Judgment :- 1. These two appeals arise from orders passed in execution of the decrees passed in O. S. Nos. 175 of 116 and 216 of 117 of the Kottayam Munsiff's court. The appellant in S. A.. No. 606 of 1959 is the third defendant in O. S. No. 175 and the same person figuring as the second defendant in O. S. No. 216 is the appellant in S. A. No. 607 of 959. The question that arises for decision is whether the decrees in these two cases are incapable of execution due to the bar of limitation. The decree in O. S. No. 175 was passed on 15-12-1941 and the decree in O. S. No. 216 on 27 51942. The execution petitions filed in the two cases were on 9 81956. These petitions admittedly were filed twelve years after the dates of the respective decrees and the contention, therefore, was urged by the appellant that execution cannot be had in either of the cases. This contention was repelled both by the execution court and by the lower appellate court. 2. The ground on which this contention was negatived by the execution court was that the appellant was concluded by the orders passed in the two cases respectively on 10 31956 and 3011956 when prior execution petitions dated 15 91955 were taken out in the two cases. In the order dated 10 91956, the reason given is this: "It is seen that the execution was stayed from O. S.149 of 1124 and hence there is no limitation." The order dated 3011956 passed in O S. No. 216 is more elaborate and is in these terms: "The contention that the decree is barred by limitation is not tenable, because the execution of the decree at least as against the attached property was stayed from O. S.149 of 1124. Since the decree holder's discretion in executing the decree in any manner that suits him cannot be questioned in stay (sic) in respect of the attached property would have limitation in respect of the whole execution proceedings." This order is not very clear, but it appears to me that what it purports to say is that the decree having been stayed at least in regard to execution being proceeded with against the attached properties, S.15 of the Limitation Act is attracted and the decree-holder is entitled to the exclusion of the time during which the injunction was in force. This view is apparently based on the view taken by the Travancore High Court in a number of cases starting from the decision reported in Parameswaran v. Kaliamma Pillai (XIV TLJ. 501) and followed in the decisions reported in Parameswaran Unnithan v. Narayanan (XVIII TLJ. 792), Kochan v. Govinda Pillai (XVIII TLJ. 816) and Parameswaran Pillai v. Rudrayani Pillai (XXXI TLJ. 794). No decision either of the Travancore, Travancore-Cochin or of the Kerala High Court differing from the views expressed in these decisions has been brought to my notice during the course of the arguments. But counsel for the appellant relied mainly on a ruling of the Calcutta High Court reported in Lala Baijnath Prasad v. Nursingdas Guzrati (AIR. 1958 Cal. 1) and submitted that in view of the fact that earlier execution applications dated 15 91955 filed in the two cases contained a prayer only for proceeding against the attached property, the question whether personal execution could be had against the appellant in these cases was not the subject matter of enquiry and could not have been determined by the prior orders dated 3011956 and 10 21958. He, therefore, urged relying on the principles stated in the Calcutta decision that S.15 can operate only as a partial stay preventing the execution of the decree in so far as that portion of the decree which is stayed is concerned. His argument, therefore, is that assuming that execution can be had against the attached properties, the decree-holder should not be permitted to proceed against the person of the appellant. He is fully supported in this submission by the decision of the Calcutta High Court. His argument, therefore, is that assuming that execution can be had against the attached properties, the decree-holder should not be permitted to proceed against the person of the appellant. He is fully supported in this submission by the decision of the Calcutta High Court. This, however, is not the view taken by the Travancore High Court and that seems to have been the law in the area from which this case has arisen for over 35 years now. There is no justification for limiting the wording of S.15 or for adding words to the section. In the decision reported in Kunjo Mal v. Firm Daniat Ram (AIR. 1940 Lahore 75) the -view was taken that S.15 can be attracted only in cases where there has been an absolute and complete stay of execution of the entire decree. Consistent with that, it was held that when there was a partial stay, there can be no exclusion of time under S.15. If the wording of S.15 is understood in the manner in which it is understood, it must certainly follow that S.15 cannot have any application when there is a partial stay of the decree. This extreme view did not, however, find favour with the Calcutta High Court and the view was expressly dissented from in the decision reported in Lala Baijnath Prasad v. Nursingdas Guzati (AIR. 1958 Cal. 1). Their Lordships further held that the section should be read as to mean that there will be an exclusion of time regarding that part of the decree which has been stayed and only as regards that part. This conclusion, I think, is based more on what the court considers just or unjust than on the wording of the section. But it ignores the other principle which has been adopted by the Travancore High Court that the decree holder's discretion to execute the decree in any manner he deems fit should not be fettered. To compel the decree holder to adopt a particular mode of execution is to take away the discretion vested in him. I do not think this is warranted. In any view of the matter, it cannot be gainsaid that more than one conclusion is possible as is evident from the conflict of decisions on this point. To compel the decree holder to adopt a particular mode of execution is to take away the discretion vested in him. I do not think this is warranted. In any view of the matter, it cannot be gainsaid that more than one conclusion is possible as is evident from the conflict of decisions on this point. As I said earlier, the Travancore High Court had taken the view that a partial stay of execution of decree enables the decree-holder to claim the benefit conferred under S.15 by excluding the time during which the injunction was in force. I think I must adhere to the same view and dismiss these appeals and I do so. 3. In the light of what is stated above, it is unnecessary to consider whether the orders passed on 10 2 1956 and 3011956 operate as res judicata to prevent the appellant from raising these contentions. 4. Counsel for the appellant has been very fair and limited his arguments to the question that personal execution should not be allowed against the appellant. It cannot be said that the arguments that he advanced are unsupported by judicial opinion. I therefore consider that the parties must be directed to bear their costs throughout in these proceedings and I order accordingly. Dismissed.