JUDGMENT-The defendant has come up in second appeal to challenge the appellate decision in Civil Appeal No. 37-A of 1956 decided by the Additional District Judge, Khamgaon. 2. Field survey No. 115, area 27 acres and 28 gunthas, assessment Rs. 66-10-0, of mauza Rohinkhed belongs to the plaintiff-Shripal Sidha Swami Math Sansthan, which is a public trust. This field was let out to the defendant-appellant Totaram on a batai contract, by which the parties understood that half of the yield was to be given as lease-money. The defendant was accordingly in possession of the field from the year 1951-52 and onwards. In Revenue Case No. 131/51-B of 1953-54, decided on the 14th of May 1954, the Sub Divisional Officer, Malkapur, had fixed the liability of the defendant for lease-money at five times the assessment. In Revenue Appeal No. 71/51.B of 1954-55, decided on the 10th of January 1955, the Deputy Commissioner, Buldana, had rejected the application of the landlord-plaintiff for termination of the defendants lease. In the year 1954-55 to which the present litigation relates, the defendant was and continued to be in possession, as the lessee of the field. 3. The plaintiff-respondent filed Civil Suit No. 99-A of 1955 for possession and for Rs. 900 as the value of the plaintiffs share of the crops on the following allegations: The plaintiff Sansthan was duly registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, and Shiomurti was appointed as its wahiwatdar or manager. The field had been let out for the year 1954-55 on a batai contract and the defendant had raised crops worth about Rs. 1,800. The plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to half share thereof, Rs. 900. The Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, did not apply to the plaintiff-trust and the orders passed by the Revenue Courts fixing the lease money at five times the land revenue and refusing permission to terminate the tenancy of the defendant were, therefore, not binding on the plaintiff. Not being bound by that Act, ,the plaintiff was entitled to claim possession also. 4. The defendant-appellant contested the suit on the following grounds: The plaintiff-Sansthan was not registered as a public trust according to law. Shiomurti was not its legally appointed wahiwatdar. Not being bound by that Act, ,the plaintiff was entitled to claim possession also. 4. The defendant-appellant contested the suit on the following grounds: The plaintiff-Sansthan was not registered as a public trust according to law. Shiomurti was not its legally appointed wahiwatdar. The defendant had been cultivating the suit field on lease since the year 1951 and had, therefore, become a protected lessee under section 3 of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951. He had not agreed to deliver half of the produce to the plaintiff for the year 1954-55 because the maximum lease-money was already fixed at five times the land revenue by the revenue authorities on the 14th of May 1954. The defendant being a protected lessee, the plaintiff cannot claim possession of the field. The decisions and orders of the revenue. Courts were binding on the plaintiff who was a party to those proceedings. The plaintiffs claim was untenable. 5. The learned trial Judge found that the net profits yielded by the field were Rs.900 and granted Rs. 450 to the plaintiff as its half share of the produce. The learned Judge also decreed the claim for possession holding that the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, was not applicable to the plaintiff. In Civil Appeal No. 37-A of 1956, the learned Additional District Judge, Khamgaon, affirmed the decree for possession but dismissed the claim for mesne profits. The defendant-appellant has now come up in second appeal to challenge the decree for possession. The plaintiff-respondent has filed cross objections to challenge the dismissal of its claim for lease-money. 6. The important point which falls for decision in this appeal is, whether the civil Court had no jurisdiction to determine the claim of the plaintiff for exemption from the operation of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act,1951 on the ground that it was a "person under disability" by virtue of section 3 (4) read with section 2 (f) thereof. The learned Advocate for the defendant-appellant contended that this claim for exemption was intimately connected with the defendants claim that he had become a protected tenant under section 3, which was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Officer by virtue of section 16 (1) and therefore the civil Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the plaintiffs claim for exemption. The learned Advocate for the plaintiff-respondent contended on the other hand that the Revenue Officers were not invested with jurisdiction to decide whether the parties were governed by or exempted from the operation of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951 and the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to decide that question was not barred by section 16 (1) or 16-B and, therefore, the civil Court had the jurisdiction to decide the plaintiffs claim for exemption from the operation of that Act, even though it was connected with the defendants claim that he was a protected tenant under section 3. These respective contentions would require careful consideration. 7. The relevant provisions of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951 regarding jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers and civil Courts• are stated below:- "Power of Revenue 16 (1) Whenever any question arises whether any transaction officer to determine between a landholder and a. person claiming to be nature of transaction. his lessee is a lease within the meaning of this Act, such question shall be decided by the Revenue Officer. 