Judgment :- 1. This second appeal arising in execution raises a short question whether a melvaram right is liable for attachment and sale in execution of a decree. The judgment debtor appellant unsuccessfully contended before the lower courts that it was not attachable because of S.60 (f) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The same contention is raised in second appeal as well. 2. Only two documents were marked in evidence before the lower courts, Ex. A-1 being a kanom document executed by the judgment debtor in favour of a third party and Ex. BI being the judgment of the Madras High Court in S. A. No. 1055 of 1894. No evidence appears to have been adduced to show the real nature of melvaram right; that is, whether it was a service tenure or not. Before me a certified copy of the judgment in O. S. No. 422 of 1892 on the file of the Court of the District Munsiff of Taliparamba, which ultimately went up to the High Court in S. A. No. 1055 of 1894. has been produced. That was a suit between the judgment-debtor's predecessor, i. e., the successor of the original grantee, and the successors of the original grantor of the melvaram right. In considering Issue No. 6 in that suit, namely, whether the latter were legally bound to pay the melvaram to the former, the learned District Munsiff held that the ancestors of the grantee were the Chief Feudatories under the Northern Kolathiries and as such they were at one time the protectors of trade and the guardians of peace. According to the learned District Munsiff the melvaram right was a service tenure for such services rendered by the grantee and his ancestors. Without pronouncing any final opinion regarding the origin of the melvaram right, I would accept this observation of the learned Munsiff and proceed to consider the question in dispute on the basis that the melvaram right involved in this case originated as a service tenure. 3. It is admitted that no service is being done now; and the point for consideration is whether that has any bearing on the question in dispute. 3. It is admitted that no service is being done now; and the point for consideration is whether that has any bearing on the question in dispute. There are decisions of the Privy Council to the effect that in the case of service tenures even if the services become obsolete, the grantor cannot resume the lands: see Alexander Jones Forbes v. Meer Mahomed Tuquee (13 M.I.A. 438) and Kooldeep Narain Singh v. The Government (14 M. I. A. 247). The underlying principle appears to be that in every case the right to resume must depend in a great measure upon the nature of the particular tenure or the terms of the particular grant; that there is a clear distinction between the grant of an estate burdened with a service and the grant of an office the performance of whose duties are remunerated by the use of certain lands; and that in the latter case the lands may be resumed if the duties need no longer be performed, but in the former the lands cannot be resumed even if the services become obsolete. For the sake of argument, I would accept that the melvaram involved in the case before me is a service tenure, which cannot be resumed even if the services have become obsolete. 4. Even then there is the further question as to what is the nature of the property covered by the grant after the services become obsolete. On this question also there is a decision of the Privy Council in Appayasami Naicker v. Midnapore Zamindari Company Ltd., (ILR. 44 M. 575). In that case a Palayam in the Madras District, which was originally held on military service tenure and subject to payment of a tribute to the Paramount Power, was involved. The military service was abolished by a proclamation in 1801 and in 1895 the Palayagar mortgaged the villages of the Palayam for debts incurred by him. In 1900 the villages were bought by the mortgagees in court sale and the Privy Council held, in those circumstances, that the Palayam villages were alienable since military service was abolished. This case was in appeal from a decision of the Madras High Court, which is reported in ILR. 41 Mad. at page 744. In 1900 the villages were bought by the mortgagees in court sale and the Privy Council held, in those circumstances, that the Palayam villages were alienable since military service was abolished. This case was in appeal from a decision of the Madras High Court, which is reported in ILR. 41 Mad. at page 744. It was held in that case that the lands held on service tenure were inalienable beyond the life-time of the holders; that when the holders were freed from the liability to perform the services, the reason for inalienability ceased; and that the land thereafter became subject to the ordinary laws of descent and became alienable for the debts of the holders or of previous holders so as to bind the successors. This proposition was accepted by the Privy Council in the decision given by them in appeal. 5. The learned advocate of the appellant contends that once the tenure originated as a service tenure, thereafter at no stage, even after the services have become obsolete, can the property change its character and become either alienable or attachable and saleable. In support of this proposition he cites two old decisions of the Bombay High Court, namely, Govind Lakshman Joshi v. Ramakrishna Hari Joshi (ILR.12 Bom. 366) and Rajaram v. Ganesh (ILR. 23 Bom.131). The former ruled that johshi vrilli, being a right to receive certain emoluments as a reward for personal service, was not liable to attachment under the Code of Civil Procedure; and the latter held that a vrilli could not be sold in execution of a decree, because such compulsory alienation was opposed to the Hindu Law and Public Policy and was also against the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Both these decisions do not lay down that even after the services become obsolete, the property covered by the service grant retains its original character. As a matter of fact, the discussion of Ranade J. at p. 135 of the reports in the second case shows that the reason for the decision was that compulsory sales might transfer the property to persons disqualified to perform the duties of the office and in the case of private alienations such objection did not hold equally good and therefore private alienations were not absolutely prohibited. This reasoning itself shows that once the services become obsolete and the need to perform them vanishes, the necessity for inalienability also disappears and the property thereafter becomes ordinary property subject to the ordinary laws of alienation, succession etc. Therefore, this contention cannot stand. 6. In this case, to cap, the judgment-debtor himself has treated the property as alienable, because he has executed a kanom document Ex. A-1 regarding the property. But the argument on the appellant's side is that even though the property is subject to private alienation, it is not liable to. compulsory sale through court. This contention, I have already pointed out, is baseless and unwarranted in the light of the decisions already discussed. 7. The result is, the second appeal fails and is dismissed. But in the circumstances, I do not pass any order regarding costs. Dismissed.