ORDER.- The award, the propriety of which is questioned in this petition, has to be quashed, I think or two grounds, which I shall presently deal with. It will suffice to quite briefly mention the facts relevant to them. The petitioner which is the Management, by a notice dated 25th April, 1962, retrenched 48 workmen out of whom 23 settled their claims with the Management by receiving compensation and in view of this the Labour Court passed no award in respect of them, except to notice the fact of settlement in the course of its award. The workmen having raised a dispute that the retrenchment was not proper on the ground, among others, that the principles of section 25-G of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with, and the conciliation in respect of that matter having failed, a reference was made by the State Government to the Labour Court for adjudication of the question whether the non-employment of the 48 workmen was justified. The Management contended that the Labour Court to whom the reference was made had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter and that, in any case, the petitioner having itself taken over the concern with effect from 1st January, 1961, all the workmen were appointed or should be taken to have been appointed as on that date and that on that basis there was no room for application to the case of the principles of section 25-G: It does not appear that there was any controversy before the Labour Court as to whether justifiable circumstances existed for retrenchment. The Labour Court repelled the objection to its jurisdiction and found that 25 out of the 48 workmen were retrenched without following the procedure prescribed by section 25-G. On that ground the Labour Court held that the 25 workmen were entitled to reinstatement with back wages, at the rate last drawn by them from the date of their non-employment till their reinstatement: in service. It may also be mentioned that on behalf of the Management it was said that ten out of the 25 workmen were removed from the list of retrenched workmen but were subsequently dismissed for misconduct, and on account of this fact the Labour Court should not order their reinstatement. The Labour Court also declined to accept this contention. The petition is to quash its award. The Labour Court also declined to accept this contention. The petition is to quash its award. The first ground of objection to the propriety of the award is the one pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to adjudicate the question referred to it The contention is that the proviso to section 10(1) has no application and did not enable the Slate Government to refer the dispute to the Labour Court instead of the Industrial Tribunal. It is common ground that retrenchment of workmen is an item in the Third Schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act and as such any question, relating to that will have, under section 10(1), to be referred to the Industrial Tribunal. The proviso to the sub-section reads: “Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Third Schedule and is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, the appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court under Clause (c)”. The Labour Court considered that the dispute related to a matter affecting only 48 workmen and that being the case, the reference by the Government, acting under the Proviso, to the Labour Court was right. The learned Advocate-General contends that this view of the Labour Court is not correct. The question of jurisdiction so raised turns upon the construction of the words “likely to affect” in the proviso read by me. A prima facie reading of these words no doubt suggests that by those words only the workmen who are actually affected in the sense of they being the ones retrenched that is meant. But the learned Advocate-General argues that having regard to the scheme of the Act and certain authorities interpreting section 33, those words mean exactly the same thing as workmen concerned in the dispute referred for adjudication. Section 33(1)(a) uses the words “in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter to the prejudice of the workmen concerned In such dispute”. The section directs that pending certain proceedings, the conditions of service, etc., of the workmen concerned should remain unchanged. Rajagopalan, J., in Newtons Studios v. T. R. Ethirajulu1 construed the words “workmen concerned” as referring to all the workmen in the employ of the Management. The learned Judge observed: “.......... The section directs that pending certain proceedings, the conditions of service, etc., of the workmen concerned should remain unchanged. Rajagopalan, J., in Newtons Studios v. T. R. Ethirajulu1 construed the words “workmen concerned” as referring to all the workmen in the employ of the Management. The learned Judge observed: “.......... The nature of the industrial dispute was such that all the workmen then in the employ of the management were concerned in that industrial dispute, in the sense they were interested in the settlement of the principles that should govern the right of the management to effect a retrenchment and the conditions subject to which that right should be exercised.” But the learned Judge was not prepared to restrict those words as referring to only those workmen who had actually been retrenched. The Supreme Court in New India Motors (P.) Ltd. v. K.T. Morris2, accepted that construction of the words. The Supreme Court held: “Prima facie the argument that ‘workmen concerned in such dispute’ should be limited to the workmen directly or actually concerned in such dispute appears plausible, but if we examine the scheme of the Act and the effect of its material and relevant provisions this limited construction of the clause in question cannot be accepted”. The Supreme Court particularly referred to the definition of “Industrial Dispute” and the provisions of section 18 in coming on that conclusion. It is no doubt true that Rajagopalan, J., and the Supreme Court in those decisions were concerned with different words in section.33. But it seems to me that the reasoning on which, they ascertained the scope of those words should equally apply in appreciating the. scope of the words “likely to affect more than one hundred workmen” in the Proviso. Reference for adjudictaion is conditional upon the existence of an industrial dispute which, having regard to its definition, means a dispute