This revision has been preferred against the appellate judgment of the Collector, Tonk dated 24.3.61 by which he has accepted the appeal preferred by the opposite party against the order of the Tehsildar Malpura dated 10.8.60 and amended the right of way allowed to the applicants u/s 251 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955(hereinafter referred to as the Act) to be confined to only human beings walking on foot, disallowing the same to the passage of bullock-carts, etc. The trial court decided the case on 10.8.60 and the first appellate court also on 24.3.61 as stated above. Sec. 251 of the Act had not been amended till then. It is an agreed position between the parties and has been also verified from the record. The amendment came in April, 1961. It would, therefore be Sec. 251 as it stood before its being amended by the Rajasthan Tenancy Amendment Act, 1961 (Act No. XII of 61) that would govern the present case. The section reads as follows:— "251—Rights of way and other private easements: (1) In the event of a dispute arising as to the route by which a holder of land shall have access to his fields otherwise than by the recognised roads, paths, or common land including roads and paths mentioned as such in the settlement records (or as to the waste or pasture lands of the village) or as to the course or source by which he may avail himself of water to which he is entitled from a tank well or other source, the Tehsildar may on application after local enquiry decide the matter with reference to the previous custom in each case and with due regard to the convenience of all parties concerned. This will mean that in the event of a dispute arising as to route for access to a field by the holder of a land the Tehsildar will decide the matter after local enquiry with reference to the previous custom in each case and with due regard to the convenience of all parties concerned. This section has come for examination by the Rajasthan High Court in Civil Misc. Writ application No 131 of 1957 decided on 20.8.59 Mahendra Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan reported at 1960 RRD 118. This section has come for examination by the Rajasthan High Court in Civil Misc. Writ application No 131 of 1957 decided on 20.8.59 Mahendra Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan reported at 1960 RRD 118. It has been laid down by Their Lordships therein that the first question to which the Tehsildar had to address himself in an enquiry under this section is whether the person applying has a right of way and having found that he has such a right only it is to be determined how it should be exercised having regard to the previous custom and convenience of all parties concerned. The question of the custom and the convenience of the parties, it has been observed, become relevant only for determining the mode of enjoyment of the right and not for the determination of the right itself. The right is to be determined, it has been laid down on the basis of the law of the land relating to easements alone. In the instant case both the learned courts below found that the right of way existed in favour of the applicants and that is not being questioned nor can it be questioned, in this revision. The learned Tehsildar after inspecting the site and examining the case from all points of view came to the conclusion that the applicants could be allowed to exercise the right of way as decided by him unfettered in any way and the only condition laid down by him was that they would make the passage of the receipt of water into the fields over the "pal" on which the disputed way passes at his own cost. The learned Collector has also seen the site and made a detailed examination of the condition of the spot and then taken into consideration the previous custom as well as the convenience of the parties. As already stated the dispute is about the place where a "pal" (embankment) has been constructed by the opposite party over fields. He has taken into consideration these factors as well as the necessity and convenience of the parties and has ordered that the right of way shall be restricted only to persons walking on foot. It has been contended on behalf of the applicants that the learned Collector has committed an illegality and material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction in doing so. It has been contended on behalf of the applicants that the learned Collector has committed an illegality and material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction in doing so. The argument is that when the right of way had been granted to the applicants by the learned Tehsildar and the learned Collector has also come to the conclusion agreeing with the Tehsildar that the right of way did exist he had no authority to place any restrictions thereon and reduce the utility of the orders passed by the Tehsildar. It is urged that this was done because the opposite party (appellant before him) made application praying that he will have no objection if the passage was confined to the people coming on foot. On this ground it is urged that the learned Collector should have decided the case on merits and not been influenced by this prayer and amended the order of the Tehsildar. The question for determination therefore, will not be as has been urged by the learned counsel for the applicants whether the learned Collector committed an illegality or irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction but whether he had the jurisdiction to pass the order that he has done and make an amendment in the order taken in appeal to him. That this jurisdiction did vest in the Collector is not denied on behalf of the applicants. What is contended is only that he should not have exercised the jurisdiction in this manner. Certainly this is not a point on the mode of the exercising of the jurisdiction. It is only a case of exercising the jurisdiction itself. As stated earlier the right of way having been determined as has been done in this case by both the lower courts concurrently the Tehsildar as well as the Collector as an appellate Court had to examine the question of custom and convenience of the parties regarding the mode of enjoyment thereof. What the learned Collector has done as is evident from the perusal of his order is that he has applied his own mind to the need of the convenience of the parties besides the customs itself and has come to an independent conclusion that having regard to the construction of a "pal" (embankment) by the opposite party the passage traffic other than persons walking on foot should not be allowed at the disputed place. The law did vest in the learned Collector the jurisdiction to take his own decision in this respect after considering all the facts before him. He had inspected the site and examined the whole position thereof independently. He had heard the parties and their counsel. He had even considered the convenience and inconvenience of the parties. He could not be called to have exceeded his jurisdiction or committed any illegality or irregularities in the exercise thereof when the question