D. N. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) THE short facts in this case are as follows : The petitioner joined the National Insurance Co. Ltd. , a company carrying on business of life insurance, sometime in April 1955. At the relevant time he was working as a Divisional Superintendent. Sometime in January, 1956 was promulgated the Life Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance (1 of 1956) by which all life insurance business in India was nationalised. Under this Ordinance, the management of all life insurance offices including that of the said National Insurance Co. Ltd. , vested in the Central Government. This was later on followed by the Life Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Act 1956. This Act gave the Central Government a suitable opportunity for establishing an autonomous body namely, the Life Insurance Corporation of India. From 20th January, 1958 to 31st August 1956 the Central Government managed the business of the insurance offices through a number of officials designated as 'custodians', who were directly responsible to the Finance Ministry. The Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (Act No. 31 of 1956) came into operation on the 1st September, 1956. By this Act, was established an autonomous corporation namely, the Life Insurance Corporation of India. All controlled business of insurers who carried on life insurance business in India became vested in the Life Insurance Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as the 'corporation' ). Under Section 11 (1) of the said Act, every whole-time employee of an insurer whose controlled business had been transferred to and vested In the Corporation and who was employed by the insurer wholly or mainly in connection with his controlled business immediately before the appointed day (1st of September, 1956) became an employee of the Corporation and was to hold office therein by the same tenure, at the same remuneration and upon the same terms and conditions and with the same rights and privileges as he would have held on the appointed day if the Act had not been passed. It further provided that this would continue unless and until his employment in the Corporation was terminated or until his remuneration, terms and conditions of service were duly altered by the Corporation, Sub-section (2) of Section 11 granted power to the Central Government to alter the terms of service of such employees if it was necessary for the purpose of rationalising the pay-scales of all employees of insurers whose controlled business had been transferred to and vested in the Corporation or for the purpose of reducing the remuneration payable to employees, in cases where in the interest of the Corporation and its policy-holders such reduction was called for. If such alteration was not acceptable to any employee, his services could be terminated upon payment of compensation. By Section 48 of the said Act, the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, make rules to carry out the purposes of the said Act. Such rules are to be laid, for not less than thirty days, before both Houses of Parliament and shall be subject to such modification as Parliament may make. Under Section 49, the Corporation has been given the power with the previous approval of the Central Government, to make regulations not inconsistent with the said Act and the rules made thereunder. One of the subjects on which such regulations may be made, relate to the terms and conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation. In exercise of the power granted to the Central Government under Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the said Act, the Central Government passed an order dated 1st June, 1957. Para 4 of the said order provided that the employees who were in supervisory posts on the 31st August, 1956 shall be fitted in as superintendents or Section head; only to the extent of the number of such posts available and on the basis of a selection which shall take into account salary, experience in supervisory capacity and qualifications of every such employee. It appears that according to the annexure to the said order, Superintendents belong to class III category on a pay-scale of Rs. 200-20-500/ -. On the 30th December, 1957 the Central Government passed an order under Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the said Act, known as the Life Insurance Corporation Field Officers (Alteration of Remuneration and other Terms and Conditions of Services) Order, 1957. 200-20-500/ -. On the 30th December, 1957 the Central Government passed an order under Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the said Act, known as the Life Insurance Corporation Field Officers (Alteration of Remuneration and other Terms and Conditions of Services) Order, 1957. This is also known as the 'categorisation order', or the 'blue Order', as it was printed on blue paper. This is the order which is the subject-matter of dispute in this application. The most important thing in this order is the definition of a 'field Officer' which runs as follows:"2 (c ). 