JUDGMENT 1. This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by Nandigir and two others against Padamdas and the Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, paying that a writ of Certiorari an appropriate writ, order or direction be issued to quash the judgment of the Board of Revenue, dated 18th of July, 1962 in appeal No. 21 of 1960. 2. The facts of the case are that Nandigir, disciple of Ratigir, was holding a piece of land, measuring 70 Bighas, 2 Biswas, comprised in Khasra No. 593 in village Nohar as a Muafi. The said land was given for cultivation to Padamdas on 1st of July, 1952 for three years, that is, for Samvat years 2009, 2010 and 2011 and it was specifically mentioned in the lease deed executed by Padamdas that he would surrender the land to the petitioner after the expiry of the period of the lease. Pursuant to the condition of the lease, petitioner served Padamdas with a notice on the 7th April, 1955 to return the land to the petitioner as the period of the lease had expired but the respondent did not pay any deed to the above notice as the Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949 was in force where under no tenant could be ejected from his holding save as provided in that Ordinance. On 15th of October, 1955, the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (Act No. 3 of 1955) came into force which repealed the provisions of Rajasthan (Protection of Tenants) Ordinance, 1949 and enacted certain provisions under which suit for ejectment of a tenant could be filed by the landholder. Petitioner filed a suit for ejectment of Padamdas from the disputed land on 14th of January, 1957, in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Nohar. The suit was contested by respondent Padamdas on various grounds, the main ground being that the suit was misconceived as it did not relate to Khasra No. 593, and secondly, the petitioner was not entitled to seek relief under Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act as Padamdas, under the circumstances of the case, could not be treated as a trespasser. The learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Nohar, dismissed the suit of the petitioner holding that the identity of the disputed land could not be ascertained from the averments made in the plaint and that Padamdas could not be ejected from the land under Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act as he was not a trespasser. Petitioner Nandigir filed an appeal against this order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Nohar and obtained a decree in his favour from the Court of the Commissioner, Bikaner Division, Bikaner, who held that the respondent Padamdas was a trespasser as he was retaining the possession of the suit land after the expiry of the period of the lease without any lawful authority from his land-holder and as such the order for ejectment could be passed under section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act in favour of the petitioner. Against this order of the Commissioner, Padamdas preferred a second appeal in the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan. After hearing both the parties the Board accepted the appeal of Padamdas and observed that the respondent Padamdas could not be treated as a trespasser under the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and, therefore, a decree for ejectment could not be passed against Padamdas under Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. It was, however, casually mentioned by the Board that Padamdas having been admitted as a tenant is liable to ejectment only as a tenant and not as a trespasser. It is against this order of the Board of Revenue that petitioner Nandigir has come to this Court and has filed the present writ petition. 3. Mr. Acharya on behalf of the petitioner has urged that the lease was for a fixed term of three years and, therefore, after the expiry of the period of lease, when a notice was served on the respondent by the petitioner to surrender the land, he had no authority to retain the possession of the suit land, and therefore, Padamdas could not in any manner, be declared by the Board of Revenue as a tenant as he definitely falls within the mischief of the definition of `trespasser' as given in section 5 clause (44) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. According to the submission of Mr. According to the submission of Mr. Acharya, the Board of Revenue has erred in holding Padamdas as tenant at sufferance especially when the petitioner had unequivocally expressed his intention to get back land from respondent Padamdas after the period of the lease had expired. It is also contended by Mr. Acharya that Section 63 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act is silent about the termination of the tenancy of this nature which extinguishes with afflux of time and, therefore the provisions of this section could not be attracted to determine the nature of the possession of respondent Padamdas and his possession could not, therefore, be held as a juridical possession. It is also urged that the Board of Revenue has erred in not granting relief to the petitioner under the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act which, in the opinion of the Board, were applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case, and unnecessarily left the parties to enter into further litigation, when the facts disclosed by the petitioner in his plaint were sufficient to grant relief by applying relevant provisions of the law. 4. Mr. Lodha for the respondent has supported the order of the Board of Revenue and has contended that under the scheme of the Tenancy Act fixed term tenancy cannot automatically be deemed to have extinguished and the tenant could only be ejected from the land in accordance with the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. His main emphasis is on the fact that the petitioner wanted Padamdas to be ejected as a trespasser under Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act which relief he could not successfully get from the Court under the Scheme of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. It is also urged by Mr. Lodha that under the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, Padamdas who entered the land under a valid lease, could not be considered as a trespasser as the Legislature did not think it proper to extinguish the tenancy rights of the tenants by afflux of time as long as the tenant is in possession throughout. Under the scheme of the Tenancy Act, the possession remains that of a tenant unless he has been ejected therefrom under the process of law as provided by the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. 5. Under the scheme of the Tenancy Act, the possession remains that of a tenant unless he has been ejected therefrom under the process of law as provided by the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. 5. The entire controversy in this case, centres round the status of Padamdas after the expiry of the period of the lease initially granted by the land-holder. 6. Learned Members of the Board of Revenue have in their judgment observed that after Samvat year 2011 (i.e after the period of lease has expired) Padamdas was a tenant at sufferance and not a trespasser, and, therefore, no decree for ejectment could be given under Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act treating Padamdas as a trespasser. In expressing this opinion the Board has followed a Full Bench authority of their own Court in Umdi Ram v. Ram Deo, 1961 R.R.D. 109 wherein the observations of Chagla C.J. in K.K. Verma and another v. Union of India and another, A.I.R. 1954 Bombay 358 have been followed. Contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Board has erred in following the ratio of Bombay authority which does not apply to this case in view of the difference in law applicable to the instant case. Mr. Acharya has tried to distinguish the authority by referring to the observations of Chagla C.J. in Para 5 at Page 360 where the learned Chief Justice has read word "is" in Section 3 (1) (a) (ii) of the Government Premises (Eviction) Act (273 of 19'0) in the present perfect tense and, the term "is in unauthorised occupation" was interpreted by him as if the occupation was unauthorised to start with and continued to be unauthorised throughout the time that the person was in possession. In the opinion of Mr. Acharya, in case of agricultural tenancies the Court need not trace the occupation of a tenant as an unauthorised occupation at the inception of his entering into possession to declare him a trespasser as the definition of the term `trespasser' in Rajasthan Tenancy Act is such that a tenant who enters into possession under a valid lease would become trespasser no sooner the lease has expired and thereafter he continues in possession without the lawful authority from the land-holder. In the instant case, a notice was served on respondent Padamdas as soon as the period of tenancy expired and, therefore, it is urged that he should be deemed to be retaining possession of the land without any lawful authority. 7. We gave our serious consideration to the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, but we regret that we cannot agree with his reasoning as it was not open to the petitioner in April, 1955 to make a demand from Padamdas for the surrender of the land in view of the provisions of the Rajasthan (Tenants Protection) Ordinance, 1949 (No. 9 of 1949) which put a clog on the right of the land-holder to get back his holding from his tenant by ejecting him in any other manner except as provided therein. Under these circumstances, when there was a statutory bar for a land-holder to eject his tenant, it cannot be deemed that the tenant who held the land after the expiry of the period of lease was holding it without the authority of the land-holder and, therefore, authority of the landholder to retain the land shall have to be presumed in favour of the tenant, by virtue of the provisions of the Rajasthan (Tenants Protection). Ordinance which was then in force. Padamdas, therefore, under such circumstance shall be deemed to be within his right to retain the possession of the holding even after the fixed term of his tenancy had expired. In such cases, the status of the tenants would be that of a tenant-holding over.The Board has discussed the question from other angles also and we feel that the conclusions arrived at by the Board are correct. Section 63 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act provides for the extinction of tenancies. We do not find any provision in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act whereby the tenancy may extinguish with the lapse of time. Under clause (v) of section 63 such tenancies which have been created for a fixed term extinguish only when the tenant is ejected from the land in accordance with the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Section 187 B which is analogous to section 9 of the Specific Relief Act affords protection to the tenants and gives him a right to get the possession of the land back if he is ejected therefrom without taking recourse to the process of law. Section 187 B which is analogous to section 9 of the Specific Relief Act affords protection to the tenants and gives him a right to get the possession of the land back if he is ejected therefrom without taking recourse to the process of law. These provision of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act make the position of the tenant for a fixed term quite clear that his tenancy does not extinguish simply because his period of the lease has expired. The tenancy, in such a case, comes to an end only when the tenant is ejected from his holding and till then he shall be taken as tenant-holding-over and his possession in the eye of the law will be `juridical' possession and will be protected the unauthorised ejectment. Looking from both points of view, we feel that the Board of Revenue has correctly judged the status of the tenant after his term of tenancy had expired. We cannot, therefore, accept the contention of Mr. Acharya and hold that after Samvat year 2011 Padamdas no longer remained a tenant and he could, therefore, be ejected under section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act as a trespasser. 8. This finding of the Board, in our opinion, is not by itself sufficient to dispose of the case of the petitioner in the manner it has been done. Under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, we find Sections 177 and 180 which provide a procedure for the landholder to enable him to get his tenant ejected from the holding after the clog on his right to eject the tenant is removed by the repeal of the Rajasthan (Tenants Protection) Ordinance after the Rajasthan Tenancy Act came into force in 1955. If the Members of the Board of Revenue had taken a little care to find out the provisions of the law to give proper relief to the parties, then, we feel, the suit of the petitioner could not have been dismissed. After the Rajasthan Tenancy Act came into force, Padamdas could not claim any right to retain the possession of the holding and therefore, he could not be permitted to retain the possession of the land when a suit was filed in a competent court to eject him. After the Rajasthan Tenancy Act came into force, Padamdas could not claim any right to retain the possession of the holding and therefore, he could not be permitted to retain the possession of the land when a suit was filed in a competent court to eject him. We carefully perused the plaint filed by Nandigir, and we find that all facts and circumstances giving rise to the cause of action for filling the present suit for ejectment have been given in detail. It was presumably by way of an abundant caution that the petitioner described the status of Padamdas in law as a trespasser, and in doing so, it so appears that he was led away by the definition of the word "trespasser" as given in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. But this unwarranted attempt on the part of the petitioner to apply a particular provision of the law to the facts of his case does not debar him from getting proper relief from the revenue courts. In our opinion, it was the duty of the Board to have examined the facts of the case and then the provisions of the law which were attracted to those facts as given in the plaint. The learned Members of the Board of Revenue, have, however, mentioned in the impugned judgment that Padamdas is liable to ejectment as a tenant under the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, but they fail to apply those provisions to his case, and unnecessarily created a condition by dismissing his suit that would tend to multiply further litigation between the parties. If facts, which go to constitute the cause of action, have been brought on record, and if on the basis of that cause of action plaintiff is entitled to a relief, then even though the plaintiff may not have sought relief under the proper provision of the law, it is the duty of the courts to grant proper relief to the plaintiff under the relevant provisions of the law applicable to the case. Mr. Lodha has strenuously urged before us that the petitioners be directed to file a fresh suit under the proper provision of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, and on this account the impugned order of the Board of Revenue should not be quashed. Mr. Lodha has strenuously urged before us that the petitioners be directed to file a fresh suit under the proper provision of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, and on this account the impugned order of the Board of Revenue should not be quashed. When asked as to what more facts are necessary to be stated in the present case to enable the plaintiff petitioner to seek a proper relief under the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, Mr. Lodha could not point out to us a single fact which requires to be mentioned for getting Padamdas ejected from the land under the relevant provisions of the law. We feel that under these circumstances when a proper relief could be granted on the facts stated and proved by the parties and if it was denied by the courts without any reason or rhyme, the error is manifest on the face of the record which calls for an interference from this court under its certiorari jurisdiction. It will be unjust if the parties are asked once again to go to the courts of law to litigate the same matter which has been thrashed up to the Board of Revenue simply because the plaintiff under misconception of law described the defendant as trespasser. It may be noted that the position of such a tenant under the law was not easy to be assessed as at some stage there was difference of opinion on the status of such a tenant even between the Members of the Board of Revenue and, therefore, if the plaintiffs took upon themselves to describe the defendant as trespasser in the plaint, they cannot be punished by asking them to once again enter into litigation. It will be telling harshly on both the parties if they are asked once again to undergo all the formalities of a regular suit. We strongly feel that it will serve the ends of justice if the error committed by the Board of Revenue in not granting proper relief to the parties is rectified by quashing the impugned order and directing the Board of Revenue to pass a proper order applying the provisions of the law which are attracted to the case. 9. We strongly feel that it will serve the ends of justice if the error committed by the Board of Revenue in not granting proper relief to the parties is rectified by quashing the impugned order and directing the Board of Revenue to pass a proper order applying the provisions of the law which are attracted to the case. 9. The writ petition is, therefore, accepted, the impugned order of the Board of Revenue dated 18th of July, 1962 is set aside and a direction is hereby issued to the Board of Revenue that the case be decided in accordance with the provisions of law. No order as to costs. *******