Judgment N.L.Untwalia, J. 1. These two miscellaneous appeals have been preferred lay the State of Bihar and others from the orders of the Subordinate Judge of Deoghar passed on 1-3-1961 and 5-8-1961 in Title Suits 115 and 150 of 1960 respectively filed by the plaintiff respondent. By the said orders, the learned Subordinate Judge has restrained the defendants appellants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff respondent over the suit properties. 2. The plaintiff respondent was the holder of a ghatwali tenure commonly known as the Rohini Ghatwali situate within the sub-division of Deoghar in the district of the, Santhal Parganas. fn the year 1950 was enacted the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act 30 of 1350) hereinafter called the Act, which came into force on September 25, 1950. Thereupon the respondent filed Title Suit No. 42 of 1950 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Deoghar, challenging the Act as being unconstitutional and claiming in the alternative that the Act could not acquire his ghatwali tenure and, if it purported to do so, it was ultra vires in its application to such ghatwalis. The said suit was decided against respondent by the learned Subordinate Judge and his decision was affirmed in appeal by the High Court on the 10th of December, 1954, vide T.M. Deo V/s. State, ILR 34 Pat 57. The plaintiff took the matter in appeal to the Supreme Court. By its decision, dated 19-9-1960, vide Manmohan Deo V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1961 SC 189 , the Supreme Court rejected the claim of the plaintiff and maintained the dismissal of the suit. During the pendency of the said litigation, the plaintiff was appointed receiver of the estate, namely, the whole of the Rohini Ghatwali tenure lay an order of the Supreme Court made on 23-12-1954. It may also be noted here that the State Government had issued notification on the 22nd of May, 1952, under the Act, declaring that the estate of the plaintiff did pass to and become vested in, the State of Bihar. 3. The plaintiff respondent filed Title Suit No. 115 of 1960 on 19-9-1960, the very day his appeal arising out of Title Suit No. 42 of 1950 was dismissed by the Supreme Court. 3. The plaintiff respondent filed Title Suit No. 115 of 1960 on 19-9-1960, the very day his appeal arising out of Title Suit No. 42 of 1950 was dismissed by the Supreme Court. In this suit the plaintiff claims that certain Basauri Mahats known as Deoghar Jasidih Basauri Mahals in the towns of Deogar and Jasidih consisting of Basauri lands and holdings in the mauzas noted In the schedule appended to the plaint, which mauzas admittedly formed part of, and were comprised in, the Rohini Ghatwali tenure, are his personal properties and are not part of any estate or tenure within the meaning of the Act. The Act does not purport to vest the Basouri Mahals in the towns of Deoghar and Jasidih. The said claim is founded chiefly by pleading in paragraph 4 of the plaint-- "That as a result of the Act V of 1859, Agricultural lands in different mouzas were acquired by the Ghatwalis on payment of compensation and on payment of compensation the said lands lost their agricultural character and became the personal properties of the ghatwal and the lands were then settled with different lessees for construction of dwelling houses etc. and the relation of the lesser and the lessees was henceforth governed by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act and Contract Act. After stating in paragraph 9 of the plaint that -- ". ..... the defendant No. 1 enacted Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 and thereupon the plaintiff brought % Title Suit No, 42 of 1950 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Deoghar for a declaration that the plaintiffs tenure is outside the purview of the Land Reforms Act and the said suit was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge of Deoghar and ultimately an appeal is now pending before the Hon ble Supreme Court of India and plaintiff is in possession of the ghatwali tenure as a Receiver appointed by the said Hon ble Court." It is further said in paragraph 11 -- "That the plaintiff apprehends that the defendant No. 1 in pretended exercise of power under Bihar Land Reforms Act will ask the plaintiff to deliver possession of the said Basouri Mahals if the decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court of India is against him .... ." 4. ." 4. The plaintiff filed an application in Title Suit No. 115 of 1960 for ad interim injunction restraining the State of Bihar and its officers, the other defendants, from taking possession of the Basauri Mahals in exercise of their power under the Act until the disposal of the suit. The prayer was vehemently opposed by that State but the learned Subordinate Judge, by holding that the plaintiff has a prima facie fair case for trial and finding the balance of convanience in his favour, has made the order of injunction on 1-3-1961. Miscellaneous Appeal 130 of 1961 has been brought from this order. 