or difference between the employers and their workmen, connected among others, with nonemployment of any person. ‘Workmen' under the definition do not necessarily mean as is now settled, only those workmen actually concerned in the dispute. Reference for adjudictaion is conditional upon the existence of an industrial dispute which, having regard to its definition, means a dispute or difference between the employers and their workmen, connected among others, with nonemployment of any person. ‘Workmen' under the definition do not necessarily mean as is now settled, only those workmen actually concerned in the dispute. Workmen in that context, will include all those who are concerned in that dispute, in the sense of all those persons interested in or espousing the cause of the dispute, When on reference an award is made, section 18 enacts the persons on whom the award will be binding Sub-section (3) of that section shows that an award will be binding not merely on all parties to the industrial dispute, but also on the other workmen who were employed under the Management and also on persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment. That being the case, when the proviso to section 10 (1) speaks of a dispute which is not likely to affect more than a specified number of workmen, what is meant is, not only those who are actually involved or directly affected by the retrenchment, but all those who are interested in the dispute or concerned with it will also be regarded as person likely to be affected by the dispute. The words “likely to affect” in the proviso, as it seems to me, have the same import and should be understood in the same way as the words “workmen concerned in the dispute” in section 33. As a matter of fact, the question that was raised before the Labour Court, which Was the subject-matter of the dispute, was whether the principles of section 25-G were applicable to the case. While the Management contended that because, according to them, all the workmen were or should be taken to have been appointed on a particular date, there was no room for the application of that section, on behalf of the workmen that position was not accepted. The question at issue between the parties was, therefore not confined to the retrenched workmen alone but undoubtedly it affected the entire body of workmen in the service of the petitioner. In that sense, therefore, the dispute raised affected not merely the 25 or even the 48 retrenched workmen but all the workmen. The question at issue between the parties was, therefore not confined to the retrenched workmen alone but undoubtedly it affected the entire body of workmen in the service of the petitioner. In that sense, therefore, the dispute raised affected not merely the 25 or even the 48 retrenched workmen but all the workmen. It is not disputed that at all relevant times, at any rate, when the reference was made by the State Government under section 10(1)(c) read with the Proviso, there were in the employ of the petitioner more than 100 workmen, whether they were 140 as the petitioner would say or 150 as the workmen would have it. It follows, therefore, that the dispute in this case was likely to affect more than one hundred workmen and in any such case the Proviso to section 10(1) could not properly be invoked. The result is, the reference by the State Government to the Labour Court of the dispute was one without jurisdiction. That will suffice to dispose of this petition. But since the other ground also has been argued, I shall briefly deal with it. The learned Advocate-General contends that before the Labour Court applied section 25-G to the facts of the case, it was incumbent upon it, having regard to the pleadings, to enquire into and decide as to whether the case of the petitioner that all the employees under its service were appointed on a particular date was well-founded. This contention appears to be right. The Management did raise the factual question before the Labour Court that all the workmen were or should be deemed to have been appointed on a particular date. If that case was accepted, it follows that there would be no room at all for applying section 25-G. The Labour Court found the retrenchment to be improper only on the ground that the procedure prescribed by that section had not been followed. There is no dispute, therefore, that the failure on the part of the Labour Court to decide the controversy raised as to whether the workmen were all appointed on a particular date, vitiates the award. I, therefore, accept this ground as well. There is no dispute, therefore, that the failure on the part of the Labour Court to decide the controversy raised as to whether the workmen were all appointed on a particular date, vitiates the award. I, therefore, accept this ground as well. It was stated on behalf of the petitioner that even before the Conciliation Officer made his report, the petitioner had cancelled the retrenchment of ten out of the 48 workmen and informed him of that fact and that notwithstanding the fact that the Labour Court’s attention was drawn to this circumstance, it declined to give effect to the withdrawal of the workmen from the list of retrenched workmen but erroneously proceeded to regard those ten workmen also as retrenched and directed their reinstatement. It appears that subsequently the ten workmen were proceeded against by the petitioner on a charge of misconduct and they were eventually dismissed. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the Labour Court was not right in declining to take notice of the fact that the retrenchment of the ten workmen had been cancelled even before the Conciliation Officer made his report. Mr. Ismail for the workmen contended that since the reference related to all the 48 workmen who had been originally retrenched, the Labour Court could not go behind it. But there is here no question of going behind the reference. The Labour Court was entitled, in adjudicating on the reference, to take note of the fact that the retrenchment of ten out of the 48 workmen had been since cancelled and the propriety of the retrenchment of those ten workmen no longer arose for adjudication. In doing so, it cannot be said that the Labour "Court would be going behind the reference, but on the other hand it was its duty to take note of that fact arid proceed to give its award. This petition is allowed and the award of the Labour Court is quashed. No costs. V.K. ---------- Petition allowed.