JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is an appeal from an order, dated 23-7-1962 of the Arbitrator, appointed under the provisions of Orissa Act, XVIII of 1948, to decide the quantum and apportionment of compensation payable in respect of certain lands acquired for the well known Hirakud Dam Project. 2. There were two rival claimants for the compensation. On 23-3-1961 the Arbitrator passed an ex parte award in favour of the Respondent. The Appellants then filed an application for setting aside the ex parte award and also examined some witnesses. The learned Arbitrator after discussing the evidence held that there was no sufficient ground for his absence on the date fixed. Hence he rejected his application to set aside the ex parte award. 3. Mr. R.C. Mohanty for the Respondent raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this appeal. He contended that under Sub-section (3) of Section 7 of Orissa Act, XVIII of 1948, a right of appeal is conferred only against the award of the Arbitrator and not against any other decision or order that might have been passed by him in the course of the arbitration proceedings. Hence, according to him, there is no right of appeal against an order refusing to set aside an ex parte award. 4. Mr. R. Das for the Appellant however relied on the provisions of Rule 16 of the Rules framed under Orissa Act, XVIII of 1948, which runs as follows: Save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in these rules the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply to all proceedings before the Arbitrator amp anything to the contrary contained in any other law notwithstanding. He urged that once the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, are made applicable to proceedings before the Arbitrator, all other provisions of the CPC dealing with the right of appeal against orders should also be deemed to have been made applicable and that consequently the ex parte order of the Arbitrator under Order 9, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, must be held to be appealable. In our opinion this contention cannot prevail. As early as 1912 the Privy Council pointed out in ILR Cal 21, that a right of appeal must be given by an express enactment and cannot be implied. In our opinion this contention cannot prevail. As early as 1912 the Privy Council pointed out in ILR Cal 21, that a right of appeal must be given by an express enactment and cannot be implied. The same principle was reiterated in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Seth Banarsi Das Vs. The Cane Commissioner and Another, (at page 1429) in the following terms: The right to appeal is a substantive right and is to be conferred on a party by or under the Act. The Act must either provide for the appeal or enact that the Rules framed thereunder may provide for right of appeal against certain orders or decisions as, in the absence of such provision in the Act, Rules cannot provide for appeals. These observations apply with full force here. Orissa Act. XVIII of 1948 provided for an appeal only against the award of the Arbitrator. It does not say that there will be an appeal against any other decision or order passed by the Arbitrator appointed under the Act. Similarly, in the rule-making provision conferred by the Act (See Section 14) it was not expressly provided that the Rules may provide for appeals against certain orders or decisions or the Arbitrator. Apart from the absence of such rule making power in the rules framed under the Act, there was no provision conferring a right of appeal against any other interlocutory order that may be passed by the Arbitrator. 5. Mr. Das, however, relied on certain observations of the Privy Council, in AIR 1948 12 (Privy Council) reiterating the previous view taken by them in AIR 1916 P.C. 21 : AIR 1936 93 (Privy Council), where they held that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rule of procedure applicable thereto, and an appeal lies if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arose under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal. This principle, however, cannot apply here because the Arbitrator having been appointed under the provisions of the said Orissa Act XVIII of 1948 is not an ordinary civil court of the country. This principle, however, cannot apply here because the Arbitrator having been appointed under the provisions of the said Orissa Act XVIII of 1948 is not an ordinary civil court of the country. He is a special court constituted for the purpose of the aforesaid special Act and the rights of appeal against his orders or decisions must be governed by the provisions of that special Act and the Rules made thereunder, bearing in mind the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid Supreme Court decision. In fact there is a Calcutta decision reported in AIR 1933 Cal 558, where it was held that there would be no right of appeal against the order of a Judge acting under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act dismissing an application under Order IX, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, Mr. Das then relied on some observations of a single Judge of this Court in 29 Cuttack Law Times 594, to the effect that where a munsif executes a decree u/s 13 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, a right of appeal and second appeal will lie against that order under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the fundamental distinction between that case and the present case is that there u/s 13 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act an order passed by the Controller u/s 7(1) was deemed to be a decree executable in the Court of the Munsif. Thus the ordinary civil court was conferred jurisdiction to execute the decree passed by the House Rent Controller and hence the principle laid down by the Privy Council in AIR 1948 P.C. 18 would apply with full force. But here, as already pointed out, once it is held that the Arbitrator is not an ordinary civil court, that, principle has no application. 6. Mr. Das then contended that even if this appeal is not maintainable it may be treated as a Civil Revision. Without deciding whether the Arbitrator is a Civil Court for the purpose of exercise of jurisdiction u/s 115, Code of Civil Procedure, we may point out that there is no error of law or jurisdiction that would justify the exercise of our revisional jurisdiction u/s 115 CPC which is of a very limited scope. 7. For these reasons the appeal is dismissed as not maintainable. There will be no order for costs. 7. For these reasons the appeal is dismissed as not maintainable. There will be no order for costs. Barman, J. 8. I agree. 9. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed