JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. This writ petition was heard by me on a former occasion and 1 proceeded on the basis that the claim of the landlord for eviction of the respondent from his holding will have to be considered in the light of the provisions contained in section 11(4) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959, Act XVI of 1959. 2. At that time, Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that on a strict construction of section 11(4) it will be seen that there is nothing to indicate in order to enable a landlord to ask for eviction that the subletting must have occured after the coming into force of Kerala Act XVI of 1959. At this stage I may mention that both the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority have agreed with the contentions of the landlord and granted the eviction as asked for by him. But the learned District Judge in exercise of his revisional powers has disagreed with the views expressed by the subordinate authorities. The learned District Judge was of the view that the provisions of the Madras Act in question must be considered to be contained in a temporary enactment and as the temporary enactment itself has ceased to be in force by the repeal made by the Kerala Act XVI of 1959 during the pendency of the proceedings the landlord has no further rights to rely upon the provisions of that statute. Therefore, the learned District Judge proceeds on the basis that the claim of the landlord will have to be considered only under section 11(4) of the Kerala Act. 3. In considering this question, the learned District Judge is of the view that on a construction of the said section 11(4) it must be held that unless there is a subletting after the coming into force of Kerala Act XVI of 1959, no right is recognised in the landlord to ask for eviction and in this view the learned District Judge reversed the orders of both the appellate authority as well as the Rent Controller. 4. As I mentioned earlier, on the former occasion, I was prepared to proceed on the basis that the view of the learned District Judge regarding the effect of the repeal of the Madras Act is correct. 4. As I mentioned earlier, on the former occasion, I was prepared to proceed on the basis that the view of the learned District Judge regarding the effect of the repeal of the Madras Act is correct. But in considering the question as to whether the interpretation placed upon section 11(4) of the Kerala Act by the learned District Judge that the sub-section gives a right to the landlord to apply for eviction only if the subletting has occured after the coming into force of this statute, I accepted the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar that there is no warranty for such an interpretation being placed under section 11(4) of the Act, I considered sub-s.4 of section 11 of the Kerala Act has being unlimited and unqualified in its operation and in this view I held that inasmuch as there is nothing to indicate that the Legislature intended to give a right to a landlord to ask for eviction only if the subletting has occurred after the date of coming into force of the Kerala Act, I accepted the contention of Mr. Gopalan Nambiar and reversed the order of the learned District Judge as admittedly in this case according to the findings of all the Tribunals there has been a subletting of the premises after 23rd October 1945 so as to entitle the landlord to get an eviction on that basis. 5. Subsequent to my decision, it is brought to my notice by both the learned counsel that by some oversight the amendment effected to section 11(4) of the Act by the Kerala Act XXIX of 1961 has not been brought to my notice. As I was satisfied that it is due to a bona fide mistake I have permitted the learned counsel to re-argue this matter in the light of the provisions contained in the Amending Act, XXIX of 1961. 6. Kerala Act XXIX of 1961 amends the provisions of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959. Sub-section 2 of Section 1 makes it clear that the amendment effected therein should be deemed to have come into force on 3rd April, 1959 i. e., when the main statute itself came into force. In particular section 5 clause (iii) of the Amending Act effects certain amendments to section 11(4) of the Kerala Act. Sub-section 2 of Section 1 makes it clear that the amendment effected therein should be deemed to have come into force on 3rd April, 1959 i. e., when the main statute itself came into force. In particular section 5 clause (iii) of the Amending Act effects certain amendments to section 11(4) of the Kerala Act. For clause (1) of sub-section (4) of section 11, a new clause is introduced to the effect that "if the tenant after the commencement of this Act without the consent of the landlord, -transfers his right under the lease or sublets the entire building or any portion thereof, if the lease does not confer on him any right to do so". Therefore, it will be seen that the amendment effected to sub-section (4) of section 11 by making it very clear that the tenant after the commencement of the statute, namely. 3-4-1959, should have transferred his rights without the consent of the landlord and under the circumstances mentioned therein alone will give a right to a landlord to ask for eviction and read with sub-section 2 of section 1 this amendment should be considered to have been part of the statute from the very date the latter came into force, namely, 3rd April 1959. If this had been brought to my notice at that time it would have been unnecessary for me to consider the nature of the construction to be put on section 11(4). In view of the fact that this really alters the nature of the decision to be rendered in this writ petition I have reviewed my judgment rendered already on 27th February 1962. 7. Therefore, it is clear that the landlord is not entitled to ask for eviction under section 11(4) of the Kerala Act inasmuch as admittedly there has been no transfer of the rights by the tenant after the date of the commencement of the statute, that is, 3-4-1959. 8. Therefore, faced with this difficulty Mr. 7. Therefore, it is clear that the landlord is not entitled to ask for eviction under section 11(4) of the Kerala Act inasmuch as admittedly there has been no transfer of the rights by the tenant after the date of the commencement of the statute, that is, 3-4-1959. 8. Therefore, faced with this difficulty Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar, learned counsel, relied upon the provisions of section 33(1) of the main Act and according to the learned counsel the view of the learned District Judge that section 6 of the General Clauses Act does not apply to temporary enactments is not valid and the learned counsel also urged that the test to be applied is not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities or whether the new Act manifests an intention to destroy them. So far as this proposition of law is concerned, learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Punjab v Mohar Singh (A. I. R. 1955 S. C. 84). So far as the proposition of law stated by the learned counsel is concerned, there can be no controversy because it is certainly laid down in this decision that when there is a repeal of an enactment the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears and the learned Judges also say that in the case of a simple repeal there is no room for the expression of a contrary opinion. The learned Judges further say that when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The learned Judges also say that the line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities, but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. 9. It is upon these observations of the Supreme Court that the learned Counsel urges that section 33(1) of the Act clearly indicates that far from attempting to destroy the rights of persons like the petitioner who have already taken action under the provisions of the Madras Act, there is a clear indication in section 33(1) of the legislation preserving all those rights. 10. 10. On the other hand, Mr. D. A. Krishna Warrier, learned counsel for the respondent tenant, has drawn my attention to the different phraseology used in section 33(1) and section 33(2) to show that section 33(1) on the basis of which action has been taken under the enactment referred to therein and which rights are also recognised in the new enactment enables the parties concerned to continue those proceedings under the new Act also and the learned counsel placed considerable reliance on sub-section 2 of section 33 wherein, according to the learned counsel, notwithstanding the fact that there may be some contradiction between the enactment referred to therein and the new Act, nevertheless the Legislature categorically recognises all actions and decisions arrived at on the basis of the enactment referred to therein in respect of fixation of fair rent. 11. In my view, the contentions of Mr. D. A. Krishna Warrier will have to be accepted and more especially because of the manner in which sub-section 1 and sub-section 2 of section 33 have been worded. 12. In my view, sub-section (1) of section 33 will not give assistance to Mr. Gopalan Nambiar in his contention that the Legislature has clearly made the provisions of the Kerala Act retrospective and also preserved the rights of persons like the petitioner who have already taken action under the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949. In fact the expression used in section 33(1) is "so far as may be" and that is very significant. So that only in respect of rights or matters which are already dealt with in the enactment in question and also identically recognised under the new enactment, there is a preservation of those rights which have been taken under the earlier enactment referred to in section 33(1) and Mr. D. A. Krishna Warrier is also well founded in his contention that the Legislature by express words in sub-section (2) of section 33 has clearly recognised only to a qualified extent in section 33(1) actions or decisions already arrived at and based on enactments referred to therein. D. A. Krishna Warrier is also well founded in his contention that the Legislature by express words in sub-section (2) of section 33 has clearly recognised only to a qualified extent in section 33(1) actions or decisions already arrived at and based on enactments referred to therein. Therefore, I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that section 33(1) of the Kerala Act has preserved the rights of the petitioner which have already accrued to him under the Madras enactment to ask for eviction on the ground that there has been a subletting after 23rd October 1945, though the subletting which is required to found a cause of action under the Kerala Act should have been after the coming into force of the Kerala Act. 13. On these grounds, though for reasons entirely different from those given by the District Judge, ultimately I agree with the conclusions arrived at by the Revisional authority. Therefore, the writ petition fails and the judgment already delivered by me will stand cancelled. There will be no order as to costs.