Ram Chand v. Bhagwan Das — 1963 DIGILAW 147 (ALL)

JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a tenant's second appeal from the concurrent decisions of the courts below decreeing the landlord's suit for their ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent. The appeal is confined to the decree for ejectment. The defendant appellants are the tenants of two shops in the city of Agra of which the plaintiff-respondents are the landlords. The plaintiffs obtained permission from the State Government under Sec. 7-F of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act to file a suit for the ejectment of the defendants and then terminated the tenancy. As the defendants refused to vacate, they filed the present suit. The defendants resisted the suit and pleaded in defence that the orders granting the landlord permission to sue for ejectment were illegal. Both the courts below rejected this plea and decreed the suit. The defendants have now come to this Court in second appeal. 2. The only point urged in support of the appeal is that the order of the State Government under Sec. 7-F of the Act and of the Commissioner passed in pursuance of that order by which he cancelled his previous order and granted the landlord permission "as directed" are both invalid. I may state at the outset that during the trial no witness appeared before the trial court, and the evidence consisted entirely of certified copies of the various applications made before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer (hereinafter called R.C. and E.O.), the Additional District Magistrate (to be called A.D.M.), the District Magistrate (D.M.), the Commissioner, Agra, and the State Government and of orders passed by these authorities. 3. The first plaintiff, Shri Bhagwan applied to the R.C. and E.O. under Sec. 3 for permission to file a suit for the ejectment of the predecessor-in-interest of the present defendants. That officer granted the per-mission by his order dated 1-9-1951 (Ext. 30). But the tenants moved the A. D. M. who had been authorised by the D. M, to confirm the decisions of the R.C. and E.O. or withhold confirmation. He declined to confirm the permission and remanded the case to the R.C. and E.O. for a fresh hearing. On re-hearing the R.C. and E.O. changed his view. and by his order dated 9-8-1952 (Ext. A-51) rejected the landlord's application for permission to sue. On 16-8-1952 the landlord moved the A. D. M. and in his application (Ext. He declined to confirm the permission and remanded the case to the R.C. and E.O. for a fresh hearing. On re-hearing the R.C. and E.O. changed his view. and by his order dated 9-8-1952 (Ext. A-51) rejected the landlord's application for permission to sue. On 16-8-1952 the landlord moved the A. D. M. and in his application (Ext. 28) he prayed that the R.C. and E.O's. order "be not confirmed and necessary permission to eject be granted". On 16-9-1952 he made another application addressed to the D. M. (Ext. 44), in which he again attacked the R.C. and E.O's. order re fusing permission on various grounds and prayed for the grant of permission to eject the defendants. On 18-11-1952 the A. D. M. passed a detailed order but adjourned the hearing, and on 9-12-1952 he passed a short order (Ext. A-55) granting the landlord permission to sue for ejectment. The tenants filed a revision before the Commissioner of Agra who allowed it on 4-21953 on the ground that if the tenant was ejected his business would be up set. (Ext. A-50). Thereupon the landlord moved the State Government which passed an order under Sec. 7-F, in the form of a letter dated 7-5-1953 addressed to the Commissioner (Ext. A-49), stating that after perusing the order of the A. D. M. and the Commissioner they considered that the need of the landlord was genuine. But instead of giving a decision, Government requested the Commissioner that his order of 4-2-1953 (Ext. A-50) might be "reconsidered and revised and the applicant Shri Bhagwan be permitted to sue his tenants in the civil court for ejectment front the two shops mentioned above." The case then went back to the Commissioner and on 28-7-1953 he passed an order (Ext. 32) by which he cancelled his previous order "as direct-ed" and confirmed the draw of the A. D. M. granting permission. The legality of the order of State Government under Sec. 7-F and of the order of the Commissioner made in pursuance of it is challenged in this appeal. 4. It is common ground that both the orders of the State Government and the Commissioner were passed without hearing the appellants or giving them any opportunity to show cause against them. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that both orders are invalid on this ground. 4. It is common ground that both the orders of the State Government and the Commissioner were passed without hearing the appellants or giving them any opportunity to show cause against them. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that both orders are invalid on this ground. He argued that the State Government when calling for the record of a case in which the Commissioner has granted or refused permission to eject the tenant has a duty to act judicially before passing any order. Counsel conceded that according to the previous decisions of this Court the power of the State Government under See. 7-F is administrative and not quasi judicial but he urged that these decisions require re-consideration. 