SOMNATH AYYAR, J. ( 1 ) THE Complaint made in this case by the petitioner who was a driver in the Mysore government Road Transport Department and who was dismissed by an order made by the general manager on 27 February, 1961, is that he has been punished more than once for the same act of misconduct. The question it is so. ( 2 ) ON 7 March, 1960, the deputy general manager made an order suspending the petitioner for a period of seven days and the ground on which he was so suspended was that he had obstructed an octroi mutsaddi from performing his official duty and had belaboured him and his peon. It is seen that when the deputy general manager imposed that punishment on the petitioner, the petitioner had already been convicted by the Stationary Sub-Magistrate, Bellary, in Criminal case No. 816 of 1958 by his judgment which he rendered on 23 November, 1959, of an offence of assault punishable under S. 353 of the Penal Code. The sentence imposed by the Magistrate on the petitioner was a fine of Rs. 50 which reduced in appeal to Rs. 25. The argument advanced is that when the deputy general manager imposed a punishment of suspension on 7 March, 1960, he was fully aware of the conviction of the petitioner by the Bellary Magistrate and that if nevertheless the deputy general manager only imposed a punishment of suspension, it was not within the power of the general manager to impose another punishment for the same misconduct for which he had already been punished by the deputy general manager. ( 3 ) IT seems to me that the presentation of the case in that way for the petitioner can have no answer. It is clear from the order made by the deputy general manager on 7 March, 1960 that the punishment of suspension was imposed upon the petitioner for the misconduct consisting of obstruction offered by the petitioner to the performance of the official duties of the octroi mutsaddi and the assault made on him and his peon. This is how the order reads : "read : charge Memos. Nos. This is how the order reads : "read : charge Memos. Nos. T. 6451 and 6452\57-8, dated 24 February, 1958, issued to Settappa, driver, and Kempanna, conductor, for preventing mutsaddi form checking octroi goods and for assaulting him and the peon by beating them several on 29 January, 1959 and the explanation of the running staff thereon. ORDER settappa, driver, and, L. Kempanna, conductor, are suspended for seven days each. (Sd.) ------, deputy General Manager. "Settappa referred to in this order is the petitioner. ( 4 ) IT is not disputed that the offence of which the petitioner was convicted by the Bellary stationary Sub-Magistrate was the offence of the very same assault on the octroi mutsaddi which formed the subject-matter of the charge leading to the suspension of the petitioner by the deputy general manager. The question is whether the petitioner could once be suspended for that misconduct and again be dismissed on the second occasion in respect of the same misconduct. ( 5 ) MR. Government Pleader suggested to us that it was not right to think the petitioner was dismissed for the same act of misconduct for which he had been suspended by the deputy general manager. It said that the suspension on the first occasion was for the assault on the octroi mutsaddi and the obstruction to the performance of official duties by him and that the punishment of dismissal on the second was imposed because the petitioner had been convicted of a criminal charge by the Bellary Stationary Sub-Magistrate. ( 6 ) IT is clear that the argument presented cannot succeed since that argument overlooks the clear meaning of proviso (a) to Clause (2) of Art. 311 of the Constitution which is obviously the foundation of the argument. The relevant part of Art. 311 reads : "article 311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.- (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing causes against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him : provided that this clause shall not apply - (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct has to led to his conviction on a criminal charge; * * *" it is clear from the provisions of proviso (a) to Clause (2) of Art. 311 referred to above that it is not the conviction of a Government servant which authorizes a punishment and that such punishment can be imposed only on the ground of conduct which had led to such conviction. Even in cases to which this clause of the proviso is applicable, the punishment which may be imposed without the observance of the provisions of Clause (2) of Art. 311, is for the conduct which led to the conviction on a criminal charge and not for the conviction. The punishment is imposed because the Government servant is convicted but because of his conduct for which he was so convicted. In that view of the matter, the reason for the dismissal of the petitioner on the second occasion was the same as that which formed the foundation for the imposition of a punishment of suspension on the first. ( 7 ) THERE can thus be no doubt that the disciplinary authority punished the petitioner more than once for the same act of delinquency on his part. Mr. Government Pleader cannot draw any sustenance for his contention to the contrary from any of the standing orders of the Mysore government Road Transport Department in which the petitioner was an employee by which he was governed. Standing order (n) of Chap. XII (2) of the Mysore Government Road Transport department standing orders on which Mr. Government pleader depends reads : "chapter XII (2) - Misconduct. Standing order (n) of Chap. XII (2) of the Mysore Government Road Transport department standing orders on which Mr. Government pleader depends reads : "chapter XII (2) - Misconduct. The following general acts of omission shall be treated as misconduct and shall apply to all the employees of the Road Transport Department : (n) Award of punishment by any lawful Court for any criminal offence involving moral turpitude; although this clause of the standing order refers to the award of punishment by a Court as a ground for the imposition of a punishment, what is abundantly clear is that that clause has reference only to conduct leading to a conviction on a criminal charge to which proviso (a) of clause (2) of Art. 311 of the Constitution refers. No one can say that the award of a punishment by a criminal Court is an act of misconduct. What really is misconduct of the person on whom that punishment is imposed which was punished by the criminal Court by the imposition of a sentence. In my opinion, we should understand Clause (n) of the standing order referred to above as only authorizing punishment for misconduct leading to the conviction of the employee on a criminal charge and that that clause does not empower the disciplinary authority to impose two punishments for the same act of misconduct as was done in this case. ( 8 ) EVEN otherwise, what cannot be overcome by Mr. Government Pleader in this case is that the provisions of Art. 311 (2) which are inapplicable only to cases covered by proviso (a) to that clause do not become inapplicable to the punishment imposed by the general manager in this case even on the interpretation which was suggested to us by Mr. Government Pleader. ( 9 ) WE must, therefore, in my opinion, quash the punishment of dismissal imposed on the petitioner. An order is made accordingly. But Mr. Government Pleader says that since the Government Road Transport Department stood abolished with effect from 1 August, 1961, the fact that the petitioner was dismissed without authority on 27 February, 1961, cannot entitle him to any reinstatement since the post to which he could have been reinstated stands abolished with the abolition of the Mysore Government road Transport Department. Government Pleader says that since the Government Road Transport Department stood abolished with effect from 1 August, 1961, the fact that the petitioner was dismissed without authority on 27 February, 1961, cannot entitle him to any reinstatement since the post to which he could have been reinstated stands abolished with the abolition of the Mysore Government road Transport Department. ( 10 ) IT is clear that with the abolition of that department, the post held by the petitioner perished and that the only post to which the petitioner can if at all claim reinstatement is a post in the road Transport Corporation which took over the activities of the Road Transport Department. But the question whether the petitioner can get himself employed in the corporation is one which has to be decided by the corporation and the question whether the option which was extended to the other employees of the Road Transport Department should also be extended to the petitioner is again a question on which we should say nothing since that question is one on which the corporation has to take a decision having regard to all the circumstances of the case. We should abstain from saying anything on that matter at this stage. ( 11 ) IN the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Govinda Bhat, J. ( 12 ) I agree.