JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is a revision against the judgment or the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Sadar, Cuttack, convicting the Petitioner u/s 92 of the Factories Act and sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs. 40/-. At the time of the admission of this revision petition a Rule was issued on the Petitioner to show muse why the sentence may not be enhanced and he was given an adequate opportunity to show cause against his conviction also. 2. The Petitioner is the occupier of the well-known Shri Durga Glass Factory at Barang near Cuttack. On 11-1-1961 his factory was inspected from 4.50 p.m. to 8.45 p.m. by Shri B.K. Patnaik, Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories who round 14 (fourteen) adolescents workers employed in the blowing section of the factory. But they did not have the certificate of fitness required under Sections 68 and 69 of the Factories Act. The Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories therefore filed a complaint before the Sub divisional Magistrate, Cuttack, for the prosecution of the occupier (Petitioner), u/s 92 of that Act for contravention of Section 68. 3. The sole witness in this case is the Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories (p.w. 1). He stated that during his inspection he found 14 adolescents workers working in the blowing section of the glass factory, that he asked for their certificates, of fitness from the son of the Petitioner, namely Shri J.K. Jhunjhunwalla, but that the latter could not produce them. Along with the prosecution report the Deputy Chief Inspector enclosed a list showing the names of the 14 adolescents workers. In cross-examination he further added that though he did no sent these workers to the Surgeon for determination of their age he questioned them about their age and that he could, by a mere look at those workers, estimate their age. He also added that; though he was not himself a doctor, he nevertheless had the necessary knowledge for ascertaining the age of person. 4. The learned lower court appears to have accepted the opinion of the Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories, about the age of these adoloscent worker, and further held that u/s 104(1) of the Factories Act the onus was on the occupier to show that the said fourteen persons were not adoloscents, and that as he did not discharge this onus, he was guilty of the offence. 5. 5. Before discussing the various contentions raised by Mr. A. Das appearing for the Petitioner, I may briefly refer to some of the relevant provisions of the Factories Act. 'Adoloscent' has been defined in Section 2(b) as a person who has completed his fifteenth but has not completed his eighteenth year; 'child' has been defined in Section 2(c) as a person who has not completed his fifteenth year of age; and 'young person' has been defined in Section 2(d) as a person who is either a child or an adoloscent. Section 68 prohibits the employment of any child who has completed his fourteenth year of age, or of an adoloscent, without a certificate of fitness granted by a competent medical authority. Section 69 contains detailed provisions for the grant of such a certificate by the Certifying Surgeon. Clause (b) of Section 68 further says that a child or adoloscent, while working in the factory, shall carry with him a token giving reference to such certificate. Sub-section (2) of Section 70 says that an adoloscent who has not been granted a certificate of fitness by a certifying Surgeon to work as an adult, shall notwithstanding his age be deemed to be a 'child' for all the purposes of the Act. Section 75 confers power on the Inspector of Factories to send any young person found working in a factory without a medical certificate, to a certifying surgeon for medical examination, and also to prohibit the employment of such a person until such a certificate is granted. Section 92 is the penal section and Section 104(1) shifts the onus of proof as to the age on the accused, under the special circumstances mentioned below: When any act or omission would, if a person were under a certain age, be an offence punishable under this Act and such person is, in the opinion of the Court, prima facie under such an age, the burden shall be on the accused to prove that such a person is not under such age. 6. Mr. A. Das raised the following three ingenious contentions while challenging the validity of the conviction: (i) The Inspector of Factories should have first proceeded u/s 75 of the Factories Act and sent the fourteen adoloscent workers to a Certifying Surgeon, prior to the launching of the prosecution against the Petitioner. 6. Mr. A. Das raised the following three ingenious contentions while challenging the validity of the conviction: (i) The Inspector of Factories should have first proceeded u/s 75 of the Factories Act and sent the fourteen adoloscent workers to a Certifying Surgeon, prior to the launching of the prosecution against the Petitioner. (ii) The shifting of the onus of proof as to age on the accused, u/s 104(1) of the Act would arise only if the Court first forms an opinion prima facie that these fourteen workers are adoloscents, and also gives due intimation to the accused about his opinion. Until such intimation is given to the accused the question of the accused proving the age of these workers does not arise. (iii) If these fourteen any certificate of fitness they adoloscent workers did not have should be deemed, in law, to be 'children' for the purposes of the Act by virtue of Section 70(2) and unless the prosecution further establishes that the provisions of the Act dealing with the employment of children in factories have been contravened, the accused cannot be held guilty of any offence under the Act. 7. In my opinion, none of these contentions can prevail. 