JUDGMENT GOVINDA MENON, J. :- Kunjan Vasu aged 22 was tried by the Additional Sessions Judge of Kottayam for offences under Sections 302 and 392, I. P. C., for having murdered one Bharathi and her infant son Vijayan by drowning them in the Murinjapuzha river on the night of 6-4-1962 and for having robbed her of her gold neck-chain. The learned Judge acquitted the accused of offences under Sections 302 and 392, I. P. C. but found him guilty of the offence under S. 404, I. P. C. On perusing the calendar, notice was issued by this Court to show cause why the order of acquittal under Sections 302 and 392, I. P. C., should not be set aside. Criminal Appeal 309 of 1962 is filed by the State against the acquittal and criminal Appeal 241 of 1962 is filed by the accused against his conviction. 2. Deceased Bharathi was the wife of Pw. 1 Narayanan and deceased Vijayan was their son. On the night of 6-4-62 the deceased, as usual, went to sleep in the northern room of their house and Pw. 1 took his bed on the eastern verandah. Next day morning Bharathi and the child were found missing. Pw. 1 found that she had removed some money which he had kept in the box. He went in search of her to her house at Panavalli and not finding her there he continued the search. In the evening he heard that two dead bodies were seen floating in Murinjapuzha river. He hurried to the place and found to his grief that they were those of his wife and child. Next morning he went to Vaikom Police Station and gave the first information report Ex. P-1. A case was registered. Pw. 17 the Head Constable held the inquest and the dead bodies were sent for postmortem examination. Pw. 4 the Assistant Surgeon conducted the autopsy. According to him death was due to asphyxia from drowning. 3. On enquiries conducted so far, the Sub-Inspector of police felt some suspicion against the accused. His house was searched. He was not in the village. Enquiries were made about his whereabouts and eventually he was traced and arrested on 27-4-1962. He was sent up for remand with a request to record his confessional statement. After observing all the formalities the Additional First Class Magistrate, Vaikom recorded his confessional statement. His house was searched. He was not in the village. Enquiries were made about his whereabouts and eventually he was traced and arrested on 27-4-1962. He was sent up for remand with a request to record his confessional statement. After observing all the formalities the Additional First Class Magistrate, Vaikom recorded his confessional statement. In the confessional statement Ex. P8 the accused admitted having taken Bharathi and the child from the house on the night of the incident in a canoe and having drowned them in the Murinjapuzha river and having robbed her of the gold neck-chain. After the confession was recorded the accused was transferred to police custody and the neck-chain and the currency notes were recovered. After completing the investigation the accused was charge-sheeted. 4. At the trial the accused denied the commission of the offence and stated that he gave the confessional statement as a result of torture by the police. He denied any illicit intimacy with the deceased and denied having gone to her house on the date of her disappearance. He characterised as false the evidence of Pw. 7 having met him near the house of the deceased and the evidence of Pw. 8 having seen him and the deceased in the canoe. He admitted having changed one 10-rupee note from P.W. 11. Regarding the hundred-rupee notes he admitted that he had given a hundred-rupee note to his mother-in-law, but stated that it was from out of Rs. 200/- which he had got from Sulaiman's chitty. When questioned about the evidence of P. W. 19 the Circle Inspector of Police about the recovery of M. O. 2 the gold chain, he stated that P. W. 1 had given that gold chain M. O. 2 to him for pledging; that he had redeemed the pledge and was keeping the chain with him, the Circle Inspector of Police took it from him and had it planted in the shop and he was asked to take it out. 5. On a consideration of the prosecution evidence the learned Judge found that the evidence was insufficient to find the accused guilty of murder. He found that the offence of robbery also will not lie and acquitted the accused of those offences. 5. On a consideration of the prosecution evidence the learned Judge found that the evidence was insufficient to find the accused guilty of murder. He found that the offence of robbery also will not lie and acquitted the accused of those offences. On the ground that the neck chain admittedly belonging to the deceased and which she was wearing at the time of her death was traced to the possession of the accused, the learned Judge found the accused guilty under S. 404, I. P. C. 6. There are no eye witnesses and the guilt of the accused depends solely on circumstantial evidence. The mode of evaluating circumstantial evidence has been stated by the 'Supreme Court in Hanumant v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343 . Their Lordships say: "It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." 7. The view has been followed in later decisions of the Supreme Court. In the recent case in Anant Chintaman v State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 500 , the appellant was tried for the murder of one Laxmibai Karve. The fact found against him was that on or about November 12 and 13 1956 either at Poona or in the course of a railway journey between Poona and Bombay he administered to the deceased some unrecognized poison or drug which would act as poison, with the intention of causing her death and which did cause her death. Autopsy and the chemical analysis did not reveal any sure signs of poison having been administered. It was contended that in the absence of any evidence that death was due to poisoning conviction could not be sustained. Autopsy and the chemical analysis did not reveal any sure signs of poison having been administered. It was contended that in the absence of any evidence that death was due to poisoning conviction could not be