B. J. DIVAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS Special Civil Application arises under the following circumstances: ( 2 ) THE petitioner joined the service of the first respondent Cooperative Society as its Secretary on March 7 1950 and he was discharged from the service on January 7 1951 It appears that in June 1951 the Registrar of Cooperative Societies ordered special audit so far as this cooperative society was concerned and a deficit in cash of the society amounting to Rs. 4690. 00 was found and various other amounts aggregating to Rs. 994-14-0 were found unexplained or unaccounted for. Thereafter on October 22 1953 complaint was lodged against the petitioner for the misappropriation regarding these two items of Rs. 4690. 00 and Rs. 994-14-0; and on January 15 1955 the petitioner was acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate First Class Santrampur and there was no appeal against the acquittal. It appears that pending these proceedings in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class Santrampur on January 13 1954 the first respondent Cooperative Society made an application to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies under sec. 54 of the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act 1925 as it then stood for arbitration regarding the sum of as. 994-14-0 which claim was made against the petitioner No claim appears to have been made in respect of the amount of Rs. 4690. 00. Thereafter the arbitration proceedings in accordance with the provisions of sec. 54 of the Act as it then stood were started and the arbitration was of three arbitrators one being the nominee of the Registrar and the other two having been nominated by each party The majority of the arbitrators decided on March 18 1960 against the petitioner and awarded a sum of Rs. 937-7-9. Thereafter an application was made by the petitioner to the Cooperative Tribunal and he called it a revision application. It is the petitioners contention that in fact he was preferring an appeal and by mistake he called it a revision application. The petitioners contention is that the Tribunal was under an impression that it could only exercise revisional powers and the Cooperative Tribunal addressed itself to only one aspect of the case viz. whether the award of the arbitrators was perverse and gave its finding in the negative and dismissed his appeal and or revision application on September 23. The petitioners contention is that the Tribunal was under an impression that it could only exercise revisional powers and the Cooperative Tribunal addressed itself to only one aspect of the case viz. whether the award of the arbitrators was perverse and gave its finding in the negative and dismissed his appeal and or revision application on September 23. 1960 without going through the evidence and without adjudicating upon the case on merits. It is against this order of the Cooperative Tribunal that the present Special Civil Application has been filed. ( 3 ) IT is to be borne in mind that while proceedings were pending before the three arbitrators the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act 1925 was amended by Bombay Act No. 41 of 1956 and extensive changes were made in the scheme of the Act regarding the machinery for decision of disputes and regarding appeal. Prior to the amendment by Bombay Act No. 41 of 1956 sec. 54 of the Act provided that if there was any dispute touching the constitution or business of a society between the society or its committee and any officer agent member or servant of the society past or present it had to be referred to the Registrar for decision by himself or his nominee or if either party so desired to arbitration of three arbitrators who were to be the Registrar or his nominee and one arbitrator bad to be nominated by each of the parties concerned. It was under this provision of sec. 54 that the matter came to be referred to the three arbitrators. Under the Act as it stood prior to its amendment the sec. It was under this provision of sec. 54 that the matter came to be referred to the three arbitrators. Under the Act as it stood prior to its amendment the sec. 54a provided as follows:-"54a (1) In the case of any award made by the arbitrators under section 54 the Tribunal may on the application of any of the parties to the award or otherwise for reasons to be recorded in writing:- (i) modify the award or (ii) set it aside and order that the dispute shall be referred back to the arbitrators in the manner provided under the said section: Provided that no such order shall be made- (a) after the issue of a certificate under section 59 for the execution of the award and (b) except on any of the following grounds:- (i)an objection to the legality of the award is apparent on the face of it or (ii)the award has been vitiated in consequence of corruption or misconduct on the part of any of the arbitrators or (iii) the award is in any way perverse. ( 4 ) UNDER sec. 56 of the Act if instead of a Board of three arbitrators the matter had been decided by the Registrar or his nominee an appeal lay to the Tribunal and sec. 57 provided that the award of the arbitrators or the decision by the Registrar or his nominee under sec. 54 was not liable to be called in question in any civil or revenue court and thus the only appeal which could be made was against the decision of Registrar or his nominee and so far as the decision or award of a board of three arbitrators was concerned it could be challenged by an application to the Cooperative Tribunal and not by way of an appeal and the Cooperative Tribunal was authorised to disturb the award of the arbitrators only on one of the three grounds mentioned in sec. 54a. So far as is relevant for the purposes of this decision these are the relevant provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act 1925 as it stood prior to its amendment by Bombay Act No. 41 of 1956. 