JUDGMENT Ramachandra Iyer, C.J.- This is an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent from the judgment of Jagadisan, J., setting aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Cuddalore in O.S. No. 82 of 1957 and restoring the scheme framed by the authorities functioning under the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act with respect to a specific endowment attached to Sri Kailasanathar Temple at Villupuram. By his will, dated 21st March, 1923, Ganesa Mudaliar, the husband of the appellant, endowed certain properties, the income from which was to be devoted for the performance of an utsavam in the local Perumal temple, for the performance of certain pujas and utsavam in Sri Kailasanathar Temple, and for the Gurupuja of Saint Manickavachagar. By the same document, he appointed his wife, Navaneethammal (the appellant herein), to be the trustee, investing her with a right to nominate her successor ; the successors too were to have a similar right of nomination of the next trustee. Soon after Ganesa Mudaliar's death, his agnate, the second respondent to this appeal, repudiated the will and he appears to have got possession of the properties by trespassing upon them. He even effected certain alienations of the properties. The appellant then took a number of proceedings, and succeeded, after a sustained effort, in recovering possession of those properties. Soon thereafter, without even waiting to see whether or not the appellant was going to perform the charities as directed under her husband's will, the Deputy Commissioner of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Coimbatore, acting on the basis of a report by the Assistant Commissioner, initiated proceedings for framing a scheme on the ground that there had been a mismanagement by the trustee. The proceedings thus initiated appear to have been inspired by the second respondent, who failed in his attempt to secure the property for himself, and between whom and the appellant not much cordiality exists. It was the elementary duty of the Deputy Commissioner to have considered whether there was any justification for a scheme. There was, however, no attempt in that direction. Stating that the appellant had not explained about the alienation of the properties, that authority framed the usual scheme containing within it a power in the appropriate authority to associate two non-hereditary trustees with her in the management,-thus effectually reducing the appellant's voice in the management to nothing. There was, however, no attempt in that direction. Stating that the appellant had not explained about the alienation of the properties, that authority framed the usual scheme containing within it a power in the appropriate authority to associate two non-hereditary trustees with her in the management,-thus effectually reducing the appellant's voice in the management to nothing. Little did the Deputy Commissioner realise that the alienation of the endowed property was not effected by the appellant, but by the second respondent who was claiming a title adverse to the endowment. Nor does the Deputy Commissioner appear to have been conscious of the fact that the appellant, far from alienating the property, actually recovered the same for the Trust. This extremely unsatisfactory disposal of the matter was not even noticed by the Commissioner, on appeal. The order of that authority, which savours of a cavalier way of disposal of things, purported to sustain the scheme on the ground that the religious services in the temple were not performed for a long time,-a matter which, if investigated, could have shown that the appellant was in no way responsible-and that the Assistant Commissioner had reported about the irregularities in the management. But neither of the two officers appears to have even noticed that the appellant had not even been told of any remissness on her part which justified a scheme and the association of the other trustees with her to enable her to answer the charge. Indeed, the only documents, that we find in this case to sustain a scheme are Exhibits A-3 and A-5, the notice issued by the Deputy Commissioner, and his own order. Exhibit A-3 states: “Whereas the Deputy Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments is of opinion that, in the interest of the proper and better administration of the abovesaid specific endowment, a scheme of administration should be settled.” On what basis that opinion was formed, it has not been disclosed in the notice. The other document, Exhibit A-5 is a little more explicit. That is an annexure to the order by the Commissioner, sanctioning the scheme. That states: “The allegation was that some of the properties left by Ganesa Mudaliar were alienated and services discontinued. The inspector suggested that proceedings be started to remove the trustee from office. The other document, Exhibit A-5 is a little more explicit. That is an annexure to the order by the Commissioner, sanctioning the scheme. That states: “The allegation was that some of the properties left by Ganesa Mudaliar were alienated and services discontinued. The inspector suggested that proceedings be started to remove the trustee from office. I took the view that, if the allegations were correct, the proper remedy was not to remove the trustee, but to frame a scheme empowering the appropriate authority to appoint suitable persons as trustees with power to take steps to recover the properties alienated and carry out the wishes of Ganesa Mudaliar………” It will be seen that this document reveals a travesty of procedure prescribed lay the Act. Who was the person that alienated the property the authority did not pause to consider and who was responsible for the service being discontinued was left equally undetermined. The Inspector appears to have suggested that the trustee should be removed. The Inspector was not examined as to the basis on which he came to make that suggestion. There can be no doubt from the surrounding circumstances in the case that the Inspector, at any rate, must have been inspired by the second respondent, who, to his great chagrin, was evicted from the properties by the efforts made by the appellant. To continue the narrative, the appellant, feeling aggrieved by the order of the authorities appointed under the Act, filed the statutory suit. The learned Subordinate Judge, not inappropriately, observed that the procedure adopted by the De puty Commissioner was “ Shocking “ and against all principles of judicial procedure and natural justice. The learned Subordinate Judge, therefore, set aside the scheme. On appeal by the Department, Jagadisan, J., has reversed that judgment and sustained the scheme. In the opinion of the learned Judge a scheme cannot affect any vested right of any party and the fact that no charges were laid or proved against the trustee would not disentitle the authorities from framing a scheme. The learned’ Judge has stated: “No trustee of a public trust need or can fight shy of a scheme which is designed only to ensure due and orderly execution of the trust. A scheme is the mechanism of a system to keep the wheels of the trust moving on the proper track. The learned’ Judge has stated: “No trustee of a public trust need or can fight shy of a scheme which is designed only to ensure due and orderly execution of the trust. A scheme is the mechanism of a system to keep the wheels of the trust moving on the proper track. It is not an imposition on the trust to impede its working. A trustee who views any and every scheme as an infliction on the trust is not imbued with the right and proper spirit of administration of the trust and is really under a misconception of the duties of the trustee. The outlook of a trustee who imagines the framing of a scheme in respect of the trust: as a slur on his or her reputation as a trustee, is merely sentimental. A trustee can, if he is so advised, submit to the statutory authorities that a scheme in neither necessary nor desirable. But he cannot call upon the statutory authorities to formulate the reasons which prompted the authorities in starting: the proceedings or which are deemed sufficient for the framing of a scheme.” While we agree with the learned Judge that the framing of a scheme for a religious endowment need not be preceded by laying and proving any charges against the trustee and that the authorities would have jurisdiction to frame a scheme if the interests of the proper management of the institution require it, we are, with great respect, unable to share the view that the statutory authorities need not formulate the reasons which induced them to frame a scheme, particularly when such scheme contains the drastic provision of associating other trustees with the hereditary trustee and also gives scope for the appointment of an executive officer. The statute confers jurisdiction on the Deputy Commissioner to frame a scheme only if it is to be in the interests of the institution concerned. A change of the trustee or the addition of more persons to that office cannot be assumed generally to be one in the interests of the institution, unless it is be proved either that the existing trustee is unfit to be in management or that it is necessary in the interests of the institution that other trustees be associated with him. We cannot also subscribe to the proposition that the objection of a hereditary trustee to the framing of a scheme is nothing more than a sentimental one and that he has only to submit to any proposal for a scheme to be framed by the statutory authorities, however ill-founded the basis of such a scheme might be. The power of the founder of a religious endowment to prescribe a line of succession to the office of the trustee and to lay down rules for the management of the trust has been recognised right from the early times. That right in the founder can be justified on the principles that those prescriptions and conditions form an integral part of the endowment or foundation itself. The prescribed devolution of the office can be hereditary or one without conforming to the law of inheritance. In the latter case, the provision as to devolution of office will be valid notwithstanding its transgression of the rules of perpetuity, i.e., where the trusteeship is a bare right to manage and not one coupled with a beneficial interest in the property. In the present case under Exhibit A-8, the will of Ganesa Mudaliar, the devolution to the office of trustee of the endowment created by him is by nomination by the previous trustee. That will not be hereditary succession in the sense that the succession to the office will be governed by the law of inheritance, although the trustee for the time being will have to be regarded as hereditary trustee by reason of the definition contained in section 6 (9) of the Act. If the endowment in the case amounts merely to a charge, as indeed it was contended on behalf of the appellant before the lower Court, the property will belong to the legatee and the attempt of the testator to prescribe a line of succession unknown to law would be futile. The provision