5. The plaintiff respondent after the decision of the Supreme Court filed Title Suit No. 150 of 1960 on the 21st of December, 1960 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Deoghar. In this suit he claims for a declaration that the notification dated 22nd May, 1952, issued under Sec.3 of the Act was rendered nugatory by the conduct of State of Bihar in waiving the Notification by various acts of commissions, omissions and conduct/ and that the Defendant State of Bihar is estopped from asserting its right under the said Notification by various acts, declarations and omissions subsequent thereto and that bv operation of the rules of the estoppel, waiver, acquiescence and relinquishment, and the State la estopped from challenging or questioning the plaintiffs title, possession, right, privileges and immunities over his tenure. In the schedule appended to the plaint are given various tauzi numbers comprising the ghatwali estate known as the Rohini Ghatwali Estate excluding Basauri Mahals of Deogar, Jasidih and Rohini. The claim in this suit is founded by pleading in paragraph 4 of the plaint -- "That after the notification under Sec.3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act in May, 1952, the State of Bihar by its deliberate conduct waived the Notification 33 would appear from the following facts and circumstances : (i) By demanding, collecting and accepting the Land Revenue from 1952 to 1957 even after General Notification issued in the year 1955 the defendants have accepted about Rupees 18000/-, on account of Land Revenue. (ii) By demanding and collecting chaukidari tax regularly till the year 1955. (iii) By realising Cess and other taxes etc. (ii) By demanding and collecting chaukidari tax regularly till the year 1955. (iii) By realising Cess and other taxes etc. (iv) By taking out Certificates against the plaintiff and by issuing warrant attachment of his moveable properties from time to time commencing from 1952 and realising dues by the Certificate Officer of Deoghar. (v) By attaching the decretal amount in Sub-Judge Money Suit No. 42 of 1950 for realisation of Chaukidari dues. (vi) By starting Certificates on account of Road Cess and by asserting that they are entitled to full dues of Cess in their written statement in a regular suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Deoghar and also in the Court of the Additional District Judge of Santhal Parganas, Damka in Title Appeal No. 60/47 of 1957/58 and accepted the plaintiff as owner of Rohini Estate. (vii) By issuing notices and demands by various departments by the Court in the name of the plaintiff. (viii) By contesting the petitions and appeal against certificate proceedings. (ix) By filing an affidavit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Deoghar, that General Notification does not affect plaintiffs Rohini Estate. (x) By sending a letter to the plaintiff by the Deputy Commissioner, Santa I Parganas that General Notification does not affect Rohini Estate. (xi) By not getting the name of Government mutated in the Register D in Dumka Collectorate in place of plaintiff. The name of the plaintiff is stilt continuing. * * * * *" In the plaint of this suit, the facts of the institution of Title Suit No. 42i of 1950 and the upholding of its dismissal by the Supreme Court on the 19th of September, 1960, are mentioned. In paragraph 11 of the plaint, it is mentioned that the plaintiff apprehends that the State of Bihar will attempt to take possession of the plaintiffs tenure after the decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court on 19-9-1960. On the application of the plaintiff, an ad interim order of injunction has been passed on 5-8-1961 against the state and its officers restraining them from taking possession of the estate until the disposal of the suit. Miscellaneous Appeal 350 of 1961 has been brought from this order. 6. On the application of the plaintiff, an ad interim order of injunction has been passed on 5-8-1961 against the state and its officers restraining them from taking possession of the estate until the disposal of the suit. Miscellaneous Appeal 350 of 1961 has been brought from this order. 6. Before I proceed to deal with the points raised in the appeals in question, I may mention a fact in connection with Miscellaneous Appeal No. 419 of 1961, which was posted for hearing along with these two appeals but was not pressed by the learned Government Advocate and was, therefore, dismissed by our order dated 6-11-1963. After the dismissal of the plaintiffs appeal by the Supreme Court in Title Suit No. 42 of 1950, in which the plaintiff had been appointed a receiver by the order of the Supreme Court as stated above, the State of Bihar filed an application in the Court of the Subordinate Judge to direct the respondent to make over charge of the suit properties to the State and such an order was made on 5-8-1961, the very same day on which the order of injunction has been made in Title Suit No. 150 of 1960. In view of the orders of injunction passed in the two suits, therefore, the State filed an application in Title Suit No. 42 of 1950 on 29-8-1961 asking the Court to remove the plaintiff from the office of he receiver and appoint the Collector of Santhal Parganas as receiver in view of the fact that the effect of the orders of injunctions passed in the two suits is to allow the plaintiff to continue as receiver in Title Suit No. 42 of 1950. This prayer was disallowed by the learned Subordinate Judge fey his order dated 30-9-1961 and Miscellaneous. Appeal No. 419 of 1961 was brought from that order, which as stated above, was not pressed. 7. This prayer was disallowed by the learned Subordinate Judge fey his order dated 30-9-1961 and Miscellaneous. Appeal No. 419 of 1961 was brought from that order, which as stated above, was not pressed. 7. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, I am constrained to observe at the (sic) outset that the plaintiff, after having unsuccessfully fought a battle for a decade in Title Suit No. 42 of 1950 but having successfully kept the State out of possession of the whole of his estate known as Rohini Ghatwali for about 8 years, has again succeeded, for another three years, in not permitting the State of Bihar to take possession of his estate under the Act by creating two new fronts in respect of the very same property by bifurcating it and calling one part of it as Basauri Mahals not forming part of his estate or tenure, the other part, and by making different grounds of attack on the two fronts. I am s bit surprised to find that the, plaintiff, who was appointed by the Supreme Court in Title Suit No. 42 of 1950 as receiver of the entire estate, in spite of having been directed to hand over the charge of the estate to the successful party, namely, the State of Bihar as he was bound to be so directed, has been allowed by the learned Subordinate Judge under the orders of injunction to continue in possession of the properties in his own rights, the effect of which, in my opinion, is to notionally hand over possession of the entire estate to the State of Bihar in Title Suit No. 42 of 1950 and recover it back the same moment in pursuance of the orders of injunctions passed in the two suits. This is a matter which, on the face of it, sounds so incongruous that a situation like this ought not to have beer allowed to come into play by the Court below; this apart from the fact that the plaintiff, as I shall show hereinafter, has made out no case for grant of interlocutory injunctions in either of the suits. 8. Principles upon which Court acts in cases of interlocutory injunctions in aid of the plaintiffs right are well established and well known. 8. Principles upon which Court acts in cases of interlocutory injunctions in aid of the plaintiffs right are well established and well known. I may, however, quote a passage from the case of Israil V/s. Shamsher Rahman, ILR 41 Cal 436 at p. 442 : (AIR 1914 Cal 362 at p. 353), on which reliance was placed by Mr. N.C. Chatterjee, learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent. It reads thus -- "What the Court has, at this stage, to determine is whether there is a bona fide contention between the parties, or as was said by Mr. Justice Markby in Moran V/s. River Steam Navigation Co., 14 Beng LR 352, whether there is a fair and substantial question to be decided to what the rights of the parties are. To the same effect is the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Walker V/s. Jones, (1865) LR 1 PC 50, where Turner, L. J. observed as follows: The real point is, not how these questions ought to be decided at the hearing of the cause, but whether the nature and difficulty of the questions is such that it was proper that the injunction should be granted until the time for deciding them should arrive. It is quite sufficient if the Court finds a case which shows that there is a substantial question to be investigated and that matters should be preserved in status quo until that question can be finally disposed of : Jones V/s. Pacaya, (1911) 1 KB 455." To the same effect and based upon thei cases aforesaid is the observation of Reuben, J., as he then was, in Province of Bihar V/s. Kamakshya Narain Singh, AIR 1950 Patna 366 at page 367 (column 2):- "We are not concerned to decide what is the correct answer to be given to the question in the hearing of the suit, but merely whether there is a fair point for trial............................." In paragraph 763 at pages 364 and 365 of Halsbury s Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 21, the principles have been stated thus -- "In cases of interlocutory injunctions in aid of the plaintiffs right, all the Court usually has to consider is whether the case is so clear and free from objection on equitable grounds that it ought to interfere to preserve property without waiting for the right to be finally estab lished. 21, the principles have been stated thus -- "In cases of interlocutory injunctions in aid of the plaintiffs right, all the Court usually has to consider is whether the case is so clear and free from objection on equitable grounds that it ought to interfere to preserve property without waiting for the right to be finally estab lished. This depends upon a variety of circumstances and it is impossible to lay down any general rule on the subject by which the discretion of the Court ought in all cases to be regulated, but in no case does the Court grant an interlocutory injunction as of course. * * * * * * It is not necessary that the Court should find a case which would entitle the plaintiff to relief at all events: it is quite sufficient if the Court finds a case which shows that there is a substantial question to i.e. investigated, and that matters ought to be preserved in status quo until that question can be finally disposed of." In paragraph 765 at page 365 it is further stated -- "Where the plaintiff is asserting a right, he should show a strong prima facie case, at least, in support of the right which he asserts: .... and it is said in paragraph 765 at page 366 -- "Where any doubt exists as to the plaintiffs right, I or if his right is not disputed, but its violation is denied, the Court, in determining whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted, takes into consideration the balance of convenience to the parties and the nature of the injury which the defendant, on the one hand, would suffer if the injunction was granted and he should ultimately turn out to be right, and that which the plaintiff, on the other hand, might sustain if the injunction was refused and he should ultimately turn out to be right. The burden of proof that the inconvenience which the plaintiff will suffer by the refusal of thei injunction is greater than that which the defendant will suffer, if it Is granted, lies on the plaintiff." 9. Now 1 proceed to examine whether these were the fit cases in which interlocutory injunctions could be and ought to have been granted by the learned Subordinate Judge in exercise of his judicial discretion. In Miscellaneous Appeal Mo. Now 1 proceed to examine whether these were the fit cases in which interlocutory injunctions could be and ought to have been granted by the learned Subordinate Judge in exercise of his judicial discretion. In Miscellaneous Appeal Mo. 130 of 1961 arising out of Title Suit No. 115 of 1960, the plaintiff claims that the Act does not purport to vest the Basauri Mahals in the State of Bihar. It would appear from tha decision of this Court in first Appeal No. 309 of 1954 arising out of Title Suit No. 42 of 1950 reported in ILR 34 Pat 57, that the case made out there was not only that the Act was ultra vires but that, even if it was intra vires, its provisions did not apply to the plaintiffs tenure, which, as I have said above, included the Basauri Mahals, according to the plaint of that case. One of the issues in the case as noticed by the Supreme Court vide AIR 1961 SC 189 ) was: "Do the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 , purport to acquire the plaintiffs ghatwalis?" These questions were consistently answered by the High Court and the Supreme Court against the plaintiff. One of the arguments put forward before the Supreme Court on behalf of the plaintiff was that -- "..... Sub-clause (1) of Clause (q) and Sub-clause (iv) of Clause (r) must be read in the light of the substantive part of the two clauses, even though the sub-clauses state in express terms, that a tenure includes a ghatwali tenure and a tenure holder includes a ghatwal. It is pointed out that a zamindari ghatwal acquires his interest from a proprietor and the substantive part of Clauses (q) and (r) may apply to a zamindari ghatwal and his tenure but the substantive part of the two clauses cannot apply to a Government ghatwal and his tenure." This argument was rejected. The very same argument has now been advanced before us by Mr. N.C. Chatterjee in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 130 of 1961 in regard to the Basauri Mahals and this has to be stated only to be rejected again. The very same argument has now been advanced before us by Mr. N.C. Chatterjee in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 130 of 1961 in regard to the Basauri Mahals and this has to be stated only to be rejected again. It has been further submitted that the plaintiff is the landlord of Basauri Mahals in the English sense of the term and hence the State cannot acquire the said property under the Act in my opinion, this alternative claim, if sustainable in law, could have been put forward in the earlier suit; there could have been no inconsistency, as was argued on behalf of the plaintiff respondent, in putting forward such a claim in. regard to the Basauri Mahals. The plaintiff could have very well said in Title Suit No. 42 of 1950 that his Rohini Ghatwali tenure could not be acquired under the Act; in any event, the Basauri "Mahal situate within that tenure was not a tenure or in estate within the meaning of the Act in any seme and the State Government could not touch it in exercise of its power under the Act. Such claim having not been put forward, it seems, to me that there are strong grounds for taking the view that the claim of the plaintiff on this score would be barred by constructive res judicata. Whether it would be so barred or not will have to be decided finally in the suit itself. But I am of the view that when a suit appears to be barred by res judicata, interlocutory injunction should not be granted to maintain the status quo in such a suit, unless there is a decisive balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff and the point of res judicata is doubtful. On the vesting of the plaintiffs tenure, the Collector under Section 4(f) of the Act ss deemed to have taken charge of such estate or tenure and of all properties vested in the State under Sec. 4, and, if there is a dispute ss to whether the; Collector is entitled to the direct possession of any property comprised in the estate, the same can be determined under Sec. 4 (g) of the Act. And, this can be so done with reference to the other provisions of the Act, namely, Sections 5, 6, 7 etc. And, this can be so done with reference to the other provisions of the Act, namely, Sections 5, 6, 7 etc. But on the facts stated in the plaint and in view of the history of the earlier litigation, there is no substantial question to be investigated in the suit and the plaintiff has made out no case for the property to be preserved in status quo until the disposal of the suit, much less a strong prima facie case. I am: further of the view that the balance of convenience is also not in favour of the plaintiff as he can claim damages from the State upon his ultimate success in the suit but the State on the other hand, will be in a tremendously difficult position to claim and recover damages from the plaintiff for being kept out of possession of the suit property until the final disposal of the suit. 10. Coming to Miscellaneous Appeal 350 of 1961 arising out of Title Suit 150 of 1960, 1 find the position of the plaintiff is much worse. In State of Bihar V/s. Kamakshya Narain Singh, 1961 BUR 446 it has been held by a Bench of this Court, to which my Lord the Chief justice was a party -- a case whore the acts of estoppel and waiver alleged were exactly the same as in the instant case that: "Once it is held that the estate of the plaintiff vested absolutely in the State on 3-11-51, then all realisations made, compensation paid and proceedings taken in respect of the said estates constituted the ultra vires acts of the various Government servants, and, as a matter of law, were inadmissible to raise estoppel against the Government." It has further been observed: "......all these collections were made by the Government officials in exercise of their power or discretion vested to them by relevant rules or laws and not in pursuance of any implied authority derived from the Government, and, therefore, the Government cannot be bound by those acts." The said conclusion was arrived at in that case on a careful consideration of the various authorities on the point. The learned Subordinate Judge side-tracked the authoritative pronouncement of this Court in the case of 1961 BUR 446 feeling persuaded to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the plaintiff that the authority of this case is doubtful in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar V/s. Rani Sonabati, 1961 BUR 285 : ( AIR 1961 SC 221 ). In my opinion, the learned Subordinate Judge has clearly fallen into an error in this regard. In the case before the Supreme Court notification under the Land Reforms Act was issued in the name of the Governor by officer of the State in contravention of the order of temporary injunction. In the appeal before the Supreme Court arising out of the contempt proceeding, it was urged on behalf of the State that the publication of the notification was not the act of the State. The contention further was that, unless it was proved that it was the Governor himself who had authorised the issue of the notification, the State or the State Government could not be fixed with liability therefor, so as to be held guilty of disobedience of the order of Injunction. This argument was not accepted by the Supreme Court. The validity of the order as being that of Government was not in controversy at all. The only point canvassed was whether it was an order made by the Governor or by some one duly authorised by him in that behalf within Article 154(1) of the Constitution, in such a situation, it was observed by the Supreme Court--"Even assuming that the order did not originate from the Governor personally, it avails the State nothing because the Governor remains responsible for the action of his subordinates taken in his name." It has thus to be noticed that the notification issued by the State Government in Rani Sonabatis case, 1961 BUR 285 : ( AIR 1961 SC 221 ) was not urged to be invalid on any account. On the one hand, it was contended that it was in pursuance of the power of the State Government under Sec.3 (1) of the Act; on the other, it was submitted that the order could not be said to have been made by the Governor or by some one duly authorised by him in that behalf for the purpose of conscious violation of the order of injunction. No such consideration did arise in the case of 1961 BLIR 446 nor can it arise in the instant case. To wit a few more notable facts of the present case, I would state that the notification under the Act was issued on 22-5-52 in respect of the Rohini Ghatwali of the plaintiff during the pendency of T. S. 42 of 1950 which was decided by the Subordinate judge of Deoghar on the 24th July, 1954. Throughout in the said suit up to the Supreme Court, the stand taken on behalf of the State was that the estate of the plaintiff could vast and had vested in tbe State under the Act. In such a situation, I find it difficult to hold that the plaintiff has a substantial question to be tried in this suit on the ground of estoppel, waiver or acquiescence on the alleged act of omission and commission of the officers of the State Government, as stated in paragraph 4 of the plaint. It is further to be remembered, as has already been stated, that the plaintiff had been appointed receiver of the estate by the Supreme Court by an order made on the 23rd of December, 1954. In his capacity as a receiver he was submitting budget and accounts of income and expenditure in relation to the whole of the estate including the Basauri Mahals as observed by the learned Subordinate Judge himself. How, therefore, the alleged acts of waiver could demolish the effect of the vesting of the estate in pursuance of the notification issued on the 22nd of May, 1952, is not understandable. On the issuance of the notification, the validity of which could not be and is not challenged on any ground whatever in either of the two suits, the consequences provided in the Act have got to follow and it does not seem open even to the State Government, much less to its officers, to waive its right to take charge and possession of the estate and such properties as had vested in the State in pursuance of the notification. Upon the vesting of the estate, it cannot be divested by the alleged acts of waiver, estoppel or acquiescence of the State Government or its officers who are not empowered under the Act to divest the State of the property which has vested in it under the Act. Upon the vesting of the estate, it cannot be divested by the alleged acts of waiver, estoppel or acquiescence of the State Government or its officers who are not empowered under the Act to divest the State of the property which has vested in it under the Act. It is not the case of the plaintiff, nor obviously could it be, that any fresh estate or ghatwali tenure was created in his favour by the alleged acts of omission or commission of the State Government or its officers after the issue of the notification under the Act on the 22nd of May, 1952. I am, therefore, definitely of the view in this appeal also that the plaintiff has no prima facie case for trial and it is not entitled to the grant of interlocutory injunction until the final decision of the suit. In regard to the question of balance of convenience, the view expressed above, while dealing with M. A. 130 of 1961, applies with equal, if not greater, force to this appeal also. 11 In the result, both the appeals are allowed with costs, with only one hearing fee. The orders of temporary injunction made by the Subordinate Judge on 1-3-61 in Title Suit 115 of 1960 and on 5-8-61 in Title Suit 150 of 1960 are set aside. V.Ramaswami, J. 12 I agree.