sustained. Hidayatullah, J., delivering the majority judgment observed : "If the deceased died in circumstances which prima facie admit of either disease or homicide by poisoning, the Court must look at the conduct of the accused (who was a medical man) who brought the deceased to the hospital, and consider to what conclusion that conduct unerringly points. If the accused as an honest medical man had taken the deceased to the hospital and she had died by reason of disease, his conduct would have been entirely different. He would not have taken her to the hospital bereft of property with which she started from home; he would not have given a wrong or misleading name to cover her identity; he would not have given a wrong age and wrong history of her ailment; he would not have written a letter suggesting that she had a brother in Calcutta, which brother did not exist; he would not have abandoned the corpse to be dealt with by the hospital as an unclaimed body; he would not have attempted to convince the world that she was alive and happily married; he would not have obtained her property by forgeries, impersonation and other tricks indulged in both before and after her death; but he would have informed her relatives and done everything in his power to see that she was properly treated and stayed on to face whatever inquiry the hospital wished to make into the cause of death and not tried to avoid the postmortem examination and would not have disappeared, never to reappear." 8. The learned Judge has referred to various cases. One of the cases referred to is the case of R. v. Mary Ann Nash, 1911-6 Cr. App. Rep. 225. That case is illustrative of the proposition that even though the cause of death may not appear to be established by direct evidence the circumstances of the case may be sufficient to infer that a murder has been committed. In that case, the prisoner had an illegitimate son, five years old. There was evidence to show that the mother desired to put the child out of her way. In that case, the prisoner had an illegitimate son, five years old. There was evidence to show that the mother desired to put the child out of her way. One day in June 1907 the mother left the house and returned without the child. She made several statements as to what had happened to the child, which were found to be untrue. As late as April 1908. the body of a child was discovered in a well. Decomposition had so far advanced that even the sex of the child could not be determined. There was nothing therefore, to show whether death was natural or violent or whether it had occurred before or after the body was put into the well. The case was left to the jury. On appeal, it was contended that there being no proof how death took place, the judge should not have left the case to the jury but ought to have withdrawn it. Lord Chief Justice delivering the judgment of the Court of appeal referred to the untrue statements of the prisoner about the whereabouts of the child and observed as follows : "All these statements were untrue; She had an object in getting rid of the child and if it had been lost or met with an accidental death, she had every interest in saying so at once. It is said there is no evidence of violent death, but we cannot accept that Mr. Goddard cannot have meant that there must be proof from the body itself of a violent death.........In view of the facts that the child left home well and was afterwards found dead, that the appellant was last seen with it and made untrue statements about it, this is not a case which could have been withdrawn from the jury." The learned Judge concluded by stating : "Circumstantial evidence in this context means a combination of facts creating a net-work through which there is no escape for the accused, because the facts taken as a whole do not admit of any inference but of his guilt. To rely upon the findings of the medical man who conducted the postmortem and of the chemical analyser as decisive of the matter is to render the other evidence entirely fruitless. While the circumstances often speak with unerring certainty, the autopsy and the chemical analysis taken by themselves may be most misleading. To rely upon the findings of the medical man who conducted the postmortem and of the chemical analyser as decisive of the matter is to render the other evidence entirely fruitless. While the circumstances often speak with unerring certainty, the autopsy and the chemical analysis taken by themselves may be most misleading. No doubt, due weight must be given to the negative findings at such examinations. But, bearing in mind the difficult task which the man of medicine performs and the limitations under which he works, his failure should not be taken as the end of the case, for on good and probative circumstances, an irresistible inference of guilt can be drawn." 9. We may, in this connection, refer to the following observations of Lord Coleridge, J., quoted at pages 46 and 47 in Wills on Circumstantial Evidence 7th Edn. : "Now circumstantial evidence varies infinitely in its strength in proportion to the character, the variety; the cogency, the independence one or another, of the circumstances. I think one might describe it as a network of facts cast around the accused man. That network may be a mere gossamer thread, as light and as unsubstantial as the air itself. It may vanish at a touch. It may be that, strong as it is in part, it leaves great gaps and rents through which the accused is entitled to pass in safety. It may be so close, so stringent, so coherent in its texture, that no efforts on the part of the accused can break through. It may come to nothing - on the other hand it may be absolutely convincing............ The law does not demand that you should act upon certainties alone......... In our lives, in our acts, in our thoughts we do not deal with certainties: we ought to act upon just and reasonable convictions founded upon just and reasonable grounds.........The law asks for no more and the law demands no less." 10. The learned author refers to the case of Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co. Ltd., (1911) 1 KB 988 where Fletcher Moulton. The learned author refers to the case of Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co. Ltd., (1911) 1 KB 988 where Fletcher Moulton. L. J., said : "Proof does not mean proof to rigid mathematical demonstration, because that is impossible; it must mean such evidence as would induce a reasonable man to come to the conclusion" (in question) "as a fact"; and Buckley, L. J., (at p. 996), "when it is said that a person must prove his case, it is never meant that he must prove it with absolute certainty. All that can be done is to adduce such evidence as that the mind of the tribunal is satisfied that the fact is so. This may be done by direct evidence or by inference from facts, but the matter must not be left to rest in surmise, conjecture, or guess." 11. In the light of these principles we will now see the various circumstances that have been proved in the case and see whether on these circumstances it would be reasonable to conclude that the death of Bharathi and the child were due to homicidal drowning and that the accused was responsible for the same. (The judgment then discussed the evidence in paras 11 to 15 and proceeded). 16. We have then the confessional statement Ex. P-8 recorded from the accused. After the arrest of the accused on 27-4-62 he was produced before the Additional First Class Magistrate of Vaikom on the same day at 3 p.m., with a requisition to record the statement of the accused. The learned Magistrate wanted to peruse the case diary statements of the witnesses before remanding the accused and he was ordered to be produced the next day. On that day the Magistrate gave necessary warning and being satisfied that the accused wanted to make a voluntary statement he was given two days' time for reflection. He was produced again on 30-4-62. Again the accused was warned and after putting the necessary questions and satisfying himself that the statement which he was about to make was voluntary one, the Magistrate recorded the statement of the accused in his own words, read it over to him and it was acknowledged by the accused to be correct. 17. The question is whether this confession is entitled to credence and could safely be acted upon. 17. The question is whether this confession is entitled to credence and could safely be acted upon. The learned counsel was at pains to show that the confession was not voluntary and true, and that even if it was so, it would be unsafe to act on the retracted confession which, according to him, was resiled as early as an opportunity occurred to the accused. We have carefully gone through the questions put by the Magistrate and the answers given by the accused and we are satisfied that nothing could be said against the procedure followed by the Magistrate. The learned Magistrate has carefully conformed to the procedure prescribed by Sections 164 and 364, Cri. P. C. He had explained to the accused that he was not bound to make a confession and if he does so it will be used as evidence against him and he has made the necessary certificate that the confession was voluntarily made. The meagre cross-examination of the Sub Magistrate has not brought out any materials which would, in any way, detract from the satisfactory way in which the learned Magistrate has performed his duty in recording the statement. The mere bald assertion by the accused that he was threatened, tutored or that inducement was offered to him cannot be accepted as true without more. There is no statement in the confession which is against the evidence adduced in the case and the circumstances referred to by as to a very great extent probabilise the truth of the confessional statement. 18. A confession of a crime by a person who is charged is usually the outcome of penitence and remorse and in normal circumstances is the best evidence against the maker. But the confession has been retracted. It is now well settled that though a conviction based on a retracted confession is not strictly illegal still it is a rule of prudence to base a conviction only if the confessional statement is corroborated by other evidence. One of the latest cases of the Supreme Court is the case in Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab, (S) AIR 1957 SC 216 . The question then arises as to what is the nature of the corroboration that is required. One of the latest cases of the Supreme Court is the case in Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab, (S) AIR 1957 SC 216 . The question then arises as to what is the nature of the corroboration that is required. In the case in AIR 1957 SC 216 (cited above) it is stated as follows : "It is necessary to emphasise here that, the rule of prudence does not require that each and every circumstance mentioned in the confession with regard to the participation of the accused person in the crime must be separately and independently corroborated, nor is it essential that the corroboration must come from facts and circumstances discovered after the confession was made. If the rule required that each and every circumstance mentioned in the confessional statement must be separately and independently corroborated, then the rule would be meaningless inasmuch as the independent evidence itself would afford sufficient basis for conviction and it would be unnecessary to call the confession in aid." As was observed in Kashmira Singh v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 159 : "Cases may arise where the judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction; in such an event, the judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept." 19. In the case in Subramania Goundan v. State of Madras, AIR 1958 SC 66 , His Lordship Govinda Menon, J., discussed the rule of corroboration and relying on the decision in AIR 1957 SC 216 observed : "It would be sufficient, in our opinion, that the general trend of the confession is substantiated by some evidence which would tally with what is contained in the confession." His Lordship then compared a retracted confession with the evidence of an approver