Judgment 1. First Appeal No. 280 of 1960 was filed by the petitioners on the 20th of September, 1960. Respondents 8 to 14 and 17 were minors. On the 19th of April, 1962, the learned Registrar directed (obviously under Rule 2, Chapter VI, High Court Rules) that the pleader guardians cost of the minor respondents should be deposited within ten days and later the Division Bench granted further time for that purpose till the 30th of June, 1962, As there was default in compliance with that order, the appeal stood dismissed against the minor respondents and the same fact was intimated to learned Counsel appearing for the appellants On the 11th of July, 1962. On the 5th of September, 1962, M. J. C. 907 of 1962 under Sec.151, Civil Procedure Code, was filed in this Court with a prayer for restoration of the appeal against the minor respondents, and in the application, it was stated that petitioner No.2, Deoki Mahto, who was in charge of the case, had an attack of typhoid fever and dysentery confining him to bed in a serious condition and, therefore, he failed to take necessary steps to deposit cost of the guardian for the minor respondents. A medical certificate was attached to the application in support of his illness. The Stamp Reporter, however, pointed out on the 29th of September, 1962, that the application was barred by time as it had not been filed within 30 days from the dismissal of the first appeal against the minor respondents, as provided under Rule 25 Chapter VII of the High Court Rules. Learned Counsel contested this report and raised an objection against the validity of that rule. He urged that the High Court could not make a rule providing for limitation of time for an application invoking inherent powers of the Court under Sec.151, Civil Procedure Code. 2. The Letters Patent constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna provide in Clause 29 "And we do further ordain that it shall be lawful for the High Court of Judicature at Patna from time to time to make rules and orders for regulating the practice of the Court and for the purpose of adopting as far as possible the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, .... to all proceedings in its testamentary, intestate and matrimonial jurisdiction, respectively." The High Court derives its power to make rules for regulating the practice of the Court from that provision. Under Sec.122 of the Code of Civil Procedure the High Court may, from time to time after previous publication, make rules regulating their own procedure .... and may by such rules annul, alter or add to all or any of the rules in the First Schedule of the Code. Sections 126 and 127 provide for the approval of the Government of the State, of such rules and for publication of the same in the Official Gazette. Sec.129 authorises the High Court to make rules, not inconsistent with the Letters Patent or order or other law establishing it, to regulate its own procedure in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction as it shall think fit, and according to Sec.131, these rules are to be published in the Official Gazette. From the aforesaid provisions it will appear that the Letters Patent do not provide for publication in the Official Gazette all the rules that may be framed under Clause 29, although such publication is obligatory when a rule is made under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Clause 29 of the Letters Patent is an authority for the High Court to make rules and orders for regulating the practice of the Court both in its original and appellate side. But rules made in regard to the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court will need publication in the Official Gazette as provided under Sec.129 read with Sec.131 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, a part of the rules that may be framed under Clause 29 of the Letters Patent may be subject to the obligatory provisions for previous publication in the Official Gazette. Rules framed in regard to the testamentary, intestate and matrimonial jurisdiction of the High Court or its appellate-jurisdiction under Clause 29 of the Letters Patent are not infested with any specific provision for previous publication either under the Letters Patent or the Code of Civil Procedure. But there may be some rules made by the High Court which, is intended to apply to both original, civil or otherwise, and appellate jurisdiction. In such a case publication in the Official Gazette before enforcing the rule will be inevitable. But there may be some rules made by the High Court which, is intended to apply to both original, civil or otherwise, and appellate jurisdiction. In such a case publication in the Official Gazette before enforcing the rule will be inevitable. Rule 25 of Chapter VII of the High Court Rules is one of that nature as it provides for applications for re-admission or restoration of an appeal or an application; the latter may include an application made in the original civil side of the Court. The non-publication of that rule in the Official Gazette, however, will not affect the validity of that rule in so far as it is applicable to matters in the appellate side. We are now concerned with an application for restoration of a first appeal. The learned Government Pleader, who appeared before us in response to a notice to the Advocate General of this case, urged that the amendment to Rule 25 as made on the 6th December, 1961, or the 27th March, 1962, was not published in the Official, Gazette, and that would affect the enforceability of those amendments. But as I have pointed out above, this argument will have no force as far as the present application to restore a first appeals is concerned. 