Chhangani, J.—The facts giving rise to this revision are not in dispute and may be briefly stated as follows— The State Trading Corporation of India Ltd., New Delhi, allotted some quota of skimmed milk powder for sale in Rajasthan. The State Government, while appointing different dealers for different areas, appointed the petitioner as a dealer for the Ajmer area vide its letter No. F. 9(1) (6)/Ind/(C)59 dated the 1st October, 1959, and allotted a quota of 50 tons of skimmed milk powder. The allotment was made subject to the following conditions :— 1. That the milk powder was to be sold at 72 nP per lb. in polythene bags, per head at a time. 2. That the material was required to be sold to only bonafide small consumers. In no case, it was to be sold to the Halwaies, Confectioners, Tea-stalls, etc. In violation of these conditions, which the petitioner had undertaken to fulfil, he delivered 167 bags of 50 lb each of the said milk powder to a Calcutta party namely, Shri Nattu Bhai Rawji Desai for Rs. 36,000/- for exporting it outside Ajmer District, and this milk was seized by Shri M.L. Goyal, Sub Divisional Officer and Magistrate, Ajmer., at 10 miles from Ajmer, at Gagwana when it was being taken in a truck outside Ajmer. On these facts, the petitioner and Nattu Bhai Rawji Desai were challaned under sec. 306, 411 and 114 I.P.C. The Magistrate framed a charge under sec. 406, Indian Penal Code, against the petitioner. The petitioner went in revision to the Sessions Judge, Ajmer, for quashing the charge. The Sessions Judge dismissed the revision observing as follows— "In my opinion, even if the legal ownership had vested in the petitioner, still the beneficial interest remained with the Collector and the public and if there has been any breach of trust for the same, the petitioner is liable to answer it as the beneficiary has every right to see that the skimmed milk powder is sold by the applicant in accordance with the terms and conditions imposed by the Collector." The petitioner has come to this Court in a further revision. 2. Mr. 2. Mr. Mukat Behari Lal Bhargava, appearing for the petitioner, has contended that the finding of the Sessions Judge that beneficial interest remained with the Collector and the public is altogether without foundation and that there are no materials on record to justify the finding. It was contended that the petitioner having paid the price and borne all other expenses was full owner of the skimmed milk powder and was not holding it for any beneficial interest therein on behalf of any-body. He admitted that the petitioner had agreed to effect sale on certain conditions and sold the skimmed milk powder to Mr. Desai in violation of conditions but contended that the breach of those conditions could not make him liable under sec. 406, Indian Penal Code, as the main element of entrustment is lacking. His clients conduct may be morally reprehensible and may constitute a breach of contract but there is no basis for his prosecution under sec. 406, Indian Penal Code. Dealing with the three cases, namely, Shah Nairn Ata Vs. Emperor (1), Mahammed Ashfaqimam Illahi Vs. Motiram Manghanmal Advani(2) & Emperor Vs. Ghandsham Das(3). relied upon by the Sessions Judge in his order, he contended that the decisions of these cases were based on facts materially different from the facts of the present case and they are of no help in arriving at a conclusion that in the facts of the present case there was entrustment of the skimmed milk powder to the petitioner. On the other hand, he cited Satyendra Nath Mukherjee Vs. Emperor(4), Sheonarayan Jaiswal and others Vs. State of Bihar (5) and some unreported decisions of the Calcutta High Court following Satyendra Nath Mukherjee V. Emperor (4). 3. The learned Assistant Government Advocate found it difficult to support the order of the Sessions Judge. 4. It is now well settled law that to establish an offence of criminal breach of trust it must be proved that the ownership or beneficial interest in the property in respect of which criminal breach of trust is alleged to have been committed, must be in some person other than the accused and the latter must hold it on account of some person or in some way for his benefit. It is not in controversy that the legal ownership vested in the petitioner and the only question which requires determination is : whether any beneficial interest vested in a person other than the petitioner ? The Sessions Judge had observed that the beneficial ownership vested in the Collector and the public but has not referred to the necessary facts supporting this conclusion. There is nothing in the language of the letters issued by the Government in connection with the appointment of the petitioner and others as dealers for selling skimmed milk powder which can suggest that the State or the Collector acquired or retained any kind of proprietory interest including beneficial interest in the skimmed milk powder. The State ofcourse was anxious to see that the skimmed milk powder alloted by the State Trading Corporation should be made available to bonafide consumers and, therefore, while appointing dealers to purchase and sell skimmed milk powder, imposed certain conditions under which the skimmed milk powder was to be sold but the imposition of the those conditions could not create any beneficial interest in the State. Undisputably the petitioner was responsible for payment of the price of the skimmed milk powder to the State Trading Corporation as also for all incidental expenses. The liability for any loss, damage or destruction of the skimmed milk powder after it came into the possession of the petitioner was apparently his. There is not even an agreement between the State and the petitioner definitely and unambiguously indicating that the petitioner was to act as the States agent. Clearly then the property in the skimmed milk powder passed to the petitioner and he was holding it exclusively on his own behalf. Indeed it cannot be reasonably suggested that in the circumstances the State should be treated to have purchased the skimmed milk powder from the State Trading Corporation and to have entrusted the skimmed milk powder to the petitioner as its agent. In my opinion, the imposition of conditions by the State under which the skimmed milk powder was to be sold was essentially an exercise of regulatory power by the State that too in the exercise of administrative side and not under any statutory powers. In my opinion, the imposition of conditions by the State under which the skimmed milk powder was to be sold was essentially an exercise of regulatory power by the State that too in the exercise of administrative side and not under any statutory powers. The agreement of the petitioner to sell skimmed milk powder on the conditions imposed of course created a moral liability and might have also created civil liability but it could not affect his proprietory title so as to create the status of the petitioner as that of an agent of the State. It follows that the State or the Collector could not be said to have acquired and retained any beneficial interest. It is equally difficult to accept that the public of Ajmer district as prospective purchasers had acquired any beneficial interest in the skimmed milk powder. They could acquire skimmed milk powder only after purchasing and paying the price and, therefore, could not be said to have had any vested interest so as to bring about judiciary relationship between them and the petitioner. The fact that the seller had agreed with the State to sell the skimmed milk powder to bonafide consumers in the Ajmer district and at certain fixed price could not be sufficient to create any beneficial interest in the skimmed milk powder in them. In these circumstances, it is difficult to hold that either the Collector or the public had any beneficial interest in the skimmed milk powder and that the petitioner was holding it in trust for them. The Oudh and Sind cases relied upon by the Sessions Judge, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Bhargava, are based on different facts and are not helpful in the facts of the present case. In the Oudh case(l) the accused was managing a large property under a definite agreement to get 3/5th share for his own use and spent 2/5th on certain religious and educational objects and it having been proved that he had converted it to his own use, some portion of the 2/5th share of the profits, which he ought to have devoted to charitable objects, it was rightly held that there was entrustment and he was rightly convicted of an offence of criminal breach of trust. In Muhammad Ashfaq Imam Illahi vs. Motiram Manghanmal Advani(2) the buyer obtained goods from purchaser under a trust receipt and although on the facts a charge of criminal breach of trust was not held, obsevations to the following effect were made— "That if the trust receipt is, what is really intended to be, a trust agency, whereby the buyer binds himself to sell the goods on behalf of the seller and is entrusted with the goods under certain clear terms and conditions, there is an entrustment within the meaning of sec. 405, and if there be a violation of the terms and conditions of the entrustment with the necessary intent there can be a conviction for criminal breach of trust." This decision also cannot be of much help. Similarly, the principle laid down in Emperor Vs. Ghanshamdas(3) that "When money is entrusted within sec. 405 to the accused it should be transferred to him under such circumstances which show that, notwithstanding its delivery, the property in it continues to vest in the prosecutor, and the money remains in the possession or control of the accused as a bailee, and in trust for the prosecutor as bailor, to be restored to him or applied in accordance with his instructions", although unassailable, is of no or little use in deciding