordinary sense of the word as denoting an unlooked-for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed." In this view of the matter a heart attack must be regarded as an accident as it is a mishap which happens unexpectedly. (35) But the expression "arising out of his employ­ment" presents more difficulties. It has been subject of interpretation in numerous cases and I may examine some of them. In AIR 1955 NUC (Assam) 3/9 it was observed by a Division Bench of this Court that the language used in Section 3 of the Act was wide and ail that might be -said was that the accident, in order to give rise to com­pensation, must have some relation to the workman's em­ployment and must be due to risk incidental to that em­ployment as distinguished from a risk to which all members of the public were alike exposed. In this case the Head Mistry of a Rice and Oil Mill was in charge of the boiler. A pipe in the boiler had to be replaced. The mill was closed. The mistry himself went to the Store-room to bring a pipe. The spare pipes were kept on a projection about Jen feet above the floor. He climbed to it fry the aid of a loose pipe. A pipe in the boiler had to be replaced. The mill was closed. The mistry himself went to the Store-room to bring a pipe. The spare pipes were kept on a projection about Jen feet above the floor. He climbed to it fry the aid of a loose pipe. When getting down he fell and had a fracture. It was held that the accident arose out of em­ployment notwithstanding the negligence or the rash manner in which the mistry was doing the act connected with his employment. (36) The question when an accident arose "out of employment" was considered by their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1933 PC 225. This appeal arose out of-four proceedings which were brought to determine the liability of the employers in respect of injuries to their workmen that occurred on the occasion of a serious earth-quake in the Hawkes Bay District of New Zealand. Their Lordships were of the opinion that the questions raised in this appeal were finally decided in the United Kingdom by the House of Fords in 1917 AC 127. There a woman employed by a fish curer was engaged in. packing kippered herrings into boxes in a shed belonging to her employers, which had brick walls and a roof of corrugated iron. While she was so engaged a brick wall which was being /cons­tructed upon a neighbouring property not belonging to her employer, fell by reason of its instability on the shed, 'bringing the roof and part of the wall down and burying the applicant under the wreckage whereby she was totally disabled. The arbitrator had found that the accident arose out of the employment; the Second Division of the Court of Session had reversed this finding. The House of Fords affirmed the arbitrator. It is to be noted that the force which brought down the shed was quite unconnected with She employment The walls and roof of the shed were good enough. But the workman was injured by the collapse of her workshop, and in the opinion of the House of Fords it was immaterial to consider why the workshop walls col­lapsed. (37) Their Lordships also considered the case of 1917 AC 479 which decided that a workman employed to go into the streets on his master's business and who was injured by a risk of the street, established an accident arising "out of" the employment. (37) Their Lordships also considered the case of 1917 AC 479 which decided that a workman employed to go into the streets on his master's business and who was injured by a risk of the street, established an accident arising "out of" the employment. (38) In the aforesaid case of AIR 1933 PC 225 one workman was killed and another severely injured by falling debris. A third workman's duty was to drive sheep up a sheep race and pen them. The sheep used to be slaughtered on the fourth floor. While standing on the fourth floor alongside the sheep race, the workman fell down the sheep race as by reason of the motion he lost his balance. Another workman who was a porter went to post a letter in performance of his duty. He was killed by the falling of a building. Their Lordships were of the opinion that the case of the first two workmen was covered by the decision in 1917 AC 127. The case of the third workman spoke for itself and the case of the fourth was within the decision as to street risks 1917 AC 479. (39) In AIR 1959 Madh Pra 281 a workman names Kalu in course of his work had to mount a belt on a machine when he received a jerk and a shock, tell down and died of heart failure. The Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the accident did not arise out of his employment. It was observed as follows: "Now, here, the association of the accident with the employment is not established. There is no evidence to show that Kalu got heart disease as a result of the work he was engaged in, in the course of his employment. There is also nothing to show that the heart attack was due to an exceptional strain of work that Kalu did on the day in question. In the absence of such evidence, it must be held that Kalu died as a natural result of the disease from which he was suffering and it he so died, then it could not be said that his death was caused by an accident arising out of his employment. All that is Mown in the instant case is that Kalu died of heart failure dur­ing his employment and that he was suffering from heart disease. All that is Mown in the instant case is that Kalu died of heart failure dur­ing his employment and that