JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - The Petitioner is the Appellant u/s 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, (Act IV of 1936), hereinafter to be referred to as the Central Act. He is a registered medical practitioner and was employed in Govinda Aushadhalaya, belonging to the opposite party, from 29-3-1957 to 19-9-1958 and from 1-10-1958 to 30-11-1958 to attend to the patients, to examine them, to prescribe medicine for them, to supervise sales of allopathy medicines and also to work as a consulting physician for his shop. The opposite party employed the Petitioner on a monthly salary Rs. 150/- for a period of one year and 8 months. The Applicant was not paid his pay. The opposite party is liable to compensation from 1-12-1958 to 28-2-1959 for Rs. 450/-. The Petitioner therefore claims Rs. 3450/- in all. 2. The opposite party stated in his written statement that the Petitioner was never employed as an employee under him, nor he wholly or principally employed the Petitioner. The Petitioner approached the opposite party with the proposal that he would see to the patients coming to the opposite-party's shop for allopathic treatment to taking fees from them and that his prescriptions, given to who patients, would he served in the opposite party's pharmacy. The opposite party accepted this proposal and allowed the Petitioner to sit for an hour or two every day in the shop according to the Petitioner's convenience. 3. The learned Additional District Magistrate of Puri investigated the matter as the competent authority and rejected the petition. He found that the Petitioner did not attend the shop during any fixed hours and was not an employee in the shop. He accepted the version of the opposite party and held that the Petitioner was making income by examining patients, giving them injections, examining their blood pressure and granting certificates in the shop of the opposite party. He also held that the Petitioner was not wholly or principally employed in the shop of the Petitioner. 4. The learned Additional District Judge confirmed all the findings of fact arrived at by the trial authority. He also held that the Petitioner was not wholly or principally employed in the shop of the Petitioner. 4. The learned Additional District Judge confirmed all the findings of fact arrived at by the trial authority. He further held that, in view of the stand taken by the opposite party that there was no relationship of employer or employee, the trial authority had no jurisdiction to go into the matter and the application was not maintainable, and that the claim of the Petitioner, even if entertainable, was barred by limitation for the period prior to 25-8-1958 as the application was filed on 25-2-1959. 5. Mr. Srinibas Misra advances the following contentions - (i) the view of the learned Additional District Judge that the competent authority had no jurisdiction to go into the matter u/s 15(2) of the Central Act is erroneous and that the application could have been allowed in granting delayed wages for six months prior to the date of the application, and (ii) the fact the Petitioner was not an employee under the opposite party has been erroneously arrived at by overlooking certain documents filed by the Applicant. 6. Though the competent authority has jurisdiction to go into the matter, the application is liable to be dismissed as the Petitioner has failed to prove that he was wholly or principally employed in the shop of the opposite party. To appreciate this point, it is necessary to examine provisions of the Orissa Shops and Commercial Establishments (Orissa Act XXX of 1956), hereinafter to be referred to as the Orissa Act. Rule 18 of the Orissa, Shops and Commercial Establishments Rules, 1958, lays down that the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (Act IV of 1936) shall apply mutatis mutandis, to all employees referred to in the Act. Section 2 of the Orissa Act lays down: In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context., xxx (6)'employee' means a person wholly or principally employed in, and in connection with, any establishment and includes an apprentice, but does not include a member of the employer's family. It also includes any clerical or other staff of a factory or industrial establishment who falls outside the coverage of the Factories Act, 1948; xxx (8) establishment' means a shop or a commercial establishment. It also includes any clerical or other staff of a factory or industrial establishment who falls outside the coverage of the Factories Act, 1948; xxx (8) establishment' means a shop or a commercial establishment. There is no dispute that the medical shop of the opposite party is an establishment within the meaning of the Orissa Act. The controversy centres round the question whether the Petitioner is an employee in the shop of the opposite party. 7. It is conceded by Mr. Misra that the Petitioner is not wholly employed in the shop of the opposite party. The only question is whether the Petitioner was principally employed in or in connection with the medical shop of the opposite party. The learned Additional district Judge came to the conclusion that the Petitioner had his major source of income elsewhere and so he was not principally employed in the shop of the opposite party. Mr. Misra contends that the question of being employed principally has nothing to do with the total employment of the Petitioner in this shop and elsewhere, but is to be determined with reference to the employment in or in connection with reference to the employment in or in connection with the shop of the opposite party. In my view, Mr. Misra's contention is correct. Even on that construction, the Petitioner's application is bound to fail as he has made out no case in support of the fact that he was principally employed in the shop of the opposite party. There is absolutely no such averment in the