Judgment :- 1. In this writ petition, Mr. V.M.B. Menon, learned counsel for the petitioner, requests this Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondent, namely the Regional Transport Officer, which is the Registering Authority, Kozhikode, from suspending the registration of the petitioner's jeep, K.L.D. 4376, and also to compel the said respondent to deliver up the registration certificate of the said jeep to the petitioner, after duly endorsing the transfer of ownership. 2. It is unnecessary to consider the nature of the relief that is to be granted to the petitioner, because the learned Government Pleader, appearing for the respondent in this case, in view of the judgment that is being immediately delivered herein, has agreed to deliver the registration certificate of the vehicle to the petitioner immediately. Regarding the second prayer that is asked for in this writ petition, namely to compel the respondent to endorse the transfer of ownership of the vehicle, that will have to abide the directions to be given later in this judgment. 3. The circumstances under which the writ petition came to be field may be briefly stated. According to the petitioner, he became the owner of the jeep bearing registration No. K.L.D. 4376, by obtaining a transfer from its original owner, namely one Neelikandi Abdulla alias Kunhipokker, on 25th July 1962. The petitioner also states that he made an application on 7th August 1962 to the respondent herein, requesting the said authority to register the vehicle in his name and also making a further request to have the registration certificate amended accordingly. That application must obviously be one sent under S.31(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act. But, according to the petitioner, no action as such in respect of the requests made by him was being taken by the authority; on the other hand he was informed by a communication Ext. P-1 dated 6th September 1962 that the transfer of ownership of the vehicle will be effected after the charge under S.33(1)(b) in respect of the said vehicle was disposed of. It is also mentioned in that communication that the registration certificate and insurance certificate of the vehicle are retained in the office of the respondent in the meanwhile. 4. According to the petitioner, on receipt of that communication, namely Ext. It is also mentioned in that communication that the registration certificate and insurance certificate of the vehicle are retained in the office of the respondent in the meanwhile. 4. According to the petitioner, on receipt of that communication, namely Ext. P-1, he made certain inquiries at the office of the respondent, and he came across the proceedings of the respondent Ext. P-2 dated 14th September 1962, a copy of which was furnished to him on his request. A perusal of that order shows that there appears to have been a report dated 28th September 1961 from the Motor Vehicles Inspector, Trichur as against the vehicle in question when it was in the ownership of the previous owner. The said report is to the effect that the vehicle was stopped and checked and found conveying the persons mentioned therein for hire without permit. A charge memo also is stated to have been issued on 9th March 1962. Ext. P-2 order further proceeds to state that the authority had issued notice to the owner of the vehicle to show cause why action proposed therein should not be taken. It is also stated that no explanation has been furnished, and accordingly the registering authority directs that the registration certificate of the vehicle in question is suspended for a period of three months from 28th September 1962 to 27th December 1962. There is also a direction for surrender of the registration certificate on or before 27th September 1962, failing which, action under S.33(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act will be taken to prosecute him. This order Ext. P2 appears to have been passed on 14th September 1962. 5. It is the contention of Mr. V.M.B. Menon, learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner having become owner of the vehicle in question, by virtue of the transfer taken from its original owner on 25th July 1962 and that application having been filed under S.31(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the authorities have acted without jurisdiction in passing the order Ext. P-2. That is, in short, according to the learned counsel, the punishment may, on the face of it, appear to be one inflicted as against the original owner for an offence, and the party who is made to suffer is not the original owner, but the petitioner himself. P-2. That is, in short, according to the learned counsel, the punishment may, on the face of it, appear to be one inflicted as against the original owner for an offence, and the party who is made to suffer is not the original owner, but the petitioner himself. The further grievance of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that if action is going to be taken as against his client under the provisions of S.31(b) of the Act, those provisions have not been complied with by the authorities concerned. 