of the maintenance of the embankment was before him and the law authorised him to allow the right of way with due consideration of the previous custom as well as the convenience of the parties. We do not find any force in the contention raised on behalf of the applicants that he was influenced by the prayer made by the opposite party as an appellant before him. There is an endorsement on the petition submitted by the opposite party as appellant before him to verify its contents. This prayer has been mentioned in the judgment which is written on the Order sheet and in the presence of the parties and their counsel and after hearing them. The result of the inspection of site and the convenience and inconvenience to the parties under the changed circumstances (because of the construction of "pal") has also been discussed by him elaborately. As a court of revision we do not think we can make any interference in the order passed by the learned Collector. For, if we do it would be substituting a judgment of the learned Collector about the convenience of the parties by our own judgment, which certainly does not lie in the competence of a revising court besides there being no ground as discussed for our interference on the basis of excess of jurisdiction or irregularity or illegality in the exercise thereof. On the point of acting illegally or with material irregularity in this exercise of jurisdiction by a Court there is a leading case of the Rajasthan High Court Bhagirath Vs. Samdukhan reported at 1953 RLW 189. In that case the District Judge has chosen in appeal to interfere with an ex-parte order appointing an ad-interim receiver in a suit for rendering of accounts and dissolution of partnership. Samdukhan reported at 1953 RLW 189. In that case the District Judge has chosen in appeal to interfere with an ex-parte order appointing an ad-interim receiver in a suit for rendering of accounts and dissolution of partnership. The question for decision was whether an interference could be made under the provisions of Sec. 115(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure corresponding to Sec. 230(c) of the Act. The allegation was that the learned District Judge had referred to the material which came on the record after the passing of it. ft was also alleged that the learned District Judge had not applied his mind to all the points which had appealed to the Munsiff passing the order. His Lordship Wanchoo C. J. as he then was, having examined various authorities in this behalf observed :— "It is difficult to give an exhaustive list of cases where the court can be said to have acted illegally or with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction. But for practical purposes in cases where the procedure provided by law has not been followed or relevant provisions of an enactment are completely overlooked or the authority of the High Court as to what is the law is ignored or the court invents a fanciful rule and acts on its basis or acts in defiance of the admitted facts of the case or decides it against fundamental principles of judicial procedure or without applying its mind to the real point involved in the case or misapprehends the nature of the enquiry before it altogether, it can be said to be acting illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction if such acting has a material effect on the result of the proceeding." He did find in that case that learned District Judge had acted with material irregularity in the exercise or his jurisdiction by referring to the material which was not before the Munsif and by not directing to all the circumstances and held that therefore there was ground to interfere u/s 115(c) of the Code. But the interference was not deemed proper on the ground that more than a year had passed since the matter was decided by the District Judge and that in the peculiar circumstances of the case there did not remain any urgency then for the appointment of an ad interim receiver. But the interference was not deemed proper on the ground that more than a year had passed since the matter was decided by the District Judge and that in the peculiar circumstances of the case there did not remain any urgency then for the appointment of an ad interim receiver. On the basis of this authority it has been urged on behalf of the opposite party that vide Sec. 251(2) of the Act any party feeling aggrieved with the order passed under this section can go and have a right established by a regular suit in a competent civil court. The argument is that in the first place there had been committed irregularity of the type referred to by the learned C. J. and that even if it had been so done in view of the provisions of Sec. (2) referred to above the interference should not be made. Further, we have been referred to A.I.R. 1960 Allahabad 590 and on this authority it has been urged that an examination of the question of fact can be made by the revising court only in order to find out whether the subordinate court had or had not the jurisdiction to pass the order but not to set aside any wrong even though it may be perverse view of law or facts. The argument is that where a procedure has been prescribed and it has been followed even a wrong conclusion on facts cannot be interfered with in revision. Further we have been referred to A.I.R. 1953 Supreme Court 23 in which when the High Court set aside in revision the order of restoration passed by the subordinate courts in proceedings for execution and remanded the case to the executing court for re-consideration and disposal in accordance with the observation made in the order it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that when the executing court was satisfied that the dismissing of the execution on part satisfaction was bad it was justified in correcting the same under its inherent powers and that the High Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in entertaining the revision and setting aside that order. Both these rulings however do not appear to be quite relevant to the present case. Both these rulings however do not appear to be quite relevant to the present case. But it can be said on the basis of these authorities that if the subordinate court or officer has passed only an order which lay in his or its jurisdiction which did not in any manner result from the overlooking or not following of any law or procedure or was found to be based on any fanciful rule or in defiance of the admitted facts of the case not was found to have been passed without applying its mind to the real point involved in the case or under the misapprehension of the nature of the enquiry it cannot be said that there has been committed any illegality or irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. We have already discussed above that the learned Collector had the jurisdiction to examine the custom and convenience of the parties and to come to his own conclusion about the same. He could not, therefore be called to have acted illegally or with material irregularity in any manner whatsoever. In the result, there is no force in this revision and it fails.