for succession being thus void, the trusteeship will revert to the founder's heirs who will hold that right hereditarily. If, on the contrary, the entire property is held to be absolutely dedicated to the charity, as the learned Subordinate Judge has found in this case, the provision in the will for succession to the office will be valid. The provision for succession being thus void, the trusteeship will revert to the founder's heirs who will hold that right hereditarily. If, on the contrary, the entire property is held to be absolutely dedicated to the charity, as the learned Subordinate Judge has found in this case, the provision in the will for succession to the office will be valid. The learned Judge has held,-and we agree with him in that-that the question as to whether the property has been completely or partially dedicated to the charity cannot be decided in the scheme proceedings. We will have, therefore, to consider the matter from both the points of view. Hereditary trusteeship is property. It has been held in Narayanan Nambudripad v. The State of Madras1that the provisions in a scheme which encroach on the hereditary rights of the trustee would be void; but the mere framing of a scheme in regard to the management of the trust-property or the association of additional trustees cannot amount to an invasion of any property right. Where the trusteeship devolves under the terms of document in a manner different from that prescribed by the law of succession, it will be a hereditary right under the Act. But the element of property will be absent in the office where no beneficial interest in the property is attached thereto. In either case, the office is undoubtedly one of dignity and prestige. The trustee not unoften, received honours which the community highly prizes. A Hindu believes that spiritual bliss will accrue to him if he were to serve in a charitable or religious institution. Indeed, service to God is one of the recognised forms of worship. Having regard to this consciousness and belief of the community, the authorities cannot in the absence of proved misconduct or incompetence on the part of the trustee, lightly interfere with his powers which were vested in him as a part of the very endowment or foundation. To do so would be to run counter to the wishes of the founder. In framing a scheme, with a view to enable the addition of outsiders ;as trustees, the authorities cannot, no doubt, be regarded as infringing any vested right of property. But, at the same time, such a scheme will interfere with what, but for the scheme, will be an exclusive privilege of the heir or nominee or the founder to manage the trust. But, at the same time, such a scheme will interfere with what, but for the scheme, will be an exclusive privilege of the heir or nominee or the founder to manage the trust. It stands to reason, therefore, that the persons entrusted with authority to frame a scheme should have due regard to the wishes of the founder and the interests of the institution before they introduce third parties into the management. This will particularly be so in regard to specific endowments in a temple. In their origin, they were founded with the express object of securing divine grace for the founder and his heirs or nominees. It is by reason of the intention of the founder, actual or presumed, that the heirs and nominees are allowed to be trustees. Interference with their exclusive right in regard to that matter cannot be justified except where cogent reasons exist and the interests of the institution demand it. Before there can be a scheme of the kind before us, there should therefore be a finding that, in the interests of the endowment, the arrangement prescribed by the founder could not be adhered to. The jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner to frame a scheme will arise only where that requirement is satisfied. The words in the statute which require it are not intended to be a mere formula to be adopted for every case, regardless of the facts and circumstances, but a real requirement on which the authority concerned has to be fairly satisfied. The satisfaction in that regard will be more or less in the nature of a quasi-judicial one. Such a consideration of the matter has been singularly absent in the present case. It has nowhere been considered whether the appellant was at all responsible for the omission to perform the kattalai all these years. Nor is there a finding by the authorities as to when she came into possession of the property, and whether, after coming into such possession, she defaulted. As we pointed out already, Exhibits A-3 and A-5 are wholly insufficient to make out any case for the framing of a scheme. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that the framing of a scheme was totally unjustified in the circumstances of the case and that the learned Subordinate Judge acted properly in setting it aside. As we pointed out already, Exhibits A-3 and A-5 are wholly insufficient to make out any case for the framing of a scheme. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that the framing of a scheme was totally unjustified in the circumstances of the case and that the learned Subordinate Judge acted properly in setting it aside. It is needless to point out that what all we are deciding in the present case is that, on the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time, the Deputy Commissioner was not justified in framing the scheme. The appeal is allowed with costs against the second respondent. V.S.-----Appeal allowed.