ORDER Dixit C.J. -1. The facts and circumstances leading to this application under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are that the services of the petitioner, who was appointed as Secretary of the Municipal Committee, Piparia, were first terminated by the Municipal Committee by a resolution passed on 18/19th November 1955. The decision of the• Committee terminating the applicant's services was set aside in appeal by the Collector. Hoshangabad, and the applicant' was reinstated by an order made on 1st June 1959. The Committee unsuccessfully challenged the Collector's order by filling an application under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in this Court. Meanwhile the Committee again passed a resolution on 22nd October 1959 dismissing the applicant from service without obtaining the prior approval of the State Government which, according to the petitioner, was necessary under the proviso to section 25 (1) of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The applicant then preferred an app al before the Collector, Hoshangabad, challenging the order of dismissal on various grounds, one of them being that under the proviso to section 25 (1) of the Act he could not be dismissed from service without the previous approval of the State Government. While his appeal was pending the State Government made an order on 27th January 1962 (Annexure-5, Page 26, Paper Book), purporting to be under section 25 (l-A) of the Act, according ex post facto sanction to the termination of the applicant's services with effect from 22nd October 1959. When this order of the State Government was placed before the Collector Hoshangabad, he dismissed the appeal taking the view that as the State Government has ratified the action of the Municipal Committee, the objection that the petitioner had been dismissed without the previous approval of the Government was without any force. He did not enter into the merits of the other contentions raised in the appeal. The petitioner then filed an appeal before the Board of Revenue against the decision of the Collector. The Board of Revenue dismissed the appeal on the view that the appeal preferred before the Collector was not competent and the one filed before the Board of Revenue was also not competent. 2. The petitioner then filed an appeal before the Board of Revenue against the decision of the Collector. The Board of Revenue dismissed the appeal on the view that the appeal preferred before the Collector was not competent and the one filed before the Board of Revenue was also not competent. 2. The applicant now contends that the order passed by the State Government on 27th January 1962 under section 25 (1-A) granting ex post facto sanction to his dismissal was not in conformity with that provision and was this illegal; that the order of the Municipal Committee dismissing him from service was also illegal and that the Collector and the Board of Revenue erred in not hearing on merits the appeals preferred by him. He prays that the decisions of the Board of Revenue and the Collector, the order dated 27th January 1962 of the State Government, and the decision of the Municipal Committee dismissing him from service be all quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari. In the alternative, it is prayed that the Board of Revenue and/or the Collector be directed to hear his appeal on merits. 3. It was argued by Shri Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the order passed by the State Government on 27th January 1962 was stated to be one under section 25 (1); that this provision did not authorise the Government to give ex post facto sanction that assuming that the order was one really under section 25 (1-A), even then it was illegal for the reason that before the making of all order under S.25 (1-A) certain conditions precedent had to be satisfied; that under that provision the Government could ratify the action of the Committee only if it was satisfied that no substantial injury would thereby be caused to anyone affected by the action of the Committee or that the action of the Committee was in the public interest; and that the order dated the 27th January 1962 did not recite that the Government had arrived at the requisite satisfaction before the making of that order. Relying on Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. Relying on Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. S. I. Tribunal, AIR 1961 SC 1381 , learned counsel urged that as the order dated the 27th January 1962 did not contain a recital of the requisite satisfaction, the burden was on the Government to satisfy the Court that the conditions precedent had been complied with, but as in the present Case no return had been filed on behalf of the Government and no appearance had been put on its behalf, it should be taken that the order was passed without complying with the conditions precedent. Learned counsel further submitted that the appeal preferred by the applicant before the Collector was competent as the bar imposed by clause (a) of Rule 1 of the Rules framed under section 25 (6) applied only to an appeal against an order passed after obtaining the previous approval of the State Government; that as in the present case the order dated the 27th January 1962 was one giving ex post facto approval, it did not fall within the purview of clause (a); and that consequently the Collector should have proceeded to hear on merits his appeal even after the receipt of the order of the Government according ex post facto sanction to the Municipal Committee's decision dismissing the applicant from service. 4 On behalf of the Municipal Committee, Shri Sen contended that the petitioner was only holding a temporary appointment and as such he had no right or appeal under rule 1 (c) of the Rules framed under section 25 (6). It was also said that in any case on the true construction of the proviso to section 25 (1) the previous approval of the Government was not necessary for the petitioner's dismissal. The argument was that the expression "shall be subject to a like approval" used in the proviso to section 25 (1) only meant that the approval should be of the State Government and did not imply that it should be a previous approval. Learned counsel for the Municipal committee further urged that an order made under section 25 (1-A) relates back" and must for the purposes of an appeal under rule 1 (a) be regarded as falling under section 25 (1). 