8. It is true that Section 75 confers power on an Inspector to send to a surgeon, for medical examination, any young person found working in a factory without a certificate of fitness, and prohibits the employment of such a person until the certificate is obtained. But neither this section nor Section 105 which deals with the power of taking cognizance says that the Inspector has no jurisdiction to file a complaint for the prosecution of the occupier, for employing an adoloscent without a certificate of fitness, in contravention of the provisions of Section 68, unless he first exercises the power u/s 75. Section 68 absolutely prohibits the employment of an adoloscent unless he possesses the necessary certificate and where the occupier employs an adoloscent in contravention of this provision, he will be clearly guilty u/s 92 of the Act-provided cognizance is taken on the complaint of the Inspector made u/s 105 (1). Mr. Das could not cite any authority for the view that when the Inspector is given power under another section to send an adoloscent worker to a certifying surgeon for medical examination, he cannot initiate prosecution for the contravention of Section 68 which has already occurred. Mr. Das could not cite any authority for the view that when the Inspector is given power under another section to send an adoloscent worker to a certifying surgeon for medical examination, he cannot initiate prosecution for the contravention of Section 68 which has already occurred. The prosecution is meant to punish the occupier for a completed offence whereas power of the. Inspector u/s 75 is intended to prevent him for repeating the commission of the offence in future. Hence Section 75 deals with an entirely different subject, and in the absence of any express provision in the Act it cannot be held that, in law, no complaint can be filed by the Inspector of Factories in respect of a contravention of Section 68 unless he first proceeds u/s 75. 9. Section 104(1) says that if, in the opinion of the Court a person is prima facie of such an age as to attract any penal provision of the Act, the burden shall be on the accused to prove that he is not of such., an age. Here, therefore, once is shown that the Court was prima facie of opinion that the fourteen workers detected by the Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories were adoloscents, the burden would be on the accused to show that they are not in fact adoloscents. It is true that Sub-section (1) of Section 104 speaks of the opinion of the Court and not of the opinion of the Inspector; and Mr. Das is undoubtedly right in saying that unless the Court forms its own opinion that these fourteen persons -are adolescents the burden will not shift on the accused to prove that they are not adoloscents. But the Court's opinion was based 'on' the evidence adduced before it by the Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories who definitely stated that these fourteen workers were adoloscents. The Inspector had formed this opinion not only by the impression which he had gathered by looking at them, but also by questioning them. As Inspector of Factories it is his duty to see whether the provisions dealing with the employment of young persons are strictly obeyed by the occupier of a factory and he is undoubtedly competent to say whether in his opinion some of the workers in a factory are adoloscents 01' children. As Inspector of Factories it is his duty to see whether the provisions dealing with the employment of young persons are strictly obeyed by the occupier of a factory and he is undoubtedly competent to say whether in his opinion some of the workers in a factory are adoloscents 01' children. Doubtless his opinion will not be final because he is not a medical officer but as the accused him self brought out in cross examination that the opinion of the Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories about the age of these 14 workers was based not only on the impression which he gathered by looking at them, but also on the questions put by him to those workers, it is open to the Court of fact to accept the same. Here the Court accepted the evidence and observed in the judgment that he had hardly any reason to disbelieve the evidence of P.W. 1. Hence, unless the accused establishes that these workers are not adoloscents his guilt for contravention of Section 68 is well proved. 