JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J. - This is an application for an order under Sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. The petitioner who has been held to be 13 years of age by the City Magistrate, Agra has been ordered by him under Sec. 17 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to be detained in Protective Home until she attains the age of 21 years. That order has been affirmed in appeal by the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Agra on 18th January, 1963. By means of this petition it is prayed that the orders passed by the City Magistrate and the I Additional Sessions Judge be quashed by means of a writ of certiorari and that the petitioner may be set forth at liberty from custody in the Protective Home. 3. The facts, in this case are not in dispute and the questions to be decided are primarily those of law. During the course of arguments, which by breaks extended to several days, we permitted the learned counsel for the petitioner to raise some legal questions which had not been specifically taken in the petition. The submissions made before us are as follows: 1. That the learned City Magistrate acted without jurisdiction in passing the order dated 27th December, 1962 directing the detention of the petitioner in a Protective Home without first having summoned a panel of five respectable persons as required by sub see. (3) of Sec. 17 of the Act with the result that the entire proceedings are a nullity for want of proper constitution of the court and the order of detention is illegal; 2. That there was evidence to show that the petitioner had married and was leading a respectable life and the learned City Magistrate, who was a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, could not have demanded from the petitioner any higher burden of proof than of prima facie establishing marriage and in any case he was prevented from into fine and complicated questions of law relating to marriage and 3. That under the provisions of Sec. 17 of the Act a person can be detained in a Protective Home only if she is carrying on promiscuous intercourse; the jurisdiction under Sec. 17 of the Act is meant to be preventive and not punitive with the result that even if it be found that though once the petitioner was carrying on promiscuous intercourse and she had given it up at the time the case was before the Magistrate he would have no jurisdiction to try the case and pass an order detaining the petitioner in a preventive Home. We will take the submissions seriatim. Sec. 17 of the Act reads as follows: "17 (1) When the Special Police Officer removing a girl under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 15 or rescuing a girl under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 16, fails to produce her immediately before the Magistrate as required by sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 15 or sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 16, he shall forthwith produce her before nearest Magistrate of any class, who shall pass such orders as he deems proper for her safe custody until she is produced before the appropriate Magistrate. (2) When the girl is produced before the appropriate Magistrate he shall, after giving the girl an opportunity of being heard, cause an enquiry to be made as to the correctness of the information received under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 16 and the age of the girl and if satisfied that the information received is correct and, the girl is under the age of twenty-one years, he may subject to the provisions of the next sub-section, make an order that such girl be detained for such period as may be specified in the order in a protective home or such other custody as he, for reasons to be recorded in writing, shall consider suitable. Provided that such custody shall not be that of a person, or body of persons, of a religious persuasion different from that of the girl. (3) In discharging his functions under sub-sec, (2), a magistrate may summon a panel of five respectable persons, three of whom shall, wherever practicable, be women, to assist him; and may for this purpose keep a list of experienced social welfare workers, particularly women social welfare workers, in the field of suppression of immoral traffic in women and girls. (4) Against every order under sub-sec. (4) Against every order under sub-sec. (2) an appeal shall lie to the Sessions Judge whose decision on such appeal shall be final" (italicized by us). 4. It is admitted in the present case that no panel as required by sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 17 of the Act was summoned and the entire proceedings were conducted by the learned City Magistrate himself without the aid of the panel. The question, therefore, that confronts us is whether the disregard of the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 17 of the Act in the present case results in an illegality which affects the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, rendering his order a nullity. It is well settled that a Court may be constituted of a Judge and assessors or jurors. In that case, the tribunal would not be complete unless the assessors or the jurors, as the case may be, also joined it and took part in the proceeding before it. It may be that the function of the assessors or jurors may be merely advisory but if it is once held that they formed an integral part of the tribunal, the fact that they were not summoned and did not sit at the hearing of the case would affect the proper constitution of the tribunal and in that sense render all the proceeding void. It is well known that before the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended, in all sessions cases, outside the presidency towns, a Sessions Judge could try an accused person only with the aid of assessors. It is equally elementary that the assessors had no voice in the matter except to give their opinion to the Judge who might or might not act upon it. Consequently, the assessors were merely in the nature of surplus ages. Even though that was so, the consistent view of all the courts in the country was that if the assessors were not properly summoned, the court itself was not properly constituted with the result that the trial was illegal. (see Magga v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 174). The question, therefore, that requires determination in the present case is whether the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 17 are mandatory in the sense that they govern the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 17 of the Act. (see Magga v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 174). The question, therefore, that requires determination in the present case is whether the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 17 are mandatory in the sense that they govern the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 17 of the Act. If they do govern, then it is obvious that their non-compliance would result in an illegality which would affect the order of the magistrate. If, on the other hand, the provisions of sub-sec. (3) are only directory, their disregard in the absence of prejudice being proved to the petitioner would only result in an irregularity which is always curable. Having given our anxious consideration to the submissions made at the bar and having carefully examined the language of Sec. 17 of the Act, we are of the opinion that it would not be correct to treat sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 17 of the Act only as a directory provision and not a mandatory one. The words italicized by us in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 17 clearly make the provisions of that sub-section dependent upon the provisions of sub-sec. (3). In other words, what is provided for in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 17 of the Act. The key words in the section are `subject to the provisions of the next sub-sec.' It is difficult to give these words any other meaning than that they provide that the provisions of sub-sec. (2) would be controlled by those of sub-sec. (3) which is the next sub-section in Sec. 17 of the Act. It is true that in sub-sec. (3) the words used are "In discharging his functions under sub-sec. (2), a Magistrate may summon a panel of five respectable persons". On the basis of the use of the word `may', Mr. Tripathi, the learned Government Advocate contends that it is only a discretionary power which may or may not be exercised. The argument is that the use of the word 'may' is conclusive of the inference that it is a pure discretion with the Magistrate either to summon a panel or not to summon. The learned Government Advocate contends that the use of the word `may' itself shows that the requirement is not imperative. The argument is that the use of the word 'may' is conclusive of the inference that it is a pure discretion with the Magistrate either to summon a panel or not to summon. The learned Government Advocate contends that the use of the word `may' itself shows that the requirement is not imperative. It is true that ordinarily the word `may' is used in a permissive sense and not in the sense of being obligatory but it all depends upon the context in which that word is used. It is well settled that the use of the word `may' or `shall' is not conclusive and whether or not a provision is mandatory or directory would depend upon other circumstances also. (See Hari Vishnu Karnath v. Ahmad Ishaque, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 233 Narayan Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 737 State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 912 Rani Drigraj Kuer v. A. K. Narain Singh, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 444 Banwari Lal v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 849 Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad Goenka, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1694. 5. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 82, at page 880, Article 380 as follows: "May" construed as mandatory. Where, from a consideration of the whole statute, and its nature and object, it appears that the intention of the legislature was to impose a positive duty rather than a discretionary power, the word "may" will be held to be mandatory. A mandatory construction will usually be given to the word "may" where public interests are concerned, and the public or third persons have a claim de jure that the power conferred should be exercised, or whenever something is directed to be done for the sake of justice or the public good, but never for the purpose of creating a right. Accordingly, in a proper case the word "may" will be construed as "must" or "shall". Such a construction is warranted only where it is necessary to effectuate a manifest legislative intent, and, if no imperative reason exists for a mandatory construction, the word "may" will be construed as permissive. The word "may" will be construed as "shall", when the statute can thereby be upheld, if a construction to the contrary would render it obnoxious to a constitutional inhibition." 6. The word "may" will be construed as "shall", when the statute can thereby be upheld, if a construction to the contrary would render it obnoxious to a constitutional inhibition." 6. Crawford in his well known treatise on Statutory Construction, 1940 Edn., at page 519 states as follows: "Mandatory and Directory or Permissive Words. Ordinarily the words "shall" and "must" are mandatory, and the word "may" is directory, although they are often used interchangeably in legislation. This use regard to their literal meaning generally makes it necessary for the courts to resort to construction in order to discover the real intention of the legislature. Nevertheless, it will always be presumed by the court that the legislature intend, ed to use the words in their usual and natural meaning. If such a meaning, however, leads to absurdity, or great inconvenience, or for some other reason is clearly contrary to the obvious intention of the legislature, then words which ordinarily are mandatory in their nature will be construed as directory, or vice versa. In other words, if the language of the statute, considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature and object reveals that the legislature intended the words "shall" and "must" to be directory, they should be given that meaning. Similarly, under the same circumstances the word "may" should be given a mandatory meaning, and especially where the statute concerns the rights and interests of the public, or where third persons have a claim de jure that a power shall be exercised, or whenever something is directed to be done for the sake of justice or the public good, or is necessary to sustain the statute's constitutionality." 7. In Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 1946 Edn., at page 264 the following has been stated: Statutes which authorise persons to do acts for the benefit of others, or, as it is sometimes said, for the public good or the advancement of justice, have often given rise to controversy when conferring the authority in terms simply enabling and not mandatory. In Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 1946 Edn., at page 264 the following has been stated: Statutes which authorise persons to do acts for the benefit of others, or, as it is sometimes said, for the public good or the advancement of justice, have often given rise to controversy when conferring the authority in terms simply enabling and not mandatory. In enacting that they "may" or "shall," if they think "fit," or, "shall have power," or that "it shall be lawful" for them to do such acts, a statute appears to use the language of mere permission, but it has been so often decided as to have become an axiom that in such cases such expressions may have to say the least a compulsory force, and so would seem to be modified by judicial exposition. On the other hand, in some cases, the authorised person is invested with a discretion, and then those expressions seem divested of that compulsory force, and probably that is the prima facie meaning. * Though Sec. 9 of the Indictable Offences, Act, 1848 (c. 42) enacted that justices "may" issue a summons on an information laid before them only" if they shall think fit, "it was held that they were not at liberty to refuse it on any extraneous considerations, such as that the prosecution was inexpedient, or that the law would operate unjustly in the particular case." Even though Sec. 140 of the Indian Railways Act provides that "any notice not required by the Act to be served on the railway department `may' be served on the persons named in the section, it was held that notwithstanding the use of the word `may', the section must be considered to mean `must'. (See :- Nadiar Chand Shaha v. Wood, (1908) I.L.R. 35 Cal. 194 at 197 G.I.P, Ry., Co. v. Chandra Bai, (1906) 28 All. 552 = 3 A.L.J. 329 Cawnpore Cotton Mills v. G.I.P, Railway, AIR 1923 Allahabad 301 = 21 A.L.J. 223 B. and N.W. Railway v. Special Manager, Court of Wards, A.I.R. 1925 Oudh 419. 8. (See :- Nadiar Chand Shaha v. Wood, (1908) I.L.R. 35 Cal. 194 at 197 G.I.P, Ry., Co. v. Chandra Bai, (1906) 28 All. 552 = 3 A.L.J. 329 Cawnpore Cotton Mills v. G.I.P, Railway, AIR 1923 Allahabad 301 = 21 A.L.J. 223 B. and N.W. Railway v. Special Manager, Court of Wards, A.I.R. 1925 Oudh 419. 8. It is recognised that if the statute authorises any specified persons to do acts for the benefit of others, the authority conferred is coupled with an obligation to discharge the duty by the statutes themselves and in such a case though the word used by the legislature may be `may' the intention is to impose an obligation upon the authority to discharge his duty with the result that the word `may' in the context means `must' or `shall'. Whether the authorised persons is given a discretion or is under a compulsion or an obligation to do a particular act would inevitably depend upon the context in which the word `may' has been used, the scheme of the statute wherein the section using the word `may' occurs and such other relevant considerations. (See Kurban Hussen Sajauddin v. Ratikant Nilkant, AIR 1959 Bombay 401 and C.C.R. Authority v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills, AIR 1948 Bombay 254. 9. Having said that the use of the word `may' does not always make a provision permissible, we have now to see whether the context in which the word `may' has been used in sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 17 of the Act, justifies the conclusion that it is used in a permissive and not in an obligatory sense. In our judgment, inasmuch as the legislature requires that the exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sec. (2) of Sec, 17 shall be subject to what is provided for in sub-sec. (3), it must be held that the word `may' used in sub-sec. (3) has been used in the imperative and not permissive sense. It is obvious that nothing can be made subject to what is discretionary. 10. The words `subject to' came up for judicial interpretation in K.R.C.S. Balkrishna Chetty v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1152. Their Lordships after carefully considering the provisions of the statute held that the use of the words `subject to' is fluctuating "the intention of the law and the correct meaning in our opinion is conditionally open." 11. 10. The words `subject to' came up for judicial interpretation in K.R.C.S. Balkrishna Chetty v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1152. Their Lordships after carefully considering the provisions of the statute held that the use of the words `subject to' is fluctuating "the intention of the law and the correct meaning in our opinion is conditionally open." 11. The Bombay High Court also had occasion to interpret these words and it was held that "the effect of the words `subject to' in a document is to introduce a condition or proviso." See Simon Reuban v. Haji Sahikh Mahomed Shastry, AIR 1922 Bombay 404. 12. It has been pointed out that in sub-sec. (3) the legislature has used the word "shall" after the words "three of whom" and before the words whenever be practicable "women" and it is contended that whenever the legislature wanted a particular part of the provision to be imperative it has used the word "shall". The point of importance is that even though the requirement that three out of the five respectable persons shall be women is couched in terms which may appear to be mandatory, their imperativeness is taken away by the expression "where-ever practicable" and, therefore, even that requirement is directory and not mandatory. Unfortunately, Sec. 17 has not been very nicely drafted. This is also clear from the use of the expression "cause an enquiry to be made" occurring in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 17. These words would indicate that the Magistrate himself is not to make an enquiry but be will have an enquiry made by another person. That certainly is not the effect of Sec, 17 of the Act read as a whole. Again, the language of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 17 of the Act may suggest that the Magistrate has to first satisfy himself with regard to the correctness of the information received and the fact as to whether or not to the girl is under 21 years of age and only after he has done that he is required to summon a panel of five persons in order to assist him in deciding where the girl is to be detained. Again to illustrate that the Act is not badly worded it is worthy of notice that neither Sec. 15 nor Sec. 16 nor Sec. 17 of the Act say anything as to what would be done after the girl is removed under sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 15 or is rescued under Sec, 16 of the. Act. This Court in Jummo v. Superintendent, Government Protective Home, Meerut, 1962 A.L.J. 725 however, held that whatever be the defects of drafting there was no vacuum existing in the Act inasmuch as Sec. 17 of the Act would apply to the case of a girl recovered under Sec. 15 or one rescued under Sec. 16 of the Act, It is well settled that want of skill in drafting a provision does not go to the root of the matter and should not affect the correct interpretation of the statute. See Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR 1960 Allahabad 136 = 1959 A.L.J. 754 (F.B.) District Board, Farrukhabad v. Prag Dut, AIR 1948 Allahabad 382 = 1948 A.L.J. 338 (F.B.) and Salmon v. Duncomba, (1887) 11 A.C. 627. 13. We have already held above that the word `may' occurring in sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 17 of the Act has been used in the sense of `shall', i.e. in the sense of being imperative with the result that in discharging his functions under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 17, the Magistrate has to summon a panel of five respectable persons. It was contended by Mr. Tripathi that a Magistrate has to summon a panel of five respectable persons not for the purpose of deciding whether or not the information received is correct and that the girl is under the age of 21 years but only in order to decide whether an order for the detention of the girl should be passed or not and for determining as to whether she should be sent to a Protective Home or be given in some other custody. Perhaps the language of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 17 of the Act may lend support to such an argument but the provisions of Sec. (3) of Sec. 17, specially the opening words i.e. "In discharging his functions under sub-sec. (2), a Magistrate may summon a panel of five respectable persons" militate against such an interpretation. Perhaps the language of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 17 of the Act may lend support to such an argument but the provisions of Sec. (3) of Sec. 17, specially the opening words i.e. "In discharging his functions under sub-sec. (2), a Magistrate may summon a panel of five respectable persons" militate against such an interpretation. The panel of five respectable persons is summoned in order to assist the Magistrate discharging all his functions under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 17 of the Act and not only a part of those functions. It is a well recognised rule of construction that one sub-section should not be so read as to bring it in conflict with another sub-section and in cases of apparent inconsistency, a harmonious interpretation must be given. Interpreting the various sub-sections of Sec. 17 of the Act harmoniously it appears to us that the Magistrate has to discharge all his functions with the aid of a panel of five respectable persons. In other words, the panel of five respectable persons is an integral part of the tribunal. It is another thing that that part of the tribunal has no final say in the matter and has only advisory or consultative functions to discharge. The position is similar to that of the assessors under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the amendment of 1956. Mr. Tripathi, the learned Government Advocate contends that even if it be assumed that the panel of five respectable persons is an integral part of the tribunal; the functions being only advisory and their opinions not being binding on the Magistrate, it would at best amount to an irregularity and cannot vitiate the trial. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel. We have already said in an earlier part of this judgment that an irregularity in the appointment of assessors in a Sessions trial whose functions were similar to the panel of five respectable persons has invariably been held to vitiate the trial. A person who is being proceeded with under Sec. 17 of the Act has a right to insist that before the Magistrate tries to pass the order, he shall consult and be assisted by the panel of five persons. In this connection it must also be remembered that the words used are `shall be assisted' and not `shall be advised by'. In this connection it must also be remembered that the words used are `shall be assisted' and not `shall be advised by'. The use of the word `assist' would show that they have to take part in all the proceedings under Sec. 17 of the Act. The act of assistance is much more comprehensive than merely giving an advice. The word 'assist' denotes taking part in the proceedings. Consequently, the exclusion of the panel at the hearing of the case cannot be treated to be a mere irregularity but a defect of substance which effects the constitution and the jurisdiction of the tribunal. It is well established that if the law requires that several persons will pool their wisdom together the circumstance that they have not done so would vitiate the proceedings. In Mohammad Akil v. Asadunnissa Bibee, 9 W.R.I. at 30 the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court consisting of nine Judges had to consider the question as to whether the circumstance that all the Judges did not consult amongst themselves vitiated the trial and Sir Barnes Peacock, C. J., while delivering the judgment of the Full Bench observed as follows : "If each of the Judges who composed the Full Bench could not have gone separately into Court, and, in the absence of the others, have read out his own judgment, without hearing the arguments which each of the other Judges, who were associated with him as members of the Full Bench, might adduce to alter his opinion, he could not lawfully deliver a separate judgment at a separate time, by handing in to the Registrar as his judgment a separate paper signed by him containing his written opinion. The mere arguments and expressions of opinion of individual Judges who compose a Court are not judgments. A judgment, in the eye of the law, is the final decision of the whole Court. It is not because there are nine Judges that there are nine judgments. When each of the several Judges of whom a simple Court is composed separately expresses his opinion when they are all assembled, there is still but one judgment, which is the foundation for one decree. It is not because there are nine Judges that there are nine judgments. When each of the several Judges of whom a simple Court is composed separately expresses his opinion when they are all assembled, there is still but one judgment, which is the foundation for one decree. If it were otherwise, and if each of the memorandum sent in on the present occasion were a judgment, there would be nine judgments in one case, some deciding one thing and some another, and each Judge would have to review his own judgment separately, if a review should be applied for." 14. For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the petition should succeed on the first ground that is that the tribunal was not properly constituted with the result that the judgments of the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge. are a nullity in the eyes of law. 15. With regard to the second submission, it may at the outset be conceded that all the tribunals of limited jurisdiction have to act strictly within the four corners of the statute creating them. See A.V.D. Costa v. B.C. Patel, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 412. The Magistrate exercising powers under Sec. 17 of the Act is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. The Preamble of the Act reads as follows : "An Act to provide in pursuance of the International Convention signed at New York on the 9th day of May, 1950, for the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls." The Preamble as also the enacting clauses of the Act show that what is prohibited or what is sought to be suppressed is not prostitution as such but suppression of immoral traffic in women and girls. This conclusion is confirmed by the scheme of the Act. It would be noticed that Secs. 3, 4, 5 and 6, which are punitive sections, do not provide for the punishment of the girl carrying on prostitution but of those who gain thereby. Secs. 7 and 8 do not provide for the punishment of a girl who is carrying on prostitution as such but for carrying on prostitution near a public place and for seducing or soliciting, for purposes of prostitution. There is no section in the Act providing for punishment of a person carrying on prostitution for pleasure, away from public places, and without soliciting and seducing. There is no section in the Act providing for punishment of a person carrying on prostitution for pleasure, away from public places, and without soliciting and seducing. Sec. 15 of the Act permits a search only in case where the Special Police Officer has reasonable ground for believing that an offence punishable under the Act is being committed in respect of women or girls living in any premises. Sec. 16 authorises rescuing of a girl below the age of 21 years only if she is carrying on or is being made to carry on prostitution in a brothel and not otherwise. The word `brothel' has been defined in the Act. Sec. 2(a) defines `brothel' as follows : "2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, - (a) "brothel" includes any house, room or place or any portion of any house, room or place which is used for purposes, of prostitution for the gain of another person or for the mutual gain of two or more prostitutes." From this it would follow that Sec. 16 can only apply if some person is gaining by acts of prostitution committed by a girl or when one or more prostitutes carry on the profession for mutual gain. There is thus nothing in the Act which punishes or makes liable for action a woman, who carries on prostitution for her own gain, unaided by others or who carries it on for the mere pleasure or fun of it. The Magistrate, therefore, under Sec. 17 can only act in cases which strictly fall within the four corners of the statute. Consequently if a girl is married and is not carrying on prostitution for the benefit of another man or in collusion with another prostitute, no action against her can be taken. The learned Magistrate has only recorded the finding that Smt. Ram Devi was carrying on prostitution and not that she was carrying on prostitution in a brothel or in her doing so some offence under the Act was being committed. The learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to send a girl to a Protective Home only because she carried on prostitution. We have already said above that neither under Sec. 15 nor under Sec. 16 of the Act can a search be made or a girl rescued when no offence was being committed and when the girl was not carrying on prostitution in a brothel. We have already said above that neither under Sec. 15 nor under Sec. 16 of the Act can a search be made or a girl rescued when no offence was being committed and when the girl was not carrying on prostitution in a brothel. For these reasons it appears to us that the Magistrate has acted in excess of his jurisdiction and the order passed by him, being without jurisdiction, is null and void and consequently liable to be quashed by means of a writ of certiorari. The same thing is true about the order of the learned Sessions Judge who has affirmed the order of the Magistrate. On this ground also, in our judgment, the petition must succeed. 16. With regard to the third ground, Mr. S.N. Misra has placed reliance upon that sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 17 which opens with the words "cause an enquiry to be made as to the correctness of the information received under sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 16 and the age of the girl and if satisfied that the information received is correct." 17. He also relies upon the fact that after rescue Smt. Ram Devi lived for some time with her relatives under circumstances not contemplated by Sec. 16 of the Act. He then contends that the opening words of Sec. 17 are in present tense, with the result that the Magistrate is precluded from investigating whether or not Smt. Ram Devi was carrying on or was being made to carry on prostitution in a brothel. The argument, in other words is that after the girl had been given in the interim custody of some relatives and was no longer carrying on prostitution in a brothel the Magistrate had lost jurisdiction under Sec. 17 of the Act. The contention is that the law requires an enquiry being made whether she is carrying on prostitution in a brothel on the date of the trial and not whether she was carrying on prostitution in a brothel in the past. It is well known that a decision in a court of law can be given with regard to the state of affairs that existed on the date the cause of action arose. It is well known that a decision in a court of law can be given with regard to the state of affairs that existed on the date the cause of action arose. Consequently, if at the time the girl was resettled tinder Sec. 16, she was living or was carrying on or was made to carry on prostitution in a brothel, an order under Sec. 17 can be passed. Besides Sec. 17(1) of the Act contemplates interim custody and the trial taking place some time after a girl is rescued which would show that the law permits an enquiry with regard to conditions existing on the date action under Sec. 15 or 16 of the Act is taken. 18. It has been contended by the learned Government Advocate that notwithstanding the decision on merits in favour of the petitioner, the petition should be dismissed for two reasons; firstly that none of the grounds on the basis of which this petition is being allowed were raised in the petition and in fact it was only during the course of arguments that this aspect of the case occurred to the Court and then the petitioner took up these points and secondly that the petition is only for an order under Sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and there is no prayer for a writ of Habeas corpus under article 226 of the Constitution. It is also pointed out that in the petition there is no prayer either for the issue of a writ of certiorari in this case. In our judgment, neither of these two objections deprive us of the jurisdiction to pass such orders as we consider fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. Even though the learned counsel did not originally take the objections on which we are allowing the petition, we allowed him to raise those objections and permitted him to argue on those points. 19. With regard to the fact that the petition has not been properly framed and appropriate reliefs have not been asked for, it has been held several times by the Supreme Court that, that is not fatal to the proceedings because it is for the Court to decide what relief it would grant. See Rashid Ahmad v. Municipal Board, Kairana, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 163. Apart from it, Mr. See Rashid Ahmad v. Municipal Board, Kairana, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 163. Apart from it, Mr. Misra has made an application for amending his petition and for being permitted to include in his relief the prayer for the issues of a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of certiorari also. He has also paid the full court-fee payable on a writ petition. The amendment application has been allowed by us. Therefore, the amended petition, as it stands today, includes the prayer for a writ of certiorari as also for a writ of habeas corpus. In the end, Mr. Tripathi contended that even though the learned City Magistrate may have had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order, the acts involved relate to public morality and consequently, the Magistrate had inherent jurisdiction to pass such an order. Reliance for this is placed upon Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1962) A.C. 220 at 268 and the following passage has been brought to our notice: occurring at page 268 of the Reports : "The same act will not in all ages be regarded in the same way. The law must be related to the changing standards of life, not yielding to every shifting impulse of the popular will but having regard to fundamental assessments of human values and the purposes of society. Today a denial of the fundamental Christian doctrine which in past centuries would have been regarded by the ecclesiastical courts as heresy and by the common law as blasphemy, will no longer be an offence if the decencies of controversy are observed. When Lord Mansfield, speaking long after the Star Chamber had been abolished, said that the Court of King's Bench was the custos morum of the people and had the superintendency of offences contra bonds mores, he was asserting, as I now assert, that there is in that court a residual power, where no statute has yet intervened to supersede the common law, to superintend those offences which are prejudicial to the public welfare. Such occasions will be rare, for Parliament has not been slow to legislate when attention has been sufficiently aroused. Such occasions will be rare, for Parliament has not been slow to legislate when attention has been sufficiently aroused. But gaps remain and will always remain since no one can foresee every way in which the wickedness of man may disrupt the order of society." This case is clearly distinguishable for several reasons, firstly because what the House of Lords said was in relation to the powers of the Judges of the High Court in England. We have before us the order of a. Magistrate and not that of the High Court. A tribunal of limited jurisdiction cannot enjoy the same powers which the High Courts in England enjoys both in respect of statutory law as also their common law. Secondly, in India courts have got not ecclesiastical jurisdiction and lastly it is trite that courts in India are not Courts of morals but courts of law. 20. For the reasons mentioned above, the petition is allowed, the order of the learned City Magistrate and that of the learned Sessions Judge are quashed and a writ of habeas corpus is issued to the Superintendent, Protective Home, Agra directing that Srimati Ram Devi shall be set at libber forth with. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.