5. The questions have been raised in this appeal (1) whether the order of the State Government is invalid because it was passed without giving the appellants an opportunity to show cause against it, and secondly, whether the order of the Commissioner cancelling his previous refusal is illegal the same reason? 6. The answer to the first question depends upon whether the State Government's power to interfere with the order of Commissioner is quasi-judicial. The previous decisions of this Court are against this view, Narottom Saran v. Government of State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 Allahabad 232, Sheikh Rafiuddin v. Govt. of U.P., 1956 A.L.J. 329 and V.S. Johri v. State of U.P., 1962 A.L.J. 672. The question is whether these decisions need reconsideration. 7. With the utmost respect for the previous decisions, if I were free to consider the question afresh I would hod that the State Government's power under Sec. 7-F to interfere with the decision of the Commissioner granting or refusing the landlord permission to sue the tenant for ejectment is quasi-judicial for two reasons: first, the order of the Commissioner being quasi-judicial the power to revise a quasi-judicial decision cannot be other than quasi-judicial; and secondly, the scheme and purpose of the Act, the nature and importance of the decision, and its effects on the rights of the parties make it clear that the State Government is required to act judicially when it calls for the record of a case in which the Commissioner has granted or refused the landlord permission to eject the tenant and makes any order which appears to it necessary in the ends of justice. The principles which distinguish a judicial from an administrative function were reviewed exhaustively by the Supreme Court in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 222 and need not be repeated here. Mahajan J. observed in that case that "the question whether any act is a purely ministerial or judicial one depends upon the circumstances of each case" and he quoted with approval the principle enunciated in In Re: Banwari Lal Roy, 48 C.W. No. 766 that the question whether an act is a purely executive act or a quasi-judicial one "depends upon the terms of the particular rule, the nature, scope, and effect of the particular power in exercise of which the act may be done." The principles are well-established but their application to the circumstances of each case is full of difficulty and, as observed by Mahajan J., the decision may vary "according to the foot of the" Judge concerned. 8. The Supreme Court in Khushaldas Advarti's case, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 222 pointed out that the duty to act judicially need not be imposed in express words; it may be implied from the nature of the function and the surrounding circumstances. No authorities were cited at the bar on this point in this appeal, but in a very large number of cases the English and the Indian Courts have held that the function was quasi-judicial though the statute conferring it did not say so. Some of :these cases were brought to the notice of counsel for the parties. The King v. Postmaster General, (1928) I.K.B. 291 Rex v. Boycott, (1939) 2 K.B. 651 Lapointe v. L. Association De Bienfaisance Et De La Police De Montreal, 1906 A.C. 535 Rex. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee, (1952) 1 All. E.R. 480 Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1110. 9. The last three cases are noteworthy. In Ghanshyarn Dass Gupta's case, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1110 the Supreme Court held that the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P., while considering cases of use of unfair means in examinations and imposing penalties exercised quasi-judicial function though there was not a word in the regulations requiring the Board to act judicially. The last three cases are noteworthy. In Ghanshyarn Dass Gupta's case, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1110 the Supreme Court held that the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P., while considering cases of use of unfair means in examinations and imposing penalties exercised quasi-judicial function though there was not a word in the regulations requiring the Board to act judicially. It reversed the view of this Court which was based on "the plain language" of the Regulation and observed, "The statute is not likely to provide in so many words that the authority passing the order is required to act judicially; that can only be inferred from the express provisions of the statute in the first instance in each case and no one circumstance alone will he determinative of the question whether the authority set up by the statute has the duty to act judicially or not. The inference whether the authority acting under a statute where it is silent has the duty to act judicially will depend upon the express provisions of the statute read along with the nature of the rights effected, the manner of the disposal provided, the objective criterion if any to he adopted, the effect of the decision on the person affected, and other indicia afforded by the statute. A duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances which it will be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to define exhaustively." The Court held that the Board of High School and Intermediate Education was under a duty to act judicially even, though "there is no procedure provided as to how the committee will act in exercising its powers under Rule 1(1) and it is further true that there is no express provision in that rule requiring the Committee to call for an explanation from the examinees concerned and to hear the examinees whose cases it is required to consider." 