JUDGMENT Mithan Lal, J. - These six second appeals filed by the Municipal Board, Shikohabad came up for hearing before a learned single Judge of this Court but after hearing the learned counsel for the appellant our brother thought that an important question of law with regard to the levy and realisation of circumstances and property tax had arisen in the case and consequently all the six appeals were referred to a larger Bench. It may also be pointed out that in the first paragraph of the order our learned brother thought that the important question related with respect to the meaning of the expression "ordinary resident" within the Municipal limits but later on he referred the entire appeals and not only one question. 2. It appears that six suits were filed in the court of Munsif, Shikohabad by the employees of the local educational institutions, rationing staff and civil court staff, Shikohabad. In one of the suits Sri Tejpal Singh who worked as a Munsif, Shikohabad was also a plaintiff and it appears from the judgment of the trial court that the suit was filed after his transfer from that place. The suits related to the recovery of circumstance and property tax with respect to the periods both before and subsequent to the constitution of Shikohabad as a municipal town. Shikohabad became a Municipal Board with effect from 1-8-1949 and in the suits which were filed some claims related to the erstwhile notified area and some related to the tax imposed by the Municipal Board of Shikohabad after its constitution. 3. All the plaintiffs were residing within the municipal limits of Shikohabad Municipality but their contention was that they were temporary residents and were not covered by the phrase used in the municipal law "ordinary residents." Since demand notices were served on some of the plaintiffs they brought the six suits with respect to the specific amount given in the plaint of each suit praying that a prohibitory injunction be issued against the defendant Municipal Board restraining it from recovering the tax in question from the plaintiffs. 4. The Municipal Board contested the suit on variety of grounds and three of its pleas were that the suit was defective as no notice under Sec. 326 of the Municipalities Act was given. 4. The Municipal Board contested the suit on variety of grounds and three of its pleas were that the suit was defective as no notice under Sec. 326 of the Municipalities Act was given. It was also stated that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction and that the suits were bad for misjoinder of plaintiffs and causes of action. None of the pleas taken by the appellant found favour with the courts below. Both the courts below held that the suits being suits for injunction notice as required by Sec. 326 of the Act was not necessary, that the suit was not bad for misjoinder of plaintiffs and causes of action and that the suits were cognizable by civil courts. It was also held by the court below that tax could not be levied on the plaintiffs because they could not be called ordinarily residing within the municipal limits." Feeling aggrieved the Municipal Board has filed these appeals. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. It appears that without going into the question specifically raised before the learned single Judge, that is, as to how the expression "ordinary resident" be interpreted, the appeals can be decided on the preliminary question raised by Sri K.N. Seth relating to the notice required to be given by Sec. 326 of the Municipalities Act. It is the admitted case of the parties and even mentioned in the plaints that no notice under Sec. 326 was given by the plaintiffs before the institution of these suits. In paras. 8 and 12 it was mentioned that as the defendant served the bills and notices of demand the tax in question upon the plaintiffs and as the object of the suit will be totally defeated the plaintiffs were entitled to bring the suit without any notice as required by Sec. 326 of the Municipalities Act. It was not made out in any paragraph of the plaint as to how the object of the suit would be defeated and it appears from the finding; of the two courts below that the case set up by the courts was that if the tax was not paid a distress warrant would have been issued which would have defeated the object of the suit. We are unable to agree with the reasoning of the courts below in this behalf and feel that that two courts below committed an error in thinking that these cases fell within the exception given in sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 326. 6. Under Sec. 326 no suit can be instituted against a Board or against a member or a servant of a Board in respect of any act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been given. Under sub-Sec. (4) it is provided that, "nothing in sub-Sec. (1) shall be construed to apply to a suit wherein the only relief claimed is an injunction of which the object would be defeated by the giving of the notice or the postponement of the commencement of the suit or proceeding." It is no body's case that the levy of the tax on the plaintiffs was not done by the Board acting or purporting to have been acting in its official capacity. The Board had the power to levy tax and the very act of levying tax was the act of the Board and consequently a notice had to be given unless it was covered by the exception given in sub-Sec. (4). The exception given in sub-Sec. (4) has also a very restricted meaning. Its language goes to show that even in case of injunction a notice is necessary to be given to the Board or to its officers or servant covered by sub-Sec. (1). But where the object of the suit would be defeated by giving a notice in an injunction suit, such a notice need not be given. It will thus appear that giving of a notice under Sec. 326 of the Municipalities Act even in suits for injunction is the rule and the exception is only in those cases where the object of such a suit would be defeated by the giving of a notice or by the postponement of the commencement of the suit or proceeding. none of the plaints of the six suits the plaintiffs made out a case as to how the object of the suit would have been defeated if a notice under Sec. 326 would have been given. none of the plaints of the six suits the plaintiffs made out a case as to how the object of the suit would have been defeated if a notice under Sec. 326 would have been given. It appears that at the time of arguments a case was made out that distress warrant would have been issued if the demand notices served upon the plaintiffs had not been complied with. Firstly, the courts below should not have permitted the plaintiffs to make out such a case which was not given in the plaint but even accepting that distress warrants would have been issued that could not be taken to be sufficient to show that the object of the suit would have been defeated by the giving of the notice. There was no question of the object of the suit failing by mere payment of the tax which had been imposed upon the plaintiffs and if the plaintiffs had succeeded in the suit they could have claimed refund of the tax paid by them. There is not even an allegation of any distress warrant or threat in the plaint but mere threat or fear of distress warrant in the mind of the plaintiffs could not be taken to be sufficient cause for not giving a notice nor could it be taken to be such as to defeat the object of the suit if the notice had been given. 7. The view which we have ex pressed finds support from the Full Bench authority of Haji Ahmad Raza v. Municipal Board, Alld., A.I.R. 1952 Alld. 711. This case was instituted on behalf of the butchers of Allahabad seeking an injunction against the Municipal Board not to enforce the amendments of the bye-laws of the Municipal Board prohibiting slaughter of bull, bullock, cow and calf etc. Sec. 326 was considered with respect to all its four sub-sections but in these cases we are only concerned with the interpretation placed by the Full Bench upon sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 326. It was held by the Full Bench that this sub-section did not dispense with the requirement of the notice in all suits for injunction. It is only in those suits for injunction in which the object would be defeated by the giving of the notice or the postponement of the commencement of the suit that this requirement has been dispensed with. It is only in those suits for injunction in which the object would be defeated by the giving of the notice or the postponement of the commencement of the suit that this requirement has been dispensed with. In that case a similar argument was put forward before the Full Bench that loss would have occasioned to the plaintiff by the enforcement of the bye-laws and consequently the suit for injunction was maintainable. The Full Bench observed that, if the impugned bye-law was illegal the plaintiffs and members of their community could be amply compensated by damages. The Full Bench limited the scope of sub-Sec. (4) to only those cases where the loss could not be compensated by damages? In the present six cases no circumstance existed which would have caused irreparable loss to the plaintiffs or a loss which could net be compensated if the suits had been decreed. If the plaintiffs had paid the tax demanded from them and if their suits would have been decreed they could have easily claimed back their taxes by way of refund. The plaintiffs, therefore, could not take recourse to sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 326 and institute a suit for a prohibitory injunction without notice when there was nothing to show that the object of the suit would have been defeated. The courts below, therefore, went wrong in holding that the suit was not defective for want of notice as required by Sec. 326 of the U.P. Municipalities Act. 8. Our attention has been drawn to the fact that respondents 5 and 6 in appeal No. 1392 of 1952, respondents Nos. 14, 18, 19 and 21 in appeal No. 1394 of 1952, respondents Nos. 10 and 16 in appeal No. 1395 of 1952, respondents Nos. 8, 17, 21, 23, 24 and 26 in second appeal No. 1396 of 1952 and respondents Nos, 10, 17, and 22, in appeal No. 1397 of 1952 have either died during the pendency of the appeal or have not been served. The counsel for the appellant has taken no steps to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased respondents nor has it taken any step to serve the unserved respondents. It has already been ordered that appeals as against aforesaid respondents shall stand dismissed because of abatement. It is ordered accordingly. The appeals as a whole do not abate because the claims were distinct. 9. It has already been ordered that appeals as against aforesaid respondents shall stand dismissed because of abatement. It is ordered accordingly. The appeals as a whole do not abate because the claims were distinct. 9. In view of what has been stated above all the appeals filed on behalf of the Municipal Board must succeed. It does not seem necessary for us to go into the questions either relating to jurisdiction of the civil court to decide the suits or the question of misjoinder of plaintiffs and causes of action or the question whether the expression "ordinary resident" includes such residents as are residing within the Municipal limits in connection with their service, whether in a local body or in an educational institution or the civil or criminal court or such allied offices. 10. Subject to the above order all the appeals are allowed with costs. The judgment and decree of the courts below are set aside. The suits are hereby dismissed but we make no order as to costs of the two courts below.