Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala — 1962 DIGILAW 95 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. In this writ petition, Mr. P. Subramanian Potti, learned counsel for the petitioner, challenges the disciplinary proceedings initiated as against his client and which culminated in the order Ext. P-11 passed by the respondent, State. 2. Ext. P.11 is dated 15th October 1960. By that order, the petitioner's services as part-time lecturer in the Law College, Trivandrum stood terminated with effect from 29-1-1960 viz., the date on which he was placed under suspension, pending inquiry. 3. The very large attack that has been made against the proceedings by Mr. P. Subramanian Potti, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that even assuming that the petitioner is a Government servant, subject to the disciplinary control of the Government, and conceding the jurisdiction of the Government to take disciplinary action also, the proceedings in this case do not satisfy the requirement of reasonable opportunity, guaranteed to persons, like the petitioner, under Art.311 of the Constitution. 4. No doubt, there are several other grounds raised in the writ petition, with which also I will deal with later in this judgment. 5. The circumstances under which the writ petition has been filed may be briefly stated. 6. The petitioner along with two others, was appointed as part-time lecturer in the Law College, Trivandrum under Ext. P.1 dated 17-1-1959. The appointment order was to have effect till the end of the academic year 1959-1960. 7. Under Ext. P-2 dated 30-1-1960, the State Government state that it has been brought to its notice that the petitioner who is a part-time lecturer in the Law College, Trivandrum is canvassing on behalf of certain candidates in the elections that were about to take place and is collecting subscriptions for a political party, in contravention of the provisions of R.67 and 69 read with R.73 of the Kerala Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1960. Under Ext. P2 the State Government places the petitioner under suspension forthwith, pending an inquiry into his conduct. 8. The petitioner, on receipt of Ext. P2 sends an explanatory statement evidenced by Ext. P3 dated 5-2-1960. In Ext. P3 the petitioner states that the allegations contained in Ext. P2 are all unfounded and factually incorrect. He further avers that he is an Advocate practising at Trivandrum and his service with the Government is only a part-time one and that as an Advocate he is entitled to practise and even appear against Government. P3 dated 5-2-1960. In Ext. P3 the petitioner states that the allegations contained in Ext. P2 are all unfounded and factually incorrect. He further avers that he is an Advocate practising at Trivandrum and his service with the Government is only a part-time one and that as an Advocate he is entitled to practise and even appear against Government. He also states that he appeared on behalf of Sri Veli K. Krishnan Nair, a candidate in the election from Trivandrum - I constituency, for scrutiny of the nomination paper etc. The petitioner further states that the appearance made on behalf of the said person was only till the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1960 came into force. At this stage it may be mentioned that the Government Servants' Conduct R.1960, according to the petitioner, came into force from 12-1-1960. The petitioner further states that after the date of coming into force of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, he has not been actively participating in any work in connection with election and he also controverts the allegation of collecting subscription for any political party and of canvassing for any candidate. 9. Ext. P3 the petitioner again states that he is advised that as the Kerala Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1960 came into force only long after his appointment as part-time lecturer and as his service was purely contractual for an academic year, he will not be governed by the said Rules. Nevertheless, he proceeds to state that he did not want to violate the provisions of the rules, even though the question whether the Kerala Government Servants' Conduct Rules applied to him, was doubtful. 10. The petitioner winds up Ext. P3 stating that he was not given an occasion to explain matters before the order of suspension under Ext. P2 was passed. He finally makes a request to the State Government to reconsider the position and cancel the order of suspension, taking into consideration the various matters mentioned by him in Ext. P3. 11. Under Ext. P3 stating that he was not given an occasion to explain matters before the order of suspension under Ext. P2 was passed. He finally makes a request to the State Government to reconsider the position and cancel the order of suspension, taking into consideration the various matters mentioned by him in Ext. P3. 11. Under Ext. P4 dated 9-2-1960, the State frames three charges and communicates the same to the petitioner, and they are: (i) that he, as a part-time Government servant took part in politics by canvassing on behalf of the Communist candidates in the recent general elections in the State; (ii) that he collected subscriptions for the Communist Party; and (iii) that he used to attend all District Committee meetings of the Communist Party. The State Government finally directed the petitioner to explain within seven days from the receipt of Ext. P-4, as to why his services as part-time lecturer in the Law College, Trivandrum should not be terminated. 12. It should be noted that there is no indication in Ext. P.4 that the Government, at any rate at that stage, contemplated any inquiry as against the petitioner, though in Ext. P.2 it is categorically stated that the petitioner is placed under suspension pending an inquiry into his conduct. Ext. P4 proceeds on the basis that if the explanation that the petitioner may furnish to the charges levelled against him under Ext. P4 are not acceptable, then the Government have got a right and also the power to terminate his services as part-time lecturer in the Law College. 13. By the time Ext. P4 was issued, the elections appear to have already taken place. From the three charges framed under Ext. P4 it will be seen that the State Government is of the view that the petitioner has contravened the provisions of R.67 and 69, read with R.73 of the Kerala Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1960. 14. The petitioner sends the reply Ext. P5 dated 10-2-1960, stating that the charges that have been levelled against him, are not sustainable in law and are against true facts. He also avers that as part-time lecturer in the Law College, he has not taken part in politics by canvassing on behalf of the Communist candidates as stated in charge 1 of Ext. P4. He also controverts the allegation that he has been participating in any work in connection with the election. He also avers that as part-time lecturer in the Law College, he has not taken part in politics by canvassing on behalf of the Communist candidates as stated in charge 1 of Ext. P4. He also controverts the allegation that he has been participating in any work in connection with the election. Regarding charge 2, he states that it is incorrect that he has collected any subscriptions on behalf of the Communist Party in connection with the recent elections. Charge 3 is also controverted by the petitioner. He states that this charge is also incorrect and that he has neither attended nor taken part in any of the District Committee meetings of the communist party. 