he was suffering from heart disease. This is not sufficient to show that he died of heart disease to which his employment was a contributing factor. In my opinion, in the material on record, it is impossible to attribute the death of Kalu to injury by accident arising out of his employment." (40) The three cases below were decided by the Born-bay High Court. In Bai Diva Kaluji v. Silver Cotton Mills Ltd., AIR 1956 Bom 424 the High Court held that where a workman suffering from heart disease after working for eight hours on a hot day in a mill died, then it was proper to hold that he died of injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. (41) In Bhagubai v. General Manager, Central Railway, (S) AIR 1955 Bom 105 the High Court held that once an applicant proved that the deceased was at a particular place and he was there because he had to be there by reason of his employment and it was further established that because he was there he met with an accident, he had discharged the burden which the law placed upon him. The peril which the employee faced must not be something personal, but must be incidental to his employment, it must not be an added peril brought about by the work­man (vide Gouri Kinkar v. Mrs. Radha Kissen Cotton Mills, AIR 1933 Cal 220.) (42) In Munshi and Co. v. Yeshwant Tukaram, AIR 1348 Bom 44 the workman was employed in a godown. As a result of an explosion the wall suddenly collapsed and a hot plate of metal got into what was left of the go-down and hit the workman's leg. The High Court held that the accident arose out of the employment of the workman as the risk of such an accident had been, even before the accident, inherent in the employment itself to a greater or lesser extent. (43) In Nawab Ali v. Hanuman Jute Mill, AIR 1933 Cal 513 it was held by the Calcutta High Court that the question as to whether the accident arose out of the employment could not be determined on any general view of facts. It depended on the facts of each particular case. (43) In Nawab Ali v. Hanuman Jute Mill, AIR 1933 Cal 513 it was held by the Calcutta High Court that the question as to whether the accident arose out of the employment could not be determined on any general view of facts. It depended on the facts of each particular case. But there was one test which was always application was it part of the injured person's employment to hazard, to suffer or to do which caused his injury, (n this case a workman employed by the respondent Mill alleged that he received an injury while tightening on a slack ring in a wheel in the Filter Rovines Department where he was employed. It was, however, found that the workman received the injury while he put his hand in the gearing box of the machine to take out a tool and thereby took unnecessary risk. It was held that the accident did not arise out of his employment. (44) In Laxmibai Atmaram v. Chairman and Trustess Bombay Port Trust, AIR 1954 Bom 180 a night watchman died of a heart attack and the medical evidence showed (hat he was suffering from heart disease and the death was brought about by the strain caused by the deceased being on his legs for a certain period of time. The Bombay High Court held that the deceased died of an accident arising out of his employment. (45) It has been held in a number of cases that an accident arises out of employment when there is causal connection between the accident and the workman's duties i.e. there must be some nexus between the death and the work that the workman had to perform, vide Bai Sakri v. New Manekchowk Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1931 Guj 34; AIR 1961 Andh Pra 15; AIR 1952 Andh Pra 42; Federa­tion of Labour Co-operative Ltd. v. S. Baliah, AIR 1362 Andh Pra 69. (46) From the above cases it will appear that there were two classes of cases in which it was held that the accident arose out of the employment. Firstly, there were cases in which the accident directly arose out of the employment i.e. there was a causal relation between the accident and the employment. Thus where the night watch­man died of heart attack brought about by the exertion of being on his legs for a long time, the employment caused the heart attack. Firstly, there were cases in which the accident directly arose out of the employment i.e. there was a causal relation between the accident and the employment. Thus where the night watch­man died of heart attack brought about by the exertion of being on his legs for a long time, the employment caused the heart attack. Secondly, there were cases in which the risk of the accident was inherent in the employ­ment, though such risk might be remote. Thus for a work­man who worked inside a Factory there was the risk that the roof might fall. For a porter whose employment necessitated his going into the street, there was the risk of road accident. But in a case where the accident is not incidental to the employment at all, it does not arise out of the employment. Thus in Craske v. Wigan, 19U9-2 KB 635 when a lady's maid in course of her employment was sewing in her employer's nursery, which was lighted by electric light, a cockchafer flew into the room by an open window and so alarmed her that she involuntarily struck her eye with her hand and permanently injured her eye-sight, it was held that the accident did not arise out of her employment. The risk was in no way incidental to the employment of the lady's maid. The risk was in no way incidental to the employment of the lady's maid. The following obser­vation made by Cozens-Hardy