'field Officer' means a person whether designated by an insurer as Branch Manager, Branch Secretary, Assistant Branch Manager, Assistant Branch Secretary, Zonal Agency Manager, Superintendent of Agencies, Divisional Superintendent, Organiser or by any other name, who before the 1st day of September, 1956, was wholly or mainly engaged in the development of new life insurance business for the insurer by supervising, either directly or through one or more intermediaries, the work of persons procuring or soliciting new life insurance business, and who was remunerated by a regular monthly salary; and who has become an employee of the Corporation under Section 11 of the Act; but does not include any person now in the employment of the Corporation as Assistant Branch Manager, Branch Manager or in any higher capacity. " ( 2 ) FIELD Officers have a pay scale of Rs. 125-500, in exercise of the power conferred by Section 49 of the said Act read with paragraph 11 of the Categorisation Order, the Corporation has framed certain regulations called the 'life Insurance Corporation of India (Fixation of Pay and Allowances of Field Officers) Regulations, 1958'. This is dated 2nd December 1957 and inter alia provides that the pay and allowances of Field Officers should be fixed upon the basis of actual performance. In other words, Field Officers were to be fitted in into their pay-scales according to their performance. It was also contemplated that a Special Committee would be appointed by the end of December, 1957 to examine the cases, inter alia of all supervisory officers who were required to work as Field Officers. This shows that all employees of insurers who were working in a supervisory capacity were not required to work as Field Officers. Some were and some were not. This shows that all employees of insurers who were working in a supervisory capacity were not required to work as Field Officers. Some were and some were not. ( 3 ) THE definition of 'field Officer' as given in the Categorisation Order, shows clearly that the Categorisation. Order contemplates a classification according to the nature of work done by tne employee. The definition clearly states that only those would be entitled to be called 'field Officers' who, before the 1st day of September, 1956 were wholly or mainly engaged in the development of new life insurance business for the insurers, a branch of activity which may properly be described as 'field Work', as opposed to office work, or work which has nothing to do with the procuring or soliciting of new life insurance business. In this background, I will have to examine certain other allegations which have been made in the petition, forming the basis of the complaint made by the petitioner of unconstitutional discrimination. The respondent No. 6 in this application is Keshab Chandra Mukherjee. He joined the National Insurance Co. Ltd. as Divisional Superintendent in October, 1955. It will be noted that under the insurers, both the petitioner and the respondent No. 6 held the same designation. After the nationalisation of all life insurance business in India, both the petitioner and the respondent No. 6 continued to be called 'divisional Superintendents'. After the 'appointed day' however, when the Corporation came into existence, the respondent No. 6 became a Branch Manager under the Corporation, whereas the petitioner continued as Divisional Superintendent until 21st November, 1956 when by an order of the Divisional Manager the petitioner was designated as an 'inspector' and attached to the City Branch temporarily located at 23 Netaji Subhas Road, Calcutta. In connection with this allocation and re-designation, it is useful to look into the interim report of a Committee headed by the Minister for Revenue and Civil Expenditure, known as the 'shah Report' which runs as follows:"15. There were considerable difficulties in assessing relative claims of officers as to seniority and gradation. Designations in companies did not in every case indicate identical duties, or functions involving the same level of responsibility. Even where the functions and the level of responsibility were the same, the size of the Company and the nature of its operations meant different degrees of training and experience. Designations in companies did not in every case indicate identical duties, or functions involving the same level of responsibility. Even where the functions and the level of responsibility were the same, the size of the Company and the nature of its operations meant different degrees of training and experience. The integration of all the officers into one well-knit cadre with a well-recognised seniority, has, therefore, been presenting considerable difficulties. " ( 4 ) IN fact, the letter dated 21st November, 1956 mentioned that the final classification of the petitioner has been kept in abeyance until 31st August, 1957 so that he might have sufficient time to organise business, and the matter would be reviewed from time to time on the basis of the standard of work performed. On the 10th June, 1957 a letter from the Divisional Manager was delivered to the petitioner, giving the details of the petitioner's employment as an 'inspector' of Agencies. The nature of business to be carried on by the petitioner was indicated therein namely, the organisation of Life Insurance business, which has been explained as consisting of organising and developing the business of the Corporation and its Subsidiaries within the area allotted to the petitioner, to select active and re-liable agents for that purpose for canvassing new business, and similar work. It was definitely stated that the main object of the work was to procure new business. The petitioner accepted this designation, worked as Inspector of Agencies and received payment as such of his remuneration. In a letter dated 6th November 1957, written by the petitioner himself, being Exhibit 'f' to the petition, he states that he was 'persuaded' to work as an Inspector because hopes were given that