Judgment :- 1. This revision petition is against the order of the District Magistrate, Tellicherry dismissing an appeal filed by the petitioner against the conviction and sentence passed on her by the Sub-Magistrate, Cannanore for offences under the Madras Prohibition Act. 2. The case against her was that on 20 81961 the police recovered from the house where she and her husband were residing, materials and apparatus used in distilling arrack as well as considerable quantities of arrack and fermented toddy. Both the wife and the husband were charged with the offences punishable under S.4 (1) (a) and 4 (1) (g) of the Madras Prohibition Act. The learned Sub-Magistrate of Cannanore convicted and sentenced them each to a concurrent term of two months' rigorous imprisonment & a fine of Rs. 200/-. On appeal the learned District Magistrate, Tellicherry, while upholding the conviction against the petitioner acquitted her husband accused 2 on the ground that as he was not present in the house at the time of the search and as he has two wives and there is no evidence to show with which one of these he was permanently living he cannot be held to have been in constructive possession of the contraband found in the house owned by the petitioner. 3. The evidence that the petitioner permanently resides in the house from where the articles were recovered and that her husband has another wife living in another house has been accepted by the lower courts. It is also not disputed that the petitioner's husband was not present in the house at the time of the search. The only question is whether the recovery of the contraband articles from the house would make her liable for possession of those articles. 4. The learned defence counsel most strongly urged that it is not the petitioner, but her husband who as the head of the family should be considered to have in possession of the articles recovered from the house. A number of cases were cited before us both for and against this position. Most of the case-law on the subject of constructive possession has been considered in the case reported in In Be Wahib Basha (AIR. 1961 Mad. 162). A number of cases were cited before us both for and against this position. Most of the case-law on the subject of constructive possession has been considered in the case reported in In Be Wahib Basha (AIR. 1961 Mad. 162). After analysing the various cases referred to, the learned judge observes that: "Where an incriminating article is recovered from a house jointly occupied by several persons, three views have been taken by various courts on the question of its possession. (1) If several persons jointly occupy a house all of them are liable for conviction for incriminating articles recovered from that house; (2) if several persons jointly occupy a house and it cannot be shown in whose exclusive possession the incriminating articles were, none of those persons is liable; and (3) if several persons occupy a house then the head of the house is responsible for incriminating articles recovered from it unless it is shown that one of the other occupants had exclusive possession of them." The difficulty in reconciling the various views on presumptive possession would be reduced somewhat, if we consider why it is that such a presumption is made. The reason is simply that normally it is the will of the head of the family that must prevail in the house. It is common experience that if the head of the family desires that a certain article should not remain in the house he will see to it that it is removed, that if he desires that it should remain it will remain even if other members of the family protest against its presence. In other words the head of the family could wield his authority to see that the article either remains in his house or is removed from there according to his will. So if prohibited articles are found in the house one could justifiably assume that the head of the household was responsible for their presence. Thus responsibility is the concomitant of authority. If authority be the criterion, then it is clear that the presumptive possession of the articles found in a house should attach itself to the person who wields effective control over the household not merely to the nominal head of the family. As an illustration we may take the case of an old man of no independent source of income living with his adult son who looks after his needs. As an illustration we may take the case of an old man of no independent source of income living with his adult son who looks after his needs. Now if this son brings contraband into the house against the wishes of his father the latter will have no real power to have them removed. In such a case it would not be proper to raise the presumption of possession against the father and call upon him to rebut the presumption for no reason other than that he is in theory the head of the family while the son escapes all liability for no reason other than that his father is living with him. Again, if in the above instance the father had his own source of income and was in a position to exert his will it is unlikely that he would meekly submit to his son's wishes. Without speculating on the probable outcome of such a clash of will we think it will be reasonable to say that if the contraband still remained in the house the presumption of possession may with justification be raised against both of them. So it seems to us in cases where the facts warrant it, a presumption of possession of the article recovered from a house may be raised against such members of the household as are in a position to control its affairs provided they were aware of the presence of the offending article. 5. In the present case we feel there is enough evidence to justify the learned Magistrate's view that the petitioner should be presumed to be in possession of offending articles recovered from her house. Though she is not proved to be the owner of the house, there is no dispute that she was permanently residing there and was present at the time of the recovery. Her husband has also another wife living in another house and he could at best be only a frequent visitor to the petitioner's house. He was also not present at the time of recovery. Under these circumstances we feel that her control over the household is such that the presumption of possession could be raised against her. The question whether it should have been raised as regards her husband also need not be considered here as his acquittal has not been questioned before us. He was also not present at the time of recovery. Under these circumstances we feel that her control over the household is such that the presumption of possession could be raised against her. The question whether it should have been raised as regards her husband also need not be considered here as his acquittal has not been questioned before us. However we would like to point out that the decision of this Court reported in Sukumaran v. State of Kerala (1961 KLT. 584) on which the learned Magistrate seems to have relied in support of his order of acquittal has no application to the facts of this case. In Sukumaran v. State of Kerala the husband was acquitted as he could not be presumed to have had knowledge of the contraband recovered from a locked box the key of which was with his wife. The petitioner cannot claim to have been unaware of the presence of the offending articles in her house as a good portion of the articles (5 bottles and two gallon jar of arrack) was recovered from inside the central room, a place she could not have overlooked. Indeed her only defence was that the articles were recovered not from the house, but from near the compound fence where they were secreted by her enemies. This claim has been found against and rightly so by both the courts. In the result the conviction and sentence are confirmed and the revision petition is dismissed. Govinda Menon J: I agree with the judgment prepared by my learned brother, but wish to add a few words. 7. The facts of the case need not be restated. That large quantities of fermented wash, some quantity of illicit arrack and distilling implements were recovered on search from the house in the occupation of the petitioner is amply proved by the evidence of pw. the Circle Inspector of Police and pw. 2, the attesting witness. The petitioner admitted the visit of the police, but denied search and recovery of the articles from inside the house, her case being that the articles were planted by her brother who was on inimical terms with her. When questioned on the prosecution evidence, the petitioner had no case that she is not in occupation of the house. The courts below have on the evidence concurrently found that the contraband articles were recovered from inside the house. When questioned on the prosecution evidence, the petitioner had no case that she is not in occupation of the house. The courts below have on the evidence concurrently found that the contraband articles were recovered from inside the house. I have scrutinised the evidence and have no hesitation in holding that they were, in fact, recovered from the house as spoken to by pws.1 and 2. The husband of the petitioner was also prosecuted. He was the second accused in the case and the trial court found him guilty and convicted him of the offence charged. On appeal the learned District Magistrate of Tellicherry acquitted him on the ground that he was not present in the house at the time of the search, that having another wife, he cannot be said to be a permanent resident in the house and cannot be said to be in possession of the contraband articles. 8. What is now argued on behalf of the petitioner is that she cannot be considered to be in exclusive possession of the house or the contraband articles recovered therefrom and as such her conviction is unsustainable in law and has to be set aside. The question for decision is whether in this case there was evidence from which it could be stated that the petitioner was in possession of the contraband articles. It is true that possession must be actual and constructive; it must be to the knowledge of the possessor who must have dominion and control over the property. But it is wholly unnecessary to inquire whether it was exclusive or not, because it is bound to be exclusive possession of the accused alone or with others. Since a person can be in possession jointly with others that person must be held guilty even if he is bound to be in joint possession. Possession is not a tangible thing which can be perceived by the senses and it has always got to be inferred from the facts and surrounding circumstances. So if from the facts of a particular case it could be stated that incriminating articles were found in a house in the occupation of a particular person who had the power and control then that person can be considered to be in possession. So if from the facts of a particular case it could be stated that incriminating articles were found in a house in the occupation of a particular person who had the power and control then that person can be considered to be in possession. In a case like this, where large quantities of fermented wash and liquor are found in the house admittedly in the occupation of the petitioner knowledge of the incriminating articles can reasonably be attributed to her, her dominion and control cannot be denied and the articles can be presumed to be in the possession and control of the accused and if that be so, the presumption under S.4 (2) (a) of the Act would arise. S.4 (2) (a) reads as follows: "(a) It shall be presumed until the contrary is shown (a) that a person accused of any offence under clauses (a) to 0) of sub-section (1) has committed such offence in respect of any liquor or intoxicating drug or any still, utensil, implement or apparatus whatsoever for the tapping of toddy or the manufacture of liquor, or any intoxicating drug, or any such materials as are ordinarily used in the tapping of toddy or the manufacture of liquor or any intoxicating drug, for the possession of which he is unable to account satisfactorily." No satisfactory explanation for the possession of such large quantities of fermented wash, arrack and distilling implements has been offered. There was no case that anybody else had planted them inside the house or that the house was accessible to outsiders. Her only case was that nothing was recovered from inside the house. From these circumstances the courts below were perfectly justified in finding that the petitioner was in possession of the articles. 9. From the fact that the accused was in charge of a godown, the Supreme Court pronounced that he was in possession of the liquor found in it: vide Vijendrajit v. State of Bombay (AIR. 1953 SC. 247). The learned counsel for the accused brought to our notice the decision of the Supreme Court in Keki Bejonji v. State of Bombay (AIR. 1961 SC. 967). In that case both the master and the servant were convicted. 1953 SC. 247). The learned counsel for the accused brought to our notice the decision of the Supreme Court in Keki Bejonji v. State of Bombay (AIR. 1961 SC. 967). In that case both the master and the servant were convicted. The Supreme Court acquitted the servant because in the first place there was evidence that he in no way aided his master to come into possession of the still and their Lordships thought that when he was pumping air into the cylinder with a motor pump while the master was holding a rubber tube attached to the tank he was doing so on the express orders of the master and that he might not have been aware of what was being manufactured and in the particular circumstances of the case held that he was not in possession and that no presumption under S.103 would arise. It is clear that the decision has no application to the facts of the present case. 10. Reference was also made to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Radha Kishan v. State of U.P. (AIR 1963 SC. 822). The charge against the accused in that case was under S.52 of the Indian Post Office Act for having secreted certain registered letters. The only evidence in proof of the offence was a recovery of certain letters from an almirah in the house where the accused was living with his father. The defence was that there was a faction in the post office where he was working and that the letters could as well have been planted by some of his enemies. The evidence showed that the room where they were living was taken on rent by the father. The key of the almirah was furnished by the father, and there was no evidence that the key was at any time with the accused. Apart from the letters, inside the almirah there were large number of articles belonging to the father of the accused. It was under such circumstances that the Supreme Court held that it would not be legitimate to infer that the almirah was even in the appellant's joint much less exclusive possession and that the father who had the key of the almirah must be deemed to be in possession of the almirah and its contents. It was under such circumstances that the Supreme Court held that it would not be legitimate to infer that the almirah was even in the appellant's joint much less exclusive possession and that the father who had the key of the almirah must be deemed to be in possession of the almirah and its contents. Their Lordships also held that the possibility of the father in some way getting at the letters and keeping them in the almirah cannot be ruled out. The decision has no bearing to the facts of this case. 11. I had occasion to consider the question of possession of husband and wife in the case in State of Kerala v. Gopalan (1961 KLT. 992) where I had held that in an appropriate case both the husband and wife could be found to be in possession of the contraband articles. I am not prepared to accede to the contention of the learned counsel that the decision requires re-consideration. The conviction and sentence, therefore, seem to be correct and are confirmed. Dismissed.