the present case. 5. On the other hand, the cases relied upon by Mr. Bhargava are nearer to the case in hand. In Satyendra Nath Mukherjee Vs. Emperor(4), a contractor had obtained a permit for 7 tons of cement on condition that the same was to be used in connection with the construction of quarters, for which the contractor had entered into a contract with the Government. After obtaining the same, 6 tons of cement were diverted and disposed of for another purpose. On these facts, the contractor was prosecuted for criminal breach of trust. After obtaining the same, 6 tons of cement were diverted and disposed of for another purpose. On these facts, the contractor was prosecuted for criminal breach of trust. It was held that even though the contractor could not have obtained the permit if it had not been intended to be used for the specific purpose, still when he was the purchaser he could not be said to have been entrusted with the goods, property in the goods having passed to him, and that he could not therefore be held to be guilty of criminal breach of trust even if he diverted and disposed of the goods for a purpose other than that for which he was given the permit. 6. In Sheo Narayan Jaiswal Vs. State of Bihar(5), the proprietors of certain distilleries obtained permits for lifting molasses to be used as raw material. Part of molasses obtained on permits was not taken to the distilleries but was sold in the blackmarket. In connection with a charge under sec. 406, Indian Penal Code, in respect of molasses, the learned Judge of the Patna High Court stated the position as follows :— "As far as I can make out the correct position is that the distillers, who worked under licenses granted to them, required molasses as raw material; for movement of molasses they obtained permits from the Excise Commissioner; they paid for the molasses as also for the transport of the molasses to the distilleries; they manufactured spirit out of the molasses and sold the spirit to the warehouses or licensed vendors under the terms of the licenses granted to them. In the circumstances stated above, I do not see how can it be said that the property in molasses or any dominion over them was entrusted to the distillers." 7. Satyendra Nath Mukherjee Vs. Emperor(4), has been followed in subsequent cases of the Calcutta High Court and the learned counsel for the defence produced certified copies of two unreported decisions. Reference may be made only to the Superintendent and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, Government of West Bengal, on behalf of the State of West Bengal Vs. Kshitish Chandra Mondal, decided on 8th June, 1961. The accused in that case was appointed dealer under the Modified Rationing Scheme at Panchuria Dharmatola for the distribution of rice to consumers under modified rationing scheme under some agreement. The accused received 30 mds. Kshitish Chandra Mondal, decided on 8th June, 1961. The accused in that case was appointed dealer under the Modified Rationing Scheme at Panchuria Dharmatola for the distribution of rice to consumers under modified rationing scheme under some agreement. The accused received 30 mds. of at a price through the storing agent at Bhangore but instead of carrying the rice to his ration shop at Panchuria Dharmatola, he arranged to transport the rice by boat to Shambazar, Calcutta, for selling the rice in the black-market. These facts were held proved and yet following the case, Satyendra Nath Mukherjee Vs. Emperor(4), it was held that there was no entrustment within the meaning of sec. 405, Indian Penal Code. 8. The facts in the cases relied upon by Mr. Bhargava resemble closely to the facts of the present case and applying the reasoning adopted in these cases to the facts of the present case, I have no hesitation in holding that the skimmed milk powder cannot be said to have been entrusted to the petitioner within the meaning of sec. 405, Indian Penal Code. There is no legal basis to frame a charge under sec. 406, Indian Penal Code, against the petitioner. The trial Magistrate was wholly wrong in framing the charge and the learned Sessions Judge was not justified in maintaining the charge and dismissing the revision application. 9. The revision is, therefore, accepted and the charge against the petitioner is quashed and he is discharged. 10. Before parting with the case, I must mention that there is no doubt that the act of the petitioner is anti-social and morally reprehensible and it is really unfortunate that such acts should go unpunished. It, however, could not be helped. The remedy as suggested in the last mentioned Calcutta case is that the Government should in such cases bring about a legal and valid agreement definitely indicating that they appointed dealers as the agents of the Government, or better still to undertake necessary legislation, principal or subordinate, to ensure that such acts are made punishable as offences.