10. In Lapointe v. L' Association De Bienfaisance Et De La Police De Montreal, 1906 A.C. 535. In Lapointe v. L' Association De Bienfaisance Et De La Police De Montreal, 1906 A.C. 535. Privy Council had to consider the nature of functions performed by a board of directors of the Montreal Police Benevolent and Pension Society under Rules 23 and 45 of the Societies' Rules which ran thus: "23 - Every application for a pension, gratuity, or aid must conic before the board when the whole circumstances of the case will be fully gone into." "45 - Any member entitled by length of service to a gratuity or pension who is dismissed from the force, or is obliged to resign, shall have his case considered by the Board of Directors, and his right to such gratuity or pension determined by a majority of the Board. "The French version of Rule 45 was slightly different and ran thus: "It shall be the duty of the committee to deliberate on the case of a member who, having a right to gratuity or a pension, shall be dismissed from the police or obliged to give in his resignation. The majority of the committee shall decide that such pension or gratuity shall he accorded to him." It will be seen that these rules did not provide that the board was under any duty to act judicially or hear the party concerned before giving their decision, but the Privy Council held that the Board exercised a quasi judicial function and were "judges, not inquisitors." 11. In Rex. v. Monchester Legal Aid Committee the Court of the Queen Bench held that "an administrative body in ascertaining facts or law may be under a duty to act judicially notwithstanding that its proceedings have none of the formalities of and are not in accordance with the practice of a court of law." 12. It is thus clear that the absence of any express words imposing a duty to act judicially is not conclusive and other circumstances have to be considered, including the nature and purpose of the function, the effect of the decision on the rights of the parties concerned, any other indications in the statute. 13. Applying these principles to the powers of the State Government to interfere with the order of the Commissioner granting or refusing the landlord permission to sue, the following facts must be borne in mind. 13. Applying these principles to the powers of the State Government to interfere with the order of the Commissioner granting or refusing the landlord permission to sue, the following facts must be borne in mind. The U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act was passed, as stated in the Preamble, to deal with the shortage of accommodation in Uttar Pradesh and to provide, inter alia, for powers to prevent the eviction of the tenants. To evict a tenant means to terminate his tenancy and dispossess him. A power to prevent the eviction of tenants, therefore, means a power to prevent the landlord from interfering with the tenancy rights of the tenant. This power is conferred by Sec. 3 of the Act which bears the title "Restrictions on Eviction." It provides in effect that, excepting seven classes of cases specified in the Section, the landlord shall not file a suit for the eviction of the tenant without the permission of the District Magistrate. Thus the District Magistrate is invested with the power to decide in each case whether or not the landlord should be permitted to interfere with the tenancy rights of the tenant. From the very, nature of this power it is obvious that it can be exercised only when there is a landlord and a tenant, and the landlord contends that he is entitled to terminate the tenancy rights of the tenant while the latter contends that he is not. The District Magistrate has to decide after taking into consideration all the relevant circumstances whether in spite of the shortage of the accommodation, the landlord should be permitted to terminate his tenancy rights of the tenant. The effect of the District Magistrate's decision may be to deprive the tenant of a very valuable right which was described by the Supreme Court as the "right to statutory protection against eviction" P.J. Irani v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1731. Thus all the elements of a dispute or lis are present whenever the District Magistrate makes his decision. The existence of the dispute is recognised by the statute itself, for sub-Sec. (2) provides that where an application has been made to the District Magistrate for permission to sue a tenant for eviction from any accommodation and the District Magistrate grants or refuses to grant the permission, the party aggrieved by his order may within thirty clays. . . . . . . apply to the Commissioner to revise the order." This provision makes it clear that the power of the District Magistrate to decide whether the tenancy rights of a tenant should be terminated can initiated exercised only in proceedings initiated by an application by the landlord which must terminate to the detriment of one of the parties who will be the person aggrieved by the D. M.'s decision and entitled to apply to the Commissioner to revise the order. Sub-Section (3) requires the Commissioner to hear the revision and empowers him, and in case he is not satisfied that the order of the District Magistrate is legal or proper or correct, to alter or reverse it or make such other order as may be just and proper. It is beyond dispute that the Commissioner acts judicially when deciding a revision under sub-Sec. (3). 14. It is in this context that the nature of the power of the State Government under Sec, 7-F to interfere with the decision of the Commissioner must be examined. That section provides that "the State Government may call for the record of any case granting or refusing to grant permission for the filing of a suit for eviction referred to in Sec. 3 or requiring any accommodation to be let or not to be let to any person under Sec. 7 or directing a person to vacate any accommodation under Sec. 7-A and , may make such order as appears to it necessary, for the ends of justice." The section empowers the State Government to interfere in three class of cases, but I am only concerned with the first of these three namely, where an order granting or refusing to grant permission for the filing of a suit for ejectment has been passed. The State Government before exercising its powers of interference has to call for the record of the case and decide whether it is necessary for the ends of justice to make any order interfering with the decision already made. The existence of a previous decision is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of interference under Sec. 7-F and the State Government can interfere only if it finds that "it is necessary for the ends of justice" to alter or reverse the decision. The existence of a previous decision is a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of interference under Sec. 7-F and the State Government can interfere only if it finds that "it is necessary for the ends of justice" to alter or reverse the decision. The words "ends of justice" occur in Sec. 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the words "to secure the ends of justice" in Sec. 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The phrase "to secure the ends of justice" is usually employed when a court or a tribunal is invested with the power to make decisions in the interests of justice in disputed matters. It must be presumed that the U, P. Legislature was aware of the usual meaning of these words when they created an authority above the Commissioner and invested it with the power to interfere with his quasi-judicial orders granting or refusing to grant permission and to pass such orders as "appears to it necessary for the ends of justice." 15. The nature of the power of interference under Sec. 7-F must be determined in the light of the object and purpose of the Act and of the other sections. The express purpose and object of the Act is to safeguard the rights of the tenants and prevent the landlords from interfering with their tenancy rights. With this object in view, the Act creates a hierarchy of tribunals with power to decide in each particular case whether the landlord should be permitted to interfere with the tenant's right to occupy the accommodation, the decision of each lower authority being subject to revision by the one above it. Sec. 3 empowers the District Magistrate to entertain an application by a landlord for permission to terminate his tenancy rights. He has to decide whether the landlord should or should not be permitted to do so, and whether the tenant should or should not be deprived of the protection of the statute. But his decision is not final and the persons aggrieved by it has the right to file a revision before the Commissioner who has the power to alter or reverse the District Magistrate's order. But his decision is not final and the persons aggrieved by it has the right to file a revision before the Commissioner who has the power to alter or reverse the District Magistrate's order. Even the Commissioner's decision is not final but can be altered or reversed by the State Government which can call for the record of the ease and pass such orders as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice. The intention of the legislature to prevent the arbitrary eviction of the tenant by the landlord is obvious from the elaborate safeguards provided in Sec. 3 which includes proceedings before the District Magistrate and a right of revision before the Commissioner. Sec. 7-F was included for the first time by the Amending Act 29 of 1952 and empowered the State Government to interfere with the quasi-judicial order of the Commissioner granting or refusing to grant the permission, but I do not think that it was the intention of the legislature in enacting this section to create an executive authority at the top with powers to reverse the judicial decision of the authority below, It is not uncommon for the legislature to make laws providing for a judicial review of executive decisions. But I knew of no instance of a law providing for a review by the executive of a judicial or quasi-judicial decision. Such an interpretation of Sec. 7-F offends against all accepted principles of jurisprudence, and, therefore, the presumption must be that where a law creates a tribunal with judicial functions and a higher authority to review the decisions of that Tribunal, the higher authority is required to act judicially the tribunal whose decision it reverses or alters. In the present case, the presumption is strengthened by the language of Sec. 7-F which provides that the reviewing authority may call for the record of "a case" in which a decision in favour of either party to the dispute has been made and interfere with that decision by passing such orders as may appear to it necessary "in the ends of justice." It must be further presumed that it could not have been the intention of the legislature, after passing a law providing for safeguards against the tenants arbitrary eviction of the landlord, to add a subsequent provision which would substitute the arbitrary whims of the State Government for the arbitrary will of the landlord." 16. It is important to remember that Sec. 7-F was inserted in the Act in 1952 - that is, after the commencement of Constitution providing for a guarantee of the equality before the law, the equal protection of the laws, and further effective guarantees against discriminatory legislation or any law investing the State with arbitrary and uncontrolled power to dis-criminate between persons or things similarly situate and therefore vitiated by an inherent vice. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 538 (548-49). 17. I shall now consider some of the previous decisions on the nature of the power under Sec. 7-F. The leading decision is that in Narottam Saran's case, AIR 1954 Allahabad 232 and the other two decisions merely followed it without any discussion. In Narottam Saran v. Government of U.P., AIR 1954 Allahabad 232, the discussion on this point consists of exactly nine lines. After quoting - Sec. 7-F, the learned Judges observed. "It is clear that the State Government is given absolute discretion to pass any order it considers necessary for the ends of justice on perusal of the order. The State Government is not required to give notice to the parties or to afford them opportunities to lay their case before it or to argue their case before it. In passing such a discretionary order the State Government cannot be said to act in a quasi-judicial capacity." Thus the view of the Bench was based on one fact alone that the Section did not expressly require the Government to give notice to the parties and hear them before making their decision but gave it absolute discretion to decide the matter as it liked. This order was made in 1953, With profound respect, since then much judicial water has flown from the Supreme Court washing away the foundations of this decision. This order was made in 1953, With profound respect, since then much judicial water has flown from the Supreme Court washing away the foundations of this decision. According to the law declared by the Supreme Court in Ghanshyamdas Gupta's case, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1110 the express language of the statute is only one of the factors to be considered, the others being the nature of the rights affected the effect of the decision on the persons affected and other indicia, and a duty to act judicially may arise even though "there is no procedure provided as to how the (authority) will act and there is no express provision requiring (it) to call for an explanation." In Narottam Saran's case no attempt was made to consider any factor ether than the words of the Section. Furthermore, the learned Judges in holding that the Section gave the Government "an absolute discretion to pass any order it considers necessary for the ends of justice" overlooked that such an interpretation of the powers of the State Government under Sec. 7-F would render the Section itself unconstitutional on the ground that it confers an arbitrary power without any guiding principle to control it and therefore "discrimination is inherent in statute itself." Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 538 (548-49). 18. The learned judges who decided Narottam Saran's case did not have the benefit of guidance from Ghanshyam Das Gupta's and Ram Krishna Dahnia's cases both of which were decided several years later. With deep respect, I would hold that Sec. 7-F can be held constitutional only if the Power conferred but it is controlled by some guiding principles and these are to be found in the Preamble of the Act which declares its purpose - namely, to present the landlord from evicting the tenant (and thus interfering with his tenancy rights). P. J. Irani v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1731. In Virendra Swarup Johari v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1731 and Sheikh Rafiuddin v. Govt. of U.P. Lucknow, 1956 A.L.J. 329 the Bench concerned merely followed the decision in Narottam Saran's case without considering the question in accordance with the principles subsequently declared by the Supreme Court in Ghanshyamdas Gupta's case. 19. In Virendra Swarup Johari v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1731 and Sheikh Rafiuddin v. Govt. of U.P. Lucknow, 1956 A.L.J. 329 the Bench concerned merely followed the decision in Narottam Saran's case without considering the question in accordance with the principles subsequently declared by the Supreme Court in Ghanshyamdas Gupta's case. 19. A few other decisions require respectful consideration as they contain observation on the nature of the power under Sec. 7-F. In Ram Gopal v. Ram Kumar, 1962 A. L. J. 532, which was an appeal from my decision, it was observed that Sec. 7-F does not require that the order passed by the State Government should be a speaking order. Thin observation requires reconsideration in view of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in P.J. Irani v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1731 a case under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 - that where the preamble and operative provisions of the statute provide enough guidance for the exercise of the discretionary power vested in Government, any individual order of Government can be reviewed by the Court for ascertaining whether it was made on grounds germane or relevant to the Act and the High Court would be justified in calling for reasons which induced the Government to make its decision and examine whether the reasons saved the exemption in favour of a particular landlord from being discriminatory or not. 20. In Parmeshwar Dayal v. Additional Commissioner, 1963 A.L.J. 296 (F.B.), Desai, C. J. observed that "7-F does not lay down how the State Government are to decide whether permission should be granted to the landlord for filing a suit for the tenant's eviction and evidently the matter has been left at their absolute discretion." The learned Chief Justice also held in effect that the State Government is not required to consider the tenant's need before deciding whether the landlord should he granted or refused permission to sue the tenant for ejectment. With deep respect, as laid down by the Supreme Court in P.J. Irani v State of Madras, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1731, the Preamble and in the object and the purpose of the Act control the exercise of the power, and as this purpose is to give the tenant statutory protection against eviction , "his inability to find alternative accommodation is a relevant matter" in considering whether the landlord should be permitted to evict him. In P.J. Irani's case, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1731 the Madras High Court quashed the decision of Government "Because the State Govt. had failed to take into account" this point and the Supreme Court upheld this decision. 21. The learned Chief Justice also observed that if a landlord would have been entitled to be allotted the accommodation if it had been vacant, he should be permitted to evict the tenant." Again with deep respect, in a case under Rule 6 the accommodation is vacant and there is no tenant whose rights need protection whereas in an application by the landlord under Sec. 3, the tenancy rights of a tenant require protection. R. 6 and the Sec. 3 deal with fundamentally different cases. 22. For these reasons I am of the opinion that the decision in Narottam Saran's case, AIR 1954 Allahabad 232 and the other two decisions which are based on it require re-consideration. The question before me is whether I should refer this point to a larger Bench or decide the appeal on another ground - namely, that the commissioner's orders cancelling his previous order refusing permission is invalid as it was passed without giving the appellants an opportunity to show cause against it. 23. After the above portion of the judgment had been dictated in Court on the previous day, I read overnight a judgment of the Supreme Court in Lakshman Purshottam Pimputkar v. State of Bombay, C.A. No. 206 of 1960; decided on 13-12-1962 which is unreported yet but of which a "blue print" has been sent to this Court. 23. After the above portion of the judgment had been dictated in Court on the previous day, I read overnight a judgment of the Supreme Court in Lakshman Purshottam Pimputkar v. State of Bombay, C.A. No. 206 of 1960; decided on 13-12-1962 which is unreported yet but of which a "blue print" has been sent to this Court. In that case the Supreme Court held that "when an authority exercises its revisional powers it necessarily acts in a quasi-judicial capacity." The Court had to consider the powers of the Government of the State of Bombay under Sec. 79 of the Watan Act which provides that the State Government may call for and examine the record of the proceedings of any officer for the purpose of sati::- lying itself as to legality or propriety of any order passed and may reverse or modify the order as it deems fit. The provision of Sec. 79 of the Watan Act are almost identical with that of Sec. 7-F of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act; but even if they were not, the law declared by the Supreme Court is in general terms and applies to all cases where an authority exercises revisional powers. A fortiori, it applies to a case where an authority is given the power to revise the decision of a quasi-judicial tribunal. 24. In view of the law declared by the Supreme Court, which takes precedence over the decisions of all other courts and is binding on me under Article 141 of the Constitution, it is not necessary for me to refer this case to larger bench. Following the precedent in Dr. Ishwari Prasad v. Registrar, University of Allahabad, AIR 1955 Allahabad 131 = 1955 A.L.J. 244 when Mootham, J. ignored a decision of a Full Bench of this Court in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court, I am of the opinion that the decision in Narottatti Saran v. Govt. of U.P., AIR 1954 Allahabad 232, V.S. Johri v. State of U.P., 1962 A.L.J. 672, Sheik Refiuddin v. Govt. of U.P., AIR 1954 Allahabad 232, V.S. Johri v. State of U.P., 1962 A.L.J. 672, Sheik Refiuddin v. Govt. of U.P., holding that the State Government does not act in a quasi-judicial capacity when revising the orders of the Commissioner granting or refusing the landlord permission to sue for ejectment of the tenant is no longer good law, and I am bound to hold, and hereby do hold, that the State Government is under a duty to act judicially when in the exercise of its powers under Sec. 7-F of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, it calls for the record of any case in which the Commissioner has granted or refused permission to sue the tenant for ejectment and reverses or alters the decision of the Commissioner. It follows that the State Government before making its decision under Sec. 7-F must observe the principles of natural justice and give an opportunity to the parties affected to show cause, and if it does not, its order will be invalid. 