ORDER P. Govinda Menon, J. 1. The petitioner was convicted by the Sub Divisional Magistrate of Hosdrug for offences of criminal breach of trust and falsification of accounts. On appeal the learned Sessions Judge of Tellicherry set aside the conviction and sentence under section 477-A I.P.C., as there was no requisite sanction under section 197 Crl. P.C, but confirmed the conviction and sentence under section 409 I.P.C. The accused has, therefore, come up in revision to this court. 2. The charge against the accused was that on 17th September 1957 in his capacity as a public servant being the clerk in the Government College, Kasaragod he was entrusted with a sum of Rs. 428.06 and that he misappropriated the amount for his own use and to cover up the fraud he falsified the accounts maintained in the college. The accused was a clerk in the office of the Government College, Kasaragod during the period 22nd July 1957 and 15th November 1957. P.W. 8 was then the Principal of the College. He has deposed that the accused was the sole clerk in the office, that he was himself receiving and disbursing the monies and maintaining the accounts; that Ext. P-2 the cash book used to be written by the accused, that it used to be put up before him at the end of the day and that he used to verify and sign the cash book. P.W. 7 was the attender of the college at the relevant time and he was the person who used to go to the treasury and cash bills. 3. Towards the value of certain books purchased by the college from Mangalodayam Company Limited, Trithur a sum of Rs. 428.06 had to be paid. Ext. P-3 is the invoice. For payment of this amount and also for another sum of Rs. 33.81 a contingent bill was drawn on 17th September 1957. The sum of Rs. 33.81 was to be received in cash and Rs. 428.06 had to be obtained by way of draft to be sent to the Mangalodayam Company, but the entire amount of the bill was actually received in cash from the treasury. P.W. 7 the attender's evidence and the treasury officer's evidence show that actual cash for the entire bill was paid by the treasury to P.W. 7. 428.06 had to be obtained by way of draft to be sent to the Mangalodayam Company, but the entire amount of the bill was actually received in cash from the treasury. P.W. 7 the attender's evidence and the treasury officer's evidence show that actual cash for the entire bill was paid by the treasury to P.W. 7. P.W. 7 has deposed that the entire money under the bill was received in cash and as usual he had handed over the same to the accused. That is not denied by the accused. The cash book written in the handwriting of the accused however, shows that only Rs. 33.81 had been received in cash and the sum of Rs. 428.06 has been received by way of draft. Ext. P-4 the despatch register of the college shows that a letter had been sent to the Trichur company, probably to show that the draft had been sent along with it. P.W. 6 the manager of the company has sworn that no such letter or draft was received by him. 4. P.W. 2, the Principal who succeeded P.W. 8 has given evidence that after he took charge, the Accountant-General's Office raised an objection that the payee's receipt for payment made to the Mangalodayam Company for purchase of the books had not been received by him. The company was addressed and Exts. P-5 and P-5 (a) are the two letters in December 1957 and Exts. P-6 and P-7 are the two replies from the company stating that they had not till then received any money. 5. When questioned on the prosecution evidence the accused admitted that the bill was drawn, that the Cash had been handed over to him by P.W. 7, but his case was that he had then and there handed over the money to the Principal. 6. The question for decision is whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving that the accused after having received the amount from the treasury had misappropriated the money to his own use. His evidence that he had paid the money to P.W. 8 is patently false. If really he had done so, there is no explanation for his writing in Ext. P-2 that the dues to the Mangalodayam Company had been sent by draft. His evidence that he had paid the money to P.W. 8 is patently false. If really he had done so, there is no explanation for his writing in Ext. P-2 that the dues to the Mangalodayam Company had been sent by draft. It is amply proved and is not disputed that the entry in the cash book is in the handwriting of the accused and he has no explanation for this false entry made by him. 7. P.W. 5 is the Head-Clerk who succeeded the accused and he has given evidence that he had written a private letter to the accused intimating about non-payment of the amount to the company and the accused had sent him a reply enclosing the receipt from the company. That receipt is Ext. P-11. It is unfortunate that P.W. 5 had not preserved the letter of the accused or the cover. 8. However, Ext. P-11 is admittedly the receipt issued by the company for having received the payment. P.W. 6, the manage of the company has sworn that the money was actually paid to the company only on 28-12-1957. He has proved the Day Book of the company, Ext. P-15 and Ext. P-15 (a) is the relevant entry. He has given evidence that the amount was brought by a person who said that he was a clerk in the Government College, Kasaragod, but he is not able to identify whether it was the accused himself who brought the money. He further stated that the person who brought the money wanted an ante-dated receipt which he refused to give. He has identified Ext. P-11 as the receipt given by him, but he stated that the date is now seen altered. The correct date, he stated, is what is seen in the Day Book entry Ext. P-15 (a). Ext. P-17 is the inner foil of the receipt book and Ext. P-17 (a) is receipt No. 372, dated 28th December 1957 which also shows that the amount was received only on 28th December 1957. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the money was paid to the company only on 28th December 1957. If the version of P.W. 5 is true, and we do not find any reason to doubt his evidence, the receipt Ext. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the money was paid to the company only on 28th December 1957. If the version of P.W. 5 is true, and we do not find any reason to doubt his evidence, the receipt Ext. P-11 was forwarded to him by the accused and so he must have been the person who had paid the amount to the Mangalodayam Company and obtained the receipt Ext. P-11. No doubt the accused denies having sent the receipt, but nobody else is interested in paying the amount to the company and obtaining a receipt and forwarding the same to the college. 