16(2) *** 16(3) Any decision of the Revenue Officer under this section shall be binding on the parties to the proceedings and persons claiming through them. Civil Court to refer16-A(1) Whenever any question as is referred to in section 16 certain question to arises before a civil Court in any suit or proceeding, the Court Revenue Officer.shall, unless such question has already been determined by a Revenue Officer, refer the question to the Revenue Officer for decision and shall stay the suit or proceeding so far as it relates to the decision of such question. (2) The civil Court shall accept the decision of the Revenue Officer on the question and decide the suitor proceeding before it accordingly. Bar of jurisdiction 16-B. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no civil Court shall Of Civil Court. entertain any suit instituted, or application made, to obtain a decision or order on any matter which a Revenue Officer is by or under this Act empowered to determine, decide or dispose of." 8. It would be seen from the above provisions that whenever any question arises whether a transaction between a landlord and a person claiming to be his lessee is a lease within the meaning of this Act, such a question. It would be seen from the above provisions that whenever any question arises whether a transaction between a landlord and a person claiming to be his lessee is a lease within the meaning of this Act, such a question. must be referred by the civil Court to the Revenue Officer and that question must then be decided by the Revenue Officer alone and the decision of the Revenue Officer would be binding on the parties to the proceedings and the persons claiming through them. It would also be seen that no civil Court shall entertain any suit or application to give a decision on any matter which. A revenue Officer is by or under this Act, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of. 9. On the basis of the aforesaid provisions, Shri C. P. Kalele for the defendant• appellant submitted that in view of the plea of the defendant that he has become a protected lessee, and in view of the claim of the plaintiff that he is not governed by the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951 ~ being a person under disability, the parties are at issue regarding whether the transaction between them "is a lease within the meaning of this Act" and consequently the Revenue Officers alone have the power to determine that question and the civil Court must make a reference to the Revenue Officer as its jurisdiction to decide such a question is barred. While supporting this submission, he drew my attention to the Full Bench decision in Paika v. Rajeshwar (1) and some other decisions which had reiterated the principle laid down in that Full Bench decision. In paragraph 4 of that decision, the following observations were made: “…….in our opinion, looking at the whole scheme of section 16 it is clear that if an issue arises between the parties whether there was a transaction which resulted in one of the parties becoming a lessee and the lease is a lease which falls within the Act, then that issue can only be tried by the Revenue Officer and not by the civil Court." In paragraph 6, two other conflicting decisions of the erstwhile Nagpur High Court were cited and then the following observations were made: “…..In our opinion, again with respect, the view which Mr. Justice Naik hall taken is the correct view, and Mr. Justice Naik hall taken is the correct view, and Mr. Justice Naik in Civil Revision No. 561 of 1934. (D/- 14-4-1955) lays that the conditions precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Re1/enue Officer art-- (1) Parties must raise the question and be on issue on it. (2) The question must be between the landholder and a person claiming to be his lessee. (3) The question must be whether there would be a lease under the Act. We agree that if these question arise, then the Revenue Officer alone can try the issue." (italics mine). 10. It was strenuously urged on behalf of the appellant that the above remarks in paragraph 6 which have resulted in putting limitations on the opinion recorded in paragraph 4, should be ignored as being mere surplusages. Shri Kalele was unable to show any authority in support of his proposition that a part of the judgment which contained grounds for formulating the opinion recorded earlier, should be ignored in the manner suggested by him. The judgment must be read as a whole and it would not be permissible to ignore or brush aside the remarks in paragraph No.6 which ought to be treated as an integral part of the opinion of the Full Bench. Even if the opinion in paragraph No.4 lone, bereft of the elucidation in paragraph No.6, were to be treated as being applicable, the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officer would arise, only if the parties are "at issue" on the relevant points mentioned therein. I would show in the sequel that the parties are not at issue on this point. 11. A perusal of the Full Bench decision would show that the three questions posed therein have to arise as "conditions precedent" and the Revenue Officer can try the issue "is these questions arise". That would mean that the three questions have to co-exist or to arise together and then only the Revenue Officer can get exclusive jurisdiction. The learned advocate for the appellant was not right in saying that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers could arise upon the existence of only on or two of these conditions. The view of Mr. Justice T.P. Naik, which was quoted and approved by the Full Bench, was not susceptible to that interpretation. The learned advocate for the appellant was not right in saying that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers could arise upon the existence of only on or two of these conditions. The view of Mr. Justice T.P. Naik, which was quoted and approved by the Full Bench, was not susceptible to that interpretation. If the Full Bench were to be of the view that only one or two of these questions could give rise to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Officers, they would not have characterised all these three questions as "conditions precedent" to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Revenue Officers and they would not have said at the end of paragraph No. 6 that the Revenue Officers would exercise jurisdiction "if these questions arise". The language used by the Full Bench and particularly the portions in italics would leave no manner of doubt that all these three questions must arise together and the parties must be at issue thereon. 12. Under Order 14, rule I, Civil Procedure Code, issues arise between the parties when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by one party and denied by the other. The material affirmation of fact by the plaintiff that the defendant was holding the land in suit on lease as a bataidar, was not denied but was specifically admitted F, the defendant. The parties were thus agreed that the defendant had the status of a tenant and they were not at issue on that point. That would mean that the first of these three conditions precedent prescribed by the Full Bench did not arise or exist. The Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, has not defined a lease, but a "lessee" is defined in section 2 (e), according to which a lessee includes a bataidar. It was not disputed that the inclusive definition, being for the purposes of the Act, was of a lessee under the Act. The contract of such a lessee namely, bataidar would necessarily be a lease under the Act. The defendant being the plaintiffs bataidar, would, therefore, be a lessee under the Act and his contract with the plaintiff would be a lease under the Act. The parties were clearly not at issue on this point either. It would, therefore, be obvious that even the third of the three conditions precedent did not arise. 13. The defendant being the plaintiffs bataidar, would, therefore, be a lessee under the Act and his contract with the plaintiff would be a lease under the Act. The parties were clearly not at issue on this point either. It would, therefore, be obvious that even the third of the three conditions precedent did not arise. 13. The plaintiff was admittedly a landholder and the defendant was a person claiming to be his lessee within the meaning of the second condition precedent. However, that (second) condition precedent could arise only if there was a "question" falling within the first and the third conditions because of their being at issue on the point of the status of the defendant and of the lease being under the Act. I have already shown in the next preceding paragraph that the question whether the defendant was a tenant or a lessee and whether he held a lease under the Act did not arise between the parties and they were not at issue thereon. Consequently, even the second of the three condition precedent did not exist. In view of the opinion of the Full Bench as explained above, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts could not arise become the three conditions precedent did not exist or arise together. 14. Shri Kalele then submitted that even though the defendant was admittedly a bataidar and, therefore, a lessee under the Act, the decision of the further questions regarding the contract between the parties being a lease under the Act within the meaning of the third and therefore, the second condition precedent, would depend upon whether the Act itself was applicable or whether the plaintiff was exempted from the operation of that Act. According to him, the parties must be deemed to be at issue on the question of the contract being a lease under the Act till the question of the applicability of the Act to the plaintiff was decided. I will deal with his submission on the question of the applicability or exemption from the operation of the Act claimed by the plaintiff, at length in the sequel. Suffice it to say for the present that the question of claiming or granting an exemption from the operation of the Act could arise only if the Act was otherwise applicable because of the existence of a lease under the Act. Suffice it to say for the present that the question of claiming or granting an exemption from the operation of the Act could arise only if the Act was otherwise applicable because of the existence of a lease under the Act. It was not disputed in the present case that the Act would be applicable unless the plaintiff could, be exempted -from its operation. Even if the submission of Shri Kalele that the parties should be deemed to beat issue till the question of exemption of the plaintiff from the operation of the Act was decided, were to be accepted, it would only mean that the third condition, and probably the second condition, was applicable but that would not make the first condition applicable. I have already shown that all the three conditions precedent and not only some of them, have to exist together before exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts could arise in accordance with the opinion -of the Full Bench. Consequently, it was not open to the defendant to say that the Revenue Officers had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the questions in dispute or that the jurisdiction of the civil Court was barred. 15. It was not disputed that the defendant, as the plaintiffs bataidar lessee would become a protected tenant under section 3 of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, and the civil Court could not eject him unless the plaintiff were to establish its claim for exemption from the operation of the Act by virtue of sub-section (4) of section 3, read with section 2 (f) on the ground that it was a person under disability. According to the plaintiff this question of its exemption from the operation of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act on the ground that it is a person under -disability can be decided by the civil Court alone and not by the Revenue Officers. It was contended that the Revenue Courts could decide the status of the defendant as a tenant but not the claim of the plaintiff that it is a person under disability and, therefore, exempted from the operation of the Act. It was contended on behalf of the defendant, on the other hand, that even this question of the status of the plaintiff as a person under disability could also be decided by the Revenue Officers exclusively. 16. It was contended on behalf of the defendant, on the other hand, that even this question of the status of the plaintiff as a person under disability could also be decided by the Revenue Officers exclusively. 16. Shri Kalele for the defendant-appellant relied on the wording of section 16 (1) and section 16-Bread with the Full Bench decision cited 6upra, to say that all questions of any kind arising out of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, could only be decided by the Revenue Officers and the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide any such questions was barred. I am afraid, these two sections, 16 (1) and 16-B were not susceptible to the interpretation which Shri Kalele was putting on them. By section 16 (1), which I have already quoted in extenso, Revenue Officers are empowered only to decide questions whether any transaction between a landholder and a person claiming to be his/lessee is a lease within the meaning of this Act and whether such person is a tenant of the plaintiff. That section does not at all say that any other questions like, for example, the question of the plaintiffs status as a person under disability, are to be decided by the Revenue Officers. Section 16-B also docs not say that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is barred for deciding all sorts of questions. It only says that no civil Court shall entertain any suit or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which a Revenue Officer is by or under this Act, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of (italics mine). That would mean that the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred only with respect to such matters which the Revenue Officers are empowered by the Act to determine, decide or dispose of. Shri Kalele could not show any provision of the Act whereby the Revenue Officers were empowered to determine or decide questions about the status of the plaintiff which would entitle him to claim exemption from the operation of the Act or to decide such Claim for exemption from the operation of the Act. Shri Kalele could not show any provision of the Act whereby the Revenue Officers were empowered to determine or decide questions about the status of the plaintiff which would entitle him to claim exemption from the operation of the Act or to decide such Claim for exemption from the operation of the Act. Consequently, it was impossible to accept the broad generalization made by Shri Kalele that all sorts of questions arising out of the Act were excluded from the jurisdiction of the civil Court even though the Revenue Officers were not specifically empowered to deal with them. 17. It would be pertinent to mention in this connection that sub-section (md) of section 70 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (Bombay Act No. LXVII of 1948) empowers the Revenue Officers to decide any dispute under section 88c which is with respect to the determination of exemption from certain provisions of the Act. Under sub-section (5) of section 880 of that Act, the decision of the Mamlatdar in that connection shall be final subject to an appeal to the Collector. Unlike that Bombay Act, the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, does not contain any provision to empower the Revenue Officers to decide questions about the applicability of the Act or about the exemptions given under that Act and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide such questions cannot be said to be barred by the provisions of section 16-B of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951. 18. The ordinary rule is that the jurisdiction of the civil Court cannot be excluded unless it is specifically barred. Normally, a civil Court shall be presumed to have jurisdiction to decide all such civil questions. The following remarks of the Supreme Court quoted in Jaswantlal v. Western Company, India (1) would be pertinent: "…….. It is possible to conceive of cases where in a suit under section 28 of the Act a question of title to the premises which does not arise out of the Act or any of its provisions may be determined incidentally. Any party to the suit aggrieved by such a determination could be free to sue in a competent Court to establish his title to such premises by virtue of the provisions of section 29-A of the Act. Any party to the suit aggrieved by such a determination could be free to sue in a competent Court to establish his title to such premises by virtue of the provisions of section 29-A of the Act. On the other hand, in a suit where 8 question of title entirely arises out of the Act or any of its provisions, the jurisdiction to try such a suit is exclusively vested in the Courts specified in section 28 and no other. That is to say, a title which could not be established outside the Act but which arose under the provisions of the Act by virtue of a claim made thereunder must be determined by a Court specified in section 28 and a title de hors the Act may be determined in any other Court of competent jurisdiction. By enacting section 29-A the Legislature clearly intended that no finality should be attached to the decision of a Court trying a suit under section 28 on a question of title de hors the Act." (italics mine) 19. Thus, it would be clear that there was no warrant for the contention of the defendant-appellant that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide questions of exemption from the applicability of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, and, therefore, I affirm the view of the Courts below that the civil Courts had the right and jurisdiction to decide whether the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, was or was not applicable to the facts of the present case. 20. As adumbrated, the plaintiff was claiming exemption from the operation of the Act under sections 3 (4) and 2 (f) of the Act. The relevant portion of sub-section (4) of section 3 is as follows: "The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall not apply in respect of- (a) any lease of land held from a landholder, who was or is,……… a person under disability at the time of granting the lease." A person under disability includes, according to section 2 (f), any public trust of a religious or charitable nature. Consequently, the plaintiff would be a person under disability within the meaning of section 2 (f) if it was proved that it was a public trust of a religious or charitable nature; and in that case, section 3 (4) would come into operation and the provisions of section 3 (1) and (2) would, therefore, be inapplicable, with the result that the defendant would not be entitled to take advantage of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951. 21. That would take me to consider whether the plaintiff had established that it was a person under disability, being a public trust for religious or charitable purpose. Before I proceed to discuss that question on its merits, I would like to refer to the criticism which was levelled by Shri Kalele on the pleadings of the plaintiff in this connection. The plaint only averred in paragraph 2 that the field belonged to the plaintiff. Sansthan of which Shiomurti was the legally appointed wahiwatdar and the Sansthan was registered according to the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act (M. P. Act No. 30 of 1951). Upon the defendant raising a contention that he bad become a protected lessee under the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, the plaintiff had averred in his rejoinder that it was not governed by the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951. Shri Kalele contended that these pleadings were entirely insufficient and unsatisfactory. He did not dispute that the plaintiff was a. public trust. But, according to him, the plaintiff had not pleaded that it was a religious or charitable trust and it had also not pleaded that it was a person under disability within the meaning of section 2 (f) and section 3 (4) of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act and, therefore, the defendant had no reason or occasion to reply to these specific pleas. He then relied on Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mt. Saran and others (1) to urge that the Court ought not to have even looked into the evidence beyond the insufficient pleadings actually made and ought not to have arrived at a finding in excess of the pleadings that the plaintiff was a religious or charitable trust which was a person under disability. 22. Saran and others (1) to urge that the Court ought not to have even looked into the evidence beyond the insufficient pleadings actually made and ought not to have arrived at a finding in excess of the pleadings that the plaintiff was a religious or charitable trust which was a person under disability. 22. The technical objection of Shri Kalele was, no doubt, correct, but it cannot be forgotten that this is a case from the mofussil and the mofussil pleadings ought not to be construed very strictly. I may mention in this connection that the pleadings of the defendant in paragraph 3 of his written statement were equally, or probably even more, vague than those of the plaintiff and yet the defendant was trying to say that they were quite clear under the circumstances. The rules of pleadings or any other rules of procedure ought to be applied in the same manner to both the parties and it would not be permissible to say that only one party should be penalised while the other should be put at a premium for making incorrect or incomplete pleadings. While I deprecate the insufficiency of pleadings, I must also note that the parties in the trial Court had no manner of doubt in their mind that the plaintiff was claiming to be a public religious trust and a person under disability and accordingly the parties went to trial. I am fortified in taking that view by the admitted fact that even after a finding by the trial Court that the plaintiff was a public religious trust and, therefore, a person under disability, the defendant in his appeal to the Additional District Judge did not question those findings or the alleged insufficiency of pleadings. If the defendant had any real grievance on the point, I do not think that he would have omitted to raise these points in the first appeal but that had not been done. If the point had been raised at the time of the first appeal, it may not be unlikely that the appellate Court might have remitted that particular point for further clarification and for enabling the parties to lead more evidence. But that question did not arise because of the failure of the defendant to challenge the findings of the trial Court on these two points. But that question did not arise because of the failure of the defendant to challenge the findings of the trial Court on these two points. Under these circumstances it was not correct to say at this stage that the pleadings were bad or that the case should be remanded as a whole or should be remitted for obtaining a specific finding after receiving further pleadings and evidence on the point. I would only say that in spite of the defective pleadings of the parties, no prejudice whatsoever was caused to either of them and both parties knew full well in the Courts below that they were going to trial on the specific questions that the plaintiff was a public religious trust and a person under disability within the meaning of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951. Consequently, I do not think it would be just or proper to uphold this belated contention on behalf of the defendant or to reopen the case for that reason. 23. In answer to the plaintiffs pleadings about the trust which I have summarised above, the defendant specifically admitted that the field belonged to the Sansthan. He only denied the allegation that Shiomurti was the legally appointed wahiwatdar or manager of the trust and also denied knowledge of the fact of registration of the trust. Even before me, Shri Kalele did not dispute that the plaintiff was a public trust. However, his assertion was that the plaintiff had not pleaded or proved that it was a public religious or public charitable trust. In this connection, he drew my attention to the definition of a. "public trust" given in section 2 (4) of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act (No. 30 of 1951). That definition is in the following terms: “Public Trust means an express or constructive trust for a public religious or charitable purpose and includes a temple, a math, a mosque, a church, a wakf or any other religious or charitable endowment and a society formed for a religious or charitable purpose." He pointed out that in the Official Gazette, which had first published this Act, there was a comma between "public" and "religious", and from the existence of that comma., he urged that the public trust as defined in that sub-section included three categories, namely, (a) public, (b) religious and (c) charitable purpose. He argued therefrom that it was quite possible that a trust can be a public trust without being religious or charitable and, therefore, the mere fact that this trust was registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, would not mean that it was a religious or charitable trust so as to bring it Within the definition of a person under disability. This interpretation of the comma after the adjective "public" was no doubt ingenious, but it would lead to some entirely untenable positions if three such categories of trusts were to be postulated. It would mean that a religious or a charitable trust even though it was a private one, would also become a public trust. Even Shri Kalele for the defendant-appellant was not prepared to go to this logical conclusion of his own interpretation which would result into the impossible position of converting a private religious and charitable trust into a public trust. That interpretation of Shri Kalele and its logical conclusion which I have indicated above, would entirely militate against the nature and purpose of the M. P. Act No. 30 of 1951. In its heading, it was described as an Act to regulate and to make better provision for the administration of public religious and charitable trusts. The preamble also stated that the Act was enacted because it was expedient to regulate and to make better provision for the administration of public religious and charitable trusts. Section 1 (1) of the Act mentioned the title of the Act as the "Public Trusts Act". All these things read together would clearly mean that the Act was not intended to cover any private trusts but was intended to cover only public trusts which were either religious or charitable. There was no warrant for the suggestion on behalf of the defendant-appellant that the Act was intended to cover all sorts of public trusts which were for purposes other than religious and charitable. Such an interpretation would not be proper. A public trust, say, for a political purpose, would not come under this Act. The history of that legislation would clearly show that it was enacted only in order to see that public religious and public charitable trusts, which were frequently mismanaged, were brought under proper control. 24. Such an interpretation would not be proper. A public trust, say, for a political purpose, would not come under this Act. The history of that legislation would clearly show that it was enacted only in order to see that public religious and public charitable trusts, which were frequently mismanaged, were brought under proper control. 24. Apart from the fact that the explanation of the comma after the word "public" so as to create three categories of trusts, was not tenable or in keeping with the tenor of the Act, there appeared to be another reasonable explanation for that comma being put after the word "public" in the definition of the "public trust". That comma was apparently put in, so that the adjective "public" should become applicable to both the categories, religious and charitable, which were mentioned immediately after the word "public". If the comma were not put in there, there was the possibility of the adjective "public" being applied to religious but not to charitable trusts and it appears that this comma was put in only for ensuring that the adjective "public" was used in apposition to both religious and charitable purposes. 25. While accepting the position that the plaintiff was a public trust, Shri Kalele submitted that it could as well be a trust for some purpose other than religious or charitable. There was no warrant for that submission in the pleadings of the defendant in the trial Court. If the trust was a public one without being for religious or charitable purposes, the defendant would not have omitted to raise that plea specifically and, in that event, the plaintiff could have produced further documents to show what was the purpose of the trust mentioned in the application for registration in accordance with section 5 (vi) of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, and what was the order eventually passed thereon. However, nothing of the sort was done. The name of the trust is "Shripal Siddha Swami Math Sansthan". This name of the trust would leave no doubt that it was, and was meant to be, a religious trust Where the devotees went for worship. However, nothing of the sort was done. The name of the trust is "Shripal Siddha Swami Math Sansthan". This name of the trust would leave no doubt that it was, and was meant to be, a religious trust Where the devotees went for worship. When the M. P. Act No. 30 of 1951 was only for regulating public charitable and religious trusts and when the plaintiff had averred that it was registered under that Act and when the fact that it was a public religious trust was not denied by the defendant, I do not think it was open to the defendant to say in second appeal now that it was not proved to be a public religious or charitable trust. 26. The order (Exhibit P-2) by the Collector as the Registrar of Trusts showed that it was ordered to be registered under the Act. There was considerable force in the submission of Shri Jakatdar for the plaintiff-respondent that a presumption should rightly be drawn under illustration (e) below section 114 of the Evidence Act, that this registration was, and was meant to be, only .of a public religious trust for the regulation of which M. P. Act No. 30 of 1951 had been passed. Shri Kalele contended, on the other hand, that such a presumption should not be drawn because the order (Exhibit P- 2) did not say that the trust was a religious or charitable one but only ordered it to be registered as a public trust. He urged that it was equally likely that even the Collect of, acting as the Registrar, may have been under a wrong impression that the Act covered public trusts other than religious or charitable trusts, as was his own interpretation. This was only a matter of speculation by the learned counsel and there was no material on record to show that the Collector, who ordered registration under the Act, was under any such misapprehension so as to leave any room for drawing an inference that the trust may have been of some other kind without being a religious or charitable trust. The short answer to this criticism is that, in case, the Registrar had meant to register the trust as a public trust without being a charitable or religious trust, the defendant would not have failed to raise a specific plea on that point and, if that were done, I have no doubt that the plaintiff could have produced further documentary evidence from the proceedings before the Registrar to show that it was claimed and was recognised as a public religious trust. 27. It would be seen that it was a pure question of fact whether the plaintiff-trust was or was not a public religious trust. The Courts below have considered the evidence on the point and have come to a concurrent finding of" fact that the plaintiff was a public religious trust and, therefore, a person under disability. In order to get over this finding of fact, which the defendant would not have otherwise been able to do, a touch of legal objections in the shape of want of proper pleadings and deciding the matter without pleadings was sought to be given. I have dealt with those objections at considerable length and I am quite clear that those objections are untenable with the material and evidence as it stands on record. There can be no doubt that the plaintiff is a public religious trust and I affirm this concurrent finding by the Courts below. It would necessarily mean that it was a person under disability within the meaning of section 2 (f) read with section 3 (4) of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, and consequently that Act would not be applicable to the plaintiff and, therefore, the defendant could not become a protected lessee within the meaning of section 3 ibid. 28. Shri Kalele had also raised one more point in connection with the registration of the plaintiff as a public religious trust. In paragraph 3, the defendant had stated that he had already become a protected tenant in 1951 but the trust was registered in 1954 and, therefore, his status as a protected lessee, which he acquired in 1951, could not be affected by the subsequent registration of the trust in 1954. In the first place, there was no pleading to that effect in the Courts below and the parties did not go to trial oil that basis. In the first place, there was no pleading to that effect in the Courts below and the parties did not go to trial oil that basis. The criticism which Shri Kalele has raised on the authority of Siddik Mah0me4 Shah v. Saran and others (1) with respect to the pleadings of the plaintiffs would apply with equal force to this submission of Shri Kalele. By the same reasoning he could not now seek a decision for the first time in second appeal on a fact which was never pleaded. Moreover, he was under a misapprehension in thinking that section 3 (4) of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951 applied only from the date of the registration of the trust. In fact, that clause made no reference whatsoever to registration or to the point of time of registration, and a plain reading of that clause would show that the person bas to be under disability on the date of the lease. The suggestion of Shri Kalele that this trust came into existence on the date of registration had no foundation in the record. On the contrary, the proceedings which his client had taken before the revenue authorities even before the registration of this trust in 1954 clearly show that the plaintiff was accepted to be a public trust long before its registration. In the absence of any pleadings or material on record, it is not possible to consider for the first time in this appeal the suggestion that the trust had or must have come into existence only after the defendant had acquired the status of a protected lessee. 