Judgment :- 1. In execution of a decree, five items of properties referred to as items 1 to 5 were purchased in auction by the 2nd plaintiff in one lot, on the 7th Edavom,1117, for Rs. 743/-. After confirmation, items 2 to 5 were delivered to him on the 28th Meenom,1118, but the delivery of possession of item 1 did not take place on account of obstruction, and a fresh suit about it, is said to be pending. The Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1958 (Act 31 of 1958) having come into force on the 14th July, 1958, the 7th defendant, a son of the judgment-debtor and the respondent in this second appeal, applied under S.22 for setting aside the sale and made a deposit of Rs. 371.50, being half the purchase-money. Plaintiffs 3 and 4 who are the legal representatives and are the appellants in second appeal contended, that the application is not maintainable as the possession of items 2 to 5, though not of item 1, had already passed to the purchaser, that in any event they are entitled to be paid Rs. 3000/- by way of value of improvements which they had effected on items 2 to 5 after the properties came into their possession, and also an amount of Rs. 1500/'-for prior encumbrances which they had cleared, and that the deposit made was not of the full amount as prescribed by S.22. The execution court ordered that items 2 to 5 having been delivered to the purchaser, the application can be allowed with respect to item 1 only, but on the respondent's paying the purchase-money for all the items and not of the proportionate part thereof in respect of item 1. The respondent appealed to the Additional District Judge who allowed the application because possession of the entirety of the properties sold had not passed to the purchaser in terms of the section and set aside the sale of all the items. It is this order which has led to this second appeal. 2. The Respondent has taken the preliminary objection that the second appeal is not maintainable. Before dealing with it, it is desirable to advert to the contentions and to examine how they have been disposed of. After the judge has disposed of the appeal, in Sayed Mohammed Beevi Amma v. Mathai Devasia, 1960 KLT. 2. The Respondent has taken the preliminary objection that the second appeal is not maintainable. Before dealing with it, it is desirable to advert to the contentions and to examine how they have been disposed of. After the judge has disposed of the appeal, in Sayed Mohammed Beevi Amma v. Mathai Devasia, 1960 KLT. 163, a bench of this court has construed the words "the said property" occurring in S.22 [1], clause [ii] to mean "the entire property sold" and has held, that under the clause when the possession of the whole of that property has not passed but only a portion of it, the sale may still be set aside, on compliance with the other conditions prescribed. The bench decision is binding upon me; it has been followed in C. R. P. 613 of 1962. On this point the view taken by the judge is correct. 3. The second proviso to sub-section (1) of S.22 reads: "Provided further that where improvements have been effected on the property sold after the date of the sale or foreclosure and before the notice under the first proviso, the value of such improvements as determined by the Court shall be deposited by the debtor for payment to the auction-purchaser," The appellants had alleged in their objection that they had effected improvements on items 2 to 5 since delivery of possession to them of these items in the year 1118, and the respondent had denied the truth of this in his reply. Within a week of the reply being filed the court heard the case and passed the order as aforesaid, refusing to set aside the sale of items 2 to 5. In appeal the judge set aside the sale of all the items without any reservation. In second appeal the appellant has relied upon this proviso which apparently has been overlooked. The next contention was, that the costs of execution incurred after the date of the court sale, which therefore could not have been included in the purchase-money, were not deposited in addition to half the purchase-money as provided in S.22, and for that reason also the application ought not to have been allowed. This point too had been taken by the appellants specifically in their objection. 4. It is now time to deal with the preliminary objection. This point too had been taken by the appellants specifically in their objection. 4. It is now time to deal with the preliminary objection. S.23 A which prohibits a second appeal was introduced in the Act by the Amending Act 2 of 1961 and has retrospective operation. The second appeal when filed was competent under S.47, CPC. Learned counsel then pressed that the appeal may be treated as a civil revision petition. S.23A. has enacted that "the order passed in appeal shall be final". The appellants are concluded by the bench decision of this court in CRP. 435 of 1961, that even a revision petition will not lie. The appellants took an adjournment and have now filed C.M.P. 3872 of 1963 to convert or treat the second appeal as an application under Art.227 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has held in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR. 1960 SC. 137, at page 142, that the jurisdiction under Art.227 is wider than that under S.115 of the Civil Procedure Code, and has generally indicated the grounds on which this power under the Constitution may be exercised in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within bounds. What is contended as the ground for interference, is that the courts below have committed an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, in overlooking the proviso extracted above, and the provision in S.22 (1) [ii] [b] by which not only the one half of the sale amount, but also the costs of execution not included in the purchase-money, had to be deposited before the sale is set aside. As regards the former the position seems absolutely clear and as regards the latter, there was an argument before me as to what the expression "costs of execution not included in the purchase-money" means, whether it can refer to costs incurred subsequent to the sale also. That such costs were incurred by way of taking delivery of possession of items 2 to 5 and of taking steps for the recovery of item 1, is hardly open to doubt. Having regard to the generality of the expression and there being nothing by way of exclusion, the plain meaning must be given effect to. That such costs were incurred by way of taking delivery of possession of items 2 to 5 and of taking steps for the recovery of item 1, is hardly open to doubt. Having regard to the generality of the expression and there being nothing by way of exclusion, the plain meaning must be given effect to. That meaning is, that all execution costs up-to-date, excluding those already included in the purchase-money have also to be deposited as a condition for setting aside the sale; there is no reason why the legislature should not insist on deposit of this amount also. This also is another error of law apparent on the face of the record. Then counsel for the respondent wanted an investigation as to whether such costs were incurred. 5. I am therefore of the view, that second appeal 1286 of 1959 is not maintainable as such and cannot be treated as a civil revision petition; but I allow the appeal to be converted into or treated as a petition under Art.227. In the exercise of the power under Art.227 I hereby set aside the order of the Additional District Judge and send back the case to the execution court for hearing and disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Having regard to the nature of the questions raised in this court I do not order costs here.