JUDGMENT Newaskar J. - l. This appeal arises out of a suit for enforcement of a mortgage dated 25-9-1944. The mortgage was executed in favour of plaintiff's father Lachhumal by Mahadeo Prasad, defendant No 1 and Sambobai, the widow of Mahadeo Prasad's cousin Munnalal both for her self and in her capacity as guardian of her minor son Sundarlal. The mortgage was anomalous and was intended to secure a sum of Rs. 14,000. Interest was agreed at Annas 7 per month. The mortgage was usufructuary but there was a personal covenant to pay within two years, On failure of payment as agreed the mortgagee had a right of sale. This mortgage was stated to have been executed by the mortgagors in order to pay two prior mortgages, first, dated 2-10-1935 for Rs.4,000 executed by Mahadeo Prasad and Munnalal in favour of Munsilal and his son Motilal. second, dated 9-3-1942 for Rs.6,000 executed by the defendants in favour of the same party. Besides the amount payable in respect of these two mortgages the mortgagors also required money for the maintenance of the joint family as also their joint family firm named Mahadeo Prasad Munnalal'. The defendants failed to pay the mortgage amount as agreed. Lachhumal the original mortgagee died on 1st of October 1949. The present suit is filed by his heirs on 28th May 1951 claiming Rs.14,000 as principal and Rs. 2,854-10-3 as interest in arrears. The total claim was for Rs.16,854-10-3. 2. Defendant No. 2 Sundarlal and his mother defendant No. 3 contested the suit Mahadeo Prasad filed a separate written statement. Contentions raised by Mahadeo Prasad are no longer in dispute in this appeal and consequently it is not necessary to refer to them. Material contentions which survived in the present appeal are as to the binding character of the mortgage executed' by Mahadeo Prasad and Samboba, as against minor Sundarlal. It was contended that the mortgage in suit dated 25th September 1944 was not for the benefit of the minor or his estate. 3. In connection of this contention an issue bearing on the question as to the binding character of the earlier two mortgages of 1935 and 1942 executed by the minor Sunderlal's father Munnalal was framed. It was contended that the mortgage in suit dated 25th September 1944 was not for the benefit of the minor or his estate. 3. In connection of this contention an issue bearing on the question as to the binding character of the earlier two mortgages of 1935 and 1942 executed by the minor Sunderlal's father Munnalal was framed. The two issues which alone need be mentioned in view of the controversy raised in this appeal are issues No.5 and additional issue (8) These issues are as follows:- Issue No.5. Whether the mortgage in suit had been executed for the benefit of the minor and whether the amount of the mortgage is binding upon the minor and his estate? Additional issue (B). Whether the defendant No. 1 and deceased Munnalal the father of Sundarlal executed mortgages dated 2-10-1935 and 9-3-1942 in consideration of Rs. 4000 and Rs.6,000 respectively in favour of Munsilal and his son for payment of Munsilal's debts and for running business of the joint family? 4. The trial Court on consideration of these two issues and on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties came to the conclusion that prior 'mortgages dated 2-10-1935 and 9-3-1942 had been executed by defendant No. 1 and Munnala for payment of prior debt of the mortgagees Munsilal and his son and for running the business of the family. It therefore held that the mortgage in suit binds the minor and his estate to the extent of Rs.10,300, which related to those mortgages. As regards the balance of Rs. 3, 00, it held that the plaintiffs had fared to make out the binding character of the mortgage to this extent in as much as it had not been established that it had been incurred by Mahadeo Prasad and Sambobai for any purpose in involving legal necessity. The trial Court passed a preliminary decree for sale of the mortgage properties as against defendants Mahadeo Prasad and Sambobai to the extent of Rs. 16,390, and as against Sundarlal to the extent of Rs. 12,055-7-0. The rest of the claim as against Sundarlal was dismissed. A usual preliminary decree for sale was accordingly passed subject to above mentioned term. 5. The present appeal is directed against that decision. 6. 16,390, and as against Sundarlal to the extent of Rs. 12,055-7-0. The rest of the claim as against Sundarlal was dismissed. A usual preliminary decree for sale was accordingly passed subject to above mentioned term. 5. The present appeal is directed against that decision. 6. The appeal is referred by Sundarlal alone and the principal contentions raised on his behalf in this appeal are (1) that the Court below was not justified in passing a preliminary decree for case as against his to an extent greater than Rs.5,985 which amount alone ought to constitute his binding liability under the mortgage in suit and that in case the above mentioned amount is the only amount considered as binding against him the alienation would be valid only to that extent even as against the alienating co-parceners. It was nor disputed that the personal liability If Mahadeo Prasad and Sambobai to pay the entire mortgage debt would survive under their personal covenant. 7. Mr. Patankar who appears for the appellant relies upon two principles in support of his contention that the mortgage in suit binds the appellant to the extent of Rs 5,985 only Firs is that a Manager of a joint family has no power to impose upon minor member of the family the risk and liability of a new business started by him so as to affect his interest in the joint family property and that it does not make any difference that the manager is the father. The second is that it is the privilege of the father alone to burden the family estate by a mortgage, by discharging an antecedent debt which must be a debt of his 'own and that the manage of the joint family who is not the father cannot bind the estate merely by discharging a pre-existing debt of the family Reliance is sought to be placed for the first proposition upon the decision of the Privy Council in Sanyasicharan Mandal Vs. Krishnadhan Bane, ji, 49 Indian Appeals 108 and Benares Bank Vs. Hari Narain, 59 Indian Appeals 300 and for the second upon the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Chiranji Lal Vs. Bankey Lal, AIR 1933 Allahabad 273 and that of this Court reported in Bhagwant Singh Vs. Beharilal. Krishnadhan Bane, ji, 49 Indian Appeals 108 and Benares Bank Vs. Hari Narain, 59 Indian Appeals 300 and for the second upon the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Chiranji Lal Vs. Bankey Lal, AIR 1933 Allahabad 273 and that of this Court reported in Bhagwant Singh Vs. Beharilal. Basing his contentions on these two propositions he submitted that although the mortgage in suit is made for discharging the earlier two mortgage debts incurred by Munnalal, the father of the appellant neither Mahadeo Prasad acting as the Manager of the joint family nor Sambobai acting as gurdian could do so except to the extent, the earlier mortgages would bind him. The first mortgage, it is said, bound the minor Sunderlal is no far as it was made by the father Munnalal for paying his antecedent debt. That debt was Rs.2,885, being the Khata balance due from him and Mahadeo Prasad jointly and severally. The remaining amount (of Rs.1,115 stated to have been taken by him and Mahadeo Prasad for the business Mahadeo Prasad Munnalal' started by both of them, not being for the ancestral business was not binding. With regard to the second mortgage, It is said, the amount taken for discharging the Khata balance of Rs.2,000 standing against the joint names of Munnalal and Mahadeo Prasad as also-the interest due on that amount as also on the amount of the prior mortgage aggregating Rs 2900 was binding but not the extra amount of Rs. 2,900 borrowed for the business which was not ancestral. The learned counsel also argued that where the alienation in suit was not good and binding against the appellant to an extent greater than Rs. 5,985 (Rs. 2,885+Rs.3,100) it did not bind the share even of the alienors i.e. of Mahadeo Prasad and Sambobai to an extent greater than the above mentioned amount and it is competent for Sundarlal to seek a decision that the alienation is void so as not to bind even the interest of the alienors. The decision of the Privy Council in 44 Indian Appeals 126, Sahu Ram Chandra Vs. Bhup Singh is relied upon for this part of the contention. 8. The decision of the Privy Council in 44 Indian Appeals 126, Sahu Ram Chandra Vs. Bhup Singh is relied upon for this part of the contention. 8. The circumstances established in the case clearly point out that family had no other source for discharging the debt incurred except by alienating the properties in suit which alone could be looked at for the purpose by the Manager of the family. When money was required earlier it was by alienating the property that the same was secured twice by Mahadeo Prasad and Munnalal. No other Source being available was indicated by the evidence led at the trial. When therefore Mahadeo Prasad and Sambobai were required to payoff the earlier mortgage debts there could not have been any ocher reasonable course open to them except by alienating the property. 9. Besides this the prior mortgage debts in respect of the 1935 and 1942 mortgage bound all the members of the family at the time of the mortgage in suit as the same was executed by Mahadeo Prasad had Sambobai for herself and her minor son of Sundarlal. They bound Mahadeo Prasad as he was one of the contracting party. They bound Sundarlal because of his pious obligation to pay his father's debt. The debt in respect of the earlier two mortgage was therefore not a mere personal debt of Munnalal but it was the debt of the family. 10. With these circumstances in view, it seems to me, that the principle laid down by this Court in Dharamrajsing Vs. Chandrashekhar Rao, AIR 1942 Nagpur 66, ought to apply so as to make the mortgage in suit binding upon the appellant to the extent of the consideration relating to the two earlier mortgages aggregating Rs. 10,300 as he been held by the lower Court. 11. The facts, in AIR 1942 Nagpur 66 (supra', an so far as they are material are that one Sheorambhau effected a mortgage of the family property and Rs. 4,000 were traceable to that mortgage He also incurred debts to other creditors. The total liability for these debts including the mortgage debt came to Rs. 6811-4-6. Subsequent to Sheorambhau's death four out of his five sons mortgaged the family property to payoff that debt. The son of the fifth non-alienating son challenged the binding character of that mortgage on the ground of absence of legal necessity. The total liability for these debts including the mortgage debt came to Rs. 6811-4-6. Subsequent to Sheorambhau's death four out of his five sons mortgaged the family property to payoff that debt. The son of the fifth non-alienating son challenged the binding character of that mortgage on the ground of absence of legal necessity. The parties were governed by the Bombay School of Hindu Law and the trial Judge accepted the contention of the contesting grandson of Sheorambhau namely Chandrashekhar and exonerated his share from liability. The plaintiff mortgagee appealed. The appeal was heard by Stone C. J. and Vivian Bose, J, in the first instance The learned Chief Justice was of the opinion that non father manager was not competent to alienate the minor member's share for discharging the antecedent debt of his grand father as the debt did not constitute a family debt but only imposed a pious obligation on Chandrashekhar to discharge it. On the other hand Bose, J., was of the opinion that it was competent for the non-father manager of the family to alienate the share of a minor member to satisfy the antecedent debts incurred by the latters grandfather provided that the circumstances of the family were such as to leave no other reasonable course to satisfy the debts. 12. The appeal was thereupon laid before Niyogi, J, as the third Judge to determine the question of law posed by the aforesaid difference. 13. Bose, J, while dealing with the question referred to the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in ILR 55 Allahabad 370, Chiranji Lal Vs. Bankey Lal, as also his own previous decision in Rambhaoo Vs. Gurudayal, AIR 1941 Nagpur 255 The former case had taken the view that the existence of an antecedent debt would not justify a non-father manager to alienate the family property to discharge it, whereas the view taken by Bose, J., in the latter was that it would be necessity if the debt could not be repaid any other way. In the above mentioned later case Bose, J., thought either of these two views were extreme ones and that the correct rule lay in between them. In the above mentioned later case Bose, J., thought either of these two views were extreme ones and that the correct rule lay in between them. The learned Judge emphasised the distinct on between the position of a minor member of the family and a member and relying upon the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Hanoomanpersaud Panday's case (6 MIA 393) he held that a non-father manager has the power to alienate the family property including the share of a minor member for payment of the antecedent debt of the latter's father or grand father provided that owing to circumstances in which the family is placed there is no other reasonable course open to him. He reasoned thus:- "It seems obvious to me that some one must have the right to manage to personal affairs (If a minor member of a joint Hindu family, and as no guardian can be appointed of his share in the joint family property, the only person in whom these powers can rest is the manager, and the limits of his authority are I think, as set out in Hunoomanpersaud Panday Vs. Mt. Babooee Munraj Koonweree. To hold otherwise would put these minors to great loss." He further went on- "I think their Lordships (of the Privy Council) have settled this point. In 6 MIA 393. One of the items of consideration was the satisfaction of an antecedent debt of the father and their Lordships clearly recognized that that would justify alienation pro tanto provided it was otherwise 'for the benefit of the estate', by which I understand their Lordships to mean that tile manager has no other reasonable course left" 14. The view taken by the learned Chief Justice appears to have been mainly influenced by the Privy Council decision in Brij Narain Vs. Mangla Prasad, 51 Indian Appeals 129, though the learned Chief Justice accepted that upon the actual question raised as above there was 'little authority'. 15. Niyogi, J., after examining the legal position with reference to the circumstances obtaining in the case held as follows:- "In as much as the family at the date of the mortgage consisted of none but the sons and grand-sons of Sheorambhau, who were all under pious obligation to pay that debt, it became the family debt which it was imperative on Gopalrao, as manager, to discharge. It has been found by Bose J., and not disputed that the debt could not be discharged otherwise than by executing the mortgage." 16. It is thus clear that the principles which Niyogi, J., accepted and applied were : (1) It is competent for the non-father manager under certain circumstances to alienate the family property for discharging antecedent debt of a member's father. (2) One such circumstance is where the antecedent debt becomes the debt of the entire family. i.e., the family debt. 17. On the principles enunciated by Bose, J., or Niyogi. J -, the alienation in the present case ought to be held valid to the extent of debts referable to the prior two mortgages of 1935 and 1942 i.e., Rs. 10,300. Both these mortgages had been executed both by Mahadeo Prasad and Munnalal. When therefore the mortgage in suit came to be executed 'the 'debt bound Mahadeo Prasad as he was contracting party and it bound Sundarlal and his mother as it was the debt incurred by Munnalal and hence antecedent debt both in fact and in time. It consequently bound the whole family and therefore become a family debt. Niyogi, J, recognized the capacity of a non-father manager to alienate the family property for the family debt. It may be mentioned here that the learned Chief Justice in that case was not prepared to hold that it became a family debt. 18. Mr. Patankar for the appellant suggested that according to Niyogi, J., a debt in order to be antecedent must be one incurred by the father independent of any joint family property. Although it is possible to interpret certain observations of the learned Judge to that effect conclusion reached by him indicate that that could not be his view. Neither the decision in 51 Indian Appeals 129 (supra) upon which he relies, nor the facts on which his conclusions are based can justify the contention. In that case the 'first mortgage relating to Rs. 1,060 was effected by Sheorambahu and that was treated as antecedent debt and was held by Niyogi, J, as binding with reference to the mortgage in suit effected by four non father members of the family. 19. In that case the 'first mortgage relating to Rs. 1,060 was effected by Sheorambahu and that was treated as antecedent debt and was held by Niyogi, J, as binding with reference to the mortgage in suit effected by four non father members of the family. 19. The principle laid down in 51 Indian Appeals 129 (supra) on the question of antecedency of debt is- "Antecedent debt means antecedent in fact as well as in time, that is to say that the debt must be truely independent of, and not part of the transaction impeached." 20. If the debt of Rs 4,000 referable to a prior mortgage by Sheorambhau were not treated as a family debt justifying alienation Niyogi, J., would not have affirmed the decision of Bose, J., and allowed the mortgagee's appeal. 21. Having regard to this decision and what we have observed above it must be held that the alienation made by Mahadeo Prasad and Sambobai for discharging mortgage debts incurred by Munnalal along with Mahadeo Prasad was prompted by necessity since there was no other reasonable course open to them to satisfy the family debt or the antecedent debt of Munnalal In this view of the matter since the debt in respect of both the two earlier mortgages of 1935 and 1942 constituted binding liability for the alienation in suit, it is unnecessary to consider the contention of Mr. Patan kar based on 49 Indian Appeals 108 (supra) regarding the binding character of debt for the business started by the father himself. 22. In view of the decision of the Privy Council in Sahu Ram Chandra Vs. Bhup Singh, 44 Indian Appeals 126, certain modification in the trial Court's decision is called for. Since the trial Court has held the debt in respect of prior two mortgages aggregating to Rs. 10,300 as binding and awarded mortgage decree against the appellant to the extent of this sum with proportionate interest in all amounting to Rs.12,055-7-0 only, it is to this extent that the transaction will bind the other alienating members also and not to the extent of Rs. 16,390. Of course the personal liability of defendants Nos.1 and 3 to pay the full amount of Rs.16,390 apart from out of the mortgage property to the extent of Rs. 12,055-7-0 and their liability to pay future interest at 4% per annum will remain. 16,390. Of course the personal liability of defendants Nos.1 and 3 to pay the full amount of Rs.16,390 apart from out of the mortgage property to the extent of Rs. 12,055-7-0 and their liability to pay future interest at 4% per annum will remain. A preliminary mortgage decree in modified form as stated above shall be framed. In other respects the decision of the lower Court is affirmed and the appeal except as indicated above is dismissed. The appellant shall pay the costs of the respondent of this appeal.