JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - The tenant-judgment-debtor is the Petitioner. On 1-7-1962, the House Rent Controller, Cuttack, dictated the following order. I, therefore order that the opposite party must put the Petitioner in possession of the house within 15 days from the date of the receipt of this order. Inform the opposite party accordingly. The typed order was signed on 14-7 -1962. As the judgment was dictated in open Court, the date of the judgment would be taken to be 13-7-1962. On 18-7-162, Execution Case No. 146 of 1962 was levied in the Court of the First Munsif, Cuttack, u/s 13 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958 (Orissa Act 31 of 1958), hereinafter to be referred to as the Act. On 21-7-1962, the decree-holder filed an application praying for dispensing with notice under order 21, Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure. The prayer was refused on the ground that the judgment-debtor belongs to Cuttack town and that there was no reason to issue a writ of delivery of possession hurriedly. On 28-7-1902, the judgment debtor filed certain objection which was not considered as no courtfee had been affixed on the objection. On 29-7-1962, delivery of possession was effected. The Civil Revision has been filed challenging the order directing delivery of possession as being without jurisdiction. 2. The order of the House Rent Controller dated 13-7-1962, which is the decree directing delivery of possession, makes it absolutely clear that the opposite party (Petitioner) would put the Petitioner (opposite party) in possession of the house within 15 days from the date of receipt of the order. Affidavit has been filed on behalf of the decree-holder that this order was dictated in the presence of the parities. Accepting this as correct as it has not been controverted by any counter affidavit, the position still remains that despite the fact the order was dictated by the Controller in open Court in presence of the parties, he deemed it desirable to grant 15 days time to the tenant for vacating the house from the date of the receipt of the order, and he made a specific direction to inform the tenant accordingly. On the basis of the decretal order, the tenant is not liable to be evicted within a period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the order. 3. On the basis of the decretal order, the tenant is not liable to be evicted within a period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the order. 3. In law, the date of the receipt of the order must be excluded from out of 45 days granted. The decree holder advanced a contention that this date was not liable to be excluded. The contention is without force in view of the pronouncement in Marakanda Sahu Vs. Lal Sadananda Singh, wherein a Bench of this Court held that the equitable principles of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act should, as a general rule, be applied to the construction of decrees and orders of Courts. In that particular case, the order was to the effect within one month from this date (25-10-1948) and their Lordships held that date should be excluded. On the aforesaid authority, the date of the receipt of the order must be excluded from 15 days granted to the tenant for putting the landlord in possession. 4. There is, however, no proof that the Controller sent a copy of the order to the Petitioner. The Petitioner filed an appeal before the Additional District Magistrate, Cuttack, on 26-7-1962 in House Rent Control Appeal No. 31 of 1962. Therein he produced a certified copy of the order of the Controller. He applied for a copy of the order on 17-7-1962 and received it on 18-7-1962, which may therefore be taken as the date of the receipt of the order. From the 15 days granted this date must be excluded. The Petitioner is, therefore, entitled to the occupation of the house in his own right for a period of 15 days from 19-7-1962 and was not evictable on 97-1962 when the delivery of possession was effected. The order directing delivery of possession and the actual delivery of possession effected on 29-7-1962 in pursuance of the order are contrary to the direction in the decree and liable-to be quashed. Section 13 of the Act lays down that the order of the Controller made under Sub-section (1) of Section 7 directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house, shall be deemed to be a decree and executable as such in the Court of the Munsif within whose jurisdiction the house is situate. Section 13 of the Act lays down that the order of the Controller made under Sub-section (1) of Section 7 directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house, shall be deemed to be a decree and executable as such in the Court of the Munsif within whose jurisdiction the house is situate. Neither in the Act nor in the Rules any procedure is prescribed to guide the Munsif in the matter of execution of the decree. CPC has not been expressly made applicable to the Act. Rule 8 only lays down the procedure in enquiry before the Controller. The Act is silent and does not prescribe an appeal against the order of the Munsif u/s 13. 6. Question arises whether the provisions of the CPC would apply to the execution proceedings before the Munsif u/s 13 of the Act and appeals would lie as prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure. In AIR 1948 12 (Privy Council) their Lordships observed: The true rule is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute, the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises on a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal. Their Lordships view was followed in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. Vs. James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd. (J. and P. Coats Ltd., Assignee), . 7. On the aforesaid authorities, the CPC would apply to proceedings in execution before the Munsif u/s 13 of the Act. The question, whether the decree was executable on 29-7-1962 before the expiry of the 15 days granted in the decree, is one relating to execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree, and comes within the purview of Section 47, Code of Civil Procedure. The order of the learned Munsif comes within the definition of decree as given in Section 2(2), CPC and is appealable u/s 96, Code of Civil Procedure, subject to a second appeal u/s 100, Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Section 115, CPC runs as follows: "115. The order of the learned Munsif comes within the definition of decree as given in Section 2(2), CPC and is appealable u/s 96, Code of Civil Procedure, subject to a second appeal u/s 100, Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Section 115, CPC runs as follows: "115. The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or. (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity the High Courts may make such order in the case as it thinks fit. The word 'appeal' includes a second appeal. Where either first appeal or second appeal lies to the High Court from the case sought to be revised the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere in revision. The order of the learned Munsif is one u/s 47 CPC from which a second appeal lies, and though the order is contrary to the direction of the decree, or is without jurisdiction, or, at any rate, has been passed in exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity, the High Court cannot interfere in revision as ultimately a second appeal lies to the High Court against that order. 9. In the result, though I hold on merits in favour of the Petitioner, the Civil Revision is incompetent and is accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs throughout. Final Result : Dismissed