6. The question of action being taken as against the petitioner, does not arise because it is not the case of the Department that there was any offence committed in respect of this vehicle when it was in the legal ownership of the petitioner. On behalf of the respondent, the learned Government Pleader has drawn my attention to the fact that after the report of the Motor Vehicles Inspector, the Regional Transport Authority issued a charge memo to the registered owner of the vehicle, namely Neelikandi Abdulla, by registered post, directing him to show cause as to why the registration certificate should not be suspended under S.33(1)(b) of the Act. But the said notice appears to have been returned unserved, and a fresh charge memo was again issued to the registered owner, namely the transferor, on 15th June 1962 and served on him on 2nd July 1962; and inasmuch as the original owner did not care to appear and offer any explanation, the authority passed the order Ext. P-2. In the meanwhile, according to the learned Government Pleader, the petitioner made a request to have the registration of the said vehicle transferred to him, as the original owner had transferred the ownership to him. 7. According to Mr. V.M.B. Menon, learned counsel for the petitioner, his client is a bonafide purchaser, without having any knowledge that the transferor bad committed any offence in respect of the vehicle or that there were proceedings against him for violation of the provisions of the Act, on the date when he purchased the vehicle from the original owner; and therefore his client should not be made to suffer for an offence that may have been committed by the original owner. 8. 8. There appears to be considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that his client should not be made to suffer for an offence that may have been committed by the transferor. But there is also the other aspect to be considered, namely that owners of vehicles, when once they are fully aware that proceedings have been initiated as against them in respect of the vehicles when they were in their legal ownership cannot also escape liability by mere transfer of the vehicles, because, in the nature of things, any action to be taken on the basis of an offence that is reported as against the owners must necessarily take some time and the necessary formalities will have to be gone through before the authorities, charged with the duties under the Act, take action. That is what has unfortunately happened in this case, because from the counter affidavit it is clear that the original owner was well aware of the charge as against him on 2nd July 1962 and he has not cared to appear and contest the proceedings. On the other hand, he appears to have quietly transferred the vehicle to the petitioner on 25th July 1962. 9. In my view, in the circumstances of this case, it is absolutely necessary in the interests of justice that persons like the petitioner, who claim to have obtained transfer of the vehicle bona fide and for value, without any knowledge that proceedings have been initiated as against them, must certainly be able to satisfy the authorities at least prima facie that they are persons who have purchased the vehicles bona fide and for value and have no knowledge of any offence having been committed by the transferor or of any proceedings being pending as against him. Therefore if the petitioner is able to prima facie satisfy the authorities on this aspect, in my view, the proceedings, which are sought to be taken for suspending the registration certificate of the vehicle in question - which will really be punishment as against the petitioner - will have to be dropped. But at the same time, the Department is entitled to proceed as against the original owner, namely the transferor, himself under the provisions of the statute in the manner which they find appropriate in the circumstances. But at the same time, the Department is entitled to proceed as against the original owner, namely the transferor, himself under the provisions of the statute in the manner which they find appropriate in the circumstances. For this purpose, I have already indicated that the registration certificate of the vehicle, which is in the custody of the authorities and at present with the learned Government Pleader, is being returned to the petitioner. 10. Then the question is as to whether the endorsement asked for by the petitioner or recognition of the transfer prayed for by him, is to be granted. That question will naturally have to await the prima facie investigation that is now being directed to be done by the authorities concerned, after giving the petitioner full and fair opportunity to satisfy the authorities, at least prima facie, that he is a bona fide purchaser who has no knowledge of the proceedings now pending as against the transferor. If the petitioner is able to satisfy the authorities in that respect, the proceedings will be dropped as against the petitioner, but subject to the liberty to take any action as against the transferor, the original owner. If the petitioner is notable prima facie to satisfy the authorities, it follows that the authorities will be at liberty to proceed as against him by way of action under S.33(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, If it becomes ultimately necessary for the authorities that the registration certificate has to be taken back from the petitioner, it is open to the respondent to issue notice to the petitioner for that purpose, fixing a reasonable time to enable him to appear and deliver the registration certificate. 11. Subject to these directions, and observations the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Dismissed.