Judgment :- 1. This Civil Revision Petition has been referred to the Division Bench by a learned Single Judge of this Court for the purpose of deciding the question raised in the petition. The revision petitioner filed a petition under S.15 of Act XXXI of 1958 for a settlement of his debts. In the petition he has scheduled 29 1/2 cents of property as the asset which belonged to him and an aggregate amount of Rs. 6,969/- as the debt owing by him. The debt mentioned arose partly out of a partnership business carried on by the petitioner and by one Kunhu Moideen and partly out of transactions of the petitioner in his own individual capacity. 2. Counter Petitioners 1, 5,11,12,14 and 15 filed objections to the petition. They raised various contentions and the only material contention with which we are concerned in this revision petition is the contention raised by them that the petitioner had not shown in the petition all the assets which belonged to him. They contended that the petitioner's father had properties worth more than 15 lakhs of rupees when he was adjudicated an insolvent in I. P. No. 3/1100 of the District Court and that the petitioner was entitled to 2/9 share in the assets of his deceased father which might be available after discharge of the debts of the father by the official receiver. In the petition the petitioner expressed his willingness to surrender all the properties belonging to him to the court as required by S.15. Although he did not mention the fact that he was contingently entitled to a share in the assets of his father in the event of there being a surplus after paying off the father's creditors, there was an undertaking in the petition that he was prepared to surrender all his properties. But when he was examined as pw.1 he categorically stated in his cross-examination that he was unwilling to surrender that contingent right to the court, although in another portion of his cross-examination he had stated that he was willing to surrender the properties which the receiver took possession from his father. 3. But when he was examined as pw.1 he categorically stated in his cross-examination that he was unwilling to surrender that contingent right to the court, although in another portion of his cross-examination he had stated that he was willing to surrender the properties which the receiver took possession from his father. 3. The court below came to the conclusion that since the petitioner had not specifically shown in the petition his right to get the surplus in the properties after paying off the father's creditors in I. P. No. 3 of 1100, or expressed his willingness to surrender the same to the court when realised, the petition was not maintainable. That court also came to the conclusion that the debt due from the partnership of which the petitioner was a partner was contracted for the purchase of goods, and since that debt was specifically excluded from the definition of the word 'debt' under S.2 clause (c) of Act XXXI of 1958, he was not entitled to have it settled in these proceedings or found his petition under S.15 upon it. The other ground mentioned by the lower court for dismissing the petition was that some of the debts mentioned ' were bogus ones. In view of these facts and circumstances the court dismissed the petition. 4. The finding of the lower court that the debt contracted by the partnership for the purchase of goods was excluded from the ambit of S.15, as it is excluded from the definition of the word'debt' in the Act, has no substance in view of the rulings reported in 1960 KLT 865 and 1961 KLT 377 where it was held that the definition of the word 'debt' in S.2 clause (c) did not govern the content of that expression occurring in S.15 of the Debt Relief Act. We accept the correctness of those rulings and hold that the petitioner is entitled to have that debt also settled in accordance with the provisions of S.15. 5. The more important point raised by counsel was that there was no obligation on the part of the petitioner to have included the contingent right which the petitioner has to participate in the surplus in I. P. No. 3/1100. 5. The more important point raised by counsel was that there was no obligation on the part of the petitioner to have included the contingent right which the petitioner has to participate in the surplus in I. P. No. 3/1100. Counsel contended that that was not a present right to any property vesting in the petitioner, and that it was not obligatory on him to have shown the mere possibility of getting an asset in future in the petition, and the fact that the petitioner expressed his unwillingness to surrender that contingent right to court was not a good ground for dismissing his petition. We do not think so. The right of an insolvent or his legal representative to the surplus in the assets which vested in the receiver after paying off the insolvent's creditors is a contingent right of the insolvent when he is alive, and of the legal representative when he is dead; and the petitioner being one of the legal representatives of the insolvent has a present right to share in the surplus, if any. The question whether such a right is transferable before the ascertainment whether there would be any surplus at all was considered in Bird v. Philpott (1900) 1 Ch p. 822). Farwell J. in discussing the question observed as follows at page 828: "It has been said that Ex Parte Sheffield, In re Austin, and In re Leadbitter decided that a bankrupt cannot deal with the possibility of surplus until all the debts in the first bankruptcy have been paid and the surplus has been ascertained. I do not think that these decisions decided anything to that effect at all. If they did, they would have overruled prior decisions - of the Lord Chancellor amongst others - which were not referred to and they would be, in my opinion, contrary to the whole spirit and principles on which the Bankruptcy Act is now built. As I read the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee takes all the bankrupt's property for an absolute estate in law, but for limited purposes namely, for the payment of the creditors under that bankruptcy, and that bankruptcy only - payment of principal and interest and all the costs of the bankruptcy. Subject to that, he is a trustee for the bankrupt of the surplus. Subject to that, he is a trustee for the bankrupt of the surplus. He as a trustee is in a better position than an ordinary trustee to the extent pointed out in Ex Parte Sheffield, In re Austin and In re Leadbitter, that is to say, the bankrupt has not the ordinary right of a cestui que trust to intervene until the surplus has been ascertained to exist, and all the creditors and interest and costs have been paid. He cannot trouble the trustee by taxing the bill of costs or interfere with the administration of the estate in any way but, subject to that and subject to his non interference with the administration and with the management of the trustee during the bankruptcy in the due course of the execution of his duty, he can, in my opinion, demand the surplus, and he has a right to the surplus - a right which he can dispose of by will or deed or otherwise during the pendency of the first bankruptcy, even before the surplus is ascertained, although such deposition will of course be ineffectual unless in the event there prove to be a surplus upon which it can operate." He quotes at page 829 the observations of Lord Westbury in Troup v, Ricardo (34 Q Ch. 91, 94) who said: "There will then follow upon universal principle, the equity that the property remaining undistributed, being, no longer required for any function of that court, falls under the general rule of law, which raises, on the part of the legal owner of property no longer required for the purposes of the conveyance to him, a trust and obligation to restore that which is not wanted to the original owner, from whom it has taken for a limited purpose. It is clear, therefore, that the surplus of an insolvent's property is subject to that law of resulting trust." The same view was expressed in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 2 at page 513, Art.1025: "The bankrupt is entitled to any surplus remaining after payment in full of his creditors with four pec cent statutory interest and of the costs, charges and expenses of the bankruptcy proceedings. 2 at page 513, Art.1025: "The bankrupt is entitled to any surplus remaining after payment in full of his creditors with four pec cent statutory interest and of the costs, charges and expenses of the bankruptcy proceedings. He cannot, however, as owner of a possible surplus interfere in the administration of the estate, though he may execute an assignment or mortgage of it which will hold good against a trustee in a second bankruptcy." In AIR. 1924 Bombay 49 the question which came up for consideration was whether a bankrupt was entitled to dispose of the surplus before the ascertainment thereof, and following the decision in Bird v. Philpott ((1900) I Ch. 822 it was held that that right is a right in praesenti capable of being transferred. It is therefore clear that this aleatory right of the petitioner which he could have transferred or otherwise dealt with was an asset and hence he ought to have expressed his willingness to surrender that asset also to the court. Not having expressed his willingness to do so the lower court was right in dismissing the petition. 6. Counsel referred us to the decisions reported in 10 Ch. D. 388, 434, AIR 1919 Allahabad 284, AIR 1952 Allahabad 328 and AIR. 1948 Allahabad 49. All these rulings relate to an altogether different question. The point considered in these rulings was whether an insolvent has any right, to interfere with the administration of the assets by the receiver and to impeach a transaction by the receiver, because he was a person entitled to a contingent surplus, and certain observations made in the course of discussions to the effect that the insolvent had no present interest in the property were relied on by counsel to substantiate the proposition that the insolvent has no present right in the surplus and therefore could not transfer or otherwise deal with the same. We are unable to reach the conclusion from these decisions that the surplus of the estate after paying the debt of the insolvent is not an asset of the insolvent, though it may be aleatory in character. In fact the rulings in 10 Ch. D. 388 and 434 were referred to, and discussed in the decision reported in 1900-1 Ch. We are unable to reach the conclusion from these decisions that the surplus of the estate after paying the debt of the insolvent is not an asset of the insolvent, though it may be aleatory in character. In fact the rulings in 10 Ch. D. 388 and 434 were referred to, and discussed in the decision reported in 1900-1 Ch. 822 already cited, and their precise import and reach considered there, and it was after considering the true metes and bounds of the principle laid down in those cases that the court came to the conclusion that the insolvent has a present right in the surplus, which he was entitled to transfer or otherwise deal with. We therefore hold that the surplus, which the insolvent may got after paying off his creditors is not a bare possibility but a present contingent right which might result in substantial asset to him or his legal representative, and an expression of willingness to surrender that right was a sine qua non to the maintainability of the petition. We really wanted to give an opportunity to the petitioner to amend his application by Including this contingent right also, and to give an undertaking that that potential right, when realised, will be placed in the custody of the court for the purpose of distribution among his present creditors. The petitioner was not willing to amend the petition or to give the undertaking. We are therefore constrained to confirm the order of the court below. 7. In the result, we dismiss this civil revision petition with costs.