15. The petitioner again states in Ext. P5 that the Kerala Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1960 came into operation only subsequent to his appointment and as his service was purely contractual, he is not governed by the said rules. Then he states that he has not violated any of the provisions of the said rules, even on the basis that the rules apply to persons, like the petitioner. He expresses the grievance that the order of suspension, pending inquiry, was passed without giving him an opportunity to explain matters and, therefore, in violation of principles of natural justice. He also requests that the charges levelled against him may be withdrawn and the order of suspension be cancelled forthwith. 16. Though Ext. P5 was sent by the petitioner as early as 10-2-60, nothing further happened for some considerable time so far as the petitioner is concerned. At this stage I may mention, that the learned Government Pleader has drawn my attention to the statement contained in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government that on 5-5-60 the State Government passed orders appointing the Principal of the Law College, Trivandrum, to conduct an inquiry into the allegations against the petitioner. On 25-5-60 the Principal of the Law College sent a communication to the petitioner, along with a copy of Ext. P4, informing the petitioner that the inquiry into the charges will take place before him at 10 A.M. on 8-6-1960. On 25-5-60 the Principal of the Law College sent a communication to the petitioner, along with a copy of Ext. P4, informing the petitioner that the inquiry into the charges will take place before him at 10 A.M. on 8-6-1960. The order of the State Government dated 5-5-60 and the communication of the Principal of the Law College, Trivandrum, sent to the petitioner on 25-5-1960, are available from the records that have been produced on behalf of the State Government by the learned Government Pleader. 17. So far as the communication issued by the Principal of the Law College, there is no controversy, because the petitioner has admittedly acknowledged receipt of the said communication. On receipt of the communication from the Principal dated 25-5-60, on the date of the inquiry viz. 8-6-60, the petitioner filed two statements evidenced by Exts. P6 and P7. In Ext. P7 he stated that he has been summoned to appear for an inquiry before the Principal, but that he has no notice that any particular witnesses are going to be examined for the inquiry and that he is entitled to notice of the same. Therefore, the petitioner prays that the examination of the witnesses be adjourned to another date, giving him reasonable time. 18. In Ext. P6 the petitioner again refers to the service of the memo dated 25-5-60 on him by the Principal of the Law College. He also refers to the objection, namely, that the Government have no authority to order an inquiry to be conducted by the Principal, as he is not a Government servant and that it should be considered as without jurisdiction. He emphasises that he is not waiving his objection to the jurisdiction and that his participation, if any, in the inquiry proceedings, which are to be conducted by the Principal of the Law College, is only subject to his categorical and emphatic objection regarding jurisdiction. In Ext. P. 6 the petitioner also states that the inquiry proposed to be held is illegal since there is no proper charge with any notice to him. On this basis the petitioner again makes a request to the Principal of the Law College to consider the question of jurisdiction, or to note his protest that his participation in the inquiry is expressly subject to his contention, that the inquiry is illegal and without authority. 19. On this basis the petitioner again makes a request to the Principal of the Law College to consider the question of jurisdiction, or to note his protest that his participation in the inquiry is expressly subject to his contention, that the inquiry is illegal and without authority. 19. It is common ground that the chief examination of three witnesses for the prosecution took place on 8-6-1960 and the inquiry proceedings were adjourned by the Principal to 9-6-60 at the request of the petitioner. Though, no doubt, the petitioner has a grievance regarding the inquiry he made a request for adjournment of the inquiry proceedings on the ground that he did not have sufficient opportunity to collect the materials for purposes of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses. That is a totally different aspect. The fact is that the chief examination of the witnesses also took place on 9-6-60. 20. The petitioner filed before the inquiry officer another statement Ext. P8, wherein he has criticised the evidence of the various witnesses who had spoken against him in the inquiry. But it is not really necessary for me to go elaborately into the various matters mentioned therein. 21. The inquiry officer appears to have sent his report of inquiry on 16-6-1960. That report has been read out in this Court for the first time, by the learned Government Pleader. 22. Under Ext. P9 dated 29-9-1960, the State Government issued a show cause notice to the petitioner. In Ext. P9 the State Government refer to the charges that have been framed against the petitioner under Ext. P4, as well as the explanation submitted by him under Ext, P5, and also to the further circumstance that as the explanation submitted by the petitioner was not satisfactory, the State Government ordered an inquiry to be conducted by the Principal of the Law College, Trivandrum. In Ext. P9 the State Government categorically state that based on the report of the inquiry, Government have come to the conclusion that charge No. 1, namely, that the petitioner took part in politics by canvassing on behalf of the Communist candidates in the recent general elections is proved and that the petitioner, is therefore, required to show cause why his services as part-time lecturer in the Law College, Trivandrum should not be deemed to have been terminated with effect from 29-1-1960, the date on which he was placed under suspension. The reply was directed to be given within seven days of receipt of the show cause notice. 23. There is one fact which has to be noted, namely, that under Ext. P9 the State Government have come to a conclusion as against the petitioner in respect of charge No. 1, based almost exclusively and solely on the report of the inquiry officer. But along with Ext. P9 - and there is no controversy about that - no copy of the inquiry report was sent to the petitioner. There is also another point to be considered, namely, that in Ext. P.9 there is no indication to the effect that in respect of the remaining two charges under Ext. P4 for which the petitioner was tried by the inquiry officer, the latter has held in favour of the petitioner completely exonerating him of those two charges. These aspects may have some bearing when I consider whether the reasonable opportunity, guaranteed to officers like the petitioner, has been given to the petitioner. 24. Under Ext. P10 dated 9-7-1960, the petitioner again sends a fairly lengthy explanatory statement wherein he refers to the fact that the evidence before the inquiry officer was absolutely of a very inferior quality and it was surprising that the inquiry officer should have held against him, as stated by the Government. Then there is a general attack made against the nature and quality of the evidence tendered before the inquiry officer. Then he makes a grievance that none of the witnesses has stated the exact time and the date when the petitioner is stated to have canvassed for the Communist candidates and, therefore, in such circumstances, such general evidence is useless to sustain the charge. The petitioner further states that he is not a Government Servant and that he is a person who has been appointed under a contract, and therefore, no proceedings can be taken against him by the State Government, nor can an order of suspension be passed against him. The petitioner further states that even on the basis that he is a Government servant and is governed by the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, his services automatically stood terminated with the expiry of the academic year 1959 - 60 and that the inquiry ordered as against him, long after he ceased to be in service, is absolutely irregular and without jurisdiction. 