MEHROTRA, C. J. '. This rule arises out of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. By this petition an award given by the Labour Court has been chal­lenged. (2) Briefly the facts are that one Raj Kumar , was working as a driver under the petitioners. The petitioners alleged that the driver committed theft of petrol and thus a chargesheet was submitted against him in December, 1959, and according to the management an enquiry was held against him. The charge was proved before the enquiring officer of the management and the enquiring officer sub­mitted his report, on which the driver was dismis­sed. There was another chargesheet against the driver given on the 6th February, 1960, in which it was stated that he was absent from duty for more than 10 days without any leave. The driver was given an opportunity to give his explanation. His explanation was submitted, in which he stated that he was ill and thus could not attend to his duties. After considering his explanation the management dismissed him from service. The dispute was taken up by the union and k when the conciliation proceedings failed, the dis­pute was referred by the Government to the Labour Court for adjudication. The matter which was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication was whether in the circumstances the order termi­nating the services of the driver was justified. The management took up the position that so far as the charge relating to the theft of petrol was concerned, full enquiry was held, and after giving every opportunity to the driver to meet the charge, the driver failed to avail of that oppor­tunity and the enquiring officer gave his report. Acting on that report, the management in the exercise of their administrative function termina­ted the services of the employee. Under these cir­cumstances, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to go into that matter and decide for itself whether the finding of the enquiring officer was correct or not. As to the second charge of being absent from duty without leave for more than ten days, the contention raised before the Tribunal was that in view of the standing orders, the act of the em­ployee constituted misconduct, and therefore, made him liable to be dismissed summarily without making any enquiry. As to the second charge of being absent from duty without leave for more than ten days, the contention raised before the Tribunal was that in view of the standing orders, the act of the em­ployee constituted misconduct, and therefore, made him liable to be dismissed summarily without making any enquiry. In these circumstances, even though no enquiry was held against him, the dis­missal could not be said to be unjustified or in violation of the provisions of the standing orders. The Labour Court rejected the contention of the management, and, on the evidence produced before it, came to the conclusion that there was no enquiry held with regard to either of the two charges. That being the finding of the Court, it Held with regard to the charge of theft that the charge was not proved against the workman. As to the second charge, the finding of the Court t was that the dismissal was unjustified as no enquiry was held and the standing order could not be relied upon by the management in support of the contention that the summary dismissal was justified. On these facts the Court gave its award and directed reinstatement of the employee. (3) By the present petition the award has been challenged. Mainly three points have been urged before as- Firstly it is contended that the finding of the-, Labour Court that no enquiry was held with re­gard to the first charge of theft is perverse. We-have examined the finding of the Court and we-do not think that any question of law arises with. regard to the finding of the Court in respect of the first charge. This Court under Article 226 of the Constitution would only interfere with the order of the Court if it is without jurisdiction or if in, the exercise of its jurisdiction the Tribunal has committed any manifest error of law. If the find­ing is based on no evidence it may be said that the Court has committed a manifest error of law, but, in the present case, it was only a matter «i-assessment of the evidence by the Court, and this Court under Article 226 will not interfere with that finding. If the find­ing is based on no evidence it may be said that the Court has committed a manifest error of law, but, in the present case, it was only a matter «i-assessment of the evidence by the Court, and this Court under Article 226 will not interfere with that finding. If the finding of the Court that there was no enquiry is correct, the whole matter is at large before the Court and the Court had ample jurisdiction on the evidence to determine whe­ther the charges had been prima facie proved or not by the management. On consideration of the evi­dence the Court has come to the conclusion that the charge has not been proved. That is a find­ing of fact and again we cannot under Article 226 interfere with that finding. There is ample autho­rity of the Supreme Court for the proposition that. if there has been a domestic enquiry held by tk.0 management, the Tribunal cannot interfere with, the finding of the domestic tribunal unless it is found that it is a case of victimisation or that the finding is perverse or that in the course of the enquiry any principle of natural justice has been violated. In cases, however, where the finding is that there has been no enquiry held, the-whole matter is at large and the Court or Tribu­nal can for itself decide whether the charges have or have not been proved against the employee. There is thus no force in the first contention. (4) The second point raised is that on the second! charge, even if there was no enquiry held, the-Court should at any rate have applied its mind to, the evidence on the record and come to its own conclusion whether the charge has or has not been-proved prima facie, and if the Court in the present case would have applied its mind, on the very face-of it would have come to the conclusion that the, conduct of the employee constituted misconduct and thus the termination of his services was justified. There are two answers to this contention. Firstly, no such point appears to have been raised' before the Court. The contention mainly raised? before the Court was that it was not necessary, to hold any enquiry in view of the provisions of the, standing order. There are two answers to this contention. Firstly, no such point appears to have been raised' before the Court. The contention mainly raised? before the Court was that it was not necessary, to hold any enquiry in view of the provisions of the, standing order. No point was urged before the Court that even assuming that no enquiry was held, but as there was evidence on the record, the Court should have given its decision. Secondly, we do not think that it is necessary that in every case the Court should give any such, decision. On the finding that no enquiry was held; two courses were open to the Court. Either the Court could hold that the dismissal order being without enquiry was not justified and set aside the order of dismissal and leave the parties to their own remedy, or the Court could itself, after giving opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence, decide whether a prima facie charge had not been established, against the workman. Mr. Bhattacharjee has relied on two cases of the Supreme Court in support of his contention. The first case referred, to is (1961) 2 Lab LJ 644, ,4i*St. Btarat Sugar Mills. Ltd. v. Jai Singh, In opinion the facts of that case were entirely different. The observations have got to be read in the light of the facts of that case. There the points taken by the respondents was that after having found that there was no enquiry, it was not necessary for the Tribunal to go into the details of the charges at all and the application under section 33, of the Industrial Disputes Act straightway should have been dismissed. This execution of the respondents was not accepted by their Lordship of the Supreme Court. It was held by their Lordships' of. the Supreme Court that in these circumstances it was open to the Tribunal to go into the merits of the charges and the Tribunal had in fact gone into the charges and gave a finding the correctness of which was examined in appeal by the Supreme Court. Strong reliance in place on the observations of the Supreme Court that it is a duty, of the Tribunal in the circumstances to give a finding. The petitioner has not asked for a mandamus directing the Court to discharge the obligation. Strong reliance in place on the observations of the Supreme Court that it is a duty, of the Tribunal in the circumstances to give a finding. The petitioner has not asked for a mandamus directing the Court to discharge the obligation. In fact, the Court has exercised its authority and has given the award. Petitioner the mandamus cannot be claimed unless the authority on whom the duty is cast has been approached to discharge its obligation, and, in the present case, at no stage the Court was guided by the petitioner to exercise its obligation. These observations of the Supreme Court do not say that if the Tribunal holds that the order is not justified in view of the fact that no enquiry was held, the Tribunal's decision is without jurisdiction and the only jurisdiction which the Tribunal possesses is to enquire into the matter on facts if there is evidence on the record. There is no warrant for such a conclusion from the decision cited. (5) The next case referred to is AIR 1963 SC the Management of Ritz Theatre (Private) Ltd., Delhi . Its Workmen, wherein the observations 3taih- Jm. the earlier case referred to above were "he facts of that case were also entirely different. There the management had made in application that it should be allowed to adduce evidence on the merits of the case. The Tribunal was held that in view of the application made by the management itself there was an implied admission on the part of the management that there had been no enquiry at all, and that being so the order of dismissal was set aside. When the matter came up in appeal before the Supreme Court, the contention was that unless the Tribunal came to a finding that there was no enquiry, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction either to set aside the order of dismissal or to go into the matter itself. This contention was accepted and in dealing with the argument raised by Mr. When the matter came up in appeal before the Supreme Court, the contention was that unless the Tribunal came to a finding that there was no enquiry, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction either to set aside the order of dismissal or to go into the matter itself. This contention was accepted and in dealing with the argument raised by Mr. Sastri, who appeared for the respondent that there could be an intermediative class of cases where the employer no doubt rests his cases on the fact that an enquiry had held, but apprehensive about the validity of the enquiry, he sought for permission to lead evidence to justify his action before the Tribunal, and that even in those cases the Tribunal ac­quires jurisdiction to go into the merits of the case; but that contention was not accepted, and it was held that only in two cases the Tribunal acquires jurisdiction to go into the merits (i) where there has been no enquiry made at all and (2) where the enquiry held was vitiated on the ground that there was no proper enquiry and the principles of natural justice were violated in the course of the enquiry. There was no third case where the Tribunal had any jurisdiction to go into the merits of the charges, and, as in the instant case, it was found on the evidence that there was an enquiry, the finding of the Tribunal was not accepted in appeal. These two cases thus, in our opinion, do not support the contention raised by the petitioner before us. (6) Lastly it is contended that after the award was given and before the award was published, a settlement was arrived at between the union and the management, and, in view of that settlement the award has been superseded and this Court must declare that the award is invalid to the extent it is inconsistent with the provisions of the settlement. Admittedly a settlement was arrived at subsequent to the award and this Court cannot decide the validity or otherwise of the award on the basis of the subsequent agreement arrived at. Reference was made in this connection to the provisions of Sections 18 and 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Admittedly a settlement was arrived at subsequent to the award and this Court cannot decide the validity or otherwise of the award on the basis of the subsequent agreement arrived at. Reference was made in this connection to the provisions of Sections 18 and 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Sub-section (i) of Section 18 pro­vides that a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. Sec­tion 19(3) provides that an award shall, subject to the provisions of this section, remain in opera­tion for a period of one year from the date on which the award becomes enforceable under sec­tion 17A. Without going into the correctness or otherwise of the contention raised by the peti­tioner, it is sufficient to point out that even if the contention is correct that the settlement arriv­ed at outside the conciliation proceedings is binding on the parties and that the award will be enforced subject to that, we cannot in these pro­ceedings declare the law as it is and on that ground we cannot declare the award to be invalid and quash it. If and when any proceedings are taken against the petitioner, it may be open to him to take up that position before the proper court, but no relief can be granted to the peti­tioner even on the assumption that the contention is correct. (7) In the result, therefore, we dismiss this petition with costs which we assess at Rs. 100/- (8) C. S. NAYUDU, J. : - - I agree. Petition dismissed