JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner is a thika tenant. He has applied under Article 227 of the constitution against an order of the appellate authority under the Calcutta thika Tenancy Act refusing to set aside an ex parte order passed by the controller. It appears that the landlord filed an application under section 5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act and an ex parte order was passed on the 4th August 1962. The petitioner thereafter applied under Order 9, Rule 13 and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ex parte order. The Controller referred to a decision of Sen, J., in C. R., case No. 3371 of 1957 and he found that in view of the aforesaid decision of Sen, J., Or. 9, rule 13, had no application. The trial authority further found that section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure could not be invoked for granting a substantive right where the Legislature had not provided for the same. The trial authority was also of opinion that as the petitioner had a remedy by way of an appeal, the petition under section 151 was not maintainable. There was an appeal to the appellate authority below. The appellate authority found as well, that as the petitioner had a remedy by way of an appeal, the application would not be maintainable. It was further urged that an application for review could have been filed and that would have been the proper remedy. In these circumstances, the appellate authority did not choose to allow the appeal and dismissed the same. Against that order the petitioners have moved this Court. Mr. Mitter on behalf of the petitioners does not dispute the decision of Sen, J., in the aforesaid civil revision case that Or. 9, Rule 13, would not apply. Mr. Mitter urges that, it does not mean that the Controller had no inherent powers to set aside the ex parte order. The other remedies which the petitioners had, are not adequate. Therefore, it is urged, the controller failed to discharge his duties by not allowing the parties to adduce evidence in the matter and dismissing the petition as not maintainable. 2. IT cannot be disputed that every court or every Tribunal has some inherent powers some powers which have not been provided for in the statute or under the rules. Therefore, it is urged, the controller failed to discharge his duties by not allowing the parties to adduce evidence in the matter and dismissing the petition as not maintainable. 2. IT cannot be disputed that every court or every Tribunal has some inherent powers some powers which have not been provided for in the statute or under the rules. Unless the tribunal or Court has some inherent powers it cannot function from day to day. The statute and the rules are not exhaustive and cannot be exhaustive. There is no provision in the Calcutta thika Tenancy Act or in the rules thereunder corresponding to Or. 9, rule 13, of the Code of Civil Procedure. That may mean, at most, that a party has no independent right to file an application for setting aside the ex parte order. But that does not mean that the tribunal has no inherent power to correct its mistakes made inadvertently. It is urged that the bailiffs of the tribunal did not do their duties properly and the tribunal therefore was under the mistaken belief in considering that the bailiffs had done their duties and acted on that mistaken belief in deciding the case ex parte. If a Court or a Tribunal finds that it has committed an act of mistake, it is the duty of that tribunal or Court to correct itself. That duty is not specifically provided for, but that duty is always there. Mr. Mitter is right when he says that a Court or a tribunal always owes a debt to justice and it is ever the duty of the Court or the tribunal to discharge that debt. There can be no question of any special provision of law, if the Court has done something by which the Court has refused to discharge its debt to justice. Whether on the facts of the particular case, the court has discharged such a debt to justice or not, is another matter. But there is no gain-saying that the Court ever owes a debt to justice and that debt the Court has ever to discharge. On this is based the powers of the court referred to as powers ex debitio justice. The Tribunals below were of opinion that the petitioner had a right of appeal. But there is no gain-saying that the Court ever owes a debt to justice and that debt the Court has ever to discharge. On this is based the powers of the court referred to as powers ex debitio justice. The Tribunals below were of opinion that the petitioner had a right of appeal. Indeed the petitioner had; but that remedy by way of an appeal would not be satisfactory or adequate and that remedy is distinct from the remedy applied for, under inherent powers of the Court. A party has a right to appeal, but still the Court has a duty to do justice. However, coming to the question as to the remedy by way of an appeal, the said remedy is of any use only when there are materials on the record in support of the case of the appellant. A party who was unable to appear before trial court and who was thus prevented from placing all materials on his behalf before the Trial court, can hardly expect any relief in a Court of appeal. The relief by way of appeal is thus not adequate nor satisfactory; that relief by way of an appeal would be limited to materials on record at the ex parte hearing. But in an application for setting aside an ex parte order, the question would be whether the Court acted inadvertently or by mistake. In order to prove that, the parties have to make a different case and to produce evidence as to what prevented the party from appearing. The scope of an appeal is thus different from the scope of an application for setting aside the ex parte order. 3. The appellate authority further considered that a review would have been the proper remedy. I am afraid, not. The grounds for review have been defined in section 27 (5) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act and those grounds are the same as under Or. 47, rule 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since, the ex parte order had been made, no new or important matter or evidence was discovered but that the party had not the opportunity to place the matter or to adduce evidence which was available to the party concerned at that date. There was no error apparent on the face of the record, but there was no material on record on behalf of the applicant. There was no error apparent on the face of the record, but there was no material on record on behalf of the applicant. "any other sufficient cause" under section 27 (5) has the same meaning as under Or. 47, Rule 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, review under section 27 (5)would not be adequate or satisfactory relief to the party. A petition for review would not serve any useful purpose. Hence, the mere existence of other remedies is no ground for refusing to exercise inherent powers of a Court or a Tribunal under all circumstances. The remedy, which might have been available to the party, must not only be a remedy but an adequate and a satisfactory remedy for the relief claimed and neither an appeal nor a petition for review is such a remedy. Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of the civil Procedure gives a party a right to file an application for setting aside an ex parte order but such right has not been given to a party under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act or under the rules. That does not deprive the tribunal of its inherent power to do justice or, in other words, exclusion of such provision from the Calcutta Thika tenancy Act does not discharge the debt which the Controller owes to justice. That debt ever remains. Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code has no application to execution proceedings an execution case was dismissed for default without being called. An application was made to the executing court concerned to set aside the ex parte order. The executing Court frankly and courageously stated that the court had made a "sad omission" in not calling the case before it was dismissed 'ex parte'. The executing court set aside the order in its inherent power. Neither Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code would apply nor any other provisions of the Code would apply. The matter went to the Supreme court and is reported in 1953 S. C. R., page 136 at p. 139 between (1) Keshardeo Chamaria v. Radha Kissen Chamaria. Mahajan, J. observed as follows: "the solid fact remains that he was not given that opportunity and that being so, the order dismissing the execution was bad and was rightly corrected by the Court on its own initiative in the exercise of its inherent powers. " 4. Mahajan, J. observed as follows: "the solid fact remains that he was not given that opportunity and that being so, the order dismissing the execution was bad and was rightly corrected by the Court on its own initiative in the exercise of its inherent powers. " 4. I may refer to another case on the date fixed for hearing, the plaintiff was dead. The Deputy Commissioner recorded as follows: "on the case being called today the plaintiff was not present. I therefore dismiss the claim. " But the plaintiff was already dead. The case was dismissed a fortnight after the death. The plaintiff could not have been present because he was dead. The case was dismissed and there was no case pending, but still the heirs filed an application and applied for restoration of the case and the Deputy Commissioner observed, "I cannot allow any technicality to obscure the fact that the case was not heard because of the calamity which prevented the applicants putting up this case. "But the appellate authority reversed the order. The matter went to the Judicial Committee in case (2) Raja Debi Bakhsh Singh v. Habib Shah reported in 40 Indian Appeals, 151. The Judicial Committee observed as follows: "the principle of forfeiture of rights in consequence of a default in procedure by a party to a cause is a principle of punishment in respect of such default, but the punishment of the dead, or the ranking of death under the category of default, does not seem to be very state able. " The acts of the superior Court in reversing the order of the Deputy Commissioner was considered to be an abuse of the process of the Court by the Judicial Committee. Their Lordships observed: "in their Lordships' opinion such abuse has occurred by the course adopted in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. Quite part from s. 151, any court might have rightly considered itself to possess an inherent power to rectify the mistake which had been inadvertently made. But section 151 could never be invoked in a case clearer than the present, and their Lordships are at a loss to understand why, apart from points of procedure and otherwise, it was not taken advantage of. " With deep respect I follow the aforesaid observations of Lord Shaw of dunfermline and also of Mahajan, J. of the Supreme Court. But section 151 could never be invoked in a case clearer than the present, and their Lordships are at a loss to understand why, apart from points of procedure and otherwise, it was not taken advantage of. " With deep respect I follow the aforesaid observations of Lord Shaw of dunfermline and also of Mahajan, J. of the Supreme Court. To deny a Court its inherent power is to deny justice. 5. It may be that a particular relief may not be demanded by justice. The court appointed a Commissioner to take charge of the documents of another party, lest they might be tampered with. The Supreme Court observed that ends of justice would not be served by passing such an order. The reason was: "it is no business of the Court to collect evidence for a party or even to protect the rival party from the evil consequences of making forged entries in those account books. If the plaintiff does forge entries and use forged entries as evidence in the case, the defendants would have ample opportunity to dispute those entries and to prove them forgeries. " This is in the case between (3) Padam Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A. I. R. 1961 s. C., page 218. Mr. Mitter has referred to another recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in (4) Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, reported in A. I. R. 1962 S. C., 527. The Supreme Court observed at p. 534 as follows: "the inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court (by section 151) ; it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it. " 6. The allegation is that the bailiffs did not serve the notices but the tribunal because of the false or incorrect report of the officers of the tribunal passed an order inadvertently on the assumption that the notices had been served and thereupon decided the case ex parte. All that the petitioner asked the tribunal to consider was that the tribunal passed an order inadvertently because of a report of an officer of the tribunal which is incorrect. The principle "actus curiae meminem gravabit" is well known. All that the petitioner asked the tribunal to consider was that the tribunal passed an order inadvertently because of a report of an officer of the tribunal which is incorrect. The principle "actus curiae meminem gravabit" is well known. If a party has suffered because of the mistake of the court or its officers, it is the duty of the Court to enquire into the matter and if such a mistake has occurred, the court should put the litigant in the same position as he would have occupied but for the mistake. The Courts below observed that the applicants had no substantive right to apply for setting aside the ex parte order. It may be so. But the matter does not end there. The Judicial Committee have observed: "the principle of forfeiture of rights in consequence of a default in procedure by a party to a cause is a principle of punishment in respect of such default. Such punishment, according to the petitioner, has been awarded to himself because of the erroneous report of the officers of the tribunal. The question is, should the tribunal refuse to exercise its inherent power and remedy the mistake committed by itself inadvertently? The answer has always been in the negative. The order is therefore set aside. The Rule is made absolute and the matter sent back to the Controller to make enquiries on the petition. The costs of this Court will be the costs of the trial, hearing fee being assessed at 5 (five) gold mohurs. "