ORDER 1. This is an application purporting to be under Order 1 rule 10 or Order 41 rule 20, Civil Procedure Code or in the alternative for exercise of inherent powers under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code filed by the appellant. The respondent Nanuram died on 10-7-1959 leaving behind his widow Mst. Basantibai. Therefore an application for substitution was filed on 7-9-1959. On behalf of Basantibai a reply dated 31-12-1960 was filed wherein it was alleged that the death of Nanuram took place before 10-7-1959. However, she failed to disclose the exact date of death. She also denied the allegation that she was the keep of Nanuram. Further she alleged that Nanuram had left behind his brother Kanhaiyalal. 2. An entry from register of births and deaths (Ex. P-1) was produced wherein the fact of Nanuram's death is recorded in the entry made on 26-6-1959 The learned appellate Judge held that the death took place on 26-6-1959 and the application filed on 7-9-1959 was within time. It was also held that Basantibai was the legal representative whose name was directed to be brought on record. 3. However, inspite of that order the necessary corrections were not made either in the memorandum of appeal or the record of the first appellate Court. The learned appellate Judge also while delivering the judgment mentioned the name of the respondent as Nanuram who had already died and whose legal representative was ordered to be brought on record. This is clearly an omission on the part of the learned appellate Judge to have the necessary stops taken in the matter of correcting the record of the first appellate Court. It was for that reason that a wrong certified copy of the judgment of the first appellate Court was supplied to the present appellant, wherein Nanuram's name was shown as respondent, However, in the certified copy of the decree of the first appellate Court, the name of Basantibai is shown. In this Court when notice of the appeal was issued to the respondent the process came un-served with the remark that Nanuram had already died much before Consequently the appellant filed the present application on 2-8 1963. 4. Upon notice of the said application being issued to the other side Shri S. L Dube counsel for Mst. Basantibai has opposed the application. The question, therefore, arises whether Mst. 4. Upon notice of the said application being issued to the other side Shri S. L Dube counsel for Mst. Basantibai has opposed the application. The question, therefore, arises whether Mst. Basantibai can be shown as a respondent in the memorandum of appeal in this Court and whether she can be impleaded now after the period of limitation. 5. In this connection it is to be noted that the principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of the Court shall prejudice no one) has to be borne in mind. In the present case ,he memorandum of appeal in this Court came to be filed because of the wrong certified copy of the judgment supplied to the appellant's counsel, although a correct copy of the decree was supplied. The question, therefore, arises whether the appellant is entitled to implead Mst. Basantibai either under Order 1 rule 10 (2) or under Order 41 rule 20, Civil Procedure Code or the Court can exercise inherent powers in the matter of getting the record corrected and allow Basantibai’s name to be shown as respondent. In this connection, I might refer to the cases of Nalini Kanta Roy Vs. Kamaraddi and others AIR 1933 Ca1. 239, Kali Prasad Sahu and others Vs. Mt. Bibi Aziz Patma and ethers, AIR 1938 Patna 149and Anant Ram Vs. Basdeo Sahai and others AIR 1957 Allahabad 114, wherein the principle of 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' has been followed. 6. Such a situation arose in Bishna and others Vs. Sucha Singh [1], decided by Abdul Rashid J. In that case the name of a necessary party was omitted due to a wrong certified copy of the judgment being supplied, although the decree showed the name correctly. However, under those circumstances the learned Judge held that the correct party could be added under Order 41 rule 20, Civil Procedure Code. The present case is similar to the said case. 7. In this connection, I might refer to a Division Bench case of the Madhya Bharat High Court, namely Keshorao Vs. Yeshwantrao 1956 MBLJ 774=AIR 1957 MB 17, wherein a Division Bench consisting of Chaturvedi and Samvatsar JJ. held that it is a well settled principle that no litigant should be allowed to suffer through the mistake of any official of the Court, who is connected with the administration of Justice. Yeshwantrao 1956 MBLJ 774=AIR 1957 MB 17, wherein a Division Bench consisting of Chaturvedi and Samvatsar JJ. held that it is a well settled principle that no litigant should be allowed to suffer through the mistake of any official of the Court, who is connected with the administration of Justice. Such a mistake according to the Division Bench, can be corrected under inherent powers as per sections 151, 152 and 153, Civil Procedure Code. The learned Judges expressed the opinion that the language of section 153 is wide enough to cover the correction of mistakes and errors in any proceedings in a suit. For that proposition, reliance was placed on the observations of Cairas L. C. in Rodger Vs Comptoired Rscomte de Faris (1871) 3 PC 465, as also on Jai Berham Vs. Kedarnath Marwari, LR 49 IA 351. The learned Judges also referred to the Single Bench case of the Lahore High Court in Bishna and others Vs. Sucha Singh AIR 1934 Lahore 402, as also the case of Alabhai Vajsurbhai Vs. Bhura Bhava ILR 1937 Bom. 602, which had taken a different view of the Privy Council case of Chokulingam Chetty Vs. Seethai LR 56 IA 7, then what the Madras High Court took in Swaminatha Odayar Vs. T. S. Gopalaswami Ojayar ILR 1938 Madras 52. In that view, the Division Bench of the Madhya Bharat High Court held that such a correction could be permitted under Order 41 rule 20, Civil Procedure Code or even under inherent powers. 