he will be given a better post later on. The respondent No. 6, having been employed after the 'appointed day' as a Branch Manager, has continued to be employed as such. I now come to the main argument advanced before me in this case. What is attacked is the Categorisation Order and the definition of a 'field Officer' as given therein. The argument advanced is briefly as follows : It is argued that, in defining a 'field Officer', all the distinctions between Branch Managers, Branch Secretaries, their Assistants, Superintendents of Agencies, Divisional Superintendents, etc. What is attacked is the Categorisation Order and the definition of a 'field Officer' as given therein. The argument advanced is briefly as follows : It is argued that, in defining a 'field Officer', all the distinctions between Branch Managers, Branch Secretaries, their Assistants, Superintendents of Agencies, Divisional Superintendents, etc. have been abandoned in the first part of the definition, the only criteria being that the employee should have been wholly or mainly engaged in developing or procuring new life insurance business. But in the second part of the definition, all persons employed by the Corporation as Assistant Managers, Branch Managers, or in any higher capacity have been excluded. According to the petitioner, this is discrimination within the meaning of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is argued that the casa of the petitioner and the respondent No. 6 is illustrative of this discrimination. ' It is pointed out that both of them were employed as Divisional Superintendents by the insurers, and yet, when it came to the Categorisation Order, the petitioner was made a 'field Officer' whereas the respondent No. 6 continued to be a Branch Manager. This, it is argued, is a discrimination which is unconstitutional. The definition is challenged in two ways: Firstly, it is said that the definition is in excess of the powers of the Central Government as conferred under Section 11 (1) of the said Act and secondly, that it violates the provisions of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution and as such is unconstitutional and void. In my opinion, the argument advanced on the first heading is entirely without substance. The argument proceeds on the mistaken idea that the power conferred on the Central Government for the alteration of the remuneration, terms and conditions of service of the employees under insurers, is a severely restricted one. According to this argument, the Central Government has the right to alter the remuneration, terms and conditions etc. of the employees, but that it cannot reconstitute the classification of employees to the detriment of any one concerned. In my opinion, this argument is entirely without any substance. According to this argument, the Central Government has the right to alter the remuneration, terms and conditions etc. of the employees, but that it cannot reconstitute the classification of employees to the detriment of any one concerned. In my opinion, this argument is entirely without any substance. Provided that it is for the purpose of rationalisation of pay scales of employees of insurers or for the purpose of reducing their remuneration where in the interests of the Corporation and its policy holders such a reduction is called for, there is no restriction upon the manner in which the alteration may be made in the terms and conditions of the service of the employees of insurers who have become the employees of the Corporation. There is nothing to prevent a different classification altogether, being made of such employees so as to be more suitable for the kind of work that is being carried on by the Corporation. In order to appreciate this point let us take a bird's eye view of the whole process of nationalisation of the life insurance business. For historical reasons not necessary to be stated, the nationalisation of all life insurance business in India happened suddenly. At first, the Government took over only the management and not the ownership. Later on, even the ownership vested in the statutory corporation which was created for that purpose. It was found that different insurance companies had different kinds of business, even though it was all life insurance business. In particular, the greatest problem that presented itself was In respect of the employment of those who were already employed by the insurers. It was found that the descriptions of their officers, whether they were called 'manager', 'branch Manager', 'divisional Superintendent', etc. were confusing and to a certain extent misleading, inasmuch as an officer similarly designated in different insurance offices was found, not to be identically employed, but often doing different kinds of work. Thus, in one case, a Branch Manager might be doing field work exclusively namely, work in connection with the bringing up of new business whereas a Branch Manager in another office would be entrusted only with administrative work, having nothing to do with the bringing in of new business. It was therefore, contemplated that immediately after the 'appointed day' such employees would continue to have the same rights and privileges for some time, but not for ever. It was therefore, contemplated that immediately after the 'appointed day' such employees would continue to have the same rights and privileges for some time, but not for ever. In the meanwhile, committees were appointed to go into the question and to look into the kind of work done by each employee or a class of employees and the quality of the work done. After this interregnum was over, the Central Government was at liberty to make provisions by which a fresh classification would be brought into existence, consistent with the requirements of the Corporation. This is exactly what is sought to be achieved by the Categorisasation Order, which relates to a particular class of employees described as 'field officers'. As I have mentioned above, the descriptions used by the insurers previously were misleading. They were not necessarily related to the kind of work carried on by a particular employee. Now, this has been altered. A 'field Officer' after the Catogorisation Order, would only be a person who on the 'appointed day' was wholly or mainly engaged in field work, by whatever name he was called. There is however, an exception. Persons who were employed by the Corporation on 30th December, 1957 as Assistant Branch Managers, Branch Managers or in any higher capacity, were excluded. There is a reason for this exclusion. As I have mentioned above, ever since the nationalisation of life insurance business in India, an attempt was going on to look into the individual merits of employees of insurers, so that they may be fitted into the organisation of the corporation. It is true that the petitioner and the respondent No. 6 were both described as 'divisional Superintendents' under the insurers. Immediately after nationalisation, they continued for a while to be called by that name. After the 'appointed day' however, there was a significant departure. The respondent. No. 6 continued to be called a 'branch Manager', but the petitioner became an 'inspector'. This was the result of an investigation into their respective merits. Section 11 of the said Act does not contemplate that a person had to be employed with the same rights and privileges for all time to come, irrespective of merit. The respondent. No. 6 continued to be called a 'branch Manager', but the petitioner became an 'inspector'. This was the result of an investigation into their respective merits. Section 11 of the said Act does not contemplate that a person had to be employed with the same rights and privileges for all time to come, irrespective of merit. On the other hand, it contemplated that such rights and privileges would only be protected during the interregnum during which the Government and the Corporation would have an opportunity of assessing the respective merits of the employees and to reorganise their classifications, scales of pay etc. This was, however only a temporary expedient. Once the results of the investigation were known, and the Central Government had come to a decision as to alterations necessary in the terms of services of the employees of the Corporation the old order of things vanished and a new order of things came into existence. The Corporation at that stage could supplement it by passing regulations. Once it was decided that the classification of field officers would only be related to the kind of work that was being done before the appointed day, no other basis of classification for that class of employee could be entertained. The classification itself is entirely rational. It is eminently reasonable that employees should be classified according to the work done by them, and not otherwise. In making such classification, it was competent for the Central Government to make an exception in respect of certain classes. As will appear from the facts given above, by the time the blue order came into existence the merits of different employees of the insurers had been largely ascertained. Those who continued to act as Managers or Branch Managers or Assistant Branch Managers under the Corporation, were no longer doing field work, and it was found that they should continue to be called by their existing designation. Others were fitted into other branches of work. There does not seem to be any discrimination in such classification and the Central Government have ample power under Section 11 (1) and (2) to achieve this end. ( 5 ) THIS brings me to the second ground that has been urged. For the reasons stated above, the exclusion of Managers or Branch Managers or Assistant Branch Managers from the category of Field Officers is not discriminatory. ( 5 ) THIS brings me to the second ground that has been urged. For the reasons stated above, the exclusion of Managers or Branch Managers or Assistant Branch Managers from the category of Field Officers is not discriminatory. The persons who have been excluded are a well determined class namely, those who were employed as such on the day when the 'blue order' came into existence. No distinction is made between persons within such a class, all being treated alike. The principle to be followed In such cases has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Ameeroonissa v. Mahboob, in the following words:"a legislature which has to deal with diverse problem arising out of an infinite variety of human relations must, of necessity, have the power of making special laws to attain particular objects, and for that purposes it must have large powers of selection or classification of persons and things upon which such laws are to operate. " ( 6 ) COMING now to the facts of the instant case, we find that after the 'appointed day' the respondent No. 6 became a Branch Manager whereas the petitioner was asked to work as Inspector of Agencies. This was done upon an examination of their respective merits. So far as the petitioner was concerned he did not object and accepted the position and its emoluments. It may be that he was persuaded to do so by promises of higher prospects, but that is a matter which I cannot take into consideration. The desired 'prospect' would have materialised if the petitioner's work was meritorious, which does not appear to have been. Discrimination can only be amongst equals, and unfortunately the petitioner and the respondent No. 6 were not found to be in the same class. The only fact that previous to the 'appointed day' they were holding a post having a similar designation, is rot of great moment. ( 7 ) A case very much like the present came up before a Division Bench of the Patna High Court, in an unreported decision, Chaturbhuj Lal v. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Misc. Judl. Cases Nos. 164 and a 778 of 1958 (Pat), judgment D/- 12-1-1950. Two employees of the Life Insurance Corporation of India made an application to the said High Court under Article 226, on more or less the same grounds. Judl. Cases Nos. 164 and a 778 of 1958 (Pat), judgment D/- 12-1-1950. Two employees of the Life Insurance Corporation of India made an application to the said High Court under Article 226, on more or less the same grounds. These two officers were employed by insurers as 'divisional Superintendents' before the 'appointed day'. After the 'appointed day', they were asked to work as 'inspector of Agencies'. They claimed that they were entitled to act as Assistant Branch Managers, which was of the same status as Divisional Superintendents. In the meanwhile, the categorisation order had come into existence, and the petitioners challenged the same as discriminatory, because several other officers junior to the petitioners were allowed to act as Assistant Branch Managers, Managers and so forth. It was claimed that there was unconstitutional discrimination and that the categorization order was bad and that the petitioners were entitled to be employed at least as Assistant Branch Managers. Both these applications were rejected, it was pointed out that the Central Government had ample jurisdiction to promulgate the categorisation order and the classification made therein was perfectly rational, it was pointed out that if the petitioners were dissatisfied with their posts, they had the option of giving up their services and claiming compensation. It was further pointed out that the exception to the general definition of 'field officers' in the 'blue Order' was an exception in favour of a well-defined class namely those who were employed as Assistant Branch Managers, Branch Managers or in any other higher capacities on the date that the order came into operation. The petitioners did not come within that classification and they were rightly excluded. The very same observations are applicable to the facts of the present case. Kanhaiya Singh, J. also said as follows:"further, in order to adjudge whether or not in fact in a particular individual case there was victimisation or favouritism, it will be necessary to examine the cases of numerous officers of the former insurance companies before a definite conclusion can be reached, and for such a decision there are no materials on the records. A 'prime facie' unequal treatment therefore, is Rot sufficient to establish violation of the equality clause embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. Mere production of inequality is not enough to hold that equal protection has been denied. A 'prime facie' unequal treatment therefore, is Rot sufficient to establish violation of the equality clause embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. Mere production of inequality is not enough to hold that equal protection has been denied. Every selection of officers or Government servant for the purposes of appointment or promotion must, of necessity, produce inequality in some degree. It should be remembered that in a classification for governmental purposes there is bound to be some apparent discrimination, because no hard and fast rule can be laid down for exact exclusion or inclusion of persons, and therefore such inequality is not necessarily unconstitutional, unless it is actually and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary. " ( 8 ) I respectfully agree with this conclusion. In the present case also, there are no sufficient materials to hold that there has been actual discrimination or any arbitrary exercise of power. On the other hand, on the facts as stated the allocation of designations seems to be eminently reasonable. It is not for the Court to tell the Corporation how to organise its business and it would be absurd to compel it to give performance to an employee of no merit. So far as Article 16 is concerned, 1 am not at all sure that it applies to a statutory Corporation. However, I need not deal with that aspect of the matter any further. ( 9 ) FOR the reasons given above, I hold that the definition of 'field Officer' in the categorisation order dated 30th December, 1957 is not in excess of the powers granted to the Central Government by Section 11 (2) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, and that the exclusion of Assistant Branch Managers, Branch Managers and other officers of the higher category from the scope of the said detinition is not violative to the provisions of Article 14 or Article 16 of the Constitution. ( 10 ) IN view of this finding, it is not necessary for me to consider certain preliminary points taken in this case. The application must be dismissed. The rule is discharged. Interim orders, if any, are vacated. There will be no order as to costs.