5. In our judgment, this application must be granted and the Collector must be directed to pear on merits the appeal preferred by the petitioner. 5. In our judgment, this application must be granted and the Collector must be directed to pear on merits the appeal preferred by the petitioner. Under rule 1 (a) of the Rules framed under section 25 (6) an Officer or a servant of a Municipal Committee has no right of appeal if the order appealed against is an order to which the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 25 applies and has passed after obtaining the previous approval of the State Government. An appeal under clause (a) is, therefore, barred if two conditions are satisfied, namely, the applicability of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 25 and the passing of the order, sought to be appealed against, without obtaining the previous approval of the State Government. Here, the order against which the petitioner filed an appeal before the Collector was admittedly, not one passed after obtaining the previous approval of the State Government. The Government's order dated. 27th January 1962 only accorded ex post facto sanction to that order. Rule 1 (a) did not, therefore, in terms apply so as to make the appeal, preferred by the petitioner before the Collector, incompetent. The Collector should have, therefore, proceeded to dispose of the petitioner's appeal on merits. The Collector no doubt dismissed the appeal by observing that "no other ground" besides the one about the absence of the Government's sanction was pressed before him. But the petitioner has challenged the correctness of this statement saying that in the memorandum of appeal he had attacked the validity of the resolution passed by the Committee dismissing him from service on the grounds that he was not given a proper opportunity to meet the charges, and that the findings reached by the Municipal Committee on the charges were erroneous and the action of the Committee was malicious, and that these grounds were also urged during the course of arguments before the Board of Revenue. This statement of the petitioner has not been challenged by the Municipal Committee by filing any return as to the facts. 6. This statement of the petitioner has not been challenged by the Municipal Committee by filing any return as to the facts. 6. In regard to the submission made on behalf of the Municipal Committee that the petitioner's dismissal required no previous approval of the State Government, it must be stated that in view of the decision, dated 1st June 1959, of the Collector, Hoshangabad, setting aside the previous order of the Municipal Committee dismissing the petitioner from service on the ground that it was in violation of the proviso to section 25 (1) for want of the Government's previous approval to the termination, it is not now open to the Municipal Committee to contend that the petitioner's dismissal did not require the previous approval of the Government. That order of the Collector proceeded on the basis that the petitioner was holding a permanent and not a temporary appointment. The Municipal Committee cannot, therefore, now be allowed to say that the petitioner was only a temporary employee It must be noted that in M.P. No.274 of 1961, filed by the Municipal Committee under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for quashing the decision dated 1st June 1959 of the Collector the point whether the applicant-Mannilal's appointment was permanent or temporary was specifically raised and decided by this Court by holding that the petitioner held a permanent appointment. It is difficult to see how the contention that no previous approval of the Government was necessary for the petitioner's dismissal can at all be of any assistance to the Municipal Committee in maintaining that the appeal preferred by the applicant before the Collector was incompetent, if the fact that the petitioner was holding a permanent appointment cannot now be questioned. That apart, there is really no substance in the contention that the expression "shall be subject to a like approval", used in the proviso to section 25 (1), does not carry the implication that the dismissal of the persons enumerated in the proviso does not require the previous approval of the State Government. The words "like approval" clearly mean the 'approval of the kind indicated earlier'. So read, the expression "shall be subject to a like approval" cannot but be construed as meaning that the dismissal from service of any of the officers mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 25 requires the previous approval of the Government. 7. The words "like approval" clearly mean the 'approval of the kind indicated earlier'. So read, the expression "shall be subject to a like approval" cannot but be construed as meaning that the dismissal from service of any of the officers mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 25 requires the previous approval of the Government. 7. In this view of the matter, and in view of the direction which we, propose to make asking the Collector to dispose of the petitioner's appeal on merits, it is not necessary to examine the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the order made by the State Government on 27th January 1962 was not one under section 25 (1-A) and even assuming that it was one under that provision, the order was not in conformity with the said provision. It is open to the petitioner to urge the contention before the Collector he decision of the Board of Revenue holding that the second appeal preferred to it was incompetent, even if correct has not the effect of upholding the order passed by the Collector dismissing the petitioner's appeal. That being so, it becomes unnecessary to issue a writ of certiorari for quashing the decision of the Board of Revenue which contains the expression of opinion that the appeal preferred by the petitioner before the Collector was not competent under rule 1(a) of the aforesaid Rules 8. For these reasons, the decision of the Collector, Hoshangabad, dated the 17th February 1962, dismissing the petitioner's appeal is quashed and he is directed to hear and dispose of on merits the appeal in the light of this order. The petitioner shall have costs of this application from the Municipal Council, Piparia. Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 75, The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner.