Ramachandra Ayyar, C.J. - The appellant, a Councillor of the Corporation of Madras, applied to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of prohibition forbidding the Council of the Corporation of Madras from considering at its meeting to be held on 15th November, 1962, or at any subsequent meeting, the subject relating to the restoration of eight members of the Corporation who had lost their office by failing to attend the meeting of the Council for three consecutive months. That application has been rejected by Veeraswami, J., and the correctness of that decision forms the subject-matter of this appeal. Under rule 2 of Schedule II of the Madras City Municipal Act, 1919, the Council of the Corporation of Madras, in whom the Municipal government of the city is vested, is required to meet in the municipal office for the transaction of business at least once in every month. By virtue of the powers vested in the Council under section 31 of the Act, Regulations have been made regarding the proceedings of the Council. Rule 9 of the Regulations prescribes that at least two ordinary meetings of the Council shall be ordinarily held on the first and third Tuesdays every month. Under section 53(1)(i) of the Act:- "a Councillor shall cease to hold office as such, if he fails to attend the meeting of the Council for a period of three consecutive months beginning from the date of the commencement of his term of office or of the last meeting he attended as the case may be". This prohibition is made subject to section 54 which vests jurisdiction in the Chief Justice of the Court of Small Causes at Madras, to decide whether the Councillor has become disqualified for the office by reason of the provisions of section 53. It is plain from the terms of section 53 (1) (i) that the period of absence which would result in the forfeiture of his office by a Councillor is to be calculated from the date of the meeting he last attended. This was the construction placed on an analogous provision in Subbaroya Goundan v. Muthukumaraswami Goundan1 and Thiruppuliswamy v. Manickam2. It is plain from the terms of section 53 (1) (i) that the period of absence which would result in the forfeiture of his office by a Councillor is to be calculated from the date of the meeting he last attended. This was the construction placed on an analogous provision in Subbaroya Goundan v. Muthukumaraswami Goundan1 and Thiruppuliswamy v. Manickam2. It is also clear from the terms of the section extracted above that no formal act of any authority is necessary to put an end to the membership of a Councillor who had absented himself for three consecutive months from the date when he last attended a meeting of the Council. The cessation of membership is automatic on such absence. The Act, however, makes provision for restoration of the member who lost his office by reason of the provision contained in section 53 (1) (i). That provision is contained in sub-section (4) of section 53 which says: "In the case of a person who has ceased to be a Councillor in consequence of failure to attend meetings the matter shall be reported by the Commissioner at the next ordinary meeting and the Council may at that meeting restore such person to office." There were not less than two meetings of the Corporation every month till the end of July, 1962. On 16th August, 1962, there was an ordinary meeting of the Council over which the present Mayor Sri Kuchelar presided. Shortly thereafter, Sri Kuchelar participated in an illegal demonstration against the Government which resulted in his being convicted under section 7 (9) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of three months. No further meeting of the Corporation Council was convened in the month of August. Nor was there any meeting for the entire month of September. On being apprised by the Commissioner of the Corporation of Madras of the stalemate in regard to the civil administration of the City, the Government passed an order in exercise of its powers under section 42 of the Act directing the Commissioner of the Corporation to arrange for the convening of a meeting of the Council for the 26th October, 1962, and on such other subsequent days as the Council might decide for the purpose of disposing of the urgent subjects brought before the Council. Accordingly, there was a meeting of the Council on 26th October, 1962, for transacting the business directed by the Government in its notification. Two further meetings were held in the same month on 29th and 31st. The Mayor was released from jail on 8th November, 1962. He convened an ordinary meeting of the Council of the Corporation for 15th November, 1962. Even by 26th October, 1962, the first of the meetings of the Corporation Council after the aforesaid conviction of the Mayor, certain members had incurred forfeiture of their office under the provisions of section 53 (1) (i) by reason of their anterior absence from the meeting of the Corporation Council for a period of three consecutive months since their last attendance. According to the appellant there were eight such members, namely, (1) Sri G. Krishnan, (2) Srimathi Alamelu, (3) Sri K.A. Nagalingam, (4) Sri A.K.A. Abdul Samad, (5) Sri B. Krishnamurthy, (6) Sri V.S. Govindarajan, (7) Sri P.S. Chettiar and (8) Sri K. Govindasami. Of them Sri Krishnan and Sri B. Krishnamurthy have denied that they lost their office by the provisions of the section, as, according to them, they had attended the meeting held on 16th August, 1962. To remove any doubts in the matter they have applied to the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes under the provisions of section 54 of the Act for a declaration that they had not ceased to hold office by continued absence for three months. There is, however, no dispute in regard to the rest of the members aforesaid. They did not attend the meetings of the Corporation Council for a consecutive period of three months prior to 26th October, 1962. From the provisions of the section .53 (4), which we have set out above, it will be seen that it will be the duty of the Commissioner to report to the Council whenever any particular member has failed to attend the meetings for three consecutive months, at the next ordinary meeting of the Council. Unfortunately the Commissioner did not report to the Council of the absence of any of the aforesaid members at the meeting on 26th October, 1962, although he had put up for consideration of the Council nearly one hundred subjects. Unfortunately the Commissioner did not report to the Council of the absence of any of the aforesaid members at the meeting on 26th October, 1962, although he had put up for consideration of the Council nearly one hundred subjects. The first time when the intimation of the failure on the part of the aforesaid Councillors to attend the meetings was given to the Council was at the meeting to be held on 15th November, 1962. The defaulting members themselves do not appear to have taken any interest in the matter. They too did not write to the Commissioner to remind him of his duty under section 53 (4), for placing the subject for the meeting to be held on 26th October, 1962. Thereupon a ratepayer applied to this Court in Writ Petition No. 1255 of 1962, for the issue of a writ in the nature of quo warranto directing the eight Councillors to show on what authority they claimed to exercise functions as Councillors of the Corporation. The appellant also filed Writ Petition No. 1250 of 1962, out of which this appeal arises, praying, for the issue of a Writ of Prohibition to forbid the Council of the Corporation from considering the question of restoration of the eight members under section 53 (4), as according to him the Council would have no power to do so, it not having exercised its power under the section at its first ordinary meeting after the Councillors suffered the disqualification, that is, at the meeting held on 26th October, 1962. It appears that ad the Councillors have filed applications before the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes for a declaration that they had not vacated their office. There was, however, no controversy in regard to the fact that six of the Councillors had lost their office even before the meeting held on 26th October, 1962. In the application filed for the issue of quo warranto the learned Judge held that the six Councillors who had failed to attend the meetings of the Council for a continuous period of three months sustained the disqualification and had ceased to hold office as Councillors even before 26th October, 1962, the date on which the Council met on being so directed by the Government under section 42. But in regard to the other two, namely Sri G. Krishnan and Sri B. Krishnamurthi, the learned Judge declined to go into the disputed question of fact whether they in fact failed to attend the meetings of the Council for the period alleged as, in his view, this Court would not be competent to decide such a disputed question of fact in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. We shall express our view on this matter presently. On the other application, Writ Petition No. 1250 of 1962, out of which this appeal arises, the learned Judge held that although under the terms of section 53 (4), the Council would have power to restore the defaulting Councillor only at the first ordinary meeting after the concerned Councillor sustained forfeiture of his office,the power of the Council in that behalf cannot be held to be restricted, and that it could exercise such power at any other meeting and not necessarily at the first ordinary meeting after the Councillor had ceased to hold office. The reason given in support of the conclusion is, that the Council could come to know of the cessation of membership of a defaulting Councillor, only when it was so reported to it by the Commissioner and that, therefore, the Council could be reasonably held to be competent to exercise its power only thereafter. The conclusion is thus stated by the learned Judge: “But having regard to the whole purpose of sub-section (4) which is to enable the Council to restore defaulting members if it finds reason therefor time does not appear to be the essence of the provision, particularly because I do not find it possible or reasonable to read the provision in such a way as to make the availability of the power of the Council to restore dependent upon a ministerial act of the Commissioner. The Jurisdiction of the Council to restore is not in any way taken away by a failure on the part of the Commissioner to report at the next ordinary meeting.” In this view the application filed by the appellant for the issue of a writ of prohibition to prevent the Council from considering the question of restoration of the Councillors at its meeting on 15th October, 1962, was rejected. Hence this appeal. Hence this appeal. Before dealing with the appeal it is necessary to consider whether the learned Judge was right in declining to go into the question whether in point of fact Sri G. Krishnan and Sri B. Krishnamurthi sufferred the disqualification in these proceedings, as that matter is intimately connected with the application for the issue of a writ of prohibition which forms the subject-matter of this appeal. The existence of an adequate alternative remedy has always been taken into consideration in granting prerogative writs, but in the present case the rate-payer who applied for the issue of a writ of quo warranto had no alternative remedy. The learned Judge has himself held that the application for the issue of a writ of quo warranto should not be rejected on the ground of the existence of any alternative remedy. As we indicated above, there was no alternative remedy available to the rate-payer. But the learned Judge has held that once a person against whom the issue of quo warranto is sought, denies the fact of his having ceased to hold the office, it would not be competent for this Court to decide the disputed question of fact. With respect, we are unable to share this view. If the determination of a question of fact becomes necessary for the disposal of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution, it must be open, and indeed it will be the duty of this Court, to decide that question. Applications under that provision of the Constitution are original in nature, and the jurisdiction of the Court thereunder cannot be defeated by the opposing party raising an issue of fact. In such a case it will undoubtedly be open to this Court to go into the question whether there is or not an equally efficient and alternative remedy open to the party who applied for the writ. Where there is an alternative remedy available to the party applying, it will be open to this Court in the sound exercise of its discretion to refuse to go into the question. But where there is no such alternative remedy, this Court will necessarily have to investigate all questions arising on the application. For the purpose of such an enquiry this Court will have all the powers it has in respect of other matters before it. But where there is no such alternative remedy, this Court will necessarily have to investigate all questions arising on the application. For the purpose of such an enquiry this Court will have all the powers it has in respect of other matters before it. In Chenchanna v. Praja Seva Transports, Ltd.1, a Bench of this Court has held that an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari will be governed by the procedure prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code. In that case an application for review of a judgment given in an application under the Article 226 of the Constitution was entertained on the ground that the procedure under the Civil Procedure Code was attracted for the disposal of application for the issue of a writ. Indeed, it will be noticed that State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava2, proceeded on the footing that evidence could be let in before the High Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is a common feature in applications for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus to receive oral evidence; questions of fact will often arise for determination in that case. Likewise in mandamus, prohibition, etc. Even in applications for the issue of a writ of certiorari impugning the constitutional validity of a statutory enactment, evidence in the shape of the Report of the Select Committee, etc., have been allowed to be let in. But the right to decide questions of fact of this kind in applications under Article 226 of the Constitution will have to be distinguished from the rule which prevents the High Court from going into questions of fact while it is approached for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash an order of an inferior Tribunal. That rule is based on the principle that in respect of matters lying within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the High Court cannot interfere with findings of fact and even of law unless there is an error apparent on the face of the record. That rule will not apply to collateral questions or jurisdictional matters, where it has been held that questions of fact on such preliminary issues can be decided by this Court, so as to enable it to keep the inferior Tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction: vide also XI Halsbury, Laws of England, Third Edition, page 75, Article 138. That rule will not apply to collateral questions or jurisdictional matters, where it has been held that questions of fact on such preliminary issues can be decided by this Court, so as to enable it to keep the inferior Tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction: vide also XI Halsbury, Laws of England, Third Edition, page 75, Article 138. We are, therefore, of opinion that for a proper disposal of the present appeal, the question whether Sri G. Krishnan and Sri B. Krishnamurthi were absent from meetings for three consecutive months after the last meeting of the Council they attended, will have to be decided. They have categorically stated before the learned Judge that they attended the meeting of the Council held on 16th August, 1962. There is a denial of that averment by the appellant. But unfortunately that controversy cannot now be decided as the appellant has not made those two persons parties to the present appeal. It is, however, contended that it is unnecessary to make them parties as the direction sought in the appeal is only against the Mayor and the Commissioner of the Corporation of Madras. That may be so. But in the absence of the two members from the record who are vitally interested in the decision on the question, we consider that it will not be proper to investigate the matter, although if they have been made parties this Court will have to decide it. The appeal will, therefore, have to be restricted to the six other Councillors who had admittedly sustained the forfeiture of their office by reason of non-attendance for a continuous period of three months. There has been a controversy in this case on the question, whether the meeting held on 26th October, 1962, under the directions of the Government given under section 42 of the Act, will be an ordinary meeting of the Council, or whether the meeting convened by the Mayor on 15th November, 1962, should alone be regarded as the first ordinary meeting of the Council after the six Councillors sustained loss of their office. Mr. Gokulakrishnan, appearing for the Mayor, has contended that the meeting of the Council held under the directions of the Government could not be regarded as an ordinary meeting. In this he was supported by Mr. Mr. Gokulakrishnan, appearing for the Mayor, has contended that the meeting of the Council held under the directions of the Government could not be regarded as an ordinary meeting. In this he was supported by Mr. T. Chengalvaroyan, who appeared for the Commissioner, who argued that the subject as to restoration of the members had been properly laid before the meeting called for 15th November, 1962, as that, according to the learned Counsel, was the only ordinary meeting of the Council after the month of August, 1962. In support of the argument, learned Counsel referred to sections 28, 29, 32 and 34 of the Act as contrasted with section 53 (4) and the provisions contained in rules 2 and 5 of the Second Schedule to the Act, and contended that the Act must be held to recognize three kinds of meeting namely, meetings simpliciter, ordinary meetings and special meetings. According to the respondent, an ordinary meeting is one which is convened by the Mayor as prescribed by rule 2 of Schedule II to the Act and the Regulations made thereunder ; a special meeting will be one which is convened by the Mayor on receiving a request from the members for any special resolution that they may propose to move. It is said that any other meeting like the one convened by virtue of a direction under section 42 of the Act should be regarded as a meeting simpliciter which is neither special nor ordinary. In other words it is said that the character of the meeting depends upon who calls it, when and how it is called, and so long as the Mayor has not been instrumental in calling the meeting, it should not be regarded as an ordinary or even a special meeting. We are unable to accept this contention. Under the provisions of the Madras City Municipal Act, the municipal government of the City is vested in a body of Councillors. That body can act only in its corporate capacity and its business, therefore, can be conducted only at a meeting. Meetings of the Council held for the purpose of transacting the business of the Corporation are convened and conducted under the terms of the statute and the regulations made thereunder. They will be ordinary meetings. A meeting of the Council convened at the request of members for a special purpose will be a special meeting. Meetings of the Council held for the purpose of transacting the business of the Corporation are convened and conducted under the terms of the statute and the regulations made thereunder. They will be ordinary meetings. A meeting of the Council convened at the request of members for a special purpose will be a special meeting. Section 42 of the Act does not in terms refer to the convening of any meeting. It enables the State Government to give directions to the Council or other authority whenever any duty cast upon it has not been performed by it. That is to say, if there has been an omission on the part of the Council to have an ordinary meeting for the disposal of the business of the Corporation, the Government is enabled by that section to call upon the Council to do that act. In Devarajan v. State of Madras1, it was held by this Court that section 42 provides the machinery for compelling the Council or other municipal authority to perform its duty which it had defaulted. When, as in this case, the default on the part of the Council was in respect of its holding ordinary meetings for the transaction of its business, the direction of the Government under section 42 can only be one to hold its ordinary meetings. This is indeed made clear by the terms of the order of the Government issued under section 42 of the Act. This is indeed made clear by the terms of the order of the Government issued under section 42 of the Act. The relevant portion of it states: “Whereas information has been received that the Council of the Municipal Corporation of Madras has not met for the transaction of its business in the whole of the month of September, 1962; And whereas there is no likelihood of a meeting of the Council being convened even during the month of October, 1962; And whereas nearly one hundred subjects which require to be disposed of by the Council without further delay are pending decision of the Council; * * * * Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 42 of the Madras City Municipal Act, 1919 (Madras Act IV of 1919) the Governor of Madras hereby directs the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation of Madras to arrange for the convening of a meeting of the Council on the 26th October, 1962, and on such other subsequent days as the Council may decide for the purpose of disposing of all urgent subjects brought before the Council and further directs the Commissioner to discharge the duties assigned to the Mayor by. rules 2 to 5 of Schedule II to the said Act and the regulations made thereunder for the purpose of convening the meeting of the Council as aforesaid.” There can be little doubt that what the order contemplates is the holding of an ordinary meeting of the Council ; the business to be transacted at the meeting pertains to the business for the performance of which the Council exists. It follows that the meeting held on 26th October, 1962, will be the first ordinary meeting of the Council within the meaning of section 53 (4) of the Act. Mr. Chengalvaroyan next contended that as the Commissioner has no access to the Council except through the Mayor, he was justified in not submitting the report till the Mayor was in a position to preside over the meetings of the Council We are not here concerned with the question whether the Commissioner was justified in his omission to make a report under section 53 (4) on 26th October 1962 Possibly accumulation of subjects and the indifference on the part of the concerned Councillors were responsible for the omission. It is, however, clear from the terms of the section that the report contemplated under section 53 (4) is to the Council and not to the Mayor personally. But in the view we are taking of the main question in the case, it is really unnecessary to express any final opinion on the question whether the Commissioner was justified in not submitting a report as to the absence of the Councillors to the Council at its meeting held on 26th October 1962. We shall next proceed to consider the main question that falls for determination in this appeal, namely, whether in a case where a Councillor sustains loss of his office by reason of non-attendance at the meetings of the Council for three consecutive months, it will be open to the Corporation to reinstate him at any other meeting than the first ordinary meeting of the Council after the three months’ period prescribed by section 53 (4) had expired. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the appellant has contended that, on the terms of the section which is plain, the Councillor who has sustained the disqualification thereunder can be restored only at the first ordinary meeting of the Council. A literal construction of the section, which can in no sense be said to be ambiguous, does support the contentions. If the Legislature had really intended to place no limit of time on the exercise of the power conferred on the Council, it would undoubtedly have used another language. Even if the Legislature had intended that the reinstatement could be made at any other time than the first meeting, it would have expressed itself differently. In this connection reference can be made to the corresponding provisions in the District Municipalities Act, section 50 (4) and in the Madras Panchayats Act, 1958, section 27 (2). Even if the Legislature had intended that the reinstatement could be made at any other time than the first meeting, it would have expressed itself differently. In this connection reference can be made to the corresponding provisions in the District Municipalities Act, section 50 (4) and in the Madras Panchayats Act, 1958, section 27 (2). In those statutes there are the following words: “..............If such a person applied for restoration suo motu to the............Council, ................on or before date of its next meeting or within fifteen days of the receipt by him of such intimation, the Panchayat, or the Panchayat Union Council, as the case maybe, may at the meeting next after the receipt of such application restore him to the office of Councillor.” The learned Judge has given expression to the view that the whole purpose of subsection (4) of section 53 of the Act is to enable restoration of the defaulting members to office, and time should not, therefore, be regarded as the essence, as to do so would be to deprive the Council of its powers even before it became aware of the forfeiture of office by the concerned members. We are, however, unable to accept the proposition that the purpose of section 53 (4) is merely to enable the restoration of members who had lost their office by non-attendance at meetings. Sub-section, (4) of the section 53 has to be read with sub-section (1) (i) and section 55-A (2). They together provide for sanction against non-attendance by Councillors in the representative body, which undoubtedly would result in detriment in the performance of a public duty, and at the same time to give a discretionary power to the Council to restore the Councillor to his office. The exercise of that power is limited so that it could be done at a specified meeting. We cannot also accept the position that the default or delay on the part of the Commissioner to inform the Council of the previous absence of any Councillor will enlarge the powers of the Council or enable it to exercise such powers beyond the terms of section 53 (4). The report of the Commissioner who is the chief executive authority of the Corporation is to give information to the Council of the omission on the part of the defaulting Councillor to attend the meetings. The report of the Commissioner who is the chief executive authority of the Corporation is to give information to the Council of the omission on the part of the defaulting Councillor to attend the meetings. It is not a duty cast on him with a view to see that such members are restored to office. The office of Councillor of Corporation is not a common law office. It is a. creature of statute. The tenure or the termination of the office depends on the terms of the statute. Section 53 enacts several grounds by which a Councillor once elected will lose his office even before his period has expired. Continuous absence at meetings of the Corporation for a period of three consecutive months would entail loss of office, with the result that there would arise a vacancy. Section 55-A (2) provides for the filling up of such casual vacancies. If a Councillor fails to attend the meetings of the Council for a period of time, it would mean that the Division he represents goes without representation in the Council. It is the essence of proper civic administration that the elected Councillors who represent the various. Divisions in the City should attend the meetings of the Council and protect the interest of those whom they represent. Failure to attend meetings would affect the rate-payers who are represented by the concerned Councillor. Section 53, therefore, provides a sanction against the default by forfeiture of office for continuous absence. It also makes a provision for a fresh representation by election by the Division whose representatives thus fail to attend. At the same time an exception is provided by sub-section (4) by vesting discretionary power in the Council to restore the member. Such power, if exercised, will have the effect of preventing a fresh election. It is, therefore, of paramount importance that the restoration of the Councillor should be made quickly. We shall later point out the inconvenience that will result if that power is not exercised within the time prescribed by the statute. Section 53 (4) expressly lays down the mode of exercising the power by saying that the restoration can be made by the Council at its first ordinary meeting after the office had been lost by the absentee Councillor. Section 53 (4) expressly lays down the mode of exercising the power by saying that the restoration can be made by the Council at its first ordinary meeting after the office had been lost by the absentee Councillor. It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another, the maxim being expressio unius est exclusio alterius. In Broom’s Legal Maxims (Tenth Edition) (page 452), it is stated: "A statute is to be so construed, if possible, as to give sense and meaning to every part ; and the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius was never more applicable than when applied to the interpretation of a statute, The sages of the law, according to Plowden, have even been guided in the construction of statutes by the intention of the Legislature, which they have always taken according to the necessity of the matter, and according to that which is consonant to reason and sound discretion." Stating the rule, Willes, J., said in North Stafford Steel & Co. v. Ward1: "......If authority is given expressly, though by affirmative words, upon a defined condition, the expression of that condition excludes the doing of the act authorised under other circumstances than those so defined." The rule, however, is not of universal application, and the application of it depends upon the intention of the Legislature expressed in the statute. If the above rule were to be applied to the construction of section 54 (4), the exercise of the power of the Council for restoration of the defaulting members who lost their office, at any meeting other than the one specified therein will stand excluded by implication. Mr. Gokulakrishnan, in an able and interesting argument has, however, contended that the words of the statute being affirmative in character could not be taken as laying down any absolute rule. According to the learned Counsel, if the Legislature had really intended to prohibit the exercise of the power at any meeting subsequent to the first ordinary meeting, it would have used words like not at any later meeting, and that in the absence of any such provision, the power conferred on the Corporation Council should be regarded as a duty to be done for the benefit of the public and, therefore, of a directory nature only. In support of that contention the learned Counsel referred to the following observation of Lord Tenterden, C.J., in The King against The Justices of Leicester2: " It has been asked, what language will make a statute imperative, if the 54, G. 3, c. 84 be not so ? Negative words would have given it that effect, but those used are in the affirmative only." But the foregoing observations cannot be taken as laying down a rule that a statute can be held to be absolute or imperative only when it used negative language and that in all cases where it uses positive or affirmative language, it should be regarded as merely directory. In The Queen v. Churchwardens of All Saints, Wigan3, an enactment authorised the Churchwardens to borrow monies for certain purposes, and impose a rate for repayment of the loan by annual instalments within a period of twenty years at the farthest. It was held that notwithstanding the fact that there was no prohibition to levy the rate after the expiration of the period of twenty years, the statute should be construed as not conferring a power to levy the rate after that period. Lord O’Hagan observed at page 628: "Could a clause have been framed with more elaborate care to secure the payment within the twenty years ? It has not a negative provision but its affirmative words are very stringent. The rates are to be made ‘so as to secure repayment’... .of what?......‘of all sums’, that is, of everything which has been advanced ‘within the period of twenty years’. This seems clear enough, but to render the purpose of the Act, if possible, more unmistakeable, it adds ‘at farthest’, and fixes the period so as to make it run from the time of the first advance made to the parishioners." The question whether the provisions of section 53 (4) are absolute and not merely directory has, therefore, to be decided irrespective of the consideration that it does not employ negative language. A mandatory or absolute statute must be fulfilled exactly: a statute merely directory will be held to have been sufficiently complied with if the enactment has been obeyed or fulfilled substantially. The question in each case will be whether the relevant statutory provision is mandatory or merely directory. A mandatory or absolute statute must be fulfilled exactly: a statute merely directory will be held to have been sufficiently complied with if the enactment has been obeyed or fulfilled substantially. The question in each case will be whether the relevant statutory provision is mandatory or merely directory. In Statutory Construction by Crawford, it is stated in Article 261 at page 515 thus: "If the provision involved relates to some immaterial matter, where compliance is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or directs certain action with a view to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of public business, the provision may be regarded as directory, but where it directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way and indicates that compliance with such provisions is essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or requires some antecedent and pre-requisite conditions to exist prior to the exercise of the power or to be performed before certain other powers can be exercised, the statute may be regarded as mandatory." The attempt of Mr. Gokulakrishnan before us has been to show that the requirement as to restoration of the members being done at the first ordinary meeting of the Council is only a matter of convenience with a view to facilitate the prompt conduct of the business. But the power conferred on the Council to restore the members who had lost their office cannot be said to be merely one for the prompt conduct of public business, nor can it be said that the time of restoration is not essential. Further his argument really ignores the other provisions in the Act as to the occurrence of a casual vacancy once a member sustains the disqualification and for the filling of the same. It is needless to point out that in order that a representative institution could function properly with due and effective representation for all Divisions, it is essential that strict compliance with the terms of the section should be enforced. Let us illustrate the inconvenience which will result if a contrary view is taken. Suppose the matter relating to the reinstatement of a Councillor is not placed at the first ordinary meeting, the fresh election contemplated under the Act will have to be postponed pending decision of the Corporation Council. Let us illustrate the inconvenience which will result if a contrary view is taken. Suppose the matter relating to the reinstatement of a Councillor is not placed at the first ordinary meeting, the fresh election contemplated under the Act will have to be postponed pending decision of the Corporation Council. If again a fresh election is arranged and expenses are incurred and later the Council deems fit to restore the defaulting member, then all the trouble taken in connection -with the election for the casual vacancy would go waste. The interests of the public, therefore, require that the question of restoration of the members who had lost their office by non-attendance at the meetings of the Council should be taken up at the first available opportunity. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume XXXI, Second Edition, page 530, dealing with the distinction between directory and mandatory statutes it is said: "Broadly speaking, it may be said that powers conferring jurisdiction on a judicial body, provisions as to time in regard to procedure, and generally in public statutes, enacting words where the thing to be done is for the public benefit or in advancement of public justice, must be taken to have a compulsory force. On the other hand, statutes conferring private rights, or prescribing that certain things are to be done within a certain time, time not being of the essence, or in a certain manner, or by those whose action the person invoking the aid of the statute is unable to control are usually directory only; and where the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty, and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of that duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, such provisions should be construed as being directory only and not imperative. The Courts lean against construing words as mandatory when the result would be that the common law rights of individuals would be infringed. Much will depend upon the subjectmatter, and it is in deciding whether a provision in a statute is imperative or permissive that the intention of Parliament has most strictly to be regarded. The Courts lean against construing words as mandatory when the result would be that the common law rights of individuals would be infringed. Much will depend upon the subjectmatter, and it is in deciding whether a provision in a statute is imperative or permissive that the intention of Parliament has most strictly to be regarded. The distinctions are often fine." The question has been dealt with by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition, page 364, thus: "It has been said that no rule can be laid down for determining whether the command is to be considered as a mere direction or instruction involving no invalidating consequence in its disregard, or as imperative, with an implied nullification for disobedience, beyond the fundamental one that it depends on the scope and object of the enactment. It may, perhaps, be found generally correct to say that nullification is the natural and usual consequence of disobedience, but the question is in the main governed by considerations of convenience and justice, and, when that result would involve general inconvenience or injustice to innocent persons, or advantage to those guilty of the neglect, without promoting the real aim and object of the enactment, such an intention is not to be attributed to the Legislature. The whole scope and purpose of the statute under consideration must be regarded. The general rule is, that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially." As we said earlier, the Corporation Council is a representative institution, in which the rate-payers have a voice in the administration through their elected representatives. For that voice to be effective, the representatives should function. If it were to be held that the power of restoration of the defaulting Councillor can be taken up at any time or as and when the Commissioner chooses to place the subject before the Council, it will mean that the rate-payers representation will have to depend on the fancy of an individual or body. For a proper working of the Act and an implementation of its provisions it is essential, therefore, that the Council should take up the question of restoration at its first meeting and if it does not do so the machinery of the Act which provides for the filling up of the casual vacancy should be brought into play. For a proper working of the Act and an implementation of its provisions it is essential, therefore, that the Council should take up the question of restoration at its first meeting and if it does not do so the machinery of the Act which provides for the filling up of the casual vacancy should be brought into play. This would be possible only if section 53 (4) is held to be mandatory. Learned Counsel for the respondents has referred us to a number of cases on interpretation of statutes imposing a public duty on a person with a direction that it shall be performed in a certain manner or within a certain time or under certain conditions. There it has been held that the prescription was merely of a directory character. In Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin1, a question arose whether the omission to revise the jury list as directed by the statute had the effect of nullifying the verdict given by the jury. The Privy Council held that the irregularities in the matter of proper revision of the jury list would not ipso facto avoid the verdict of the jury. Sir Arthur Channel, delivering the judgment treated the case as one where the statute made provision for the performance of a public duty. This is clear from the following passage at page 175: "When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience, or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them, though punishable, not affecting the validity of the acts done." In Caldow v. Pixell2, the enactment called upon the Bishop to direct the surveyor to inspect and report after the benefice became vacant in order to ascertain what sum the estate of the previous incumbent to the benefice would be liable. It was held that the provision as to the time within which the Bishop was to direct the surveyor to inspect and report on the buildings was merely directory and not imperative. It was held that the provision as to the time within which the Bishop was to direct the surveyor to inspect and report on the buildings was merely directory and not imperative. The reason for the conclusion was that the right given by the statute existed previously and that the statute which modified such right only imposed a public duty on the Bishop, namely that of seeing that buildings are kept in proper repair by the last incumbent. That is not the same thing as power being conferred on him. It was also held that public convenience should require that time should not be the essence. In dealing with the rule of construction Lopes, J., observed at page 568: "In construing the statute we must strike a balance between the inconvenience of holding the direction of the Bishop and the proceeding subsequent thereto to be null and void, and the inconvenience of giving effect to the direction when it has been made after the prescribed time." This decision has been followed by this Court in Velliappa v. Subrahmanyan3. That case was concerned with the interpretation of rule 161 (a) of the Civil Rules of Practice which fixed a period of six months for applying for execution, in the Court to which the decree had been transmitted for execution. An execution application filed after the expiry of that period was held to be valid as the rule was a mere instruction or direction to the Court not being mandatory in nature. Two other cases cited on behalf of the respondents were Gurdit Singh v. Gurdwara M. Committee4 and Hirday Narayan Singh v. Jang Bahadar Singh5. In the former case, rity. In such a case affirmative conferment of such power by the very nature of it would imply that there will be no power otherwise. An almost analogous case is found in Bowman v. Blyth1. By section 1 of the Justices Clerks’ Fees Act, 1753, Justices in Quarter Sessions were empowered to alter the table of fees after the same shall have been approved by Justices at the next succeeding General Quarter Sessions. A new table of fees was made and submitted for approval at the next Quarter Sessions. But the matter could not be dealt with at that sessions and it was adjourned to the next one. A new table of fees was made and submitted for approval at the next Quarter Sessions. But the matter could not be dealt with at that sessions and it was adjourned to the next one. It was held that the table of fees was not properly sanctioned and, therefore, has no legal effect. Lord Campbell, C.J., said at page 1165: “Now the powers of approval here, and that of altering the table, are not given to the justices generally, but to those of a particular sessions; we think the approval was an act to be done at that particular sessions, which must be completed and done by that sessions only ; and here it was not completed by them but adjourned to the next sessions. We think that, notwithstanding the general power of sessions to adjourn, which we are anxious to preserve, the Legislature have prescribed that the approval should be completed by that sessions only..........This table was not so approved, and therefore we think that it is not in force, and that no action lies for taking fees contrary to it.” There are two decisions of this Court on a similar provision in statutes pari materia, and it will be appropriate to refer to them now. In Subbaraya Goundan v. Muthukumaraswami Goundan2, the President of the Taluk Board failed to attend its meetings for three consecutive months. The Acting President did not report the matter to the Board and consequently the former President’s membership was not restored by the Councillors. But strangely enough, the absentee member was reelected as President after he had ceased to be a member. Wallace, J., held that the Board could restore him to the membership only under the terms of section 56 (4) of the Local Boards Act, and it not having done so, he had ceased to be a member and his election as President was, therefore, invalid. The conclusion reached by the learned Judge in that case accords with the principle to which we have made reference. But the learned Judge observed in the course of his judgment at page 267: “No doubt it seems an anomaly that no member can compel the President to report such a matter, to the Board. The conclusion reached by the learned Judge in that case accords with the principle to which we have made reference. But the learned Judge observed in the course of his judgment at page 267: “No doubt it seems an anomaly that no member can compel the President to report such a matter, to the Board. But that is how the law runs, and if the President does not choose to report the matter to the Board, then the Board under the law has no power to restore him.” Veeraswami, J., has expressed disagreement with these observations. If Wallace, J., intended to lay down that once the matter is not brought before the first meeting for whatever reason by the President, the Board will thereafter have no power to reinstate the Councillor, we agree. But if the learned Judge intended to lay down that no member can even compel the President to report the matter to the Board at its meeting, we must express our respectful dissent. In our opinion, it should be open to the absentee member or even other Councillors to table at the first meeting of the Council or the Board, after the loss of office by non-attendance of a member a motion for the restoration of the member. The provision in section 53 (3) of the City Municipal Act and the corresponding provision under the Local Boards Act which cast a duty on the Commissioner or the President to inform the Board is merely directive machinery devised for facilitating the exercise of the power conferred on the Council. In Vaidyanatha Thevar v. Murugaiyan Chettiar3, a similar question arose in election proceedings relating to a Local Board. Devadoss, J., referred to section 56 (4) of the Madras Local Boards Act which corresponded to section 53 (4) of the Madras City Municipal Act and observed at page 555: “When the law prescribed that at the next meeting of the Board such persons may be restored to office, it is not open to the Board to restore them at any future time.” We agree with that view of the learned Judge. But unfortunately the judgment in that case contains certain further observations going against what has been stated before. But unfortunately the judgment in that case contains certain further observations going against what has been stated before. The learned Judge said at page 555: “If the restoration is not to be at the next meeting a person who failed to attend two meetings for three consecutive months in 1927 might be restored in 1929. There is nothing to prevent a Board from doing that. Such an action would be irregular.” This passage in the judgment has been taken advantage of by the respondent to show that it would be a mere irregular exercise of power if the Council were to restore the Councillors who had lost their office at a subsequent meeting. We are by no means sure that the learned Judge intended to lay down any such proposition as he had clearly stated earlier that it would not be open to the Board to restore them at any future time, than at the first meeting. The case itself, as we said, was concerned with the validity of the election in which the members who were illegally restored participated. With great respect we are unable to regard a contravention of clause (4) as a mere irregularity. Learned Counsel for the first respondent referred to the decision in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava1. That was a case where the Supreme Court came to the conclusion on a consideration of the various provisions of the Constitution, that the provision contained in Article 320 (3) (c) was a mere directory one. To sum up, the power of the Corporation Council to restore to office a Councillor who had lost it by non-attendance at the meetings of that body is to be exercised at its first ordinary meeting after the disqualification had been sustained by the Councillor. The Commissioner is bound to report to the Council at that meeting about the member having sustained the disqualification. The question whether the Council can exercise the power of restoration of that member at any meeting other than its first ordinary meeting will have to be decided on the terms of the statute. If the time fixed therein is absolute or mandatory it should be fulfilled exactly, that is, at the meeting specified or probably on any adjourned date of the meeting. If the time fixed therein is absolute or mandatory it should be fulfilled exactly, that is, at the meeting specified or probably on any adjourned date of the meeting. If on the other hand the time specified is regarded as merely directory, the restoration can be made at any later meeting, for in such a case a substantial compliance of the statute will be sufficient. The determination of the question whether the section is mandatory or directory will depend on the intention of the Legislature as disclosed in the statute. But it must be made clear that the question cannot depend merely on the form or phraseology employed by the statute. The language of the provision has to be understood in the light of the object, scope and subjectmatter of the legislation, the context in which the provision occurs and the consequences that would flow if it were to be held to be mandatory or directory. Certain tests are usually employed to ascertain the true intention of the Legislature. Generally where a public authority is created by a statute for a special purpose, the prescribed mode of its acts are regarded as an imperative direction. That should also be the case where a statutory office is to be revived by a particular procedure contained in the statute, the part of the prescription imposed by the statute, for restoration of office which owes its existence to the statute itself should be regarded as imperative. Again if on a consideration of the importance of such prescribed procedure in relation to the general objects of the Legislature, it is found that it is essential, the statute should be regarded as mandatory. Judged by this test, the provisions in section 53 (4) should be held to be mandatory, as otherwise it will lead to great inconvenience in the functioning of representative institutions. The section no doubt casts a duty on the Commissioner to report about the sustaining of the disqualification by the absentee Councillor. But that is merely to remind the Council of its powers ; non-submission of his report cannot detract or enlarge the powers of the Council. There will really be no hardship in giving such an interpretation to the section as the Commissioner can always be expected to do his duty. But that is merely to remind the Council of its powers ; non-submission of his report cannot detract or enlarge the powers of the Council. There will really be no hardship in giving such an interpretation to the section as the Commissioner can always be expected to do his duty. Accidental omission, as in the present case, will be of very rare occurrence and can afford no justification to extend the powers of the Council in that behalf. The absentee member himself can remind the Commissioner to bring up the matter before the first meeting of the Council after he sustained the disqualification. This is much more easy in a case where the party system functions in representative public bodies. It has been contended on behalf of the first respondent that before the Council could get jurisdiction to exercise the power conferred upon it by sub-section (4) of section 53, the Commissioner’s report will be necessary, and the Council would be justified in exercising its power after such a report is received. We arc unable to agree with the contention. The power for restoration is conferred on the Council. It cannot be read as being conditional or as coming into existence on the Commissioner submitting a report. The report is intended merely as information to the Council. A careful reading of the provisions of the Act will show that the occurrence of a vacancy by reason of the operation of section 53 (1) (i) is not postponed. Once the three months period expires, the vacancy arises. The power to restore would come into existence at the next meeting of the Council. That power being a limited statutory power, cannot be held to be enlarged by reason of an act of the executive authority of the Corporation by merely delaying the submission of the report. For the reasons stated earlier we are unable to agree with the learned Judge that the Council of the Corporation will have power to restore the six Councillors at any meeting other than the one held on 26th October, 1962. The appellant will, therefore, be entitled to the issue of a writ of prohibition forbidding consideration by the Council of the restoration of the six members to whom we have made reference earlier. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. The appellant will, therefore, be entitled to the issue of a writ of prohibition forbidding consideration by the Council of the restoration of the six members to whom we have made reference earlier. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Venkatraman, J.-The question whether the words in a statute that something; may be done in a particular manner or form are directory or mandatory has usually arisen only in a case where the statute does not expressly declare the consequence of non-compliance with the provision and in some of those cases it has been held that the provision is merely directory and in other cases it has been held that the provision is mandatory. This is how for instance the question is posed in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, (Tenth Edition), page 374: “When a statute requires that something shall be done, in a particular manner or form, without expressly declaring what shall be the consequence of non-compliance, the question often arises:. What intention is to be attributed by inference to the Legislature?” It seems to me, however, that the present case is somewhat different from the two types of cases envisaged above, in that the Legislature has itself provided in the City Municipal Act for the effect of the Municipal Council not restoring the absentee member at the next ordinary meeting within the meaning of section 53 (4). What I mean is that under section 53 (1) (i) the member who fails to attend the meetings of the Council for a period of three consecutive months after the last meeting attended by him automatically ceases to hold office. That provision would automatically come into play unless he is restored by the Council at the next ordinary meeting under section 53 (4). If he is not restored under section 53 (4), it will mean that the effect of forfeiture of his seat incurred by virtue of section 53 (1) (i) will remain unimpaired. This apart, section 55-A (2) of the Act contains a provision for the filling up of the casual vacancy caused by the forfeiture of the seat on account of absence, just as it does for the filling up of the casual vacancy arising from the other causes listed out in section 53(i). This apart, section 55-A (2) of the Act contains a provision for the filling up of the casual vacancy caused by the forfeiture of the seat on account of absence, just as it does for the filling up of the casual vacancy arising from the other causes listed out in section 53(i). The scheme of the City Municipal Act clearly shows that the primacy object of the Act is to ensure that all the citizens are enabled indirectly to have a voice in the administration of the Corporation through the medium of the elected Councillors. That is why for instance the Legislature has prescribed in rule 2, Schedule II that the Council shall meet at least once in every month and has further enacted in section 53 (1) (i) that failure to attend the meetings for a period of three consecutive months will entail loss of the seat automatically. But, to overcome the hardship which may be caused in any particular case, power has been given to the Council under section 53 (4) to restore the absentee member. But the power has to be exercised only at the next ordinary meeting. That cannot mean that the power can be exercised at any meeting other than the next ordinary meeting. If we were to hold that the power of restoration could be exercised even at any meeting later than the next ordinary meeting, there would be really no time limit to the exercise of the power and it would follow that the power could be exercised even one year afterwards. This would be rather startling and would defeat the main purpose of the Act, namely, representation of the public. If, by way of answer to this, it is suggested that since even where a rule is directory, it had to be substantially complied with, the restoration after one year would not be substantially complied, though restoration within a much shorter period after the next ordinary meeting would be substantial compliance with the provision, the question would still remain, where we are to draw the line for determining whether there has been substantial compliance. Here we would have to remember that it is not the province of the Court to legislate — it can only interpret — and it would not be unreasonable so to interpret the provision as to hold that the Legislature itself intended to remove all such possible uncertainty in the matter and to lay down the next ordinary meeting as the definite occasion for the exercise of the power of restoration. The fact that the Commissioner did not bring the matter to the notice of the Council on 26th October, 1962, is really immaterial. The Council’s power of restoration is in no way dependent on the report of the Commissioner. The Council had the power to restore notwithstanding the absence of a report from the Commissioner. As my Lord the Chief Justice has pointed out, the provisions of section 50 (4) of the District Municipalities Act, are somewhat different because there the absentee member has to be informed of the fact of forfeiture of his seat and he has fifteen days’ time from the receipt of such intimation to apply for restoration. Notwithstanding this difference, it was open to the absentee Councillor even under the City Municipal Act to move the Council under section 53 (4) for his restoration on 26th October, 1962. Thus the view we are taking need not work as a hardship to the individual Councillor concerned, even assuming that individual hardship would be a germane consideration. In partial support of the strict construction we are adopting, I think it is pertinent to refer to a decision of the Bench of this Court in Mariya Pillai v. Muthuvelu Pandaram1. It was a case under the Local Boards Act (XIV of 1920); section 56 (1) (h) ran: “Subject to the provisions of section 57, a member of Local Board shall cease to hold his office, if he — ........................................................... It was a case under the Local Boards Act (XIV of 1920); section 56 (1) (h) ran: “Subject to the provisions of section 57, a member of Local Board shall cease to hold his office, if he — ........................................................... (h) fails for three consecutive months to attend the meetings of the Local Board.” The provision for restoration was section 56(4), which runs as follows: “In the case of a person who has ceased to be a member in consequence of failure to attend meetings the matter shall be reported by the President at the next meeting of the Local Board, which may at that meeting restore such person to office.” What actually happened in that case was that the President, while reporting to the meeting that the petitioners had failed to attend meetings for three consecutive months, also gave a ruling that they had not forfeited their seat on that account. The Board had consequently no formal opportunity of exercising the power of restoration itself, though there can be no doubt that if it had formally considered the matter, it would have exercised the power of restoration. Nevertheless it was held that there was forfeiture and no valid restoration. P.R.N. ------ Appeal allowed.