JUDGMENT : P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. 1. Two items of dispute were referred by the Governor of Punjab for industrial adjudication by the Labour Court between the respondent, Rohtak General Transport Co., and the appellants, its employees. These two items were in respect of action taken by the respondent in retrenching Mr Narayan Das (driver) and in not giving duty to Mr Ram Nivas. Before the Labour Court, the respondent raised a preliminary objection that the reference was incompetent inasmuch as the dispute referred for adjudication, was an individual dispute and not an industrial dispute. This argument was based on the assumption that the dispute in question had not been sponsored by the majority of the workmen concerned. In respect of this plea, parties led some oral evidence and filed statements to which we will presently refer. After considering the evidence led on the point, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the case of the two workmen had been espoused only by five members out of the total strength of about 25 or so, and so the dispute raised on behalf of the said two workmen could not be said to be an industrial dispute. The Labour Court took the view that unless a particular dispute referred for adjudication, was sponsored by a substantial section of the workmen, it could not be said to amount to an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). On this finding, the Labour Court refused to deal with the merits of the dispute. It is against this decision that the appellants have come to this Court by special leave. 2. On behalf of the appellants, it has been urged that the view taken by the Labour Court that no dispute can be treated as an industrial dispute unless a substantial section of the workmen has sponsored it, is inconsistent with the decision of this Court in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Workmen. 1960(3) SCR 157 at 160. 2. On behalf of the appellants, it has been urged that the view taken by the Labour Court that no dispute can be treated as an industrial dispute unless a substantial section of the workmen has sponsored it, is inconsistent with the decision of this Court in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Workmen. 1960(3) SCR 157 at 160. In that case, this Court observed: "...both logic and fair play would justify the conclusion that it is open to a minority of workmen or a minority union to terminate the award by which they, along with other employees, are bound just as much as it is open to them to raise an industrial dispute under the Act." Therefore, the appellants contend that the only reason given by the Labour Court for holding that the reference was invalid, is contrary to law as declared by this Court, and so the dispute must be sent back to the Labour Court for disposal in accordance with law. It is not disputed by the respondent that the finding recorded by the Labour Court would not justify the ultimate decision of the Labour Court that the reference was invalid. 3. It is, however, urged that there is nothing on the record to show that even a minority of workmen had sponsored the present dispute before the reference in question was made, and reliance has been placed on a subsequent decision of this Court in Bombay Union of Journalists v. Hindu Bombay, 1961(2) LLJ 436 . In that case, this Court held that before a dispute could be regarded as an industrial dispute under the Act, it must be shown that the said dispute had been duly sponsored before the reference was made. Two aspects of this problem were noticed by this Court in that case. The first aspect was that if a reference is made in regard to an industrial dispute which had been duly sponsored by workmen before the date of reference, it would not become invalid merely because subsequent to the date of reference, the majority of workmen dissociated themselves from the dispute and refused to sponsor it any longer. The first aspect was that if a reference is made in regard to an industrial dispute which had been duly sponsored by workmen before the date of reference, it would not become invalid merely because subsequent to the date of reference, the majority of workmen dissociated themselves from the dispute and refused to sponsor it any longer. In other words, if a dispute is sponsored by workmen and the reference follows, the dispute which was an industrial dispute at the date of the reference, does not cease to be an industrial dispute, merely because it has lost the sympathy of the workmen thereafter. The other aspect of the problem was whether a dispute which is referred for adjudication without being sponsored by workmen, can be treated as validly referred, merely because subsequent to the reference, it happens to be sponsored by the workmen; and it was held that subsequent sponsoring of the dispute would not retrospectively validate the reference, and the test to apply in each case, would be: "had the dispute been sponsored by the workmen before it was referred for adjudication"? It is on this decision that Mr D.D. Sharma for the respondent very strongly relies and contends that at best, the evidence on which the appellants rely, would show that five workmen had supported the raising of the dispute after the reference was made. The argument is that such subsequent sponsoring of the dispute cannot make the reference valid. 4. In dealing with this argument, it would be necessary to refer to the relevant evidence on the record. But before referring to that evidence, we ought to point out that the Labour Court's finding is clear. The finding is that the case of the two workmen had been espoused only by five members out of 22. In other words, having regard to the words used by the Labour Court in recording its finding, it does not appear that it had been urged before the Labour Court that the five members espoused the cause of the two workmen not before the date of the reference but subsequent to it. Now, it appears that at the trial before the Labour Court, both parties agreed that Ex. M/1 and Ex. W/l might be admitted in evidence to prove whether or not the workmen named therein espoused the cause of either party. Now, it appears that at the trial before the Labour Court, both parties agreed that Ex. M/1 and Ex. W/l might be admitted in evidence to prove whether or not the workmen named therein espoused the cause of either party. Accordingly, the two documents were filed and they showed that whereas 14 members did not espouse the cause of the wordmen, seven did. Among the seven, are the two workmen concerned, so that looking at the two documents themselves, fourteen did not espouse the cause of the two workmen, and five did. The document which shows that five workmen espoused the cause, says that at a meeting held on 25-5-1960, it was unanimously agreed that the case of Mr Narayan Das which was pending in the Labour Court, should be vigorously prosecuted. All the workmen, who put their signatures to the document, were of the opinion that injustice was being done to Mr Narayan Das. Mr Sharma contends that the meeting to which the document refers, took place on 25-5-1960, whereas the reference was made on 21-3-1960, and he urges that whatever the meeting may have decided on 25-5-1950, cannot reasonably lead to the inference that the workmen who signed the document, attended the meeting and passed the resolution, had supported the cause of the workmen prior to 21-3-1960. Prima facie, there is some force in this argument. But on the other hand, we must look at the substance of the matter in dealing with the present technical objection taken by the respondent against the competency of the reference. The resolution to which the document refers, shows that the parties agreed to prosecute the reference vigorously, and that does not necessarily rule out the appellants' case that a they had already espoused the cause, they decided to prosecute the reference vigorously before the Labour Court. If this aspect of the matter had been specifically raised before the Labour Court, it would have been possible for the appellants to examine the five workmen in question and give them a chance to state that they had espoused the present cause before the date of the reference. The five workmen did not step into the witness box for the reason that the parties agreed that whoever opposed or espoused the cause, should sign the document and that the two documents should be admitted in evidence. The five workmen did not step into the witness box for the reason that the parties agreed that whoever opposed or espoused the cause, should sign the document and that the two documents should be admitted in evidence. Therefore, we think it would be unreasonable to treat the relevant documents too technically and to seek to construe them as if they included statutory provisions. 5. Besides, it appears that before the reference was made, the cause of the two workmen had been taken up by the Hissar District Transport Workers Union. A demand notice had in fact been served on 1-12-1959, by this Union. If the respondent had raised the argument that even a minority of workmen have not espoused the cause before the date of reference, it would has been open to the appellants to lead evidence to show that the Union which served the demand notice, was under the Act, entitled to act on behalf of the workmen. This course was not adopted by the appellants, because the narrow point on which the parties appear to have been at issue before the Labour Court, was that the cause of the two workmen had not been espoused by a majority of workmen and so the reference was invalid. It is true that Mr Sharma is now able to raise the present point because of the subsequent decision of this Court in the case of the Bombay Union of Journalists v. Hindu, Bombay, 1961(2) LLJ 436 ; but before this point is decided in favour of the respondent, it would be obviously necessary to give the appellants a chance to prove that their cause had been espoused by the five workmen before the date of the reference. We do not think that interests of justice require that we should allow this issue to be reagitated and send the matter back with a direction that the parties should lead evidence in support of their respective contentions. After all, a technical point was raised against the competency of the reference on a very narrow ground, and on that narrow ground, the appellants are entitled to succeed even if the finding of the Labour Court is accepted. After all, a technical point was raised against the competency of the reference on a very narrow ground, and on that narrow ground, the appellants are entitled to succeed even if the finding of the Labour Court is accepted. We are, therefore, satisfied that Mr Sharma is not entitled to contend now that the documents on the record do not support the conclusion that the cause of the two workmen had been espoused before the date of reference. 6. Mr Sharma, no doubt, contended that the oral evidence showed that the persons who had espoused the cause before the date of reference, were different from those who had signed the document, Ex. W/1, but if it had become necessary for the appellants to prove that the workmen, who had signed the said document, had espoused the cause even before the date of reference, the appellants would have examined the said workmen, and, they did not do, because it was not the respondent's contention before the Labour Court that the espousal of the cause was subsequent and not prior to the reference. 7. In the result, we hold that the Labour Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the reference was bad and the dispute was not an industrial dispute because only a minority of workmen had espoused the cause in question. The appeal, accordingly, succeeds. The finding made by the Labour Court is set aside, and the matter is sent back to the Labour Court for disposal in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.