Order.- These Second Appeals arise out of two connected suits practically between the same parties which were tried together and disposed of by a common judgment in the trial Court as well as in the lower appellate Court. The appellant in both these appeals is a certain Neelakantam Pillai who has been worsted in the Courts below, and he has filed the appeals challenging the correctness of the decision against him. To begin with, the broad outline of the case, the nature of the two suits and array of parties therein may be briefly stated. Four items of wet lands in the village of Tirupachur, Chingleput district, belonged to one Rajammal. She, along with her husband, Ranganatha Pillai, jointly executed a conveyance of the said lands in favour of one Vadivel Achari. The document of sale is Exhibit A-1, dated 2nd September, 1957. The consideration recited in that document is a sum of rupees two thousand. Out of this a sum of rupees two hundred was paid by the vendee to the vendors on the date of execution of the deed. There was a stipulation in the document that the vendee should retain a sum of rupees one thousand two hundred and fifty alleged to be due by Rajammal to one Andalammal. The balance of a sum of rupees five hundred and fifty was payable to the vendors at the time of registration of the instrument. Before the document could be registered, the parties fell out, with the result that the vendee, Vadivel Achari, resorted to proceedings for compulsory registration of the document. But the vendee could not recover possession of the properties. He had, therefore, necessarily to institute a suit for recovery of possession ; and that he did, by filing the suit, Original Suit No. 205 of 1958, on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Tiruvallur. He impleaded his vendors as defendants 1 and 2, Andalammal, to whom money was made payable under the deed of sale, as the third defendant, and Neelakantam Pillai, the appellant, as the fourth defendant. The reason why Neelakantam Pillai was impleaded, was that, by the time the suit came to be instituted, he had obtained a sale deed (Exhibit B-21), dated 27th September, 1957, from Rajammal herself the admitted owner of the properties. Andalammal and Nilakantam Pillai were not strangers to defendants 1 and 2. The reason why Neelakantam Pillai was impleaded, was that, by the time the suit came to be instituted, he had obtained a sale deed (Exhibit B-21), dated 27th September, 1957, from Rajammal herself the admitted owner of the properties. Andalammal and Nilakantam Pillai were not strangers to defendants 1 and 2. They arc the children of Balakrishna Pillai, the brother of Ranganatha Pillai. The allegation in the plaint filed in Original Suit No. 205 of 1958 was that Neelakantam Pillai was aware of the anterior sale in favour of Vadivel Achari, that the defendants had conspired and brought into existence an alleged agreement to convey, dated 15th August, 1955, and that, under no circumstances, the fourth defendant could claim title as against Vadivel Achari. In this suit, defendants 1 and 2 had first appeared through Counsel and filed written statement, but they were subsequently absent and set ex parte at the trial. Andalammal and Neelakantam Pillai, defendants 3 and 4, however, contested the suit, and claimed title to the suit properties. Substantially, their case was that Rajammal had executed an agreement in favour of the fourth defendant on 15th August, 1955, long prior to the sale in favour of the plaintiff, that the fourth defendant was in possession of the properties in pursuance of the said agreement, that the plaintiff had notice of the agreement, that the plaintiff was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, and that, though actually the sale in favour of the fourth defendant, was subsequent to the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, his rights accrued under the agreement to sell of the year 1955. The learned District Munsif of Tiruvallur who tried the suit upheld the plaintiff’s contention and granted a decree in his favour. The fourth defendant, Neelakantam Pillai, filed an appeal in the District Court of Chingleput, Appeal Suit No. 122 of 1960, but substantially failed. The learned District Judge, however, directed the plaintiff to deposit into the Court an amount admittedly due by him under the sale deed in his favour. The learned District Judge directed that there should be a stay of execution of the decree for possession in Original Suit No. 205 of 1958, till the amount due by the plaintiff to the third defendant is deposited. Subject to this modification, as already stated, the appeal was dismissed. The learned District Judge directed that there should be a stay of execution of the decree for possession in Original Suit No. 205 of 1958, till the amount due by the plaintiff to the third defendant is deposited. Subject to this modification, as already stated, the appeal was dismissed. This decree of the learned District Judge is, of course, absolutely just. Neelakantam Pillai was not content, merely, with resisting the suit, Original Suit No. 205 of 1958. He, in turn, filed a suit, Original Suit No. 302 of 1959, on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Tiruvallur, claiming relief by way of specific performance of the alleged agreement in his favour, dated 15th August, 1955. He had already obtained a registered conveyance from Rajammal herself under Exhibit B-21, dated 27th September, 1957, and there was absolutely no necessity for him to have filed the suit for specific performance, even assuming that the claim put forward by him was true. To this suit, he impleaded Vadivel Achari, the plaintiff in Original Suit No. 205 of 1958, as the first defendant, and Rajammal, the owner of the properties, as the second defendant. The dispute between the parties to this suit was practically the same as that involved in the other suit, namely, whether the agreement, dated 15th August, 1955, was true. The learned District Munsif found that the agreement was not true, and that it was fabricated for the purpose of defeating the rights of Vadivel Achari, and accordingly dismissed the suit. In fact, it was on the basis of this finding that he granted a decree in favour of Vadivel Achari in the other suit, Original Suit No. 205 of 1958. Neelakantam Pillai preferred an appeal to the District Court of Chingelput against the dismissal of his suit for specific performance, and the learned District Judge who affirmed the findings of the trial Court, naturally, dismissed that appeal. Second Appeal No. 496 of 1961, was filed by Neelakantam Pillai in this Court against the judgment and decree in Appeal Suit No. 122 of 1960, on the file of the District Court, Chingleput, which partially modified the judgment in Original Suit No. 205 of 1958, on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Tiruvallur. Second Appeal No. 496 of 1961, was filed by Neelakantam Pillai in this Court against the judgment and decree in Appeal Suit No. 122 of 1960, on the file of the District Court, Chingleput, which partially modified the judgment in Original Suit No. 205 of 1958, on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Tiruvallur. That appeal was posted for admission under Order 41, rule 11, Civil Procedure Code before Venkatadri, J. The learned Judge passed an order dismissing the appeal on nth April, 1961 observing thus: In the Second Appeal no question of law is involved. Both the Courts have found that Exhibit B-7 is a genuine document. But it is a question of fact. The Second Appeal is dismissed. Exhibit B-7 is the agreement, dated 15th August, 1955, and the Courts below have found it, not genuine. Presumably, the learned Judge meant, in his order, that the finding of the Courts below was that Exhibit B-7 was not a genuine document. A few days after the dismissal of Second Appeal No. 496 of 1961, Second Appeal No. 559 of 1961 was filed by Neelakantam Pillai from the judgment and decree of the District Court, Chingleput, in Appeal Suit No. 165 of 1960, affirming the judgment and decree of the Munsif’s Court, Tiruvallur, in Original Suit No. 302 of 1959. This appeal was filed on 20th of April, 1961. On the same date Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 6986 of 1961, was filed by Neelakantam Pillai for review of the order of Venkatadri, J., dated 11th April, 1961, dismissing Second Appeal No. 496 of 1961. The learned Judge admitted Second Appeal No. 559 of 1961 on 24th April, 1961 and directed the issue of notice to the respondents. The application for review was heard by the learned Judge on 1st January, 1962, and he reviewed his earlier order and admitted Second Appeal No. 496 of 1961 also. In granting the review, the learned Judge stated thus: Second Appeal No. 496 of 1961 filed by Neelakantam Pillai against the decree of the suit for declaration and possession was not admitted. But, Second Appeal No. 559 of 1961, filed by the same Neelakantam Pillai against the dismissal of his suit for specific performance was admitted. Both the suits were tried together and the evidence is also common to both the suits. But, Second Appeal No. 559 of 1961, filed by the same Neelakantam Pillai against the dismissal of his suit for specific performance was admitted. Both the suits were tried together and the evidence is also common to both the suits. That being so, in the interests of justice, I am of opinion that Second Appeal No. 496 of 1961, also should be admitted and heard along with Second Appeal No. 559 of 1961. It is admitted accordingly. It appears that the review petition was again placed before the learned Judge at the instance of the Office, pointing out that the review had been granted without notice to the respondents. The learned Judge again heard arguments on the question of necessity to issue notice before a review can be granted of an order dismissing an appeal under Order 41, rule 11, Civil Procedure Code and passed the following order: After the order was passed, it was brought to my notice by the Office that no notice has been given to the opposite party. Mr. Natesan brings to my notice a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Janaki Nath Hore v. Prabhasini Dasee1, where their Lordships held that no notice is necessary to the opposite side while setting aside an order passed in Second Appeal even at the admission stage. Following that decision, I hold that no notice is necessary to the opposite side in this case. This order is also dated 1st January, 1962. When the Second Appeals came on for hearing before me for final disposal, the learned Counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection that the appeals should not be heard on the merits, because, the order granting review of the dismissal of Second Appeal No. 496 of 1961, passed without notice to the opposite party, was nullity, and that, if the dismissal of Second Appeal No. 496 of 1961, were to stand, the appellant cannot prosecute Second Appeal No. 559 of 1961. Mr. K. Rajah Iyer, learned Counsel for the appellant, concedes that, if the dismissal of Second Appeal No. 496 of 1961, were to stand, the finding in that case holding that Exhibit B-7 was not a genuine document would operate as res judicata and that Second Appeal No. 496 of 1961, must fail. Mr. K. Rajah Iyer, learned Counsel for the appellant, concedes that, if the dismissal of Second Appeal No. 496 of 1961, were to stand, the finding in that case holding that Exhibit B-7 was not a genuine document would operate as res judicata and that Second Appeal No. 496 of 1961, must fail. I have, therefore, to decide, at the outset, the true scope of the provisions of Order 47, rule 4, Civil Procedure Code which enables the Court to grant a review of prior orders and the effect of an order granting a review ex parte without notice to the persons who would be aggrieved by the granting of review. A dismissal of an appeal under Order 41, rule 11, Civil Procedure Code without notice to the respondents in the appeal is no doubt an ex parte dismissal but, nonetheless, it is dismissal on the merits of the case. It is because that the Court is of opinion that there are no merits in the appeal and that it is not convinced of prima facie case in favour of the appellant, it does not feel inclined to issue notice to the respondents which would necessarily involve a waste of judicial time, and of course, unnecessary expenses to the parties themselves. Order 41, rule 11, no doubt, applies to appeals from original decrees, but the provisions of Order 42, have made Order 41, applicable even to appeals from appellate decrees. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that the Court has got power to dismiss a Second Appeal under Order 41, rule 11, on the merits of the case, without issuing notice to the respondents. The effect of dismissing an appeal under Order 41, rule 11 is to merge the decree of the Subordinate Court in the decree of this Court and thereafter, even an application for amendment of the decree has got to be made only in this Court. This would certainly emphasise the fact that the dismissal of an appeal under Order 41, rule 11, clothes the successful respondent who was not, however, obliged to come to this Court to defend the decree passed in his favour by the Court below with vested right. This would certainly emphasise the fact that the dismissal of an appeal under Order 41, rule 11, clothes the successful respondent who was not, however, obliged to come to this Court to defend the decree passed in his favour by the Court below with vested right. So much seems to be clear, and indeed whatever controversy there may be in regard to the true scope of the provisions of Order 47, rules 1 and 4, to which I shall refer immediately, the fact of dismissal of an appeal even at the stage of admission is what I have set out above. It will now be convenient to refer to the relevant provisions of Order 47. Order 47, rule 1 enacts that any person considering himself aggrieved by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred may make application for review of the decree or order on the ground that he has discovered a new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason. The words other sufficient reason should be read as ejusdem generis to the preceding words or, as meaning, a ground at least analogous to those specified immediately previously, and this is now the settled law — vide Chhajju Ram v. Neki1. This is also the view taken by the Supreme Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and another v. The Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and others2. Now Order 47, rule 4 is the material provision; and the portion relevant for the present case is as follows: (1) Where it appears to the Court that there is not sufficient ground for a review, it shall reject the application. (2) Where the Court is of opinion that the application for review should be granted it shall grant the same: Provided that — (a) no such application shall be granted without previous notice to the opposite party to enable him to appear and be heard in support of the decree or order, a review of which is, applied for.... (2) Where the Court is of opinion that the application for review should be granted it shall grant the same: Provided that — (a) no such application shall be granted without previous notice to the opposite party to enable him to appear and be heard in support of the decree or order, a review of which is, applied for.... The terms of this provision clearly lay down the necessity to issue notice to the opposite party before granting review. Whether the non-compliance of this provision renders the order granting review null and void is really the crucial question that has to be considered in the present case. Before discussing that question, I would also like to refer to the provisions of Order 47, rule 7, which in so far as it is material for the present case, reads: — (1) An order of the Court rejecting the application shall not be appealable ; but an order granting an application may be objected to on the ground that the application was — (a) [Omitted by section 14 (10) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act LXVI of 1956]; (b) in contravention of the provision of rule 4............ Such objection may be taken at once by an appeal from the order granting the application or in any appeal from the final decree or order passed or made in the suit.......... What is the true scope of Order 47, rule 4, which categorically provides that a Court shall not grant review without previous notice to the opposite party? Does the absence of notice, which is no doubt mandatory under the rule, affect the jurisdiction of the Court to grant review, in the sense that, if no notice is issued as prescribed by the rule, the Court has no power to grant review ? This is the problem which is now posed before me. Judicial opinion on this point is not quite uniform, and, so far as I am able to see, no clear guidance can be had from the decisions which have dealt with the matter and to which I shall, of course, be referring in some detail in this judgment. But I must, however, observe that the decision in Janaki Math Hore v. Prabhasini Dasee3, cited by the learned Counsel appearing before Venkatadri, J., has been practically dissented from by a Division Bench of this Court. But I must, however, observe that the decision in Janaki Math Hore v. Prabhasini Dasee3, cited by the learned Counsel appearing before Venkatadri, J., has been practically dissented from by a Division Bench of this Court. (Devadoss and Waller, JJ., in Narayana Chettiar v. Muthu Chettiar.4) It is regrettable that the learned Counsel failed to draw the attention of the learned Judge, to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, particularly when the case actually cited lays down a principle different from that accepted by this Court. The decisions on the subject may now be noted. In Abdul Hakim Chowdhury v. Hem Chandra Das5, a Division Bench took the view that non-compliance with rule 4 of Order 47, of the Code rendered the granting of an application for review by the appellant ex parte a nullity as it was prejudicial to the respondent and as previous notice was necessary. But this view did not find acceptance by another Division Bench, as can be seen from the decision in Janaki Nath Hore v. Prabhasini Dasee1: In a case, an appeal was lodged in the High Court from a decree of the District Judge. It was summarily dismissed under Order 41, rule 11, of the Code by a Divisional Bench consisting of Carnduff and Richardson, JJ. An application was made by the appellants for a review of this order which was heard ex parte; the previous order of dismissal was recalled and the following order was passed: The appeal will be heard. Let the record be sent for and issue the usual notice. When the appeal came on for final hearing, the respondent took a preliminary objection to the hearing of the appeal on the ground that the order recalling the original order of dismissal was bad having been made in contravention of the Proviso to rule 4 of Order 47, of the Code. The learned Judges, Mookerjee and Roe, JJ., referred to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Zahur-ud-din v. Nur-ud-din2 and observed that no order or review could be made without notice to the person in whose favour the decree sought to be reviewed had been passed. But nevertheless the learned Judges held that notice to the respondent was not necessary. The learned Judges, Mookerjee and Roe, JJ., referred to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Zahur-ud-din v. Nur-ud-din2 and observed that no order or review could be made without notice to the person in whose favour the decree sought to be reviewed had been passed. But nevertheless the learned Judges held that notice to the respondent was not necessary. In their opinion, the expression opposite party would not include the respondent, as he was not interested in supporting the order of dismissal when the order substituted on review was that the appeal shall be heard in his presence. The learned Judges observed thus at page 182: Now, what was the order in the present case which was sought to be recalled by the appellant and what was the order which they endeavoured to get substituted in lieu thereof ? The order which they prayed might be recalled was to the effect that the appeal be summarily dismissed; and the order which they wished to have substituted in its place was that notice of the appeal be served upon the respondent and that the appeal be heard on the merits after the record had been received. Can it be contended reasonably that the respondent was the “opposite party” within the meaning of the expression in the Proviso to rule 4 of Order 47, that he was in fact interested to appear and support the order of summary dismissal, when the only order sought to be substituted therefor was that the appeal be heard in his presence? In our opinion, the question must be answered in the negative. With great respect to the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court I am unable to agree with the view expressed by them. It seems to me that it is repugnant to the clear terms of the Proviso. The words opposite party mean the person who is interested in supporting the order sought to be reviewed. Where an appeal is dismissed under Order 41, rule 11, summarily, the person who would be interested in upholding that order would certainly be the respondent in the main appeal. The Code requires that notice should go to him, so that he can point out that the applicant for review has no case to put forward under Order 47, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. The Code requires that notice should go to him, so that he can point out that the applicant for review has no case to put forward under Order 47, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code. I have already pointed out that the dismissal of an appeal even without notice to the respondent is still a decision on the merits which is in no way different from the dismissal of the appeal in his presence after due notice to him. In Official Trustee of Bengal v. Benode Behari Ghose Mal3, the learned Judges preferred to follow the decision in Janaki Nath Hore v. Prabhasini Dasee1, in preference to the previous decision in Abdul Hakim Chowdhury v. Hem Chandra Das4. They observed that there had been a long practice extending over a period of forty years in the Calcutta High Court, by which an appeal summarily dismissed under Order 41, rule 11, was asked to be set aside on review by the same Bench without notice to the person affected. It is difficult to follow, speaking with respect, how the practice, however long and uniform it might have been, would override the clear provision of a statute. Procedure can no doubt be moulded in a manner convenient to the Court ; but it must be consistent with the rules which are obligatory and mandatory. The Patna High Court has not accepted the Calcutta view as correct. In Suraj Pal Pandey v. Uttim Pandey5, the scope of Order 47, rule 4, has been considered. After referring to the decision in Janaki Nath Hore v. Prabhasini Dasee1, Dawson Miller, C.J., delivering the Judgment of the Bench, stated thus at page 283:- "The ground for this decision appears to have been that there was no Opposite Party within the meaning of the Proviso to rule 4 of Order 47 at that stage of the proceedings. There does not appear to have been any settled practice of the Calcutta High Court at that time and from the judgment it appears that in certain cases the contrary view has been expressed notably in the case of Abdul Hakim Chowdhury v. Hem Chandra Das.1 In my opinion the expression Opposite Party in the Proviso to Order 47, rule 4, means the party interested to support the order or decree sought to be set aside or modified in the application for review. In the present case the defendants were the opposite party and I can see no reason why the expression there used should be limited to cases in which such party has actually appeared in the appeal." Again at page 284 the learned Judge observed: "It seems to me that the defendants who had had no opportunity of appearing to oppose the application are at least entitled to a hearing as soon as the matter is drawn to their attention." The view of the Patna High Court is that an order granting review without notice even in a case where an appeal is summarily dismissed under Order 41, rule 11, would be illegal, though not void. I shall now refer to the two decisions of the Lahore High Court. In Gopal Mal Ganda Mal v. Hara Chand2, a single Judge held that, where the defendant is given every opportunity to raise an objection that he could raise and he is in no way prejudiced by reason of the fact that no notice was issued to him, the order granting review should not be set aside by the appellant Court. The petitioner in that case filed a suit for recovery of a sum of money stated to be due on accounts by the defendant in the suit. The plaintiff was directed to pay the process fee before particular date. On that date the defendant did not appear and it was discovered that his non-appearance was due to non-payment of the process fee on the part of the plaintiff. The suit was dismissed under Order 19, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. Then an application for restoration of the suit was filed ; but that was also disallowed. Another application for review of the order disallowing the application for restoration was presented. The learned District Munsif, following the decision in Janaki Math Hore v. Prabhasini Dasee3, granted review without notice to the defendant. The defendant filed pleas in defence of the suit and raised the question that the order granting review was illegal. The Munsif over ruled the objection and proceeded to decide the case on the merits and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant filed pleas in defence of the suit and raised the question that the order granting review was illegal. The Munsif over ruled the objection and proceeded to decide the case on the merits and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant preferred an appeal to the lower appellate Court and the learned appellate Judge upheld the defendant’s objection and set aside the decree passed by the trial Court, mainly on the ground that the order granting review was bad. The plaintiff filed a revision petition before the High Court and reliance was placed upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Janaki Nath Hore v. Prabhasini Dasee3. At page 304, the learned Judge observed thus: "It is not necessary for me to express any opinion as to the view expressed by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court in that case, for the case may be decided upon another ground on which the case of Taj Muhammad v. Kanshi Mal4 was decided. Now, in this case the defendant did not appeal against the order granting review............ The defendant was given every opportunity to raise any objection that he could raise. He is in no way therefore, prejudiced by reason of the fact that no notice was issued to him. The learned Judge of the Court below ought to have taken into consideration the circumstance and ought not to have set aside decree passed by the trial Court merely on the ground that no notice had been issued to the defendant before granting review of the judgment. The other case of the Lahore High Court is the decision in Abdul Karim v. Ram Singh.5 That again was a decision of a single Judge. There an application for the execution was dismissed for default on 19th January, 1921. An application to have that order set aside was filed on 22nd January, 1921, urging that the decree-holder’s agent was present outside the Court room when the case was called on for hearing and that he could not be present in Court, as he had gone to answer calls of nature. The previous order was set aside. The judgment-debtor filed an appeal to the High Court against the order restoring the execution petition. The previous order was set aside. The judgment-debtor filed an appeal to the High Court against the order restoring the execution petition. It was contended on his behalf that the Court had no power either under section 151, Civil Procedure Code or under Order 47, rule 4, Civil Procedure Code, to set aside the order dismissing the execution petition without notice to him. The learned Judge followed the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Janaki Nath Hore v. Prabhasini Dasee1, and observed thus at page 351: "The ratio decidendi was that as the appeal was dismissed summarily by an ex parte order there was really no opposite party to whom it was necessary to give notice, within the meaning of Order 47 rule 4 (2), Proviso (a)................it cannot be said, following the reasoning of the Calcutta High Court in the case above referred to, that there was any opposite party to whom it was necessary to issue the notice.................. The order could certainly have been passed under section 151, Civil Procedure Code, and I am not prepared to say that, under the circumstances of the case, there would have been any necessity to issue notice to the judgment-debtor beforehand." With respect I am unable to agree with these decisions of the Lahore High Court. It is enough to point out that the said decisions cannot be reconciled with the clear and express terms of the provision of Order 47, rule 4. I shall now refer to the decision of this Court in Narayana Chettiar v. Muthu Chettiar2, where several of the decisions above have been considered and dealt with. The facts of that case are as follows: — An application for execution of a decree was dismissed owing to the absence of the decree-holder’s pleader on the day of the hearing; on the same day the application was restored on the application of the pleader without notice to the judgment-debtors ; a petition for amendment of the execution application in certain particulars was filed and notice of this petition was issued to the judgment-debtors; when the petition came on for hearing, the judgment-debtors objected that the order of restoration of the execution application passed without notice, was illegal and invalid and that it should be set aside. A Division Bench consisting of Devadoss and Waller, JJ., held that the order of restoration should not be considered as a valid order passed on review under Order 47, of the Code, an issue of notice to the opposite party was imperative, and that the. order passed without notice was not merely irregular but illegal and the judgmentdebtor were not bound by it but could object to it when they became aware of it. At page 72, Devadoss, J., discussing the scope of Order 47, rule 4, stated thus: "It is urged by the respondent that, when the Subordinate Judge restored the petition to file, the appellants should have preferred an appeal against that order ; when a remedy is open to a party against an irregular order made by a Court it should not be considered to be a nullity ; for the Court has power to review its own order and if it reviews it irregularly the party affected by the order should appeal against it and rule 7 (b) provides for an appeal if the Court granting the review contravenes the provisions of rule 4. The question is not whether the party to an illegal order has a remedy or not. If a Court does something which it is not authorized by law to do, that order has no legal force Such an order is illegal and not merely an irregular one and a party is not bound by the illegal order. Again at page 75, the learned Judge stated as follows:- "Though the party against whom an order is made without notice is entitled to object to it afterwards, it is not competent to a Court to omit to give notice to the opposite party when the law requires that notice shall be given of an application before it is granted." The decisions of the Calcutta High Court have been referred to in this judgment. The comment of the learned Judges in regard to the Calcutta decisions is as follows at page 72: — "These two cases [Janaki Hath Hore v. Prabhasini Dasee1 and Abdul Hakim Chowdhury v. Hem Chandra Das3] cannot be authority for the position that no notice is necessary in the case of a review of an order under Order 47, for the practice of the Calcutta High Court was rightly or wrongly to set aside a summary order of dismissal on an application made for that purpose. In Abdul Hakim Chowdhury v. Hem Chandra Das3, it was held that non-compliance with rule 4 of Order 47 rendered the granting of an ex parte application for review a nullity................ Where the law requires that a certain formality should be complied with before an order could be made, it is not open to the Court to ignore the clear provision of the law and pass an order without complying with it. The notice to the opposite party is imperative under rule 4, clause 2 (a)." This Court has really approved of the principle laid down in Abdul Hakim Choudhury v. Hem Chandra Das3, and a fortiori differed from that of the latter decision of the Calcutta High Court in Janaki Nath Hore v. Prabhasini Dasee1. The preponderance of judicial opinion, therefore, seems to be that notice is necessary to the respondent for a valid order granting review of dismissal of an appeal under Order 41, rule 11. It cannot be otherwise having regard to the clear language of the rule. Indeed this was pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Zahur-ud-din v. Nur-ud-din1. Does the failure to issue notice make the review order merely irregular or illegal liable to be set aside or does it render the order absolutely ineffective ? This is the issue now. The distinction between an illegal order and an order without jurisdiction is visibly plain. The former binds the parties notwithstanding its legal infirmity ; but the latter has no existence in the eye of law and cannot, therefore, affect the rights of the parties. The Court, it is said, has jurisdiction to pass a right order as well as wrong order ; and the party adversely affected by a wrong order cannot unfetter himself from such order by merely proving it to be wrong. The Court, it is said, has jurisdiction to pass a right order as well as wrong order ; and the party adversely affected by a wrong order cannot unfetter himself from such order by merely proving it to be wrong. It would bind him till he gets rid of it in a manner known to law. But the Court cannot act beyond its competency and if it does so and passes an order, such an order is not that of the Court, though it purports to be so. The law treats an order without jurisdiction as nullity. It creates no rights, affects nobody and has no sanction behind it. The party against whom it is sought to be used can resist it by merely pointing out that it has no force, and that it is not a weapon against him. On a reading of the provisions of Order 47, rule 4 of the Code, it seems to me that the issue of previous notice to the opposite party, namely, the person interested in upholding the order sought to be reviewed is a condition for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court to grant review. I cannot say that the Court is clothed with jurisdiction by virtue of the provision of the said rule, because it has power to grant review, if any one or more of the conditions prescribed in Order 47, rule 1 are present. But, before that jurisdiction can be exercised, the Code makes it imperative that notice should go to the opposite party. Order 47, rule 4, is the machinary part of Order 47, rule 1. The foundation for the power to grant review is the latter provision ; how it has to be exercised it governed by the former. In a loose sense, it can be said that the Court has no jurisdiction to pass an order of review without complying with the terms of rule 4. But, in my opinion, non-compliance with Proviso to rule 4 regarding notice would be a jurisdictional error and not a defect of utter lack of jurisdiction or total absence of initial jurisdiction, which alone would render the order passed a nullity. But, in my opinion, non-compliance with Proviso to rule 4 regarding notice would be a jurisdictional error and not a defect of utter lack of jurisdiction or total absence of initial jurisdiction, which alone would render the order passed a nullity. Whatever phraseology is adopted to describe an order granting review without notice to the opposite party — whether it is called illegal or irregular or null and void — the position of the person affected by the order is fairly clear. He need not file any independent application of his own to have the order in the review application set aside. The order would not, of course, bind him. He can either prefer an appeal from that order or object to it at the subsequent stages of the proceedings as provided for under Order 47, rule 7. That enacts that an order granting an application may be objected to on the ground that the order was in contravention of the provisions of rule 4. On such objection being raised, the order granting review cannot be relied upon by the person who succeeded in getting that order. The view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Narayana Chettiar v. Muthu Chettiar2, is binding on me and I may be permitted to add, that I find myself substantially in agreement with it I am, therefore, of opinion that the order of Venkatadri, J., granting review of the previous order of dismissal under Order 41, rule 11, would not bind the respondents in this appeal and they must succeed in the objection raised by them that the said order being repugnant to rule 4 should not be treated as valid and operative. Mr. K. Rajah Iyer, learned Counsel for the appellant, contends that the respondent cannot ignore the order made in review and they can only claim to have an opportunity to be heard in the matter, and that opportunity can now be availed of by them I apprehend that that is not the true or proper scope of the rule. On being shown that the impugned order was one without notice it cannot operate to the prejudice of the party who wants to rely upon the order that formed the subjectmatter of the review application. It is unnecessary for such a party to go further and say that there are no adequate grounds to justify a review. On being shown that the impugned order was one without notice it cannot operate to the prejudice of the party who wants to rely upon the order that formed the subjectmatter of the review application. It is unnecessary for such a party to go further and say that there are no adequate grounds to justify a review. Rule 7 states that any review granted may be objected to on the ground of contravention of rule 4. The objection goes to the root of the order and if made out renders the order ineffective. This would not, however, revive the application for review necessitating a fresh disposal after due notice. Objection to the order, though upheld, cannot bring about its effacement. The preliminary objection is, therefore, upheld. Mr. K. Rajah Iyer submits that the judgment of the lower appellate Court is unsatisfactory, as there has been no proper discussion or consideration of the material evidence on record. It is not necessary for me to express any opinion in this contention, as I have already held that the order of dismissal by Venkatadri, J., of Second Appeal No. 496 of 1959 on nth April, 1961, should stand. If that is the true position, and in my opinion it is, it would not certainly be open to the appellant to prosecute the other Second Appeal — Second Appeal No. 559 of 1961. Second Appeal No. 496 of 1961, has already been dismissed by Venkatadri, J., and as the order granting review has now been held to be not binding on the respondents, that order of dismissal stands. There is no need to dismiss that appeal again. Second Appeal No. 559 of 1961, fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. K.L.B. ------ Appeal dismissed.