10. There is no provision in Section 104 or in any other section of the Factories Act, to the effect that during trial the Court while forming a tentative opinion about the age of the workers should communicate that opinion to the accused and inform him that it would draw a presumption against him u/s 104(1). It will suffice, if, from the record and from the procedure adopted during trial, it is satisfactorily established that the inclination of the mind of the Court was made known to the accused. Hereafter the evidence of the Inspector was recorded, the accused (Petitioner) was questioned by the Court, u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure and the very first question put to him was as follows: Did you allow 14 adoloscent workers to work in the blowing section of the factory on 11-1-1901 at about 7.40 p.m. without a fitness certificate? The Petitioner answered in the negative. The Court again questioned him as follows: Will you adduce evidence? The Petitioner replied to this question in the affirmative, but eventually did not adduce any evidence. 11. The Petitioner answered in the negative. The Court again questioned him as follows: Will you adduce evidence? The Petitioner replied to this question in the affirmative, but eventually did not adduce any evidence. 11. The examination of an accused person, u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure is done mainly with a view to give, him an opportunity to explain any incriminating piece of evidence appearing against him during trial, and hence, when the Court specially questioned him as to whether he employed he adoloscent workers without a proper certificate the obvious inference is that the Court was of opinion that the evidence of P.W. 1 as regards the age of these workers was acceptable prima facie and that it was an incriminating piece of evidence against the accused (Petitioner). If the Court was not unlined to accept the evidence of P.W. 1 on this point, it would not have put this question. The Petitioner was therefore fully aware of this opinion of the Court and hence he informed the Court that he would adduce evidence in defence, thereby implying that he was aware of the shifting of the burden of proof on him u/s 104(1) of the Factories Act. I should, in this connection, further observe that the Petitioner was represented by a Pleader Shri R.K. Mitra, while he was examined u/s 342 Code of Criminal Procedure and the lawyer may be presumed to know the implications of Section 104(1). I am, therefore, satisfied that the requirements of Section 104(1) were duly complied within the case and the Court is entitled' to shift the onus of proving the exact age of these 14 workers on the Petitioner.11 12. The third contention of Mr. A. Das was raised for the first time in the grounds of this revision petition. Mr. Das himself was not quite clear as to how he could put forward this contention while challenging the legality of the conviction. As already pointed out Section 69 deals with the procedure to be followed by the Certifying Surgeon when a young person is sent to him for medical examination. He has to decide whether a certificate of fitness should be issued to the young person to work in the factory as a child (Clause (a) of Section 69(2)) or whether a certificate should be given for that young person to I work as an adult (Clause (b) of Section 69(2)). He has to decide whether a certificate of fitness should be issued to the young person to work in the factory as a child (Clause (a) of Section 69(2)) or whether a certificate should be given for that young person to I work as an adult (Clause (b) of Section 69(2)). Section 70(2) says that if the certifying surgeon does not grant a certificate of fitness to a young person to work in a factory as an 'adult' that person shall be deemed to be a 'child' for all the purposes of the Act,. Reading Sections 69 and 70 together therefore, the reasonable inference is that if a young person is first produced before the Certifying Surgeon and that Surgeon is unwilling to grant him a certificate to work as an adult, the deeming provision, viz. Sub-section (2) of Section 70 would apply., That young person would then be considered to be a 'child, but even a child who has completed his fourteenth year is prohibited by Section 68, from being employed in a factory unless he is granted a certificate of fitness by the certifying surgeon. The deeming provision cannot apply where the young person has not been produced before the certifying Surgeon. Here there is no evidence to show that these 14 young workers were actually produced before the Certifying Surgeon by the Petitioner (occupier). Hence Sub-section (2) of Section 70 has no application. 13. For these reasons I am satisfied that the Petitioner was rightly convicted. 14. As regards the sentence, in my opinion, a sentence of fine of Rs. 401- is grossly in adequate. The statutory restrictions' on the employment of young persons are meant to prevent exploitation of young labourer and to provide for their safety, and if the occupier of a glass factory allows fourteen adoloscent workers to work in the blowing section (which is a hazardous occupation) he should be punished severely. 15. While therefore maintaining the conviction of the Petitioner u/s 92 of the Factories Act, I enhance the sentence to a fine of Rs. 200.00 (Rupees two hundred only); in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. 16. The revision petition is dismissed and the Rule for enhancement is made absolute. Revision dismissed &. rule for enlightenments made absolute. Final Result : Dismissed