petition filed before the learned Additional District Magistrate. A mere assertion that he was employed does not cover the further assertion that he was principally employed. Mere bald allegation that the Petitioner was principally employed would not also have been enough. Necessary material facts must be pleaded in the application to indicate as to how the Petitioner was principally employed. On the case found out, the opposite party has a shop which remains open for more than 12 hours a day. The Petitioner attends the shop irregularly for one to two hours a day at the maximum. The onus is on the Petitioner to make out a satisfactory case that he was principally employed in the shop. The word 'principally' carries meanings 'for the most part' and 'chiefly' as given in the Oxford Dictionary. The Petitioner attends the shop irregularly for one to two hours a day at the maximum. The onus is on the Petitioner to make out a satisfactory case that he was principally employed in the shop. The word 'principally' carries meanings 'for the most part' and 'chiefly' as given in the Oxford Dictionary. The Petitioner should have, therefore, given necessary averments in the petition and proved in support of such averment that he was for the most part or chiefly engaged in the shop of the opposite party. Even assuming that the Petitioner was employed in the shop of the opposite party, in view of the admitted position that he was not wholly "employed and in the face of absence of averment and lack of proof that he was principally employed in the shop, the petition is liable to be dismissed. Mr. Misra's argument that the entire Prescription Book of the shop, during the relevant period, was in the handwriting of the Petitioner does not carry his case very far. That the writing and the serving of the entire prescriptions in the shop did constitute the principal employment with reference to the entire affairs and business of the shop for the day is a matter to be pleaded and proved. I find no force in this contention. 8. Mr. Misra's argument on the question of jurisdiction has considerable force. The view of the learned Additional District Judge that as the opposite party denies that the Petitioner was an employee under him, the competent authority has no jurisdiction to go into the question of determining the relationship of employer and employee is erroneous. Section 15(2) of the Central Act may be quoted. The view of the learned Additional District Judge that as the opposite party denies that the Petitioner was an employee under him, the competent authority has no jurisdiction to go into the question of determining the relationship of employer and employee is erroneous. Section 15(2) of the Central Act may be quoted. (2) Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from the wages of any employed person or any payment of wages has been delayed, such person himself, or any legal practitioner, or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector under this Act, or any other person acting with the permission of the authority appointed under Sub-section (1), may apply to such authority for a direction under Sub-section (3); Provided that every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the deduction from the wages was made or from the date on which the payment of the wages was due to be made, as the case may be; Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the Applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. Viswanath Tukaram v. General Manager Central Railway AIR 1958 Bom. LLJ (F.B.), lays gown that in order to determine what the contract was what the terms of the contract were, what were the wages due under the contract, it might become necessary for the authority to determine whether in the first place there was a contract of employment. The opposite party takes the stand that there was contract indicating the terms under which the Petitioner was to attend the shop of the opposite party, but that was not a contract of employment within the meaning of 'employee' as given above. The determination of the character and the nature of the contract is an incidental fact to be determined by the competent authority. In Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. S.B. Bhatt and Another their Lordships observed that in dealing with the claims arising out of deduction or delay made in payment of wages, the authority inevitably would have to consider questions incidental to the said matters. In Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. S.B. Bhatt and Another their Lordships observed that in dealing with the claims arising out of deduction or delay made in payment of wages, the authority inevitably would have to consider questions incidental to the said matters. In determining the scope of these incidental questions, care must be taken to see that under the guise of deciding incidental matters the limited jurisdiction is not unreasonably or unduly extended. Care must also be taken to see that the scope of these incidental questions is not unduly limited so as to affect or impair the limited jurisdiction conferred on the authority. Their Lordships further held that if a claim was made by an employee on the ground of alleged illegal deduction or alleged delay in payment of wages, several relevant facts would fall to be considered, and one of them was whether the Applicant was an employee of' the opponent. Their Lordships considered it is expedient to lay down any hard and fast or general rule which would afford a determining test to demarcate the field of incidental facts which can be legitimately considered by the authority and those which cannot be so considered. Reference was made to Viswanath Tukaram v. General Manager Central Railway, In the case before their Lordships the relationship of employer and employee was not in dispute. But their Lordships categorically observed that the authority had jurisdiction to determine what the terms of the contract between the parties were? On the basis of the aforesaid authorities, I am of opinion that the question of existence of relationship of employer and employee is determinable by the competent authority. Mr. Dasgupta cited Manager, Codialabail Press v. K. Monappa AIR 1963 Mys 128, in support of the opposite view. This particular point did not arise in that case. On the contrary, in paragraph 6 of the Judgment, his Lordship observed that even when an application for wages is registered on the ground that the Applicant has not and was at no time an employee, the jurisdiction to inquire into the truth of the employment would be debatable. The position was considered with reference to an adjudication between competency of the employer to retire his employees. The learned Additional District Judge erroneously held that the competent authority had no jurisdiction. 9. If the Petitioner's contract that he was employed on a pay of Rs. The position was considered with reference to an adjudication between competency of the employer to retire his employees. The learned Additional District Judge erroneously held that the competent authority had no jurisdiction. 9. If the Petitioner's contract that he was employed on a pay of Rs. 150/- a month be accepted, he is entitled to a pay of six months prior to the date of the presentation of the application. The claim for a period prior thereto is barred by limitation u/s 15(2) First Proviso of the Central Act. 10. The next question for consideration is whether the concurrent finding of the learned Additional District Judge that the Petitioner failed to prove his contract of employment is assailable. The finding is a pure finding of fact and is not assailable in Civil Revision. Mr. Misra however, contends that two documents were not taken into consideration by the learned Additional District Judge. of these documents one is the order of the income tax officer (ext. 4) in which he recorded a finding that the opposite party admitted that he was paying certain commission on the prescriptions to the Petitioner. The statement of the opposite party before the income tax officer has not been filed. That would have been a previous statement and could have been used for contradiction u/s 145, Evidence Act. Moreover the Petitioner in his deposition in court states. I have seen the Judgment of the income tax officer. In that I found that Acharya had paid me commission which he did not do actually. On the Petitioner's own solemn testimony, the statement of the opposite party before the income tax officer was false. Such a false statement might have been made to deflate the income so as to get relief from the tax. No value can be attached to the observation of the income tax officer in ext. 4 in view of the Petitioner's own statement that it was false. The other document, alleged not to have been taken into consideration, is ext. 3, which is an application to the Civil Surgeon of Puri made by the opposite party. In the body of the application, there is a recital that drugs should be sold under the personal supervision of the Petitioner. Mr. Misra contends that this application clearly establishes that the Petitioner was an employee under the opposite party. 3, which is an application to the Civil Surgeon of Puri made by the opposite party. In the body of the application, there is a recital that drugs should be sold under the personal supervision of the Petitioner. Mr. Misra contends that this application clearly establishes that the Petitioner was an employee under the opposite party. This application was rejected by the learned Additional District Judge as not carrying much value as the person, who filled up the body of the application was not examined. He only took the admitted signature of the opposite party as having been proved and the rest of the document as not proved. Mr. Misra contends that this is an application in Form No. 19 under Rule 59(2) of the Drugs Rules, 1945. Assuming without deciding that this application is a public document and can go in without further proof, it does not in any way establish that the Petitioner was in the service of the opposite party on a pay of Rs. 150/- a month. Even according to the opposite party's case, the Petitioner was attending his shop and doing certain work. There was a reciprocal benefit to both parties by arrangement-the Petitioner would do certain things in the shop without making any charge from the opposite party and get certain income by examining patients and giving them injections and certificates while the opposite party was to derive certain benefit as under the supervision of the Petitioner the prescription should be served and drugs sold. This document is not inconsistent with the defence case and does not advance the case of the Petitioner in proof of the contract of his employment on a pay of Rs. 150/- per month. It is also not a conclusive piece of evidence and the ultimate finding is not vitiated by non-consideration of this particular piece of evidence. u/s 167, Evidence Act, the improper rejection of evidence is not a ground for reversal of a decision unless it appears to the Court that independently of the evidence objected to there was no sufficient evidence to justify the decision, or that if the rejected evidence had been received, it would have varied the decision. I am satisfied that the learned Additional District Judge recorded a correct finding and his decision would not be different even if the recital in ext, 3 were given full weight. 11. I am satisfied that the learned Additional District Judge recorded a correct finding and his decision would not be different even if the recital in ext, 3 were given full weight. 11. The Civil Revision has no merit and is dismissed. But in the circumstances, parties to bear their own costs throughout. Revision dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed