JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - The opposite party is the Appellant u/s 7(3) of the Orissa Development of Industries (land Acquisition) Act, 1948; 2-22 acres of bhogra land were acquired. The total compensation fixed was Rs. 1339-44 np. Before the learned Arbitrator both the parties claimed the entire amount. In the appeal, the Appellant has reduced his claim to half the amount. He claims to be the hereditary Ganju of village Tarkera in the ex-State of Gangpur, district Sundargarh: The objector was appointed the Sikkim Ganju of the village under Patta (ext. 3) and 50.21 acres of bhogra land including the disputed land were leased out to him in 1934 by the father of the Appellant. There was a previous litigation as to the title to the entire bhogra land. The matter was finally concluded in Second Appeal No. 288 of 1952 wherein this Court held that the objector acquired the title of a lessee in terms of ext. 3 by adverse possession. It is conceded by either side that the objector is the lessee and the opposite party is the lessor. The title of each party rests on the recitals of ext. 3, dated 30-8-1934. In accordance with its terms, the objector would remain in possession of the bhogra land. The only condition for forfeiture of the lease is that if the lessee failed to pay the Malgujari to the State according to the Kists through the lessor he would be liable to eviction from Sikkim Gountaiship and in respect of the bhogra land attached to it. The Arbitrator held-- The contingency whereby the Sikkim Gountias rights would be extinguished with the abolition of the Gounjhuani fights of the Lessor, has not arisen till the date of submersion. The entire compensation was awarded to the objector. The appeal has been filed against this order. 2. Mr. Panda contends that the Arbitrator acted contrary to law in refusing to value the aforesaid right of reversion which vested in the lesser in the contingency of failure on the part of the lessee to pay the Malgujari to the State through him according to Kists. Mr. Sinha, on the other hand, contends that this right of reversion is a mere chance of the lease coming to an end by forfeiture and has no value and that the objector is entitled to the entire compensation. Mr. Sinha, on the other hand, contends that this right of reversion is a mere chance of the lease coming to an end by forfeiture and has no value and that the objector is entitled to the entire compensation. The contention raises an interesting question of law and requires close examination. 3. There is no dispute over the principle that the respective interests of the lessor and the lessee must be determined when the acquisition is made and that the said interests are to be valued separately and that the total compensation payable is to be apportioned between the different interests according to the valuation. The controversy centres round the only question whether the right of reversion claimed by the lessor in this case has at an any value. Mr. Sinha relies upon Dinendra v. Tituram ILR 30 Calcutta 801 and Biprodas v. Saratchandra 17 Indian Cases 168, in support of the contention that such a chance of the lease coming to an end by forfeiture has no value. In Biprodas v. Saratchandra 17 Indian Cases 168, their Lordships observed, in peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. The only thing of which he could be said to have been deprived is the chance of the patni lease coming to an end by sale or forfeiture. But there is no evidence as to pecuniary value of such a chance and for the simplest of all reasons that it is difficult to appreciate what the monetary value would be. On such a view, their Lordships held that the Patnidar was entitled to the whole of the compensation money. No compensation was allowed as there was no evidence in the case as to the pecuniary value. In Natesa Aiyar v. Kaja Maruf Sahib AIR 1927 Madras 489, the position of law as to the character of interest that the landlord and the tenant have has been well elucidated. Their Lordships held. The melvaramdar has the rest of the interest in the land in himself. It is not merely a right to receive rent; he has got several other rights. For example, he could recover the land itself from the tenant; if the tenant denies his title there might be a forfeiture of the permanent tenancy. In that case the landlord would get back the land. There are other rights which the melvaramdar has in the land. For example, he could recover the land itself from the tenant; if the tenant denies his title there might be a forfeiture of the permanent tenancy. In that case the landlord would get back the land. There are other rights which the melvaramdar has in the land. To value the melvaramdar's interest merely at 20 years purchase of the rent that is reserved in his favour would, it seems to me, an easy thing in any case to apportion the value of land between two persons who have got somewhat indefinite rights in the land, such as melvaramdar and the kudiwaramdar. Mr. Justice Orders referred to Dinendra v. Tituram and observed that it was rot clear exactly what was the tenure and its terms which existed between the parties in the Calcutta case. This decision clearly brings forth the principle that the right of the lessor or the landlord to get back the land in case of forfeiture of the lease of the tenancy is not an ethereal but a substantial right and is to be compensated. In Sadasherao v. The Collector, Nagpur AIR 1942 Nagpur 86 , his Lordship also took notice of Dinendra v. Tituram and summarised the position thus. The case law on the subject is very varied, but all the cases are agreed that it is not proper to regard the malguzar's interests as consisting of the capitalised value of the rent he receives and nothing more. Even the rulings in Zamindari cases, where the rent is fixed in perpetuity, recognise that tenancies are sometimes forfeited and that this gives the landlords the chance of putting the land to more remunerative uses. Such a case is Dinendra v. Tituram. His Lordships further observed-- It is difficult to deduce any principle from these cases except the one that the first thing to do is to find out the market value of the land and then apportion that between the landlord and the tenant according to their several interests in the land. What those interests are can only be ascertained by the evidence in each case, but when, as here, there is next to no evidence it is only possible to follow a rough and ready rule. 4. What those interests are can only be ascertained by the evidence in each case, but when, as here, there is next to no evidence it is only possible to follow a rough and ready rule. 4. The position of law seems to be concluded by the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Sakariyawo v. Moriamo AIR 1930 P.C. 261 , which has not been noticed in any of these cases. The decisions cited by Mr. Sinha do not lay down the proposition that the right of reversion cannot be valued. Each case depends on the evidence in that case. If, however, these decisions purport to lay down anything to the contrary, they must be treated as not laying down good law in view of the Privy Council dictum. The argument of Mr. Sinha, almost identically expressed in a passage in the judgment under appeal before their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, was expressly dissented from. That passage was-- The family possess no rights which they can at present exercise; they possess the right which they might exercise on some contingent event in the future. There can be no doubt that by Government acquisition this possible contingent right has been taken away. Is compensation payable for the loss of this contingent right? We do not think, following the principles laid down in Tijani, that compensation is payable for possible future rights, that is to say, rights which are in embryo and may never fertilize. Their Lordships expressed their dissent from the aforesaid passage and observed-- Their Lordships therefore are of that some portion of the compensation money in this case should be allotted to the Plaintiff in respect of his possible right of reversion, which is cut off for ever by the compulsory acquisition. As to the value of that right, their Lordships observed-- It is clear that the possible right of reversion on the failure of the family of any of the occupants, though not actually illusory, must be of small value. 5. To summarise, the position is unassailable that the Appellant is entitled to a part of the compensation money representing the value of his right of reversion embodied in the Patta (ext. 3) subject to which the lessee acquired title. No evidence has been adduced in this case to determine the value of such a right. 5. To summarise, the position is unassailable that the Appellant is entitled to a part of the compensation money representing the value of his right of reversion embodied in the Patta (ext. 3) subject to which the lessee acquired title. No evidence has been adduced in this case to determine the value of such a right. Before the Arbitrator the parties had no clear legal concept about the character and enforceability of this right and accordingly no evidence bad been led. I would follow the procedure in Sakariyawo v. Moriamo by remanding the case to the Arbitrator for evaluating such right. The learned Arbitrator would give full opportunities to the parties to lead evidence as to the value of the right of reversion which I have quoted above and if in fact the value cannot be precisely determined a rough and ready method of valuing it would be adopted as observed in Sadasherao v. The Collector Nagpur and several other decisions. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the award dated 29-6-1961 is set aside and the case is remanded for disposal in accordance with law and observations made above. Costs will abide the result. Appeal allowed. Final Result : Allowed