M. R. may be noted viz: "I think it would be dangerous to depart from that which, so far as I am aware, has been the invariable rule of the Court of Appeal since these Acts came into opera­tion, namely, to hold that it is not enough for the applicant to say "The accident would not have happened if I had not teen engaged in that employment or if I had not in that particular place." He must go further and must say "The accident arose because of something I was doing in the course of my employment or because I was exposed by the nature of my employment to some peculiar danger." Unless something of that kind is established the applicant must fail." (47) There is no absolute certainty whether the work­man in the present case had a fall and consequently had a heart attack, or the heart attack creceded a fall, in such d case it cannot be said to have been proved that the accident arose out of the employment of the workman. In Messrs Steel Products Ltd. v. Amelda, AIR 1951 Cal 145 the workman was a Fitter employed by the appellants. He was sent to the Writers Buildings to repair the handle of an almirah. After measuring something of the almirah the workman went outside apparently to start the work. It was not known what he was doing outside, but was found loaming at the mouth. There was no direct evidence that he fell. But it could not be said that lie did not. It was thought that he did fall. But whether the fall preceded the attack of cerebral haemorrhage and thrombosis, or whe­ther the attack of cerebral haemorrhage and thrombosis caused the fall, it was utterly impossible to say. It was held by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that in such a case it was not established that the death was due to accident arising out of and in course of employment. In the present case even if Haradhan had a fall it is not possible to say quite definitely whether the fall preceded ' the heart attack of the workman or that he fell down as. a result of the heart attack. In the present case even if Haradhan had a fall it is not possible to say quite definitely whether the fall preceded ' the heart attack of the workman or that he fell down as. a result of the heart attack. The preponderance of evi­dence, however, goes to show that the heart attack preceded the fall, if the deceased actually fell down. Only one wit-1 ness deposed that he saw Haradhan falling down. This witness said that he was one of the persons who took. Haradhan later to the hospital. But this witness did not see any injury on the person of Haradhan. Nor did ha say that Haradhan complained of .any fall. On the other hand D. W. 1 Satish Chandra Seal and D.W. 2 Rambanadur deposed that Haradhan told them that he was feeling breathing difficulties. (48) D. W. 1 Satish deposed that he asked Haradhan it he had a fall or accident but Haradhan replied in the negative and said that he suddenly felt unwell. (49) According to his wife the deceased was a healthy, man. Such a man must have a very heavy fall if any fall was to cause any heart attack. But the absence of any j external injury showed that the deceased could not possibly have a fall which caused a heart attack. On the other; hand, instances are not rare when a person without any previous complaint suddenly has a heart attack. Had the deceased slipped or stumbled on something and had a fall which caused the heart attack, it could be said that the heart attack arose out of his employment. But there is no evidence to support such a presumption. The evidence goes to show that the heart attack preceded the fall, it there was a fall at all. (50) In such circumstances, the heart attack of the, workman in the present case cannot be associated in any! v way with his employment. (51) There is nothing to show that the employment caused any kind of exhaustion which caused the heart attack. There is a suggestion that when the deceased was inform­ed that the fan stopped, he hurried to start it and the heart attack was caused by excitement and alarm. It is true, that P. W. 2 Macca deposed that the stoppage of the fans, meant stoppage of air inside the mines and the workers there might die. There is a suggestion that when the deceased was inform­ed that the fan stopped, he hurried to start it and the heart attack was caused by excitement and alarm. It is true, that P. W. 2 Macca deposed that the stoppage of the fans, meant stoppage of air inside the mines and the workers there might die. But at the same time he added that about 10 or 15 minutes after Haradhan went to start the fans he noticed that the fans were not running and after half an hour he saw Haradhan being carried away. There is nothing to show that anybody became suffocated in the mine al­though the fans were not started. D. W. 2 Ram Bahadur deposed that he informed Haradhan about 10 minutes after the fans stopped. This also shows that the stoppage of the fans was nothing serious. Hence there could be no necessity for Haradhan to get excited or alarmed at the stoppage of the fans. (52) There is also no proof that the risk of a heart attack was even remotely inherent in the type of work in which he was engaged. The deceased, in other words, was not exposed to the risk of a heart attack by the nature of his work. In the result it cannot be said that the; accident arose out of the employment of the workman, j The appeal should, therefore, be allowed and the order for compensation set aside. (53) Per curiam : In view of the decision of the majority, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.