3. Another point of importance for consideration is whether the period of 30 days from the date of dismissal of the appeal or application could be provided in the rule by the High Court within the powers vested in it under Clause 29 of the Letters Patent. Rule 25, either as it was originally or as it stands after amendment, is not a rule made under Sec.122 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it does not touch any of the rules in the First Schedule of the Code or come under any of the provisions laid under Sec.128. Clause 29 of the Letters Patent gives power to the High Court to make rules and orders for regulating the practice of the Court and for the purpose of adapting as far as possible the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to all proceedings in its testamentary, intestate and matrimonial jurisdiction, respectively. Clause 29 of the Letters Patent gives power to the High Court to make rules and orders for regulating the practice of the Court and for the purpose of adapting as far as possible the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to all proceedings in its testamentary, intestate and matrimonial jurisdiction, respectively. Re-admission of an appeal dismissed for default has been provided for by Rule 19 of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, But the dismissal envisaged in that rule must be under Rule 11 Sub-clause (2) or Rule 17 or 18 of that Order. That is to say, such dismissal must be for the default of the appellant to appear when the appeal is called on for hearing on the date fixed, or for his default to deposit the money required to defray the cost of serving the notice on the respondent. If Rule 25 of Chapter VII of the High Court Rules is taken to refer also to restoration of an appeal dismissed for such default, it will be a rule envisaged in Sec.122 of the Code, in which case the non-approval of the State Government and the non-publication of the rule in the Official Gazette will hit it. It will, therefore, be safe to take that rule as applicable to cases of dismissal of appeal not covered by Rules 11, 17 or 18 of Order 41 of the Code. 4. An appeal can be dismissed by the High Court for default committed in regard to the deposit of printing cost, process fee, cost of guardian for the minor respondents and the like. It is true that, except Rule 23 of Chapter IX where dismissal of an appeal for failure of the appellant to deliver his list or deposit the cost of printing of papers in the list has been provided for, no rule specifically provides for the dismissal of an appeal for defaults in compliance with any of other rules about the deposit of the guardian cost or process fee as dealt with in Chapters VI and VIII. Defaults of that kind are, however, met with the dismissal of appeals when the time fixed by the Bench for any specific compliance expires. For restoration of an appeal in such cases, Rule 25 of Chapter VII is intended. Defaults of that kind are, however, met with the dismissal of appeals when the time fixed by the Bench for any specific compliance expires. For restoration of an appeal in such cases, Rule 25 of Chapter VII is intended. This rule only lays down the procedure, namely, that an application will have to be filed asking for such restoration, but that rule does not, as it cannot, vest any power in the High Court to restore a dismissed appeal. For that power the Court will have to invoke its inherent powers to carry out the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Sec.151 of the Code has reiterated such powers. No time limit is imposed for exercise of such powers, either under the Code or under the Indian Limitation Act. Article 168 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act provides 30 days from the date of the dismissal of an appeal within which the application for re-admission can be made. But that is applicable only to cases of dismissal of appeal as provided under the Code of Civil Procedure and not to dismissal ordered for default in compliance with the rules of the High Court. In the case of Ram Hari V/s. Madan Mohan, ILR 23 Cal 339 it was held that where an appeal was dismissed under Rule 17 of the Rules of the High Court (Calcutta), Part II, Chapter VIII, for failure to deposit the estimated amount of costs for the preparation