25. In the present case, it is common ground that the State Government gave no opportunity to the appellants before reversing the order of the Commissioner and making a decision adverse to them. Its decision is therefore invalid. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the State Government has the power under Sec. 7-F to remand the case to the Commissioner and ask him to review or reconsider his previous order, instead of deciding the case it-self. As observed by the Supreme Court in Lakshman Purshottarn Piputkar's case, C.A. No. 206 of 1960; decided on 13-12-1962 finality attaches to a quasi-judicial decision and there is no power, of review "in the absence of any express provision empowering (the authority) to review its own order." I am doubtful whether the words "or pass such order" in Sec. 7-F include the power to remand a case to the Commissioner for the purpose of a re-hearing and am inclined to the view that the State Government is required to make the final decision itself - whatever it may be after examining the record of the case. There is no inherent power of remand or review in the case of quasi-judicial Tribunals. 26. The order of the Commissioner dated 28-7-1953 granting permission "as directed" and cancelling his previous order dated 4-2-1953 refusing permission is also illegal. There is no inherent power of remand or review in the case of quasi-judicial Tribunals. 26. The order of the Commissioner dated 28-7-1953 granting permission "as directed" and cancelling his previous order dated 4-2-1953 refusing permission is also illegal. It is well settled that the Commissioner, when exercising his revisional powers under Sec. 3 of the Act, is under a duty to acts judicially, it follows that if he reconsiders or alters his previous decision to the prejudice of a party, he must act judicially and give an opportunity to the party concerned to show cause against the revised decision. It is conceded that in this case the Commissioner of Agra did not hear the appellants or give them any opportunity to show cause before cancelling his previous order. It is obvious that the appellants were prejudiced by not being heard, for they were given no opportunity of showing that even within the limits of the State Government's direction they might be permitted to occupy the accommodation for sometime till they could make an alternative arrangement. The order of the Commissioner being passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is invalid. It is also invalid because he cancelled his previous order and granted permission "as directed," and without applying his mind to questions which were left to his discretion as for example, whether the appellants should be given some time to enable them to find another accommodation. The result is that the permission granted under these two orders is void and ineffective and the suit for ejectment must be deemed to have been filed without permission and therefore incompetent. 27. Mr. Kackar argued in the alternative that the plaintiff-respondents are entitled to rely on the order of the A.D.M. dated 9-12-1962 (Ext. 55) granting the landlord permission under Sec. 3. Learned counsel contended that this order was illegally set aside by the Commissioner who had no power to interfere with it under the law as it stood at the time. But the counsel for the appellants have objected that the plaintiff-respondents should not be permitted to take up a new case at the stage of second appeal as this would prejudice the appellants seriously. But the counsel for the appellants have objected that the plaintiff-respondents should not be permitted to take up a new case at the stage of second appeal as this would prejudice the appellants seriously. It was argued that had this plea been taken in the courts below the appellants would have shown that the order of the A.D.M. itself was without jurisdiction, as it was passed on an application to set aside the order of the R.C. and E.O. Unfortunately for the respondents there is considerable force in this objection I have perused the two applications filed by the plaintiff landlord before the A.D.M. These are Ens. 28 and 44. In both of them the order of the R.C. and E.O. refusing the landlord permission was assailed on various grounds and the applicant prayed for the reversal of this decision and grant of the permission by the A.D.M's. It is not clear whether the A.D.M's. order was passed on the application dated 16-8-1952 or 16-9-1952. Mr. Kackar tried to argue that the later application was a fresh application and that the attack on the R.C. and E.O's decision was not a vital part of it. But learned counsel in the end had to concede that the question whether the order of the A.D.M. was passed on a fresh application for permission or on an application in revision requires additional evidence which is not before this Court. In these circumstances, I cannot entertain this plea. 28. The result must be that the plaintiff-respondent's suit for ejectment must fail as having been filed under a permission which was not valid. I allow this appeal, reverse the decision of the lower appellate court and dismiss the plaintiff-respondent's suit for ejectment. In the circumstances of the case however I direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout.