JUDGMENT Krishna Rao, J.- This is an appeal under section 417 , Criminal Procedure Code by the Public Prosecutor against the acquittal of the respondent, who was charged with having contravened the provisions of sub- sections (1)(a)and (5) of section 3 and thereby having committed an offence punishable under section 29 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (XV of 1960), hereinafter called the Act. The principal question that arises for decision in the appeal is whether a tenant who sublets a building is deemed to be a landlord for the purpose of section 3 of the Act. As there is no ruling of our High Court on this question our learned brother Mohamed Mirza, J., has referred the case to a Division Bench. The facts are briefly these. In or about 1945, the respondent took the building bearing door No. 7/69 of Maharanipet at Visakhapatnam on rent from its owner Appalanarasayya (D.W.1). He was paying a rent of Rs.80 for the entire building. In 1955 he sublet the western portion of the ground floor of the building to Williams (P.W. 1) on a monthly rent of Rs.35 exclusive of electricity charges. He similarly-sublet the eastern portion of the ground floor and himself occupied only the upstairs of the building. The last sub-tenant of the eastern portion was one Shanmukham who was the sub-tenant from January, 1959 on a monthly rent of Rs.27 exclusive of electricity charges. Shanmukham vacated the eastern portion on 29th October 1960, but the respondent did not give notice of the vacancy under section 3(1)(a) of the Act. On 3rd November, 1960 he gave a statement (Exhibit P-7) to the Rent Control Revenue Inspector admitting that he did not give notice of the vacancy and alleging that he was using this portion vacated by Shanmukham as his office room. On 5th November, 1960 he sent a reply (Exhibit P-9) to the notice issued by the Officer authorised under section 3(1)(a) of the Act, currently known as the Accommodation Controller, informing him that the portion was not vacant and was under his own occupation. Consequently, the Accommodation Controller filed a charge-sheet against the respondent under section 29 of the Act for violating sections 3(1)(a) and 3(5) of the Act. Consequently, the Accommodation Controller filed a charge-sheet against the respondent under section 29 of the Act for violating sections 3(1)(a) and 3(5) of the Act. In his statement before the Munsif-Magistrate at the trial, the respondent admitted that Shanmukham vacated the portion on 29th October, 1960, and that he occupied the portion; but denied that he had committed any offence. He also alleged that the rent stipulated with Shanmukham was only Rs.25 per month and that he had charged in addition Rs.2 as hire of furniture supplied by hint. The owner of the building, Appalanarasayya, gave evidence as D.W.1 that the respondent did not obtain any permission from him to induct sub-tenants. The Magistrate found that the rent for the portion let by the respondent to Shanmukham was Rs.27 per month and not Rs.25 as belatedly alleged by the respondent for the first time at the trial. But he construed the Explanation to section 2 (vi) of the Act as meaning that, “a tenant should be deemed to be a landlord for a limited purpose, viz., when any question arises between himself and his sub-tenant and the tenant is not bound to intimate the Rent Controller about the fact of a sub-tenant vacating the premises.” He was also of the view that the respondent had no right to sub-let the building and therefore a new sub-tenant could not be introduced by the Government. He, therefore, acquitted the respondent. In order to deal with the contentions raised, it may be useful to read the relevant provisions of the Act. They are: “ Section 2 (vi): ‘Landlord’ means the owner of a building and includes a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another person or on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant. Explanation.- A tenant who sublets a building shall be deemed to be a landlord within the meaning of this Act in relation tothe sub-tenant. Explanation.- A tenant who sublets a building shall be deemed to be a landlord within the meaning of this Act in relation tothe sub-tenant. Section 2 (ix): ‘Tenant’ means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son or daughter, of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the building as a member of the tenant's family up to the death of the tenant and a. person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building by its tenant or a person to whom the collection of rents or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter-house or of rents for shops has been farmed out or leased by a local authority. Section 3(1)(a): Every landlord shall, within ten days after the building becomes vacant by his ceasing to occupy it, or by the termination of a tenancy, or by the eviction of the tenant or by release from requisition or otherwise, give notice of the vacancy in writing to the officer authorised in that behalf by the Government. Section 3 (5): The landlord shall not let the building to a tenant or occupy it himself, before the expiry of the period of fifteen days specified in sub- section (3), unless in the meantime he his received intimation that the building is not required for the purposes, or for occupation by any of the officers specified in that: sub-section.” It will be seen that section 3(1)(a) imposes the duty of giving notice upon every landlord, when the other conditions specified therein exist. Under the Explanation to section 2 (vi), a tenant who sublets a building is brought into the category of landlords, though he is only a landlord in relation to his sub-tenant. It follows that the plain meaning is that, such a tenant has also the duty of giving notice under section 3(1)(a) of the Act. Sri V. Subba Rao, the learned counsel for the respondent has raised the following contentions: (1) Under section 2(vi), the primary meaning of the word ‘landlord’ is the owner of the building. It is only by the inclusive meaning that it is extended to cover a person who receives the rent of a building etc. Sri V. Subba Rao, the learned counsel for the respondent has raised the following contentions: (1) Under section 2(vi), the primary meaning of the word ‘landlord’ is the owner of the building. It is only by the inclusive meaning that it is extended to cover a person who receives the rent of a building etc. We would be going too far away from this concept of a ‘landlord’ if we say that a tenant also is included in it. It would offend the rule that an Explanation ought not to be construed so as to enlarge the scope of the section it explains; (2) The intention of the Explanation is that, a tenant would be a landlord only for the limited purpose of his relations with the sub-tenant such as eviction, collection of rent etc. It does not intend to cover the relations of a tenant with the Accommodation Controller. Such a construction should be avoided because, contravention of section 3(1)(a) entails penal consequences; and (3) In any event, it is only when a tenant entitled to sublet a building does so, that section 3(1)(a) may be held to be attracted. If he sublets unauthorisedly, as in the present case he renders himself liable for eviction by the landlord under section 10(2)(ii)(a) of the Act. It cannot have been the intention of the Legislature that such a tenant must give notice under section 3(1)(a) and induct a sub-tenant and thereby render both himself and his sub-tenant liable to be evicted by the landlord. In our opinion, these contentions have no force. On the first point the learned counsel relied on Kishan Singh v. Prem Singh1 where Dalip Singh, J., who spoke for the Division Bench, observed: “An Explanation does not enlarge the scope of the original section that it is supposed to explain.” The actual question which arose for consideration there was whether the expression “Application made in accordance with law” in clause 5 of Article 182 of the Limitation Act meant by necessary implication that the application has to be made in accordance with Explanation I, thereunder which specifies persons in whose favour and against whom the application mentioned in clause 5 takes effect. The decision of the Division Bench was that the Explanation did not by implication impose such an additional condition as to what are applications made in accordance with law. The decision of the Division Bench was that the Explanation did not by implication impose such an additional condition as to what are applications made in accordance with law. No authority has been cited before us for the proposition that as a general rule of construction, an Explanation cannot enlarge the scope of the section to which it is appended. On the other hand, in Krishna Ayyangar v. Nallaperumal Pillai2 Viscount Finlay, dealing with the Explanation to section 68 of the Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882) said that, “ the construction of the Explanation must depend upon its terms, and no theory of its purpose can be entertained unless it is to be inferred from the language used.” In Venkata Rami Naidu v. Suryanarayanamma3 Satyanarayana Raju, J., who spoke for a Division Bench of this Court, observed that “the purpose of an Explanation is not to delimit the scope of the main provision.” An Explanation, as its meaning indicates, makes plain or intelligible or clears from obscurity something which may arise from the main section. The construction of an Explanation like the construction of any other provision in a statute mainly depends on the language used. No doubt, as observed by Patanjali Sa;tri, C.J., in State of Bombay v. United Motors, Ltd.4 in dealing with the question whether the Explanation to the old Article 286(1) of the Constitution could operate as an exception or a proviso to clause (1) of the Article, “when two interpretations are sought to be put upon a provision, that which fits the description which the Legislature has chosen to apply to it is, according to the sound canons of cons ruction, to be adopted provided, of course, it is consistent with the language employed, in preference to the one which attributes to the provisions a different effect from what it should have according to its description by the Legislature.” If the language of the Explanation to section 2(vi) permits of two constructions, one that is consistent with its being an Explanation and the other that would make it operate as a proviso, the former meaning ought to be preferred. But no such problem arises here. A tenant who sublets a building is entitled to receive the rent under his contract with the sub-tenant. He would therefore come within the definition of ‘landlord’ in section 2(vi). But no such problem arises here. A tenant who sublets a building is entitled to receive the rent under his contract with the sub-tenant. He would therefore come within the definition of ‘landlord’ in section 2(vi). But some doubt may arise, because the definition of a ‘tenant’ in section 2(ix) excludes in terms a person placed in occupation of the building by a tenant. This doubt is dispelled by the Explanc Hon which specifically says that as between a tenant and his sub-tenant, the tenant is alandlord. The learned counsel has cited the cases of Madras Corporation v. A.D. Charles5 and Express Estates Ltd. v. Modern Furnishing House6 where it was held that as against the landlord of the chief tenant, a sub-tenant does not have the rights of a tenant. But we fail to see how this can affect the meaning of the Explanation to section 2(vi) which enacts that a chief tenant is the landlord of his sub-tenant. Turning to the second contention, the argument is that although a tenant is a landlrod for purposes like eviction of a sub-tenant, as held by single Judges in Nataraja Achari v. Balasubrahmaniam1 and Abdul Khader v. Hussain Ali2 he is not a landlord for purposes of giving notice of vacancy. The expression “a landlord in relation to the sub-tenant” is sought to be construed as meaning a landlord only for purposes of his relations with the sub-tenant. We are unable to agree with such a strained construction. What the Explanation says is that, a tenant who sublets the building is a landlord qua a sub-tenant. The expression ‘every landlord’ in section 3(1)(a) is wide enough to cover such a landlord, if the other conditions specified in section 3(1)(a) are satisfied. Here it is only by reason of the subletting and the vacating by the sub-tenant that the vacancy arises. Therefore, the respondent comes squarely within section 3(1)(a) of the Act. With regard to the third contention, no doubt where a tenant unauthorisedly sublets the entire building or any portion thereof to a sub-tenant, he furnishes his landlord with a ground under section 10(2)(ii)(a) for evicting him and the subtenant cannot resist eviction, if it is ordered against the chief tenant. But this would be properly a matter for the consideration of the Accommodation Controller before he requisitions a building vacated by the sub-tenant. But this would be properly a matter for the consideration of the Accommodation Controller before he requisitions a building vacated by the sub-tenant. Merely because there may be difficulties both for the chief tenant and for the sub-tenant inducted by the Accommodation Controller, it would not follow that the provisions should be construed in such a way as to exempt the chief tenant from his duty under section 3(1)(a) as a landlord under the Explanation to section 2(vi). In our opinion, the tenant, who is deemed to be a landlord under the Explanation to section 2 (vi) , has the duties imposed on the landlord under section 3(1)(a) and section 3(5). It follows, that the acquittal of the respondent is erroneous. We allow the appeal and convict the respondent under section 29 of the Act for having contravened sub- sections (1)(a) and (5) of section 3 of the Act. On the question of punishment, we would take into consideration the fact that the respondent repeatedly explained to the Accommodation Controller in Exhibit P-9 and again in Exhibit P-12, dated 19th December, 1960 that he had no intention to violate the provisions of the Act. The offence appears to be due only to a misunderstanding of the provisions on which even a learned Judge of this Court felt a doubt. The learned counsel for the respondent also undertakes that he will instruct his client now to give a notice of the vacancy. Having regard to all the circumstances, we take a lenient view and sentence him to pay a fine of Rs.25 with simple imprisonment for two weeks in default. G.S.M.-----Appeal allowed; Fine imposed.