Judgment SHAH, J. : This is an appeal with special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Madras. 2. On February 18, 1948, S. Nanjalingiah Gowder - hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff -borrowed Rs. 1,500 from K. Simrathmull - hereinafter called the defendant. On February 19, 1948 the plaintiff executed a sale deed conveying to the defendant certain land at Ootacamund together with a house standing thereon and belonging to him for Rs. 700. Two other documents were executed on the same day: (1) a deed of reconveyance (Ext. A-1) counterpart of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff which contained the following covenant: "If you pay the sum of Rs. 1,500 within a period of two years I shall at your cost and your responsibility execute a sale in respect of the under-mentioned land and house. You shall pay the assessment for the house and the municipal tax, you shall if there is any arrears of rent pay the same prior to the sale, as per the rental deed executed by you and your father. If there is arrears of rent for six months, the aforesaid counterpart deed shall become cancelled.", and (2) a Rent Note by the plaintiff and his father Bora Gowder in favour of the defendant agreeing to pay rent at Rs. 26-4-0 per mensem for occupation of the house and the land. 3. Rent accruing due was not paid regularly by the plaintiff and his father, and by April 1949 it was in arrears for seven months. The plaintiff sent Rs. 52-8-0 by postal money order being rent for two months, on April 20 1949, but it was not accepted by the defendant. The plaintiff then filed on November 7, 1949 a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Ootacamund, for specific performance of the agreement of reconveyance contained in the deed Ext. A-1. The suit was dismissed, for, in the view of the trial Court, the conditions incorporated in Ext A-1, had not been strictly complied with, and the agreement stood cancelled. The decree of the trial Court was affirmed in appeal. But in second appeal the High Court of Madras reversed the decree and ordered specific performance. 4. The sale deed, the deed of reconveyance Ext A-1 and the rent note Ext. The decree of the trial Court was affirmed in appeal. But in second appeal the High Court of Madras reversed the decree and ordered specific performance. 4. The sale deed, the deed of reconveyance Ext A-1 and the rent note Ext. B-1 were undoubtedly parts of the same transaction The plea of the plaintiff that the sale deed Ext. A-l constituted a transaction of mortgage by conditional sale is inadmissible, because the sale deed and the covenant for reconveyance are contained in separate documents. Indisputably, on the findings of the trial Court and confirmed by the Appellate Courts, the plaintiff, has not complied with the terms of the agreement for reconveyance. The plaintiff however, submitted that the court could relieve him against the forfeiture of his rights in exercise of the court s equitable jurisdiction. The defendant submitted that the covenant for reconveyance was in the nature of a concession granted by the defendant subject to certain conditions and if the conditions were not fulfilled the right could not be enforced. On this question the trial Judge with whom the First Appellate Court agreed held that the court had no jurisdiction to relieve against the extinction of the right to demand reconveyance, because the plaintiff had failed to comply strictly with the conditions of the deed. The High Court held that the equitable jurisdiction of the Court could properly be exercised in favour of the plaintiff so as to relieve him against the extinction of his right. 5. The plaintiff had sold his property to the defendant. There is now no dispute that though the sale deed was for Rs. 700, if was in satisfaction of the loan borrowed on February 18,1948 for Rs. 1,500 that the sale deed was executed. By the deed Ext. A-1 the defendant gave to the plaintiff a concession: he agreed to reconvey the house, but the exercise of the right of demanding reconveyance by the plaintiff was subject to two conditions (1) that the right must be exercised within two years, and (2) that the rent payable under Ext. B-1 and should not be in arrears for more than six months at any time. When the plaintiff demanded specific performance of the agreement of reconveyance, the first condition was fulfilled but the second was not. B-1 and should not be in arrears for more than six months at any time. When the plaintiff demanded specific performance of the agreement of reconveyance, the first condition was fulfilled but the second was not. It is true that equity relieves against penalties when the intention of the penalty is to secure payment of a sum of money or attainment of some other object, and when the event upon which the penalty is made payable can be adequately compensated by payment of interest or otherwise. Thus relief is granted in equity against the penalty in a money bond, and also against penal sums made payable on breach of bonds, covenants and agreements for payment of money by instalments, or for doing or omitting to do a particular act (see Halsbury s Laws of England III Edition Vol. 14 page 620, Art. 1147). The cases in Kilmer v. British Columbia orchard Lands Ltd., 1913 AC 319 and Devendra Prasad v. Surendra Prasad, 63 Ind App 26: are illustrations of that principle. But there is a well recognised exception to this rule: which is enunciated in Halsbury s Laws of England Vol. 14, III Edition page 622, paragraph 1151, as follows: "Where under a contract, conveyance, or will a beneficial right is to arise upon the performance by the beneficiary of some act in a stated manner, or at a stated time, the act must be performed accordingly in order to obtain the enjoyment of the right, and in the absence of fraud, accident or surprise, equity will not relieve against a breach of the terms". The Federal Court in Shanmugam Pillai v. Annalakhshmi Ammal, AIR 1950 FC 38, held by a majority of three to two that where under an agreement an option to a vendor is reserved for repurchasing the property sold by him the option is in the nature of a concession or privilege and may be exercised on strict fulfillment of the conditions on the fulfillment of which it is made exercisable. If the original vendor fails to act punctually according to the terms of the contract, the right to repurchase will be lost and cannot be specifically enforced. If the original vendor fails to act punctually according to the terms of the contract, the right to repurchase will be lost and cannot be specifically enforced. Refusal to enforce the terms specifically for failure to abide by the conditions does not amount to enforcement of a penalty and the court has no power to afford relief against the forfeiture arising as a result of breach of such a condition. A majority of the Judges of the Court in that case followed the principle set out in Davis v. Thoms, (1830) 39 ER 195. We accept the view of the majority enunciated in Shanmugam Pillai s case, AIR 1950 FC 38. The decree passed by the High Court must therefore be set aside and the decree passed by the trial Court restored. But the. property in dispute is valuable. Even on the defendant s case it was on the date of the institution of the suit worth Rs. 15,000. The defendant purchased it only about a year and seven months prior to the date of the institution of the suit for Rs. 1,500. He appears to have overreached the plaintiff and taken a document of sale conveying the property when a mere loan was intended on the security of the property. It is unfortunate, having regard to the provision of S. 58 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act, that the plaintiff is debarred from proving that the transaction was in the nature of a mortgage. In the circumstances, we direct that there will be no order as to costs throughout. 6. We can also not refrain from observing that the statement of the case on behalf of the plaintiff has not been properly drawn up. The chronological statement of the material events which is required to be filed under the Rules of this Court is very badly drafted and is misleading. In the statement of the case, as originally drawn, no such chronology of events was set out and the list of authorities relied upon was omitted. The Rules of this Court provide for taxing substantial amounts as costs for drawing up and settling the statement of the case. We find that in the statement of case as originally filed, was endorsed as drawn up by one advocate and filed in Court by the Advocate on Record. The Rules of this Court provide for taxing substantial amounts as costs for drawing up and settling the statement of the case. We find that in the statement of case as originally filed, was endorsed as drawn up by one advocate and filed in Court by the Advocate on Record. After the attention of the Advocate on Record was invited by the Office of the Registrar that the statement was defective, it was rectified, and curiously an endorsement was made that the statement was drawn up by the Advocate on Record who had initially merely filed it and that it was settled by the advocate who had previously claimed to have drawn it. At the time of the hearing the advocate in charge of the case had not with him the list of dates fled in Court. We think that in this case there has been negligence in drawing up the statement of the case and an attempt has been made by the several endorsements to support a claim for costs for drawing up the statement of the case as well as for settling the statement. We therefore direct that in taxing the bill of costs as between advocate and client, the Taxing Officer will not award any costs to the appellant s advocates for drawing up or settling the statement of the case. Order accordingly. For Citation : AIR 1963 SC 1182 = 1962 SCD 701 = 1962 Supp(3) SCR 476