or an accomplice and stated : "Though under S. 133 of the Evidence Act a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds on the uncorroborated testimony of witnesses. Illustration (b) to S. 114 lays down that a Court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. Illustration (b) to S. 114 lays down that a Court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. In the case of such a person on his own showing he is a depraved and debased individual who having taken part in the crime tries to exculpate himself and wants to fasten the liability on another. In such circumstances it is absolutely necessary that what he has deposed must be corroborated in material particulars. In contrasting this with the statement of a person making a confession who stands on a better footing one need only find out when there is a retraction whether the earlier statement, which was the result of remorse, repentance and contrition, was voluntary and true or not and it is with that object that corroboration is sought for. Not infrequently one is apt to fall in error in equating a retracted confession with the evidence of an accomplice, and therefore it is advisable to clearly understand the distinction between the two. The standards of corroboration in the two are quite different. In the case of the person confessing who has resiled from his statement, general corroboration is sufficient while an accomplice's evidence should be corroborated in material particulars; In addition the Court must feel that the reasons given for the retraction in the case of a confession are untrue." 20. Applying the test laid down in these decisions the confessional statement has been amply corroborated. (The judgment then discussed the evidence and proceeded). Here the circumstances referred to by us go to show that the accused must have tilted the boat and brought about the death of Bharathi and her child and that is what he stated in the voluntary confessional statement which he had made. The learned Judge has, therefore, erred in thinking that the statement of the accused that he tilted the boat and brought about the fall of the deceased into the water has to be corroborated by independent evidence. 21. The learned Judge felt that the accused had no motive for causing the death of Bharathi and her child and found that the probabilities are that she would have committed suicide. If it was only to make some gain it could be argued that there was no need for the accused to have caused the death of the woman and her child. If it was only to make some gain it could be argued that there was no need for the accused to have caused the death of the woman and her child. But we do not know if that alone was the motivating force. Motive being a mental attitude is often difficult of proof. People do often commit grave crimes from the most inadequate of motives. So absence of proof of motive or an adequate motive is not fatal to the prosecution case even in a case depending solely on circumstantial evidence. If the circumstances otherwise establish guilt, inability to prove motive or an adequate motive is not an impediment to a conviction. (The judgment then discussed the evidence and proceeded). 22. We will now look into the conduct of the accused and consider to what conclusion that conduct unerringly points. If the death of Bharathi and her child had not been brought about by the accused his conduct would have been entirely different. He would not have taken the trouble of removing the neckchain and secreting it and disposing of the currency notes knowing that the police were after him. He would not have abandoned the corpse and gone away as if nothing had happened and disappeared from his house to be arrested days after the incident. These circumstances advance the case against the appellant very much beyond suspicion and reasonably and definitely point to the conclusion that the deaths of Bharathi and her child were brought about by the accused. In such a situation the fact that the accused has no explanation to offer as to how, after having taken charge of this woman and having travelled with her on the night of the 6th in the canoe, where and how he parted company with her and how she and her child happened to get drowned goes a long way against him. The fact that he tried to dissociate himself from her company by putting forward the case that he had not met her on that day which is patently false is also very significant. The false explanations which he gave regarding the neck-chain and the currency notes are also telling circumstances which in a case like this taken with the other facts are enough to bring the guilt home to the accused. The false explanations which he gave regarding the neck-chain and the currency notes are also telling circumstances which in a case like this taken with the other facts are enough to bring the guilt home to the accused. We may, in this connection, refer to the observations of Jagannadhadas, J., in the case in Deonandan Mishra v. State of Bihar, (S) AIR 1955 SC 801 : "It is true that in a case of circumstantial evidence not only should the various links in the chain of evidence be clearly established, but the completed chain must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. But in a case like this where the various links as stated above have been satisfactorily made out and the circumstances point to the appellant as the probable assailant, with reasonable definiteness and in proximity to the deceased as regards time and situation, and he offers no explanation, which if accepted though not proved, would afford a reasonable basis for a conclusion on the entire case consistent with his innocence, such absence of explanation or false explanation would itself be an additional link which completes the chain." On a careful and anxious consideration of all these circumstances we are of the opinion that this is a case which satisfies the standards requisite for conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence and we hold the accused guilty of the offence of murder. As stated by the learned Judge the possession of the neck-chain would not, by itself, amount to an offence of robbery, for robbery is theft by force and theft is taking moveable properties out of the possession of a person. It is not clear whether the removal of the neck-chain was before or after her death. We, therefore, agree with the conclusions of the learned Judge that the accused could be found guilty only of the offence under S. 404, I P. C. 23. Learned counsel for the appellant finally contended that the Sessions Judge has come to a reasonable conclusion on the evidence and there is no substantial and compelling reasons to take a different view. The question as regards the correct principles to be applied by a Court hearing an appeal against the acquittal of an accused have been laid down in the leading case in Sheo Swarup v. Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 (2). The question as regards the correct principles to be applied by a Court hearing an appeal against the acquittal of an accused have been laid down in the leading case in Sheo Swarup v. Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 (2). There Lord Russell observed thus : ".........the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as, (1) the views of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses............" Adverting to the facts of the case, the Privy Council proceeded to state, ".........They have no reason to think that the High Court failed to take all proper matters into consideration in arriving at their conclusions of fact." These two passages indicate the principles to be followed by an appellate Court in disposing of an appeal against acquittal and also the proper care it should take in re-evaluating the evidence. 24. These principles have been subsequently affirmed and reiterated by the Supreme Court in a series of cases. In some of these cases it is true that their Lordships have emphasised the necessity of interference only on substantial and compelling reasons, but in stating so the Supreme Court did not, in any way, try to curtail the power bestowed on the appellate Court under Sections 417 and 423, Cri. P. C. What really is 'compelling and substantial reason' has been made clear in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 439 where Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Bench has observed as follows : "But, on close analysis, it is clear that the principles laid down by the Court in this matter have remained the same. What may be called the golden thread running through all these decisions is the rule that in deciding appeals against acquittal the Court of appeal must examine the evidence with particular care, must examine also the reasons on which the order of acquittal was based and should interfere with the order only when satisfied that the view taken by the acquitting judge is clearly unreasonable. Once the appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the view taken by the lower Court is clearly an unreasonable one that itself is a "compelling reason" for interference : For, it is a Court's duty to convict a guilty person when the guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt, no less than it is its duty to acquit the accused when such guilt is not so established." 25. It is, therefore, clear that the expression 'compelling reasons" is not intended to place any restrictions or to import any limitation on the powers of the appellate courts while hearing appeals against acquittal. Even in an appeal against acquittal the appellate court has full power to review the entire evidence on record and come to its own independant conclusion on the question as to whether such evidence is sufficient to conclusively establish the guilt of the accused. In the appreciation of such evidence, the appellate court will, no doubt, approach the evidence keeping in mind that there is the initial presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and that such presumption has gained added strength by the trial court's verdict of innocence in his favour. All the same, if on a due appreciation of the evidence, the appellate court reaches the conclusion that the verdict of the trial court is wrong and unsupportable and that the evidence against the accused is clear and convincing enough to lead to the conclusive inference that the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt, then it is the duty of the appellate court to reverse the decision of the trial court and to convict the accused. 26. Judged by these principles, we have no hesitation in holding that correct inferences have not been drawn from the facts proved in the case and on account of the misappreciation of evidence wrong conclusions have been drawn on proved facts. 26. Judged by these principles, we have no hesitation in holding that correct inferences have not been drawn from the facts proved in the case and on account of the misappreciation of evidence wrong conclusions have been drawn on proved facts. Where there is thus a total absence of any justification for the finding of the learned Judge and the order of the learned Judge is wholly erroneous and unreasonable, we have to find that the accused has been wrongly acquitted of the offence of murder resulting in a miscarriage of justice. We, therefore, set aside the order of acquittal under S. 302 I. P. C. 27. Regarding the question of sentence, in the normal course the proper punishment for the heinous and premeditated crime would have been the sentence of death, but taking into account the fact that the accused had been acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge of the offence of murder, we consider that the ends of justice would be met if we sentence the accused to rigorous imprisonment for life. In the result, the acquittal of the accused under S. 302 I. P. C., is set aside. He is convicted under S. 302 I. P. C., and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. The conviction and sentence of the accused under S. 404 I. P. C., are confirmed. The sentences will run concurrently. The acquittal of the accused under S. 392 I. P. C., is continued. Order accordingly.