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1962 DIGILAW 99 (ORI)

PARIKHIT DAS v. MADHAB JENA

1962-09-27

DAS, R.L.NARASIMHAM

body1962
JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is an application by the Plaintiff under Article 133 of the Constitution of India, for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment of this Court in F.A. 19 of 1956 dated 7th September 1960 modifying the judgment of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Berhampur. 2. Mr. Ramdas for the Applicant wanted that this Court should direct the Subordinate Judge to hold an enquiry to ascertain the valuation of the subject matter in dispute, both in the Court of first instance and in appeal with a view to enable him to show that the valuation is well above the limit of Rs. 20,000/- fixed in Article 133 of the Constitution. Mr. Rao for the opposite party however contended that the question of valuation had been practically decided even at the trial stage and that the same had been fixed at Rs. 7500/- which had been accepted by the parties and that it was not open to the Petitioner to go behind that decision. 3. The relevant facts are as follows. The Plaintiff brought the suit under appeal for declaration of title and permanent injunction against the Defendants. The total area of the lands that formed the subject matter of the litigation at that time as given as 166.23 acres. The Plaintiff valued the relief claimed at Rs. 5100/- only and paid court fee on that amount, but discretly he did not say anything as to the market value of the property in dispute. The Defendants, however, in their written statement raised the question of valuation and alleged that the market value of the suit lands would be about one lakh of rupees and that the court fee paid was grossly inadequate. 4. Before the settlement of issues, however, the Peripatetic Stamp Reporter examined the records of the case and gave a note to the effect that valuation of the suit lands should be raised to at least Rs. 10,000/- which should be taken as the minimum value, and that the Plaintiff should be called upon to pay deficit court fee. That report of the Stamp Reporter was put up before the learned Subordinate Judge on 21-2-1953 on which date he directed issue of notice to the Plaintiff and fixed the matter for bearing on 2-3-1953. 10,000/- which should be taken as the minimum value, and that the Plaintiff should be called upon to pay deficit court fee. That report of the Stamp Reporter was put up before the learned Subordinate Judge on 21-2-1953 on which date he directed issue of notice to the Plaintiff and fixed the matter for bearing on 2-3-1953. The court fee matter was again adjourned to 11-3-1953 and was actually heard on 12-3-1953 after notice to both parties. On the latter date the Court passed the following order: Heard Sri G.L.N and perused S.R's report. I fix the value of the suit...for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 7500/-. Plaintiff to pay deficit court fee by 20-3-1953. The order doubtless does not show clearly whether the learned court made a distinction between the valuation of the suit properly on the one hand and the value of the suit (meaning the notional value of the relief claimed) on the other. But on 8-4-1953 the Plaintiff's Advocate himself filed a petition for amendment of the plaint stating therein that after going through the Stamp Report and hearing the arguments the Court was pleased to fix the valuation at Rs. 7500/- and he therefore requested the Court, for permission to amend the plaint by substituting the figure of Rs. 7500/- for the figure of Rs. 5100/- as "the value of the suit lands". Thus it seems clear that the valuation of the suit lands was objected to at the earliest opportunity by the Defendants, that on receipt of the Stamp Reporter's report the Court heard the parties after giving them notice and fixed the valuation of the suit lands at Rs. 7500/- and additional court fee was paid accordingly. The same court fee was also paid while filing the appeal before this Court-against the decision of the Additional Subordinate Judge. 5. In the course of the hearing of the appeal the subject matter of the dispute in respect of which relief was claimed very much reduced and limited to items 6, 23 and 51 of plaint Schedule I only and the appeal was not pressed in respect of the remaining items. The total area of the lands covered by these three items would be 19.17 acres only. If the original valuation in respect of the 166.23 acres was fixed at the trial stage at only Rs. The total area of the lands covered by these three items would be 19.17 acres only. If the original valuation in respect of the 166.23 acres was fixed at the trial stage at only Rs. 7500/- it is obvious that the valuation of the subject matter in dispute, which was reduced to 19.17 acres must be very low indeed and the Petitioner cannot claim leave to appeal to the Supreme Court as a matter of right, unless be can bring the case within the scope of Article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. 6. Mr. Ramdas urged that the low valuation was given, for fiscal purposes, before the lower court and that the actual value of the properties in dispute was very high and that the Petitioner was entitled to show by evidence that the market value of the same both in the court of first instance and before the appellate court was much in excess of Rs. 20,000/ In support of this contention he relied on Sree Annapurna Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. Shyamalendu Bhaduri where it was held that where a low valuation is given purely for fiscal purposes in the plaint, no advantage is gained by the Plaintiff against the Defendant unless the forum where the plaint should have been filed was affected and that consequently the Plaintiff was not precluded from giving evidence to show the real market value of the property in dispute. This decision has been followed in a later Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court reported in Kuppanna Gounder and Others Vs. Peruma Gounder and Others. Mr. Ramdas's contention therefore is that so long as the forum before which the plaint is filed is not in any way affected even after such low valuation is given for the purpose of paying a reduced court fee, the Defendants cannot be said to have been adversely affected in any way and the Plaintiff also cannot be said to have gained an advantage against the Defendants so as to estop him later on from raising the question of valuation for the purpose of determining his right to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133. Mr. Mr. Rao for the other side however contended that where a valuation is given for the purpose of paying reduced court fee the Plaintiff does derive an advantage from such low valuation and he will therefore be estopped from challenging that valuation later on. For this proposition he relied on Prabirendra Mohan Vs. Berhampore Bank Ltd. and Others, which does not appear to have been noticed in the later Calcutta decision reported in Sree Annapurna Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. Shyamalendu Bhaduri, . 7. In my opinion it will be academic to discuss this controversial question here. It is true that where a low valuation is given for the purpose of paying court fee the Plaintiff does get an advantage. But whether that is an advantage gained by him as against the Defendant so as to operate as estopped when the question of valuation comes up for the purpose of granting leave under Article 133 of the Constitution is a different matter. The decisions of High Courts are not uniform on this point. But even in the Fun Bench decision of the Madras High Court relied on by Mr. Ramdas it has been pointed out that where the question of valuation has been adjudicated either expressly or impliedly the principle of res judicata may be attracted and a party may be precluded from contending later on that the real valuation of the property in litigation was much higher than the original value accepted by all concerned. The learned Judges of the Full Bench made it absolutely clear that mere erroneous valuation for purposes of jurisdiction or for fiscal purposes, without more, except in cases where the adoption of the real value would alter the forum, would not amount to such a representation on which it could be said that the opposite party would suffer a detriment. The words "without more" have special significance. 8. Here it is not a case of the Plaintiff merely giving a low valuation for the purpose of paying a low court fee and the entire litigation proceeding on that basis. On the other hand his valuation was challenged by the Defendants in their written statement. The Stamp Reporter pointed out that the valuation was low. The court gave notice to both parties and ultimately on 12-3-1953 fixed the valuation at Rs. 7500/-. On the other hand his valuation was challenged by the Defendants in their written statement. The Stamp Reporter pointed out that the valuation was low. The court gave notice to both parties and ultimately on 12-3-1953 fixed the valuation at Rs. 7500/-. The Plaintiff himself understood this order to mean that the valuation of the suit lands was fixed at Rs. 7500/- and paid court fee accordingly. It was because of this decision by the lower court on the question of valuation that when issues were settled subsequently, the Defendants did not dress for an issue on the question of valuation. It must therefore be held that there is already a decision by the lower court on the question of valuation of the suit lands in the presence of the parties on contest, who accepted the same, and consequently the principle of res judicata would apply. The Plaintiff will not therefore be permitted now to say that the valuation of the property in dispute is in excess of Rs. 20,000/- so as to entitle him to ask for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 9. This is also not a fit case for granting leave under Article 133(1)(0) of the Constitution, as no question of far reaching public or private importance arises out of our judgment in F.A. No. 19 of 1956. The leave asked for is therefore refused, with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 50;- (Rupees fifty only). Das, J. 10. I agree.