of the paper book, an application for re-admission of the appeal did not fall under Article 168 of the Limitation Act. In the case of Ninnie Lal v. Mahadeo Lall, AIR 1949 Pat 112 it was held by this Court that where an appeal was dismissed for failure to comply with an order to pay the printing cost of the appeal (as provided in the Patna High Court Rules), an application by the appellant for vacating the order of dismissal and for restoring the appeal to file, was not governed by Article 168. The learned Judges referred to the case of S.A. Ganny V/s. I.M. Russell, ILR 8 Rang 380 : (AIR 1930 Rang 228) (FB), which apparently had taken a contrary view and pointed out that in that case the application for re-admission of the appeal was under Order 52 of the Code of Civil Procedure as was then in force in Burma, and Article 168 was thus attracted. Their Lordships also brought out that the cases Lakhimoni Dassi V/s. Dwijendra Nath, AIR 1919 Cal 345 (2), Wadia Gandhy and Co. V/s. Purshottum, 9 Bom LR 508 and Raja Narendra Lal Khan V/s. Taru Bala Dassi, AIR 1921 Cal 67 were authorities for the proposition that Article 168 would apply only to application to re-admit appeals dismissed for want of prosecution as provided or contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure. Their Lordships further observed that when the Court is called on to exercise its inherent power, that power was not affected by the law of limitation, and in support of that view they referred to the case of Sonubai Baburao V/s. Shivaji Rao, AIR 1921 Bom 20 quoting Mahmud, J., "the law of limitation relates to the action of parties, but not to the action of the Court", and "the mere fact that one of the parties had made an application asking the Court to exercise that power will not .... render the action of the Code subject to the rule of limitation." The observation of Chapman, J., in the case of Jagdip Narain Singh V/s. F.H. Hollowway, AIR 1918 Pat 52 to the effect that Article 168 was applicable to an application under Sec.151, Civil Procedure Code, was held in the above case to be an obiter dictum as the case before the Bench was disposed of on the ground that the Court below had acted rightly in disallowing an application made after the period of limitation which would apply to suits or application asking for similar remedy. Thus Article 168 which provides the period of limitation for the re-admission of an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution will govern only the dismissals made under the Civil Procedure Code. Thus Article 168 which provides the period of limitation for the re-admission of an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution will govern only the dismissals made under the Civil Procedure Code. Though the words "want of prosecution" have not been qualified by a reference to the Code of Civil Procedure and though non-compliance with the High Court Rules resulting in a dismissal of the appeal can be said to be non-prosecution in any way, yet "dismissed for want of prosecution" in Article 168 will be only with reference to the appeals dismissed for default as provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. That the inherent powers of the Court and Sec.151 of the Civil Procedure Cede are to be invoked to decide upon an application to set aside an order dismissing an appeal for non-compliance with any of the orders made under the High Court Rules, cannot be in dispute. Either Rule 1 of Order 47 or Rule 19 of Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot apply to such cases. In Ramkhelawan Singh V/s. Monilal Sahu, AIR 1939 Pat 678 (FB), it was observed that an application to set aside an order dismissing an appeal for non-filing of the appellants list within the time allowed cannot be entertained under Order 47 Rule 1. Though Order 41 Rule 19, which is the only provision in the Code for the restoration of an appeal, does not apply to such a case, such application may be entertained under Sec.151 of the Code. There is no limitation of time for the exercise of the inherent powers of the Court The Indian Limitation Act has not prescribed any period of limitation for an application under Sec.151. No power was vested in the High Court under the Letters Patent to prescribe any limitation in regard to the time within which the Court can exercise its inherent powers or its powers under Sec.151 of the Civil Procedure Code, Under the powers to make rules for regulating its practice, the Court cannot impose a limitation of time for exercise of its inherent powers, particularly in face of the unrestricted provisions under Sec.151 of the Code. In that view, the imposition of 30 days as the period for an application for testoration of an appeal dismissed for default in compliance with any order made under the High Court Rules, cannot be held to be valid within the meaning of Clause 29 of the Letters Patent. 6. In the view taken above, the present application for restoration of the appeal cannot be said to be barred by time.