Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal which arises from an order in execution comes before us on a reference by Velu Pillai, J. 2. The suit was one for redemption of a mortgage. The trial court in passing a decree for redemption directed that compensation for improvements should be determined by the execution court. 3. On 3rd April 1958, the second defendant in the suit applied for determining compensation for improvements. Before the Commissioner who was deputed to do the work inspected the property, the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 29 of 1958, came into force on 24th May 1958. The Commissioner filed his report and the execution court passed an order on 8th November 1958 fixing the value of improvements. The second defendant appealed to the District Court but the appeal was dismissed on 23rd December, 1958. This Second Appeal was filed by him on 22nd June 1959. The only point pressed before Velu Pillai, J , was that compensation for coconut trees was to be assessed on the basis of the tables published by the Government under S.13 of Act 29 of 1958. Velu Pillai, J., was of the opinion that the tables having been published long after the execution court decided the question, valuation of improvements on the basis of the tables could not be resorted to and that the tables would apply only to those cases where such determination was made after the publication of the tables. As a contrary view was taken by Raghavan, J., in Suleikha Ummal v. Sumathy (1962 KLT. 822), the Second Appeal was referred to a Division Bench. S. 5 (1) of Act 29 of 1958 provides: "In a suit for eviction instituted against a tenant in which the plaintiff succeeds and the defendant establishes a claim for compensation due under S.4 for improvements, the court shall ascertain as provided in S.7 to 16, the amount of the compensation and shall pass a decree declaring the amount so found due and ordering that on payment by the plaintiff into the court of the amount so found due and also the mortgage money or the premium, as the case may be, the defendant shall put the plaintiff into possession of the land with the improvements thereon." The tables are published under S.13 of the Act which is as follows: "13. (1) For the purpose of determining the amount of compensation to be awarded under this Act, the Government may prepare tables for the whole or any part of the State showing all or any of the following matters: (a) the price of coconuts, arecanuts, pepper and paddy; (b) the cost of (i) cultivating and harvesting a crop of paddy; (ii) planting, protecting and maintaining a coconut tree, an arecanut tree, a jack tree, a mango tree, such other tree as may be notified by the Government from time to time and a pepper vine, until the tree or vine is in bearing; (iii) protecting and maintaining a coconut tree, an arecanut tree, a jack tree, a mango tree, such other tree as may be notified by the Government from time to time and a pepper vine for one year when in bearing." Though the Act came into force in 1958 the tables were published only on 25th April 1961 during the pendency of this Second Appeal. The view expressed by Velu Pillai, J., in the order of reference is mainly based on S.14 of the Act which reads as follows: "14. In respect of any produce for which no table showing the price has been published and whenever the presumption under S.13 is rebutted, the court shall adopt, as the money value for the purpose of awarding compensation under sub-section (V of S.7, the average price, as nearly as may be ascertainable in the taluk where the land is situated, for a period of 10 years immediately preceding the institution of the suit." According to the learned Judge, S.14 applies to cases where the value of improvements was determined by the court of first instance before the publication of the tables and that the later publication of the same need not be taken note of by the appellate court. 4. With great respect, we are unable to agree with this view. It was held in Kunjukrishnan v. Krishna Pillai (1958 KLT. 45)to which one of us was a party that the appellate court was bound to take note of the Travancore-Cochin Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act 10 of 1956 even when it came into force during the pendency of an appeal from the decree and to award compensation in accordance with the Act. 45)to which one of us was a party that the appellate court was bound to take note of the Travancore-Cochin Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act 10 of 1956 even when it came into force during the pendency of an appeal from the decree and to award compensation in accordance with the Act. Act 10 of 1956 was repealed by Act 29 of 1958 and in our opinion the same principle has to be followed. The only decree or order fixing the value of improvements will be that in appeal, and the fact that the trial court had passed a decree or order before the Act came into force cannot deprive this court of its duty to decide the case on the basis of the Act which came into force during the pendency of the appeal. 5. So far as S.14 is concerned, it provides that the average price of commodities for a period of ten years immediately preceding the institution of the suit should be taken as the basis of valuation in respect of any product for which no table showing the price has been published or where the presumption under S.13 is rebutted. The provision applies to a case where the product is one in respect of which no table has been published. The table regarding coconuts having been published during the pendency of this Second Appeal, the same must govern the valuation of the coconut trees notwithstanding the fact that the court of first instance as well as the lower appellate court had decided the matter before the publication of the tables. We adopt the view taken in Sulaikha Ummul v. Sumathi (1962 KLT. 822). 6. It is urged on behalf of the respondent that S.13 provides only a rule of evidence and that it cannot have any retrospective operation. We are unable to agree. The rule is only one of procedure & the presumption against a retrospective construction has no application to enactments which affect only the procedure and practice of courts. 7. Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent argued that the presumption arising from the tables could be rebutted by other evidence. We are unable to agree. The rule is only one of procedure & the presumption against a retrospective construction has no application to enactments which affect only the procedure and practice of courts. 7. Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent argued that the presumption arising from the tables could be rebutted by other evidence. The proviso to S.1.3 reads: "Provided that, in so far as such tables prescribe prices of products, the presumption shall not be rebuttable except by proof of the average price as provided in S.14." It was urged that the report of the Commissioner which was accepted by the courts below should be taken as proof of the average price rebutting the presumption. This argument also cannot be accepted, especially on the facts of this case. After the Commissioner filed his report, the second defendant filed his objections to the same. He sought to examine the Commissioner and took out summons. It is seen from the Diary that the Commissioner accepted summons and that he was to appear in court on 7111958. It is not possible to gather from the Diary whether the Commissioner was present in court on that day. However, the court heard the case and took it up for disposal. The Commissioner having accepted summons, the court should have examined him or allowed further steps for his examination. The report does not disclose the basis on which the Commissioner fixed the average price. In these circumstances it is not possible to say that there is sufficient or reliable evidence to rebut the presumption. The concurrent decisions have therefore to be set aside. We do so and remand the case to the court of first instance for fresh decision. The court will give an opportunity to the decree-holder respondent to adduce evidence to rebut the presumption arising from the tables published under S.13 in respect of coconut trees. The scope of the enquiry will be limited to the trees planted by the tenants, as the claim related only to that. 8. The Second Appeal is allowed as indicated above. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. Allowed.