JUDGMENT : A.K. Sarkar, J. 1. This is an appeal out of a proceeding started by a landlord against his tenant for ejectment under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The ejectment was sought on a number of grounds but the only one with which we are concerned in this appeal is whether the tenant had sublet the premises without the written consent of landlord. The tenant denied that there had been any subletting and that contention was accepted by the Courts below. Hence this appeal by the landlord. 2. It appears that the premises in dispute, a shop, was let out originally to a firm of the name of Chuni Lal, Gherulal. The firm consisted of three partners, namely, Chunilal, Gherulal and Meghraj. The business of this partnership was closed sometime before November 1955 and thereafter the shop was used by a new firm of the name of Meghraj Bansidhar of which the partners were Meghraj of the firm of Chunilal, Gherulal, and Bansidhar. 3. It appears that two contentions were raised in the High Court both of which were rejected. The first was that the possession of the premises by the new firm proved sub-letting. The contention appears to have been that the old firm and the new firm being two different legal entities. The occupation of the shop by the new firm was occupation by the legal entity other than the original tenant and such occupation proved subletting. This contention is entirely without substance. A firm unless expressly provided for the purpose of any statute which is not the case here, is not a legal entity. The firm name is only a compendious way of describing the partners of the firm. Therefore, occupation by a firm is only occupation by its partners. Here the firms have a common partner. Hence the occupation has been by one of the original tenants. 4. The other point was that since Meghraj entered into a new partnership with a stranger, there was sub-letting to the new partnership. It seems to us that the point sought to be made was that when Meghraj was in possession as the partner of Meghraj Bansidhar, he was in possession of the shop in a capacity different from that in which he was in possession as a partner of Chunilal Gherulal. This is clearly fallacious. It seems to us that the point sought to be made was that when Meghraj was in possession as the partner of Meghraj Bansidhar, he was in possession of the shop in a capacity different from that in which he was in possession as a partner of Chunilal Gherulal. This is clearly fallacious. Meghraj was in possession all though in his individual capacity. It is impossible to treat him as possessing one legal personality as member of one firm and another such personality as member of another firm. 5. It seems to us that the landlord cannot succeed. He has to prove it as a fact that there was a sub-letting by his tenant to another person. He does not prove this merely by showing that his tenant was one firm and the premises are in the occupation of another firm, as he sought to do in the present case. Mere possession by somebody other than the tenant would not necessarily prove that the premises had been sublet by the tenant to the person in possession. It is admitted that there is no evidence in this case to prove the fact of sub-letting. In this case in particular, the premises continued in possession of one of the original tenants, Meghraj. It may be, as the learned Counsel for the appellant said, that the attention of the Courts below had not been directed to the fact in issue, namely, the proof of sub-letting. If that was so, the fault was that of his client, the landlord; he cannot now claim any relief on that ground. As we have said, it is admitted that the evidence does not establish that there was any sub-letting by the tenant. There was nothing to prevent the landlord from leading evidence to establish that if it was a fact. If he has mis-conducted his case as he says, he must take the consequences. 6. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.