ORDER Dixit C.J. - 1. This order will also govern the disposal of Miscellaneous Petition No. 38 of 1962 2. In these two applications under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the petitioners pray for the issue of a writ of certiorari for quashing a common order made by the Board of Revenue on 4th August 1962 allowing two revision petitions preferred by the opponents against a common order made by the Additional Commissioner, Ujjain. In proceedings under section 91 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), initiated by the opponents against each petitioner. 3. In the proceedings under section 91 of the Act the non applicants alleged that they wert: in possession as Pakka tenants of certain lands situated in village Badodia Kaji in_ Ujjain pargana; that they had obtained possession of those lands in execution of a compromise decree passed in a suit which their predecessor in interest. Akbar Beg, had filed against one Mirza Abdul Naim Beg under section 326 of the Qanoon Mal Gwalior; that the petitioner – Asaf Jahan Begam in Miscellaneous Petition No. 37 of 1962 trespassed on survey Nos. 508/3, 508/3 and 508/4 on 12th June 1953 and dispossessed them; and that the other petitioner Mirza Fahim Beg in Miscellaneous Petition No. 48 of 1962 also trespassed on survey No.178 on 15th August 1953 and dispossessed them from their fields. On these allegations the opponents claimed that an order be made against each petitioner for delivery of possession of the lands from which they i.e., the opponents had been improperly dispossessed. The Tahsildar, Ujjain, made an order directing restoration of possession of the lands to the non-applicants. The order was upheld in appeal by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Ujjain. 4. In second appeal, the Additional Commissioner set aside the decision of the Sub divisional Officer and the Tahsildar taking the view that the opponents had no title to the lands in question and that the evidence which they had produced in proof of their being dispossessed of the lands consisted of interested witnesses and could not be relied upon. The Additional Commissioner held that the evidence on record Indicated that the petitioners were in continuous possession of the lands. 5. The opponents then filed separate revision petitions before the Board of Revenue. The Additional Commissioner held that the evidence on record Indicated that the petitioners were in continuous possession of the lands. 5. The opponents then filed separate revision petitions before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue held that in execution of the compromise decree that was passed in a suit instituted by Akbar Beg against Mirza Abdul Naim Beg the opponents obtained possession of all that land mentioned In the compromise decree including the lands in dispute; and that If Mirza Abdul Naim Beg had transferred a part of the disputed land to his son and daughter during the pendency of the suit filed by Akbar Beg, that transfer would be invalid on the doctrine of lis pendens embodied in section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. On this view it held that the opponents obtained title to and possession of the fields in question. It further held that the evidence which the opponents produced to support the fact of dispossession could not be rejected merely because the witnesses were interested; and that that evidence showed that the opponents had been dispossessed as alleged by them. The Board overruled the petitioner's plea that the revision petitions filed by the opponents were governed by section 39 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act and not by section 50 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code and that the Board could not disturb the finding of fact reached by the Additional Commissioner on the question of dispossession. The opponent claim for restoration of possession of the fields was thus allowed by the Board of Revenue against each of the petitioners. 6 In our judgment both these petitions must be allowed. In coming to the conclusion that it did the Board of Revenue entirely ignored the nature of the proceedings under section 91 of the Tenancy Act and wrongly held that in the two revision petitions filed by the opponents the Board could exercise the revisional powers to the extent mentioned in (section 50 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. The proceedings under section 91 of the Tenancy Act were instituted against the petitioners in 1955 long before the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. came into force. The Code was in force when the revision petitions came for hearing before the Board of Revenue. The proceedings under section 91 of the Tenancy Act were instituted against the petitioners in 1955 long before the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. came into force. The Code was in force when the revision petitions came for hearing before the Board of Revenue. Now, section 262, (1) of the Code says :- "Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Code all cases pending before the State Government Or any Revenue Court in any region Immediately before the coming into force of this Code, whether in appeal, revision, review or otherwise shall be decided in accordance with the provisions of the appropriate law, which would have been applicable to them had this Code not been passed." The language of this provision is clear enough to indicate that the proceedings initiated by the opponents hr recovery of possession of the lands in question had to be decided in accordance with the provisions of section 91 of the Tenancy Act. Before the Board the opponents relied on section 55 of the Code for contending that the revision petitions filed by them were governed by section 50 of the Code. That section runs as follows: "For avoidance of doubt. it is hereby declared that save as otherwise expressly provided in this Code, the provisions of this Chapter shall apply to :- (a) all orders passed by any Revenue Officer before the date of coming into force of this Code and against which no appeal or revision proceedings are pending before such date: and (b) all proceedings before Revenue Officers, notwithstanding that it they were instituted or commenced or arose out of proceedings instituted or commenced before the coming into force of this Code." 7. It will be seen that the effect of section 55 is to apply the provisions of Chapter V to all orders passed by any Revenue Officer before the coming into force of the Code and to all proceedings before Revenue Officers instituted or commenced before the Code was put into force unless there is an express provision to the contrary. Now, Chapter V contains provisions dealing with appeals, revisions and reviews and limitations in regard to them. Now, Chapter V contains provisions dealing with appeals, revisions and reviews and limitations in regard to them. All that, therefore, S.55 does is to make clear that all orders mentioned in clause (a) shall be open to appeal, revision or review, as the case may be, and that in all proceedings mentioned in clause (b) these remedies will be available in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter V. But the applicability of the provisions of Chapter V to the matters mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of section 55 is made conditional on there being no express provision to the contrary in the Code. The express provision to the contrary is to be found in section 262 (1) of the Code which says that all cases pending before the State Government or any Revenue Court in any region immediately before the coming into force of the Code shall be decided in accordance with the provisions of the appropriate laws which would have been applicable to them if the Code had not been passed. It is, therefore, clear that so far as the limit of the power which the Board of Revenue could exercise in a revision petition arising out of proceedings instituted before the Code came into force was concerned, it was regulated by section 39 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, which specifically defined the revisional power of the Board in matters falling under the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. 8. Now, section 39 (2) of the Tenancy Act was in these terms: "The Board may suo motu or on an application presented by any party within 90 days from the date of the order, call fur the record of any case of judicial nature of connected with settlement, in which no appeal lies to the Board, if the officer by whom the case was decided appears to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in him by law, or to have failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested or to have acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegal or with substantial irregularity and may pass such orders in the case as it thanks fit.” It will be noticed that section 39 (2) was similar to section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No doubt, it used the expression "substantial irregularity" instead of the expression "material irregularity" that is to be found in section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not necessary to speculate as to what was the draftsman's conception of the meaning of the words "material" and "substantial" when he Inserted "substantial" for "material' in section 39 (2). But, really speaking, there is no difference between the connotation of the words "material" and of the word "substantial". Both mean "of substance" as opposed to "of form", Now, It is well settled by the decision of the Supreme Court In Keshardeo vs. Radha Kishen AIR 1953 SC 23 , that the revisional power under section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure can be exercised only (1) when there is non-exercise of jurisdiction; (2) or when there is illegal assumption of jurisdiction; (3) or when a subordinate Court in exercising is jurisdiction has acted illegally or with material irregularity that is to say, though possessed of jurisdiction, commits an error or irregularity of procedure or voilates or disregards any rule of law or procedure in the manner of arriving at a decision. Under section 115 interference with conclusions of law and fact is not permissible unless a subordinates Court has voilated or disregarded any rule of law or procedure or committed an Irregularity in the manner of reaching the conclusion. These principles must also govern the interpretation of section 39 (2). It is thus clear that in the present case it was not open to the Board to disturb the finding of fact reached by the Additional Commissioner that the opponents had failed to prove their possession and dispossession from the lands in question when there was no violation 'or disregard of any rule of law or any irregularity in the manner of reaching that conclusion by the Additional Commissioner. 9. If, as held by the Additional Commissioner, Ujjain, the opponents were not dispossessed from the lands in question, then they were clearly not entitled to any relief under section 91 of the Tenancy Act even if it be assumed that their claim that they had title to the lands was substantial. Reading sections 91, 92 and 93 of the Tenancy Act together. Reading sections 91, 92 and 93 of the Tenancy Act together. it is obvious that sections 91 and 92 provide a summary and speedy remedy through the medium of the revenue Courts for the restoration of possession of lands to a dispossessed Pakka tenant or ordinary tenant or sub-tenant, leaving them to fight out the question of their respective title. if they were so advised, in a civil Court. Section 93 preserved the right of a party to sue in a civil Court for possession founded on title and in proceedings under sections 91 and 92 the Tahsildar had to make an order of possession for a party entitled to it only on the fact of possession and dispossession irrespective of the question of title of the parties to the land. Such being the nature of proceedings under section 91 of the Tenancy Act, the question whether the opponents were entitled to possession of the lands in dispute turned only on the fact whether they were in possession of those lands and were dispossessed therefrom as alleged by them. The question of their title to the lands was wholly irrelevant for the making of an order under section 91. When, therefore, the Additional Commissioner found that the opponents had failed to prove their possession and dispossession from the lands in question, and that finding could not be disturbed by the Board of Revenue, then the Board had no other alternative bat to dismiss the two revision petitions filed by the opponents. 10. For all these reasons, both these petitions are allowed. The order dated 4th August 1962 of the Board of Revenue is set aside and the decision of the Additional Commissioner. Ujjain, rejecting the opponents' claim for possession is restored. Each of the petitioners shall have costs of the application filed by him. Counsel's fee in each case is filed at Rs. 75. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to each of the petitioners.