8. However, the learned counsel for the proposed respondent invited attention to the observations of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court "presided over by Das Gupta and Mookerjee JJ. in Sisir Kumar Tarafdar Vs. Manindra Kumer Biswas and another AIR 1958 Cal. 681 . In that case, the suit had been instituted against two persons by name Manindra Kumar and Rabindra Kumar. It was alleged that they were in possession of the estate of Nrisingha Kumar Dasi as per heirs. The defendants, after notices, appeared and stated that Nrisingha Kumar Dasi was alive and as such they were not interested in her estate. Therefore, they prayed for being discharged from the suit. Therefore, an application was filed by the plaintiff for amendment of the plaint. The plaintiff wanted to substitute a new defendant in place of the defendant already impleaded. The trial Judge refused that prayer. Therefore, they prayed for being discharged from the suit. Therefore, an application was filed by the plaintiff for amendment of the plaint. The plaintiff wanted to substitute a new defendant in place of the defendant already impleaded. The trial Judge refused that prayer. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had to consider the question in a revision. The learned Judges constituting the Division Bench held that such an amendment could rot be allowed whereby on: defendant would be substituted for another defendant The learned Judges also expressed the opinion that Order 1 rule 10 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code does not contemplate a case of substitution but merely a case of addition or deletion of parties It was under those circumstances that the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the amendment asked for by the plaintiff could not be granted even under inherent powers. Of course in that case it might have been open to the plaintiff to file another suit subject to limitation. But the said case is clearly distinguishable on facts. I have already indicated earlier that the present case is similar to the one before the Single Bench of the Lahore High Court, as also the case before the Division Bench of the Madhya Bharat High Court. Therefore, this Calcutta case does not assist the respondent in any manner. 9. I may further refer to a. Single Bench case of the Nagpur High Court decided by V. R. Sen, J. namely; Maruti Vs. Khushalrao and others ILR 1951 Nag. 372, wherein the learned Judge held that even apart from the provisions of Order 41 rule 20, Civil Procedure Code the second appellate Court could exercise inherent powers in the matter of a bona fide mistake committed in the first appellate Court. The learned Judge considered the case law on the point exhaustively as also the Federal Court case of the United Provinces Vs. Mt. Atica Begum and others 1940 FCR 110. 10. The learned Judge considered the case law on the point exhaustively as also the Federal Court case of the United Provinces Vs. Mt. Atica Begum and others 1940 FCR 110. 10. Before referring to the said case, I may at this stage advert to another Single Bench case of this Court, namely, decided by Chaturvedi J. wherein Chaturvedi J. held that either under Order 41 rule 20 or under inherent powers 'under section 151, Civil Procedure Code the first appellate Court could not allow one of the joint decree holders to be impleaded as he had not been made a party within time and such a person would not be a person interested in the result of the appeal. However, on the particular facts of that case Chaturvedi J. held that the omission to implead one of the joint decree-holders as a party to the appeal amounted to gross negligence and the party concerned was not entitled to avail of extension of time under section 5 of the Limitation Act as there was no sufficient cause. Therefore, this case decided by Chaturvedi J. is also distinguishable on facts in as much as the omission to implead one of the joint decree-holders was on account of gross negligence and not on account of any mistake on the part of an officer of the Court. Therefore, the said case cannot, in my opinion, be cited as an authority for the proposition involved in the present appeal. Farlier I have already indicated that the present case is akin to the Single Bench case of the Lahore High Court and the Division Bench case of the Madhya Bharat High Court and Chaturvedi J. was a member of the Division Bench in that case. 11. It was, however, suggested by the learned counsel or the proposed respondent that there being an apparent conflict between the views as expressed by V. R. Sen J. in Maruti Vs. Khushalrao und others (supra) and by Chaturvedi J. in Bhojraj Krishnarao Kunbi and another Vs. Da ru Runjya Kunbi and others (supra) the instant case should be referred to a la! gel' Bench for' resolving the conflict. Khushalrao und others (supra) and by Chaturvedi J. in Bhojraj Krishnarao Kunbi and another Vs. Da ru Runjya Kunbi and others (supra) the instant case should be referred to a la! gel' Bench for' resolving the conflict. I am unable to accept this suggestion for the simple reason that I do not find any conflict between the views expressed by V. R Sen J. and by Chaturvedi J. The case before Chaturvedi J. sitting singly is clearly distinguishable in as much as the omission to implead one of the joint decree-holders was on account of gross degligence and not on account of a wrong action of the Court. Under these circumstances Chaturvedi J. was justified in holding that unless section 5 of the Limitation Act could be invoked by the party concerned he was not entitled to implead an omitted respondent against whom the appeal had become barred by time. The principle of 'actus curiae naminem gravabit' was not at all for consideration before Chaturvedi J. in the Single Bench case; while it was directly for consideration before him while sitting in the Division Bensh case of the Madhya Bharat High Court. Therefore, I do not find any such conflict of views. 12. It would be pertinent to reproduce the observations of Their Lordships of the Federal Court in United Provinces Vs. Mt. Atica Begum and others (1940 FCR 110):- "A person would be a necessary party if he ought to have been joined, that is to say, in whose absence no effective decree can be passed at all. He would be a proper party to be Impleaded if his presence is necessary for an effectual or complete adjudication. In a suit between a landholder and his tenant, the Provincial Government cannot be considered a necessary party at all, as a proper decree can certainly be passed in their: absence. But when in such a suit the validity of an Act of the Provincial Legislature is in question, the adjudication would affect a large section of the public, and the Provincial Government would be indirectly interested in such an adjudication. In the present case, the Government were interested to this further extent that the effect of the High Court's ruling would be to nullify certain orders, previously issued by the Government, the enforceability of which was indirectly attempted by the impugned Act. In the present case, the Government were interested to this further extent that the effect of the High Court's ruling would be to nullify certain orders, previously issued by the Government, the enforceability of which was indirectly attempted by the impugned Act. Apparently, the defendants were too poor to think of preferring an appeal to the Federal Court; and the High Court thought that it would not only be convenient but quite fair to make the U.P Government a respondent to enable it to secure a more authoritative pronouncement. As the Act was passed during the pandency of the High Court appeal, there was no earlier occasion on which the Government could have been impleaded. It is contended before us that the powers of an appellate Court are restricted within the limits imposed by O. 41 rule 20, and that the same restriction is imposed on a Court hearing a second appeal under Order 42, Civil Procedure Code. That rule no doubt permits of making a person respondent, who was a party to the suit in the original Court, and who has not been made a party to appeal, but is interested in the result of the appeal. Obviously, this rule would not apply to the present case. But the language of the rule does not show that it is exclusive or exhaustive so as to deprive a Court of any inherent power which it may possess and can exercise in special circumstances, and which has been saved by section 151, Civil Procedure Code." Therefore it is clear that from the observations of their Lordihips of the Fedral Court if a person be apathy to the suit and if his name is sought to be impleaded at the appellate stage, the matter would squarely be governed by order 41 rule 20, Civil Procedure Code. However, where that is not the case the inherent powers of the Court under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code would be there in the matter of impleading a person as a party at the appel1ate stage For this reason I am of opinion that the view taken by Abdul Rashid J. in the Lahore case and by Chaturvedi J and Samvatsar J. in the Madhya Bharat case and by V. R. Sen J. in the Nagpur case is the correct interpretation on the basis of the observations of Their Lordships of the Fedral Court. The case before Chaturvedi J sitting singly and the Division Bench case of the Calcutta High Court are clearly distinguishable and they app1y to a different set of circumstances; Therefore, I am of opinion that the name of Mst. Basantibai which had already been substituted under Order 22 rule 4, Civil Procedure Code in the first appellate Court can be permitted to be shown in the record of the present case as a respondent Under such circumstances there is no question of limitation involved so as to attract section 22 of the Limitation Act. This suggestion made by the learned counsel for the proposed respondent is wholly untenable. 13. As a result, the application succeeds and is allowed. The appellant is directed to correct the memorandum of appeal accordingly by showing the name of Mst. Basantibai as a respondent. Notice of the appeal shall now be issued to her.