29. Shri Kalele then urged that, in the past the defendant had once gone to the revenue authorities for fixing the amount of lease-money which was fixed at five times the assessment on 14-5-1954 and the plaintiff was refused permission by the Deputy Commissioner on the 10th of January 1955 to terminate the lease. According to Shri Kalele, these previous proceedings before the revenue officers must be deemed to be under the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, 1951, and the plaintiff must, therefore, be held to be bound by those decisions with the further result that the plaintiff should be held to be a person governed by the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act despite the fact that it was a person under disability. Shri Kalele did not want to go to the length of saying that those previous decisions operated as res judicata. He, however, contended that they were decisions inter paries and, therefore, they were binding on both the parties and the plaintiff cannot repudiate them. That argument firstly assumed that there was or there can be an estoppel against law. The plaintiff was no doubt a party to those previous proceedings but under the law which I have considered at length above, the plaintiff was a person under disability and, therefore, not governed by the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act. In view of that position, the mere fact that it previously submitted to the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner by moving an application for terminating the lease or by accepting the lease-money at five times the assessment would not bind it so as to preclude it from asserting that it was exempted from the operation of the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act. 30. Moreover, even if he had submitted to the jurisdiction once, it is settled law that consent cannot give jurisdiction and, therefore, the alleged previous consent to the jurisdiction of the Collector under the Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act would be neither here nor there so far as the present proceedings are concerned. Shri Kalele was not able to show to me any authority of law whereby those previous decisions of the Revenue Courts, which were entirely without jurisdiction, could be said to be binding on the plaintiff in the present proceedings. I do not think it necessary to reproduce the detailed reasons given by the learned Additional District Judge to show how the orders passed entirely without jurisdiction were of no avail to the defendant. 31. That would take me to the question of the cross-objections filed by the plaintiff. The learned Additional District Judge had held that the defendant was in possession as a bataidar from before the year 1954 and the specific contra6t for batai for the year 1954-55 was not proved and, therefore, he disallowed the entire claim for the lease-money for that year. The learned Additional District Judge had held that the defendant was in possession as a bataidar from before the year 1954 and the specific contra6t for batai for the year 1954-55 was not proved and, therefore, he disallowed the entire claim for the lease-money for that year. He had, however ignored the fact that admittedly the defendant was in possession as a bataidar in that year, as in previous years, and consequently the failure to prove the specific agreement for that year should not have led to the dismissal of the claim for lease-money of that year. Moreover it was even the defendants case that he entered into possession as a bataidar and continued to retain possession on the same basis. That would also clearly mean that the defendant was in possession as a bataidar and he has actually enjoyed the usufruct of that year. Under these circumstances, even the learned Advocate for the defendant-appellant did not dispute that the plaintiff would be entitled to his amount of lease money for the year 1954-55. 32. The next question would be regarding the quantum of lease-money. The learned appellate Judge had affirmed the finding of fact by the learned trial Judge that the income was Rs. 900 for that year and the batai share of the plaintiff would be Rs. 450, but he had disallowed it on the basis that the actual terms of agreement for that year were not proved. I was taken through that evidence which was considered by the learned trial Judge but I am inclined to think that that evidence was somewhat scrappy and was not sufficient to arrive at a correct figure of the total produce and the consequent share of the plaintiff. In view of that insufficient evidence and the fact that the defendant had admitted in the trial Court his liability to pay the lease-money at five times the assessment, coupled with the fact that the learned Advocate for the defendant accepted the position that the plaintiffs half share of the crops would not be less than five times the assessment for the year 1954-55, I would hold that the plaintiffs half share of the crops for the year 1954-55 would be equivalent to five times the assessment in lieu of the batai share of the plaintiff. I may mention, however, that what exactly should be the batai share of the plaintiff by way of subsequent mesne profits will have to be determined afresh in the executing Court. 33. In conclusion, the defendants appeal is dismissed with costs and the plaintiffs cross-objections are allowed and consequently the dismissal of the claim for mesne profits is set aside and the decree is modified by adding Rs. 333-2-0 as the plaintiffs share for the year 1954-55 with the further direction that the defendant shall be entitled to a deduction of the amount of assessment for that year, if he has already paid it on behalf of the/ plaintiff. The mesne profits for further years as may be permissible under law shall be enquired into by the executing Court. The defendant-appellant shall bear his costs and pay the costs of the plaintiff throughout. 34. At this stage, Shri Kalele sought for leave to file a Letters Patent appeal. In view of the points of law involved, leave is granted as prayed. Appeal dismissed; Cross-objection allowed.