9. Along with this, we may also see Exts. P-20 and P-21 the explanation given by the accused to the Department. There his case was that the amount due to the company was paid in cash on 17th September 1957 to the company's travelling representative. Exts. P-20 and P-21 would show that his case then was not that he had paid the amount to the Principal but his case was that after obtaining the orders of the Principal to pay the amount to the travelling representative he himself paid the amount to the representative and got a voucher. P.W. 8, the Principal has sworn that no amount was paid to him and that no amount was paid to any travelling representative under his orders. P.W. 6, the manager of the company has also categorically stated that they had no travelling representative at all and that no amount was paid. 10. Reference may, in this connection, be made to another significant letter Ext, P-22 sent by the accused to P.W. 8. The letter is dated 15th May 1960. In that letter it was stated that the explanation of the accused Ext. P-21 was being forwarded to the Principal, P.W. 8, for remarks and the accused has suggested to the Principal that the reply may be as follows: " I will be saved if you offer your remarks stating that ' touring representatives ' of certain firms used to visit the college occasionally for cash payments. In this case payment might have been made in cash by the Head Clerk to the touring representative of Messrs. Mangalodayam and receipt obtained. In this case payment might have been made in cash by the Head Clerk to the touring representative of Messrs. Mangalodayam and receipt obtained. These remarks will not be in any way harmful to you and thus you could save this poor man and his family." That this letter is sent by the accused is admitted by him. It will falsify the theory that the amount in question was ever paid or retained by the Principal. His case was only that he had paid it to the travelling representative and he tried to persuade P.W. 8 to support his version. 11. Thus on a careful consideration of the entire evidence we have no hesitation in finding that the amount which had been drawn from the treasury and entrusted to the accused for payment to the Mangalodayam Company was utilised by him for his own use till he paid the amount to the company on 28th December 1957. The courts below have concurrently found that the money had been entrusted to the accused and that he had misappropriated the amount and on the evidence the conclusion is well justified. 12. Now the only question that remains to be considered is whether under section 197 Cr. P.C, the court could not have taken cognizance of the offence without the previous sanction of the State Government as contended by the learned counsel for the accused. To determine the question whether sanction is required it will be necessary to refer to the principles established by authoritative pronouncements on the subject. The earliest decision on the subject is the case in Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor A.I.R. 1939 F.C. 43. In that case a Sub- Assistant Surgeon was charged under section 409 I.P.C. and the question that arose for decision was whether sanction under section 270 of the Government of India Act, 1935 which is similar in terms to section 197 (1) Cr. P.C, was necessary. Admittedly no sanction had been obtained from the Government. It was held that the charge under section 477-A required sanction but that no sanction was required for a charge under section 409 because, " the official capacity is material only in connection with the 'entrustment' and does not necessarily enter into the later act of misappropriation or conversion, which is the act complained of ". 13. It was held that the charge under section 477-A required sanction but that no sanction was required for a charge under section 409 because, " the official capacity is material only in connection with the 'entrustment' and does not necessarily enter into the later act of misappropriation or conversion, which is the act complained of ". 13. That case was followed by the case in H. H. B. Gill v. The King A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 128. In that case the question arose directly with reference to section 197 (1) Crl. P.C. There the accused was charged for taking bribes and on the question whether sanction was necessary, Lord Simonds approving the statement of the law by Varadachariar, J., in Hori Ram Singh v. Emperor (cited supra) observed: " A public servant can only be said to act or to purport to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is such as to lie within the scope of his official duty.... The test may well be whether the public servant, if challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he does, he does in virtue of his office. " It was accordingly held that his act of taking bribes for which the accused was prosecuted could not be justified as done by virtue of his office and no sanction was necessary. This view was followed by the Privy Council in Albert West Meads v. The King A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 156 and reaffirmed in Phanindra Chandra v. The King A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 117. 14. The question whether sanction was necessary for an offence under section 409 was elaborately considered in the case in Amrik Singh v. The State of Pepsu A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 309. 14. The question whether sanction was necessary for an offence under section 409 was elaborately considered in the case in Amrik Singh v. The State of Pepsu A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 309. His Lordship Venkatarama Iyer, J., discussed the earlier cases of the Federal Court and that of the Privy Council and summed up the position as follows: " It is not every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under section 197 (1), Criminal Procedure Code; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary ; and that would be so, irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of his duties, because that w6uld really be a matter of defence on the merits; which would have to be investigated at the trial and could not arise at the stage of the grant of sanction which must precede the institution of the prosecution. " Same view was taken in another case in Shreehantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 287. 15. This case was followed by the case in Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari A.I.R. 1966 S.C 44. In that case the learned Judge stated: " The offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. No question of sanction can arise under section 197, unless the act complained of is an offence, the only point to determine is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. " It was further observed: "The result of the foregoing discussion is this: There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty". 16. In a subsequent case in Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 458 Govinda Menon, J., held that a Public Servant committing criminal breach of trust does not normally act in his capacity as a public servant and that no sanction is necessary for prosecuting him. 17. These decisions have been followed in a Division Bench ruling of this Court in Vaidyanatha Ayyar v. State of Kerala, 1961 K.L.T. 144 to which one of us was a party. It was held that for the prosecution of the President of the Panchayat Board for criminal breach of trust no sanction of the State Government was necessary. 18. Another case that may usefully be referred to is the case in Satwant Singh v. The State of Punjab 1960 S.C. 266 at p.271. There it was stated : " It appears to us to be clear that some offences cannot by their very nature be regarded as having been committed by public servants, while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty. For instance, acceptance of a bribe, an offence punishable under section 161 of Indian Penal Code, is one of them and the offence of cheating or abetment thereof is another. We have no hesitation in saying that where a public servant commits the offence of cheating or abets another so to cheat, the offence committed by him is not one while he is acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, as such offences have no necessary connection, between them and the performance, of the duties of a public servant, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the commission of the offences." 19. What we have, therefore, to see is whether the act of the accused, namely misappropriation and the official duty are so interrelated that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty, though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation. In the light of the well settled principles laid down in all these decisions it cannot be contended that the act complained of, namely misappropriation of the money entrusted to the accused was done in the performance of his official duties and clearly no sanction is necessary for prosecuting the accused in this case for an offence under section 409 I.P.C. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred us to another decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sankarankutty Menon v. Dy.S.P.,Trichur and others 1961 K.L.T. 208 to which one of us was a party and it was contended that we are bound by the decision and in case we are not prepared to agree with the principle of law laid down therein, the case has to be referred to a larger Bench. What is contended is, that the decision has laid down, that sanction was imperative in a case of breach of trust by a public servant. No such general proposition has been laid down in that case. Learned counsel pointed out, that in that case, the accused was the Head Accountant in the office of the Assistant Supply Officer, Ernakulam, that he was entrusted with money in his capacity as a public servant for the purpose of disbursing the amount to one Padmanabha Prabhu for the value of petrol supplied to the Government, that instead of paying the amount, the accused misappropriated the amount and falsified the accounts showing that the money had actually been paid to the party and it was held that sanction was necessary under section 197 (1) Crl. P.C. and for want of sanction, the charge was quashed. It was submitted that there is no difference whatsoever, between the facts of that case and the facts of this case. A reading of that decision would show that the entire case-law has been reviewed and that the decision of this Court in 1961 K.L.T. 144 (cited supra) was approved and followed. It was submitted that there is no difference whatsoever, between the facts of that case and the facts of this case. A reading of that decision would show that the entire case-law has been reviewed and that the decision of this Court in 1961 K.L.T. 144 (cited supra) was approved and followed. It has been stated in the decision that an offence under section 409 cannot normally be committed by a public servant acting in the discharge of his duties or purporting to act in his official capacity. The learned Judge further stated that the facts of each case have to be gone into and the test must be, to find out whether from the facts and circumstances of the case the act complained of is so integrally connected with the duties attached to the office, as to be inseparable from them in which case sanction would be necessary. This is exactly the view taken by the earlier Bench decision of this Court following the decisions of the Ahammed Federal Court, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court. The fact that in the application of this rule, it was held in a particular case that sanction was necessary cannot affect the legal position. Learned counsel for the accused can make use of that particular decision only by way of illustration, but not by way of an appeal to precedent, because on the facts no two cases can be similar. Each case has its own peculiar facts and it is, therefore, not permissible to appeal to precedents on questions of fact. We are not called upon to express any opinion whether on the facts of that case, it should have been held that sanction was not necessary. Anyway merely because in that case it was found that sanction was necessary, is no ground in a clear case like this, to hold that the prosecution is vitiated for want of sanction. In this case where the offence complained of is that the accused misappropriated the amount entrusted to him in his capacity as a public servant, it cannot be stated that in committing misappropriation he was acting in the discharge of his official duties. The act of misappropriation has no reasonable connection with the discharge of official duty and the official duty has only furnished the accused an occasion or an opportunity for the commission of the offence. The act of misappropriation has no reasonable connection with the discharge of official duty and the official duty has only furnished the accused an occasion or an opportunity for the commission of the offence. We, therefore, repel the contention raised by the learned counsel that sanction was necessary before prosecution is launched against the accused. In the result the conviction and sentence passed on the accused are confirmed and the revision petition is dismissed.