25. 25. Then the petitioner states his various objections to the procedure that has been adopted in the matter of the inquiry. He states that the materials on the basis of which the charges were framed, were not furnished to him; and the charges themselves were too vague and of a general character as not to disclose the nature of the offence committed by him. The petitioner again states that he was not served with a copy of the list of prosecution witnesses who were intended to be examined as against him. There is also a grievance made by the petitioner that he had no opportunity of adducing defence evidence in spite of his request to that effect. 26. The petitioner then deals with the various charges individually, and ultimately he states that the evidence of the witnesses adduced cannot be accepted as it is very artificial and untrustworthy. Ultimately the petitioner requests the Government to take into consideration all the various matters, and to completely exonerate him of the charges levelled against him and also to cancel the order of suspension passed against him. 27. The State Government finally passed the order Ext. P11 on 15th October 1960. In that order, the State Government, after referring to the charges framed under Ext. P 4, as well as the explanation given by the petitioner under Ext. P5 and to the fact of an inquiry conducted by the Principal of the Law College, state that the Principal has furnished to the Government a report of the inquiry and connected papers along with his letter, referred to in the order. In Ext. P11, for the first time, the State Government inform the petitioner that the findings of the Principal, the inquiry officer, so far as charges 2 and 3 are concerned, are in his favour. They extract the findings of the Principal to the effect that in regard to charge 1 it is proved that the petitioner as part-time Government servant, took part in politics by canvassing on behalf of the communist candidates in the recent general elections in the State; and that so far as charges 2 and 3 are concerned, it is not proved by the evidence that the petitioner collected subscriptions for the Communist Party or that he used to attend any of the District Committee meetings of the party. 28. 28. The Government further state that after a consideration of the record of the inquiry and findings of the inquiry officer and also giving due consideration to the various representations made by the petitioner, they are of the view that the two main objections raised by the petitioner cannot be accepted. The first objection dealt with by the State Government deals with the contention of the petitioner that part-time service officers will not come under the rule-making power under Art.309 of the Constitution and that the Government Servants Conduct Rules cannot apply to them. The State Government are not prepared to accept this objection. The second objection that appears to have been pressed is that the evidence at the inquiry does not mention the exact place, date and time of his canvassing. So far as this is concerned, the State Government are of the view that they do not think it necessary to set aside the finding by the inquiry officer for the reason that the prosecution witnesses are unable to furnish the exact date of the occurrence. This finding recorded by the State Government gives the impression, that there appears to be considerable force in the grievance voiced on behalf of the petitioner that the evidence let in and accepted by the inquiry officer does not in any manner give details regarding the place where the canvassing is stated to have taken place, or the date or the time when the canvassing is said to be made by the petitioner. 29. Ultimately, the State Government state that they are satisfied that the inquiry proceedings are correct and inconsequence direct that the services of the petitioner, as part-time lecturer in the Law College, Trivandrum, be terminated with effect from 29-1-1960, the date on which he was placed under suspension. 30. In the counter-affidavit, the various steps taken by the State Government in the matter of conducting the inquiry and also the charges framed by the State Government and the replies received from the petitioner, as also the orders passed by the State Government appointing the Principal of the Law College, Trivandrum to conduct the injury and also the inquiry proceedings, have been referred to, on behalf of the State Government. But there are one or two aspects that will have to be specifically noticed, namely, that the State Government does not accept the position that the provisions contained in the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1960, are not applicable to the petitioner. Then again, though in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the petitioner has stated that even on the basis that he is a Government Servant, against whom action can be taken, the provisions of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960 have not been complied with, the State Government takes up the ground in Para.22 of the counter affidavit that the provisions of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules are not applicable to the petitioner, who was only a part-time lecturer. A further stand is taken by the State Government that the petitioner is not entitled to the rights guaranteed under Art.311 of the Constitution. 31. Ultimately, the State Government have stated that the proceedings taken against the petitioner are in conformity with the rules of natural justice and that the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity of meeting the charges and also of actively participating in the inquiry proceedings and he was also given from time to time an opportunity to make all representations that he wanted to make regarding the action proposed to be taken against him. The State Government also state that there is no scope for interference with the proceedings under attack, under Art.226 of the Constitution. 32. Before I deal with the contentions urged by Mr. P. Subramonian Potti, learned counsel for the petitioner, that there has been a serious violation of the principles of natural justice and that the petitioner has been denied reasonable opportunity guaranteed under Art.311 of the Constitution, the question as to whether the petitioner is governed by the provisions of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1960, and also the further question as to whether the stand taken by the State Government that the provisions of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960, do not apply to the petitioner, and also the further stand taken by the State Government that the petitioner is not entitled to the reasonable opportunity guaranteed under Art.311, will have first to be considered and the legal position examined. 33. 33. I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1960 which came into force only on 12-1-1960, do not apply to the petitioner, inasmuch as his appointment was on 17-8-59, a date much anterior to the coming into force of the said Rules. If, once the petitioner is considered to be a Government servant, he must be considered to be bound, when he took up such service, at least impliedly, by all the rules and regulations that may be passed from time to time by the Government under its rule-making power unless there is anything specially stated excluding him. Therefore, on this short ground, it can be held that the Kerala Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1960, though framed only much later, will very well apply to the petitioner also, if he is held to be a Government servant. In this case, whether the other rules apply to the petitioner or not, by virtue of R.73 of the Kerala Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1960, the rules relating to taking part in politics and elections apply to him, as he is certainly a part-time Government Servant. 34. Then the question is as to whether the petitioner is a Government servant and whether he is entitled to the benefit of the provisions contained in the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960. That, quite naturally, will have a considerable bearing on the question whether the petitioner is entitled to the protection under Art.311 of the Constitution, and as to whether the view of the State Government that the petitioner is not entitled to such protection, is correct. 35. From the order, Ext. P11, itself, it will be seen that the State Government do not accept the petitioner's contention that he will not come within the rule-making power under Art.309 of the Constitution. Art.309 deals with rules about recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to services and partly in connection with the affairs of the Union or State. The first charge in Ext. P4 relates to the conduct of the part-time government servant. Therefore, the State Government itself proceed on the basis that the petitioner is a part-time government servant in respect of whom the State Government have the power to make rules under Art.309 of the Constitution. The first charge in Ext. P4 relates to the conduct of the part-time government servant. Therefore, the State Government itself proceed on the basis that the petitioner is a part-time government servant in respect of whom the State Government have the power to make rules under Art.309 of the Constitution. If the State Government claim to have power to frame rules regarding persons, like the petitioner, and if the State Government also propose to exercise its disciplinary jurisdiction as against persons like the petitioner, it is difficult to accept the contention of the learned Government Pleader on behalf the State Government that persons like the petitioner are not entitled to the corresponding protection under Art.311. 36. This aspect has, in fact, been dealt with in Rebecca v. State of Kerala (1961 KLT. 662) where a similar question has been considered by me in considering the position occupied by an Hon. House Surgeon, the petitioner in that case. In that connection I had to consider whether those persons are entitled to the protection given under Art.311 of the Constitution. I have held in that case that those persons, though they may not be considered as members of the Civil Service of the State, are nevertheless to be considered as holding civil posts under the State Government, though temporary or part-time, and therefore such persons are also entitled to the guarantee given to regular government servants under Art.311. It is unnecessary for me to traverse the ground over again in this writ petition. 37. I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is not a government servant. The petitioner has accepted in his affidavit filed in this Court in support of the writ petition, the position that the Law College, Trivandrum is an institution whose control vests with the Government and which is affiliated to the Kerala University. He is appointed as such by the Government under Ext. P1. No doubt no special rules governing the service conditions of persons like the petitioner, have been brought to my notice by the learned counsel on both sides. But certainly it is not possible for me to accept the contention that the petitioner is not a government servant against whom the State Government are entitled to take proceedings by way of disciplinary action for any misconduct that may be alleged as against him. 38. But certainly it is not possible for me to accept the contention that the petitioner is not a government servant against whom the State Government are entitled to take proceedings by way of disciplinary action for any misconduct that may be alleged as against him. 38. The petitioner, though a part-time employee, must nevertheless be considered to be a government servant and will come within the expression 'Government Servant' in R.2 (b) of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960. There it is clearly stated that a 'government servant' means "a person who is a member of a service, State or Subordinate, or who holds a civil post under the Kerala Government and includes any such person...". Therefore, it will be seen that even though the petitioner may not be a member of the civil service as such, he certainly holds a civil post under the Kerala Government, and as such, he will be a Government servant under R.2 (b) of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960. R.3 of the said Rules, which deals with the application of the rules, clearly states that the rules shall apply to all government servants, excepting the persons mentioned therein. No doubt, I am aware of the contention of the learned Government Pleader, advanced on behalf of the State Government, that the petitioner is not a member of the State service, or Subordinate service, referred to in R.6 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960. But as pointed out by me earlier, even a person who holds a civil post under the Kerala Government, though he may not be really a member of the State or subordinate service, will be a Government servant in view of R.2 (b) referred to above. Therefore, the petitioner will have to be considered as a government servant; and in this view, it will also follow that the petitioner will be entitled to the procedure indicated in the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960. Admittedly, as I will indicate later in this judgment, the procedure enumerated in the said rules, has not been as such adopted either by the State Government at the earlier stage, or by the inquiry officer during the inquiry proceedings, or by the State Government at the later stage, when it proposed to inflict the punishment on the petitioner. 39. Admittedly, as I will indicate later in this judgment, the procedure enumerated in the said rules, has not been as such adopted either by the State Government at the earlier stage, or by the inquiry officer during the inquiry proceedings, or by the State Government at the later stage, when it proposed to inflict the punishment on the petitioner. 39. Therefore the fact that the Government servants' Conduct Rules came into force after the petitioner entered service, or the fact that the petitioner ceased to be a Government servant on the date, when actually the proceedings were commenced, cannot, in my view, stand in the way of the State Government enforcing such of the provisions of the Kerala Government Servant's Conduct Rules, 1960, as are applicable, as against the petitioner. I have mentioned this, because the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that his client's appointment was for the academic year 1959-60, and though the charges related to his conduct during that period, ultimately the actual proceedings as against the petitioner were started or commenced only after he ceased to be in service and that, therefore, the State Government have no jurisdiction to take action against his client. The acceptance of such a contention will lead to this result, namely, that by the time the State Government can take action as against a delinquent officer by collecting necessary materials as against him, if the officer ceases to be a Government servant, the State Government will have no jurisdiction to take action against such an officer. If at the fag end of an official career, an officer misbehaves and he retires from service before the Government could take action for misconduct, that person will go scot-free for ever. I cannot accept a contention which will lead to such a result. 40. I have held that the petitioner is a person holding a civil post; and, if that is so, the protection guaranteed under Art.311 of the Constitution will stand attracted. That means, that the petitioner will be entitled to the reasonable opportunity rule guaranteed under Art.311. 41. It is on this that there is considerable controversy as to whether the proceedings in this case show that the said reasonable opportunity rule has been satisfied. That means, that the petitioner will be entitled to the reasonable opportunity rule guaranteed under Art.311. 41. It is on this that there is considerable controversy as to whether the proceedings in this case show that the said reasonable opportunity rule has been satisfied. While according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, it has not been satisfied, the learned Government Pleader, on the other hand, very strenuously urged that at every stage of the proceedings it will be seen that the reasonable opportunity rule has been amply satisfied and that the petitioner can have no grievance at all. 42. It is not really necessary for me to go into the minor controversy that exists in these proceedings regarding the vagueness of the charges levelled against the petitioner. I am also aware of the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even during the inquiry proceedings his client did not have sufficient opportunity to collect materials for purposes of enabling him to effectively cross-examine the witnesses, and that a reasonable request for adjournment was also not granted to the extent to which the petitioner wanted. These are, in my view, minor matters though they will also have to be taken into account for coming to the conclusion as to whether the reasonable opportunity rule has been satisfied or not. 43. Before I consider those aspects, it is necessary to refer to the rules, under the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1960, on the basis of which action had been taken against the petitioner. The relevant rules are R.67,69 and 73 which are as follows: "67. Taking part in politics and elections. (1) No Government Servant shall be a member of, or be otherwise associated with, any political party or any organisation which takes part in politics nor shall he take part in, subscribe in aid of, or assist in any other manner, any political movement or activity. Taking part in politics and elections. (1) No Government Servant shall be a member of, or be otherwise associated with, any political party or any organisation which takes part in politics nor shall he take part in, subscribe in aid of, or assist in any other manner, any political movement or activity. (2) It shall be the duty of every Government servant to endeavour to prevent any member of his family from taking part in, subscribing in aid of or assisting in any other manner, any movement or activity which is, or tends directly or indirectly to be, subversive of the Government as by law established, and where a Government servant is unable to prevent a member of his family taking part in or subscribing in aid of, or assisting in any other manner, any such movement or activity, he shall make a report to that effect to the Government. (3) If any question arises whether any movement or activity falls within the scope of this rule, the decision of the Government thereon shall be final." "69. Save, as provided by or under any law for the time being in force, no Government servant shall canvass or otherwise interfere or use his influence in connection with or take part in any election to a legislative body, whether in the Kerala State or elsewhere: (1) Provided that a Government servant who is qualified to vote at such election may exercise his right to vote; but if he does so, shall give no indication of the manner in which he proposes to vote or has voted. (2) A Government servant shall not be deemed to have contravened the provisions of this rule by reason only that he assists in the conduct of an election in due performance of a duty imposed on him by or under any law for the time being in force. (3) The Government may permit a Government servant to offer himself as a candidate for election to a local authority and the Government servant so permitted shall not be deemed to have contravened the provision of this rule. Explanation.- The display by a Government servant on his person, vehicle or residence of any electoral symbol shall amount to using his influence in connection with an election within the meaning of this sub rule." 73. Explanation.- The display by a Government servant on his person, vehicle or residence of any electoral symbol shall amount to using his influence in connection with an election within the meaning of this sub rule." 73. A Government servant proposing to take part in a non-official conference or meeting held in any place in the Kerala State must obtain the prior sanction of the Government: Provided that such sanction shall not be necessary in respect of conferences in which a Government servant may participate in the course of duty or conferences convened to discuss, scientific, technical, literary or similar subjects and participation therein is not likely to embarass Government in its relationship with the public in any manner. In cases of doubt, the Government servant should apply to Government and obtain orders. The rules regarding taking part in politics and elections apply to part-time Government servants also, such as the Advocate General, etc." 44. In this connection, it is necessary to note the provisions contained in R.5 of the said rules, viz., the Kerala Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1960. That rule lays down that except where they are specially mentioned, the rules do not apply to the Advocate General and other officials who are not full-time officers, but are engaged by Government to do certain work for them without prejudice to the regular exercise of their professions in other respects. 45. There was a minor contention raised by Mr. P. Subramonian Potti, learned counsel for the petitioner, that persons like the petitioner do not come within the prohibition contained in R.73 regarding taking part in politics and elections as they have been made applicable specifically to part-time Government servants like the Advocate General etc. The further contention was that the application of the prohibition to the Advocate General etc., in R.73, applies only to what is stated in R.73 and not to R.67 to 72 also. I have no hesitation in rejecting this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In fact, as pointed out by the learned Government Pleader, the scheme of the rules appear to be that R.67 prohibits a Government servant from being a member of or being associated with any political party. R.68 requires a Government servant not to permit any member of his family to take part in or assist any movement which tends directly or indirectly to be subversive of Government. R.68 requires a Government servant not to permit any member of his family to take part in or assist any movement which tends directly or indirectly to be subversive of Government. R.69 prohibits a Government servant from canvassing or otherwise using his influence in connection with any election to a legislative body of the State. R.73 deals with taking part in any non-official conference. The group of R.67 to 73 are found under the general heading "Taking part in politics and elections," and therefore, it applies to the other rules also. As the petitioner is a part-time Government servant, he also comes under the prohibition. 46. No doubt, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the part of R.73, relating to taking part in politics and elections by part-time Government servants is really a proviso to R.73 & cannot be applied to R.67, 68 and 69. I am not inclined to accept this contention either. The group of rules beginning from 67 and ending with 73, is to be treated as relating to taking part in politics and elections. The intention is clear, namely, that the relevant rules would apply to part-time Government servants also. No doubt, there is an illustration given, like the Advocate General etc., because they are specifically dealt with in R.5. But if once the petitioner is considered to be a part-time Government servant, as I have already held him to be, it is quite natural that the prohibition contained in R.67 to 73 also will apply to him. 47. Then the question is whether the reasonable opportunity guaranteed under Art.311 of the Constitution has been complied within the circumstances of this case. Admittedly, the Government appears to have been in doubt as to the mode in which action is to be taken as against the petitioner. There can be no controversy that the provisions of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960, have not been followed as such. 48. In Ext. P2, though the State Government, while placing the petitioner under suspension, state that the suspension is pending inquiry into his conduct, from the next communication Ext. P-4, wherein the three charges framed as against the petitioner are indicated by the Government, it is clear that at that time the State Government had no idea of conducting an inquiry as stated in Ext. P-2, because Ext. P-4, wherein the three charges framed as against the petitioner are indicated by the Government, it is clear that at that time the State Government had no idea of conducting an inquiry as stated in Ext. P-2, because Ext. P4 proceeds on the basis that, if the explanation that is to be given by the petitioner to the charges levelled against him under Ext. P-4 is not satisfactory, it is open to the State Government to terminate the services of the petitioner as part-time Government servant as lecturer in the Law College. 49. According to Mr. P. Subramonian Potti, learned counsel for the petitioner, the provisions of the Kerala Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960, have been designed with a view to safeguard the interests of persons, like the petitioner also, by describing the various procedures that are to be adopted, before imposing any punishment as against an officer. The learned counsel, in particular, urged that under R.15 (3) there is an obligation on the part of the authority or officer conducting the inquiry, to frame definite charges, on the basis of the allegations on which the inquiry is proposed to be held, and that there is also a further requirement that such charges, together with a statement of the allegations, on which they are based shall be communicated in writing to the government servant concerned, who is to be required to submit within the time mentioned therein, a written statement of his defence and also to state as to whether he desires to be heard in person. There is absolutely no indication in any of the communications issued either by the Government or even by the Principal of the Law College, who was the inquiry officer, regarding the allegations on the basis of which the charges had been framed under Ext. P4. Mr. Subramanian Potti, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that it is not as if there was no material placed before the State Government when it took action suspending the petitioner under Ext. P2. P4. Mr. Subramanian Potti, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that it is not as if there was no material placed before the State Government when it took action suspending the petitioner under Ext. P2. The learned counsel in this connection relied upon a statement contained in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government to the effect that on 6-1-60 the Adviser to the Governor of Kerala received a petition from the Janadhipathya Aikya Committee, Nedumangad stating that the petitioner was actively participating in the election propaganda doing house-to-house canvassing of votes for the Communist party. There is also a reference to an investigation that is stated to have been made in regard to the said petition, by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, who had reported that the allegations made in the petition were true. 50. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in my view, is well-founded in his contention that on the date when Ext. P4 was issued and on the date when the Principal of the Law College issued notice to the petitioner, fixing the date of the inquiry proposed to be held against him there were materials in the possession of the State Government on the basis of which they had framed the charges, and such materials were not placed before the petitioner, nor was it adverted to in any of the communications sent to the petitioner. 51. The learned Government Pleader has urged that in this case, no evidence or statement was recorded prior to the framing of the charges which could be made available to the petitioner. But there is this fact, that even on their own showing, the action by way of suspension and the further action by way of framing of the charges, have been taken by the State Government on the basis of a petition stated to have been received from the Janadhipathya Aikya Committee referred to in Para.3 of the State Government's counter-affidavit. That petition or the substance of the allegations therein, was admittedly not placed before the petitioner. 52. That petition or the substance of the allegations therein, was admittedly not placed before the petitioner. 52. Then again, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that there are serious infirmities in the actual conduct of the inquiry by the officer, namely that the petitioner was not made, aware of the nature of the evidence that was proposed to be adduced against him and that he had no real opportunity of collecting necessary materials in order to effectively cross-examine those witnesses. In this connection, the learned counsel urged that the inquiry was posted to 8-6-60 and, notwithstanding the request made by the petitioner for adjournment of the inquiry, in order to enable him to know the nature of the evidence that was going to be adduced against him, the request was refused by the inquiry officer. I am aware of the contention of the learned Government Pleader that the petitioner, ulimately did ask for one day's adjournment and the inquiry officer acceded to that request. That does not carry the position of the State any far, because even when the inquiry proceedings started, the petitioner was not aware of the nature of the evidence, that was going to be adduced against him and when the adjournment was not granted and the evidence of the witnesses had been given, the only other course that was left to the petitioner, was to ask for a short adjournment to enable him to cross-examine the witnesses. 53. The chief examination of the witnesses did take place on the day fixed for the inquiry itself, viz„ on 8-6-1960, and the petitioner was given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses the next day. In my view, the request made by the petitioner before the inquiry officer for further time in order to enable him to collect materials, so that he can be armed with facts, which could provide him the basis to effectively cross-examine the witnesses, has not been in the circumstances of this case, properly given by the inquiry officer. 54. More serious than all these matters, is the stage when the Government accepted the report of the inquiry officer and issued the show cause notice to the petitioner under Ext. P-9 dated 29-6-60. The inquiry officer appears to nave sent in his report to the Government on 16-6-60. Admittedly, along with the show cause notice Ext. 54. More serious than all these matters, is the stage when the Government accepted the report of the inquiry officer and issued the show cause notice to the petitioner under Ext. P-9 dated 29-6-60. The inquiry officer appears to nave sent in his report to the Government on 16-6-60. Admittedly, along with the show cause notice Ext. P-9, the State Government did not choose to send a copy of the report of the inquiry to the petitioner. No doubt, the learned Government pleader urged that the petitioner who was an Advocate, can certainly be expected to place his grievance before the Government, and, if only be had cared to ask for a copy of the report, that request would have been granted. 55. In my view, this contention of the learned Government Pleader cannot be accepted. As jointed out by Chagla, C.J. sitting with Dixit, J. in the decision of the Bombay High Court, reported in State of Bombay v. Gajanan Mahadev (AIR. 1954 Bombay 351) if a government servant comes to Court & complains that his dismissal was wrongful & that reasonable opportunity was not given to him as required by the Statute; it is for the State then to satisfy the Court that in fact reasonable opportunity was given to him; & that the requirement of the Constitution that reasonable opportunity should be given to the Government servant, does not depend upon the Government servant asking for it. The learned judge's also held that it is a statutory protection that is afforded to the servant and a statutory obligation cast upon the State, and the State has got to discharge that obligation, irrespective of whether the protection is claimed or not claimed by the said Government servant. These observations have also been adopted and approved by the Punjab High Court in the decision reported in State v. Onkar Nath (AIR. 1960 Punjab 8.) 56. No doubt, it was open to the petitioner to have asked for a copy of the inquiry report. These observations have also been adopted and approved by the Punjab High Court in the decision reported in State v. Onkar Nath (AIR. 1960 Punjab 8.) 56. No doubt, it was open to the petitioner to have asked for a copy of the inquiry report. But the petitioner did not ask for it; probably in view of considerable doubt as to whether he was entitled to ask for a copy of the report, because if the proceeding's had been conducted on the basis of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rule's, 1960, there was an obligation on the part of the authority concerned Under R.15 (12) (a) of the said rules to furnish the government servant with a copy of the report of the inquiry officer. In this case, it is very clear from Ext. P-9 that the State Government was basing its conclusion regarding the guilt of the petitioner, exclusively on the report of the inquiry officer. In fact, it is stated in so many words in Ext. P9 by the State" Government that, based on the report of the inquiry, Government have come to the conclusion that charge No. 1, namely, that the petitioner took part in politics by canvassing on behalf of the Communist candidates' in the recent general elections, is proved. Here again, there is a very strenuous attack made by The learned counsel for the petitioner, that the non-furnishing of a copy of the report of inquiry by the State Government has really denied the petitioner the reasonable opportunity which is guaranteed to him. 57. As I mentioned earlier, the learned Government Pleader's contention is that it was certainly open to the petitioner to have asked for a copy of the inquiry report; and I have already referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court, that the plea of the Government Pleader cannot certainly be sustained. 58. That the non-furnishing of a copy of the inquiry report, on the basis of which the Government take action by way of punishment against a Government servant, is a serious infirmity, in the disciplinary proceedings and that it will amount to a reasonable opportunity having been denied to the government servant, or even amount to a violation of the principles of natural justice, is laid down in three decisions, namely, Ramesh Chandra v. State of U.P. (AIR. 1959 Allahabad 47), State v. Onkar Nath (AIR. 1959 Allahabad 47), State v. Onkar Nath (AIR. 1960 Punjab 8) and S. Nanjundeshwar v. State (AIR. 1960 Mysore 159). It is certainly not possible for the petitioner to effectively show cause against the punishment that is proposed by the Government on the basis of the finding recorded by the inquiry officer in his report, when the Government servant is not made aware of the contents of the report sent to the Government. And that is exactly the position in this case also. 59. The contention that has been raised by the learned Government Pleader before me, is that the provisions of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960, are only intended to safeguard the protection of reasonable opportunity being given to the Government servant. If that reasonable opportunity has been safeguarded and has been adopted by other proper methods, there will be no violation of principles of natural justice. The learned Government Pleader also urged that there is no scope for interference in this case by this Court in proceedings under Art.226 of the Constitution. He also relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Union of India v. T.R. Varma (AIR. 1957 SC. 882) and also the test of reasonable opportunity, as laid down in the later decision of the Supreme Court, reported in State of M.P. v. Chintaman (AIR. 1961 SC. 1623). The learned Government Pleader also relied upon the decision in Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen (AIR. 1959 SC. 1111) regarding principles of natural justice. In my view, it is not necessary to consider all those decisions, excepting to refer to the decision reported in Khem Chand v. Union of India (AIR. 1958 SC. 300). 1961 SC. 1623). The learned Government Pleader also relied upon the decision in Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its Workmen (AIR. 1959 SC. 1111) regarding principles of natural justice. In my view, it is not necessary to consider all those decisions, excepting to refer to the decision reported in Khem Chand v. Union of India (AIR. 1958 SC. 300). At page 307 of the report, after considering the various principles governing this matter, the learned judges summarise the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provisions of the Constitution, as follows: "(a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are, and the allegations on which such charges are based; (b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence; and finally (c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the inquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the Government servant, tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to the government servant." 60. The importance of a departmental inquiry has been again emphasised by the Supreme Court in Jagadish Prasad Saxena v. State of M.P. (AIR. 1961 SC. 1070). Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar, speaking on behalf of the Court, states that: "It is of the utmost importance that in taking disciplinary action against a public servant, a proper departmental inquiry must be held against him after supplying him with a charge-sheet, and he must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge-sheet." The learned judge again states: "The departmental inquiry is not an empty formality; it is a serious proceeding intended to give the officer concerned a chance to meet the charge and to prove his innocence. In the absence of any such inquiry it would not be fair to strain facts against the appellant and to hold that in view of the admissions made by him the inquiry would have served no useful purpose." No doubt, in that case, the learned judge had to deal with a ease where there was absolutely no inquiry whatsoever against the public servant. 61. Then the question is, as to what interference is called for by this court in respect of the various proceedings that have been attacked by the learned counsel for the petitioner. As I have already mentioned, the Government do not appear to have been clear in their mind as to the nature of the inquiry that is to be conducted as against persons like the petitioner, whenever they have to punish them for misconduct. That is very clear even by the stand taken in this court by the State Government, to the effect that the petitioner is not entitled to the protection guaranteed by Art.311 of the Constitution. That contention, I have already negatived. I have also shown, by referring to the communication of the State Government, viz., Ext. P. 9, wherein the petitioner has been called upon to explain the charges and as to why his services should not be terminated, that the State Government proceeds on the basis that no inquiry need be conducted as against persons like the petitioner under the provisions of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960. I have already held that the State Government have not complied with the provisions of the rules as such, because the various materials have not been made known to the petitioner in these proceedings. 62. I have given very careful and serious consideration as to which part of the proceedings should be allowed to stand, and which part should be quashed. The learned Government Pleader urged that the petitioner cannot be said to have a grievance, at any rate, up to the stage when the inquiry proceedings were completed by the Principal of the Law College. If at all, the petitioner's grievance, according to the learned Government Pleader, is that a copy of the inquiry report, on the basis of which the Government have taken action by way of termination of the services of the petitioner under Ext. P11, has not been given to him. If at all, the petitioner's grievance, according to the learned Government Pleader, is that a copy of the inquiry report, on the basis of which the Government have taken action by way of termination of the services of the petitioner under Ext. P11, has not been given to him. Therefore, the learned Government Pleader urged that proceedings up to and inclusive of the report by the inquiry officer, can be sustained and the actual order of termination of the petitioner's services can be set aside, with liberty to the State Government to take further action. 63. On the other hand, the learned counsel, Mr. P. Subramonian Potti, for the petitioner, vehemently urged that the entire proceedings starting from the order suspending the petitioner from service, will have to be quashed. The learned counsel urged rather seriously that considerable time has now elapsed and the petitioner has ceased to be a Government servant long ago, and that, therefore, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings. 64. I am concerned only with the limited point, that is, wherefrom the irregularity or illegality should be considered to start. Now the position is quite clear. The petitioner at the relevant time was a Government servant and was subject to such of the provisions of the Kerala Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1960, as are applicable to him, and was an officer against whom Government can take action for misconduct, if misconduct is alleged and satisfactorily proved. In my view, the order placing the petitioner under suspension, by virtue of Ext. P2 order dated 30-1-1960, must be allowed to stand. That action is by virtue of the power which the appointing authority has under R.10 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960. 65. Therefore, pending an investigation or inquiry into the allegations of misconduct against the petitioner, it was perfectly proper for the State Government to place the petitioner under suspension as they have already done under the order Ext. P2. That order should be allowed to stand, for the present. The further proceedings, as I mentioned earlier, are vitiated by the fact that the Government was not sure as to how to take action against the petitioner. P2. That order should be allowed to stand, for the present. The further proceedings, as I mentioned earlier, are vitiated by the fact that the Government was not sure as to how to take action against the petitioner. Considering the further proceedings from the point of view of the applicability of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960, as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, or applying the test of principles of natural justice, as urged by the learned Government Pleader, they cannot be sustained, as they do not comply with either. In my view, the proceedings, after the stage of Ext. P2, cannot satisfy either Of these tests. I have already shown that the provisions of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960 have not been followed, and I have also indicated that it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned Government Pleader that it cannot be said that there has been any violation of principles of natural justice either. I am not certainly inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the entire proceedings should stand quashed. 66. Nor am I inclined to accept the contention of the learned Government Pleader that the proceedings up to and inclusive of the report of the Principal of the Law College, should be sustained. I am only indicating this because the petitioner seems to have a real grievance that he was not given an effective opportunity to collect materials so as to enable him to effectively cross-examine the witnesses who have spoken as against him at the inquiry. Even here, it should not be missed that the inquiry officer, in respect of charges 2 and 3, has not chosen to believe the identical witnesses, namely, Pws.1 to 3. Even in respect of charge No. 1, regarding which he has found the petitioner guilty, he has chosen to disbelieve one of the witnesses, namely, Pw. 2. As to how the evidence of Pws.1 and 3, which has, no doubt, been accepted by the inquiry officer, can lead to the conclusion of guilt as against the petitioner even on charge No. 1, is a matter which will have to be considered at the appropriate stage. Even here, the final order of the State Government viz., Ext. 2. As to how the evidence of Pws.1 and 3, which has, no doubt, been accepted by the inquiry officer, can lead to the conclusion of guilt as against the petitioner even on charge No. 1, is a matter which will have to be considered at the appropriate stage. Even here, the final order of the State Government viz., Ext. P-11, does show that the evidence of these witnesses does not clearly indicate the exact place, and the time as to when the petitioner is stated to have canvassed for the candidates. 67. No doubt, the learned Government Pleader urged that it is a matter of appreciation of the evidence. But there is also another aspect to be considered, namely, whether the evidence on record would certainly justify the conclusion on charge No.1 as against the petitioner. On this aspect, I express no opinion whatsoever, and I leave the matter there. 68. To conclude: Except the order, Ext. P-2 dated 30-1-1960, placing the petitioner under suspension, pending an inquiry into his conduct, all the other proceedings, inclusive of the final order, Ext. P-11 terminating the services of the petitioner, will stand quashed and cancelled. It is open to the State Government to consider afresh as to the action, if any, that has to be taken as against the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner made a request that the Government must be directed to make up its mind one way or the other within a particular time. But I do not propose to give any such direction, as one can very well trust the Government to consider as to whether further action is to be taken, or whether the proceedings evidenced even by Ext. P-2 should also be cancelled. These are all matters for the State Government to consider. But I dare say that the State Government will take an early decision. 69. Subject to the observations made herein, the orders under attack, except Ext. P-2, are quashed and set aside. The writ petition is allowed to that extent. There will be no order as to costs. Allowed.