54a. So far as is relevant for the purposes of this decision these are the relevant provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act 1925 as it stood prior to its amendment by Bombay Act No. 41 of 1956. As a result of the amendment by Bombay Act No. 41 of 1956 the provision for reference to board of three arbitrators was done away with and after the amendment the dispute can be decided only by the Registrar or his nominee. The provision for appeal against the decision of the Registrar or his nominee was continued in sec. 56 of the Act and that provides for a regular appeal as distinguished from a revision application and a provision for revision has been set out in sec. 63a (6) of the Act. Even before the amendment the provision for revision was made in sec. 63a (6) as it then stood and there no material change seems to have been effected as a result of the amendment by Bombay Act No. 41 of 1956. However I have mentioned that provision in order to show that a distinction between an appeal and a revision application has been continued even after the amendment. ( 5 ) TO summarize as a result of the amendment the following changes were effected- (1) Prior to the amendment it was open to the parties to have the disputes decided either by the Registrar or his nominee or by a board of three arbitrators. (2) If the decision was given by the Registrar or his nominee then the appeal lay to the Cooperative Tribunal under the provisions of sec. 56 If the award was made by the arbitrators no appeal lay to the Tribunal but the Tribunal could on the application of any of the parties to the award or otherwise modify the award or set it aside and order that the dispute should be referred back to the arbitrators in the manner provided in the section (3) (3) Both before the amendment and after the amendment the Tribunal was empowered to call for and examine the record of any proceedings in which an appeal lay to it for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed. But under sec. But under sec. 54a the Cooperative Tribunal had no appellate jurisdiction but had a restricted jurisdiction to modify or set aside an award and order that the dispute should be referred back to the arbitrators and that too on the application of any of the parties to the award or otherwise. ( 6 ) THE question therefore now arises is as to whether the powers which the Cooperative Tribunal was exercising were powers of an appellate authority or were powers which it could have exercised only on an application as distinguished from an appeal preferred by the aggrieved party. For the purposes of this decision I am prepared to proceed on the basis that the power which the Tribunal could exercise under sec. 54a of the Cooperative Societies Act prior to its amendment in 1956 was an appellate power. A distinction has to be made between an appeal and a revision application and the authorities have held that a right of appeal is a substantive right and any party to a litigation is entitled to prosecute the appeal according to the law as it stood at the time when the legislature by the amending Act has interfered with that right of appeal either by express enactment or by necessary intentment. It has been also held by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court in this country that this question of a right of appeal being a substantive right and the litigation having continued the law existing at the time when the litigation commenced cannot apply when the superior authority is vested with revisional powers as distinct from appellate powers. If it is held that the powers of the Cooperative Tribunal under section 54a were revisional powers then the entire machinery for revision of an award having been abolished by Bombay Act No. 41 of 1956 the Tribunal had no further power to interfere with the award of the arbitrators. Nothing further requires to be said about the matter. However the language of sec. 54a as it stood before the amendment does not make it clear that an appeal could lie to the Tribunal. I may point out that sec. 54a was introducing grounds similar to the grounds on which a Civil Court could modify or set aside the award of an arbitrator under the provisions of the India Arbitration Act. 54a as it stood before the amendment does not make it clear that an appeal could lie to the Tribunal. I may point out that sec. 54a was introducing grounds similar to the grounds on which a Civil Court could modify or set aside the award of an arbitrator under the provisions of the India Arbitration Act. The Tribunal could interfere either on the application of any of the parties or otherwise and that on one of the three grounds mentioned hereinabove. Therefore prima facie the powers which the Tribunal was exercising were more akin to the powers of a revisional court as distinguished from an appellate court. Hence the question about what law should be made applicable to the decision of the board of arbitrators when such decision was called in question before the Cooperative Tribunal after the amendment in 1956 would not arise. As far as I have been able to ascertain the powers of revision of the Cooperative Tribunal as regards the matters pending at the date of the amendment in 1956 were not saved and really speaking therefore after the Bombay Act No. 41 of 1956 the Cooperative Tribunal had no jurisdiction either revisional or appellate over the decision of the board of arbitrators ( 7 ) ASSUMING however that the powers which the Cooperative Tribunal exercised over the board of arbitrators were the powers of an appellate authority the question is whether the Tribunal was governed by the provisions of sec. 56 which provided for the jurisdiction of the Cooperative Tribunal in respect of matters of appeal before it or whether the provisions of section 54a of the Cooperative Societies Act applied. 56 which provided for the jurisdiction of the Cooperative Tribunal in respect of matters of appeal before it or whether the provisions of section 54a of the Cooperative Societies Act applied. There are numerous decisions on this aspect of the law The leading case on the subject is the case of Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving (1905) A C. 369 and there what happened was that pending the litigation in the Courts in Australia the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act came to be passed and that enactment empowered the Parliament of Australia to confer original jurisdiction on the Courts in Australia and the Judiciary Act of 1903 was passed by the Australian Parliament and as a result of the Judiciary Act the appeals to His Majesty in Council were done away with and the Supreme Court of Australia had no power to grant leave for appeal to the King in Council after that enactment. Under these circumstances it was held by the Privy Council that although the right of appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland to His Majesty in Council given by the order in Council of June 30 1860 has been taken away by the Australian Commonwealth Judiciary Act 1903 sec. 39 sub-section 2 and the only appeal therefrom and the only appeal then lay to the High Court of Australia yet the Act was not retrospective and a right of appeal to the King in Council in a suit pending when the Act was passed and decided by the Supreme Court afterwards was not taken away. It was in this context that it was observed by Lord Macnaghten at page 372 as follows:-"as regards the general principles applicable to the case there was no controversy. On the one hand it was not disputed that if the matter in question be a matter of procedure only the petition is well founded. On the other hand if it be more than a matter of procedure if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act it was conceded that in accordance with a long line of authorities extending from the time of Lord Coke with the present day the appellants would be entitled to succeed. The Judiciary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intentment. The Judiciary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intentment. And therefore the only question is was the appeal to his Majesty in Council a right vested in the appellants at the date of the passing of the Act or was it a mere matter of procedure ? It seems to their Lordships that the question does not admit of doubt. To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of rights is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle Their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well- known general principles that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested". ( 8 ) IN the case of Venugopal v. Krishnaswami A. I. R. 1943 Federal Court 24 a suit was instituted in 1932 in British India with respect to properties situated partly in British India and partly in Burma. While that litigation was pending Burma was separated from British India and the question arose whether this suit should be continued and it was held by the Federal Court that a right to continue a duly instituted suit is in the nature of a vested right and it cannot be taken away except by a clear indication of intention to that effect. In the absence of such a clear indication in the Constitution Act a British Indian Court continues to have jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of a suit already pending before it even with respect to properties situated in Burma and in that connection the Federal Court relied on the decision in the case of Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving and as pointed out by Varadachariar J. the Federal Court considered that the principle laid down in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. s ease was sufficient to support the decision of the High Court of Madras and the Federal Court preferred to rest their decision on that ground. ( 9 ) IN the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. s ease was sufficient to support the decision of the High Court of Madras and the Federal Court preferred to rest their decision on that ground. ( 9 ) IN the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner Delhi IX Lahore 284 the Privy Council was concerned with an amendment of the Indian Income Tax Act of 1922 and the amendment was effected by Act No. 24 of 1926. No express provision for appeal to His Majesty in Council from the orders of the High Court in India made upon references either under sec. 51 of the I. T. Act 1918 or under sec. 66 of the Act of 1922 was to be found in either of that no statutes but until the case of Tata Iron and Steel Co. v. Chief Revenue Authority Bombay 50 I. A. 212 was decided by the Board it was apparently geneally supposed in India that appeals from such orders were regulated by sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As a result of the decision of the Privy Council in Tata Iron and Steel Co. s case it became clear that there was no statutory right of appeal at all against the orders made by the High Courts upon references under section 51 of the Act of 1918 or under section 66 of the Act of 1922 and that position prevailed until April 1 1926 when the Indian Income Tax (Amendment) Act 1926 came into force. By that Amendment Act sec. 66a was introduced and the provision for appeal to the king in Council was made. At page290 Lord Blanesburgh observed as follows:-"the principle which their Lordships must apply in dealing with this matter has been authoritatively enunciated by the Board in the Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving ( 1905 A. C. 369 ) where it is in effect laid down that while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly unless that construction be textually inadmissible have retrospective effect attributed to them provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. Their Lordships can have no doubt that provisions which if applied retrospectively would deprive of their existing finality orders which when the statute came into force were final are provisions which touch existing rights. Accordingly if the section now in question is to apply to orders final at the date when it came into force it must be clearly so provided. Their Lordships cannot find in the section even an indication to that effect". And it was therefore held that there was no statutory right of appeal to His Majesty in Council against the orders of the High Court made in income-tax references before the Amendment Act of 1926. ( 10 ) IN the case of H. K. Dada (India) Ltd. v. State of M. P. A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 221 the Supreme Court was concerned with the effect of the provisions of an Amending Act by which the C. P. and Berar Sales Tax Act (21 of 1957) was amended. It appears that prior to this amendment there was no requirement in the statue that the entire amount assessed by the Sales Tax Authorities should be paid as a condition precedent to the admission of the appeal against the order challenged. By the amendment effected by Act No. 17 of 1949 a substantial restriction on the assessees right of appeal was placed because the entire assessed amount was required to be paid as the condition precedent to the admission of the appeal and the question before the Supreme Court was whether the assessee in respect of the proceedings commenced prior to the amendment was bound to deposit the entire amount assessed and it was held by the Supreme Court and the law applicable to that particular appeal against the decision of the Sales Tax Authorities was the law which prevailed prior to the amendment. S. R. Das J. ( as he then was ) delivering the judgment of the court held that a right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure it is a matter of substantive right. This right of appeal from the decision of an inferior tribunal to a superior tribunal becomes vested in a party when proceedings are first initiated in and before a decision is given by the inferior Court. S. R. Das J. further held as follows:-"in the language of Jenkins C J in Nana v. Shekhu (32 Bom. This right of appeal from the decision of an inferior tribunal to a superior tribunal becomes vested in a party when proceedings are first initiated in and before a decision is given by the inferior Court. S. R. Das J. further held as follows:-"in the language of Jenkins C J in Nana v. Shekhu (32 Bom. 337) to disturb an existing right of appeal is not a mere alteration in procedure. Such a vested right cannot be taken away except by express enactment or necessary intendment. An intention to interfere with or to impair or imperil such a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or necessary implication. . . . . . . . . . The pre-existing right of appeal is not destroyed by the amendment if the amendment is not made retrospective by express words or necessary intendment. The fact that the pre-existing right of appeal continues to exist must in its turn necessarily imply that the old law which created that right of appeal must also exist to support the continuation of that right. As the old law continues to exist for purpose of supporting the pre-existing right of appeal that old law must govern the exercise and enforcement of that right of appeal and there can then be no question of the amended provision preventing the exercise of that right ". ( 11 ) THE same question again came up for consideration before a larger bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury (1957) S. C. R. 488 and in that case. what happened was that a suit was instituted on April 22 1949 and was valued at Rs. 11 400 The trial Court dismissed the suit and the High Court in appeal reversed that decision on February 10 1955 An application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused by the High Court on the ground that the value did not come up to Rs. 20 0 It was contended on behalf of the applicant that he had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court under the law as it then stood and that Court having been substituted by the Supreme Court he was as of right entitled to appeal to that Court under Article 135 of the Constitution. 20 0 It was contended on behalf of the applicant that he had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court under the law as it then stood and that Court having been substituted by the Supreme Court he was as of right entitled to appeal to that Court under Article 135 of the Constitution. It was held by a majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court that the contention of the applicant was well founded and that he bad a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court on and From the date of the suit and the application for special leave should be allowed. It was also held by the majority that the vested right of appeal was a substantive right and although it could be exercised only in case of an adverse decision it was governed by the law prevailing at the time of commencement of the suit and comprised all successive rights of appeal from court to court which really constituted one proceeding. Such a right could be taken away only by a subsequent enactment either expressly or by necessary intendment. ( 12 ) IN the light of these authoritative pronouncements both of the Supreme Court and of the Privy Council it is clear that if the Cooperative Tribunal was vested with appellate authority as regards the awards given by a board of arbitrators then that right of appeal was not affected by the amending Act No. 41 of 1956; and secondly as pointed out by S. R. Das J. (as he then was) in A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 221 the existing law would continue to govern that right of appeal. The appellate authority viz. the Cooperative Tribunal appears to have decided the matter before it under the provisions of sec. 54a as it stood before its repeal by Bombay Act No. 41 of 1956; and therefore acted correctly and no fault can be found with the Cooperative Tribunal for deciding the matter in the manner that it did. ( 13 ) THERE are two decisions of the Supreme Court which deal with the matters where no right of appeal is involved. In the case of Indian Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property Delhi (1955) 2 S. C. R. 1117 the question was whether the Amending Act applied to the proceedings before the evacuee property authorities. ( 13 ) THERE are two decisions of the Supreme Court which deal with the matters where no right of appeal is involved. In the case of Indian Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property Delhi (1955) 2 S. C. R. 1117 the question was whether the Amending Act applied to the proceedings before the evacuee property authorities. There the facts were that the appellant before the Supreme Court was a displaced person from Lahore and she was the owner of a house at Lahore and on October 10 1947 she arranged to have her house exchanged with certain lands in a village in the State of Delhi and these lands belonged to M an evacuee. On February 23 1948 the appellant made an application to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property (Rural) Delhi for confirmation of the transaction of exchange under sec. 5a of the East Punjab Evacuees ( Administration of Property) Act 1947 as amended in 1948 and applied to the State of Delhi. Under sec. 5b of the Act an order if passed by the Custodian or Additional Custodian would not be subject to a appeal or revision and would become final and conclusive but the application was not disposed of until March 20 1952 and on that day the Additional Custodian passed an order confirming the exchange but while the proceedings were pending before the Additional Custodian there were changes in the law relating to evacuee property by which the East Punjab Act a applied to the State of Delhi was repealed and re-enacted and ultimately Central Act XXXI of 1950 was passes which among other things conferred by sec. 27 revisional powers on the Custodian General. The Custodian General issued a notice under sec. 27 to the appellant and after hearing her set aside the order of confirmation and directed the matter to be reconsidered by the Custodian. It was contended on behalf of the appellant before the Supreme Court that the order of confirmation by the Additional Custodian was not open to revision on the ground that on the filing of the application in 1948 the appellant got a vested right to have it determined under section 5a with the attribute of finality and conclusiveness under sec. 5b attaching to such determination and that the subsequent repeal and re- enactment of these provisions could not affect such right in view of sec. 5b attaching to such determination and that the subsequent repeal and re- enactment of these provisions could not affect such right in view of sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act and sec. 58 (3) of Act XXXI of 1950; and it was held by the Supreme Court as follows:-". . . that sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act ( X of 1897 ) was not applicable to the case as section 58 (3) of Act XXXI of 1950 was a self-contained provision indicative of the intention to exclude the operation of section 6; that the right to a determination with the attribute of finality assuming that such a right exists is not a vested right and it does not accrue until the determination is in fact made when alone it becomes an existing right. x x x x x x x x x x that the scheme underlying section 58 (2) is that every matter to which the new Act applies has to be treated as arising and to be dealt with under the new law except in so far as certain consequences have already ensued or acts have been completed prior to the new Act to which it is the old law that will apply. In view of section 58 the application of the appellant for continuation pending on the date when Act XXXI of 1950 came into force had to be dealt with and disposed of under this Act and the order of confirmation passed in 1952 was subject to the revisional power of the Custodian General under sec. 27 of the said Act". In that case the Supreme Court distinguished the case of Colonial Sugar Refining Co. as also the case of Delhi Cloth General Mills Co. and at page 1132 the Supreme Court held as follows:-"in the present case the position is different. The action was still pending when Central Act XXXI of 1950 came into force. No order was passed which could attract the attribute of finality and conclusiveness under section 5-B of the East Punjab Act XIV of 1941. and at page 1132 the Supreme Court held as follows:-"in the present case the position is different. The action was still pending when Central Act XXXI of 1950 came into force. No order was passed which could attract the attribute of finality and conclusiveness under section 5-B of the East Punjab Act XIV of 1941. Further the possibility of such finality was definitely affected by the repealing provision in Central Ordinance No XII of 1949 and Central Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949 which specifically provided that pending action was deemed to be an action commenced under the new Ordinance as if it were in force at the time and therefore required to be continued under the new Ordinances". At page 1133 the Supreme Court further held as follows:-". . . . . WHILE a right of appeal in respect of a pending action may conceivably be treated as a substantive right vesting in the litigant on the commencement of the action-though we do not so decide-no such vested right to obtain a determination with the attribute of finality can be predicated in favour of a litigant on the institution of the action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It does not accrue until the determination is in fact made when alone the right to finality becomes an existing right as in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Led v. Income-Tax Commissioner (1927 ) I. L. R. 9 Lah 284. We are therefore of the opinion that the principle of Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Lid. v. Irving ( 1905 A. C 369 ) cannot be invoked in support of a case of the kind we are dealing with". In the case of Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 655 the Supreme Court was concerned with a situation similar to the case of Indira Sohanlal which I have just now referred to. There what happened was that the appellant before the Supreme Court was a tenant in respect of a shop situated in the urban area of Gurgaon. The first respondent before the Supreme Court purchased the shop on June 15 1956 and soon thereafter applied to the Rent Controller for eviction of the appellant under sec. 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949. The first respondent before the Supreme Court purchased the shop on June 15 1956 and soon thereafter applied to the Rent Controller for eviction of the appellant under sec. 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949. This claim was resisted by the appellant who disputed the correctness and the validity of the pleas taken by the landlord The Rent Controller upheld the contentions of the appellant before the Supreme Court and rejected all the pleas urged by the landlord. Thereafter the landlord appealed to the District Court against the decision of the Rent Controller and the appellate Court confirmed all the findings made by the Rent Controller. This appellate decision was challenged by the landlord by his revisional application in the High Court of Punjab at Chandigarh; and the High Court allowed the revisional application of the Landlord and his claim for evicting the appellant was decreed. It was against this decree that the appellant went in appeal to the Supreme Court. It appears that the application for ejectment was made on August 23 1956 Before the written statement was filed by the tenant on November 14 1956 the Act was amended by Amending Act 29 of 1956 and the amendment came into force on September 24 1956 Prior to the amendment by amending Act 29 of 1956 the law as it stood on the date when the application was filed before the Rent Controller provided that the decision of the appellate authority i. e. the District Court and subject only to such decision an order of the Controller was to be final and was not to be liable to be called in question in any court of law whether in a suit or in any of the proceedings by way of appeal or revision. By the amending Act of 1956 the High Court was empowered to exercise revisional powers in respect of any order passed or proceedings taken under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. It was contended on behalf of the tenant who was the appellant before the Supreme Court that this amended provision which permitted a revisional application to be filed before the High Court was inapplicable to the proceedings which commenced with the application for ejectment made by the landlord to the Rent Controller. It was contended on behalf of the tenant who was the appellant before the Supreme Court that this amended provision which permitted a revisional application to be filed before the High Court was inapplicable to the proceedings which commenced with the application for ejectment made by the landlord to the Rent Controller. Following the decision in Indira Sohanlals case the Supreme Court held that where the amending section had come into force at the time when the appellate authority decided the matter and when the appellate order was actually passed the appellant could not claim the finality under the earlier provision and the revision petition against the order under the amended sec. 15 was maintainable. The observations of the Supreme Court in paras 8 and 9 of Moti Rams case were with respect to the grounds on which a tenant could be evicted from the premises rented to him and the question was whether the provisions of the amending Act as regards those grounds of eviction were retrospective or not but for the purposes of the present judgment the discussion in paras 8 and 9 of the Supreme Court judgment in Moti Rams case is not relevant. ( 14 ) UNDER these circumstances I am of the opinion that even if the jurisdiction of the Cooperative Tribunal in respect of the awards made by Board of arbitrators was not done away with as a result of the amending Act being Bombay Act No. 41 of 1956 the Tribunal was bound to apply the law as it stood prior to its amendment in 1956 and not to treat the matter as a regular appeal under the provisions of section 56 of the Act as it stood after the amendment. In this view of the matter the Cooperative Tribunal was applying the correct principles of law when it considered the matter purely from the point of view of the question whether the award of the arbitration was perverse or not. In either view of the matter therefore this Special Civil Application must fail. It is possible to take the view that as a result of the amendment the Cooperative Tribunal had no power to set aside or modify or to interfere in any manner with the award of the board of arbitrators as its jurisdiction to do so was taken away. It is possible to take the view that as a result of the amendment the Cooperative Tribunal had no power to set aside or modify or to interfere in any manner with the award of the board of arbitrators as its jurisdiction to do so was taken away. Even if that view is not correct in so far as the Co-operative Tribunal could deal with the matter after the amendment of 1956 it could only do so in accordance with the provisions of the law as it stood prior to that amendment and not as an appeal under sec. 56. In either view of the matter the decision of the Cooperative Tribunal is bound to be sustained. ( 15 ) THE result therefore is that this Special Civil Application fails and is dismissed. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed. .