JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is an appeal by the Plaintiff against the decree and judgment of the Additional District Judge of Berhampur, can firming the judgment of the Munsif of Berhampur and dismissing the Plaintiff's suit far a declaration that Defendant No. 1 was not an occupancy tenant in respect of the suit lands and that the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2 were entitled to possession of the same. 2. The Appellant and his cousin (Defendant No. 2) were the inamdars of Bhantimunduli village within the zamindari of Badokhimedi in Ganjam district. During the survey and settlement operations of the estate in 1950 Defendant No. 1 was recorded as the occupancy raiyat in respect of the disputed property, notwithstanding the objections raised by the Plaintiff Appellant be fare the settlement authorities. Thereafter there was a proceeding u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure between the parties (M.C. No. 66 of 1951) in which a preliminary order was passed an 20-10-1951 and a final order was passed an 4-11-1953. The learned Magistrate declared Defendant No. 1 to be in possession of the suit property and forbade disturbance of possession until eviction in due course of law. The Plaintiff preferred a revision before the High Court but that was dismissed an 19-7-1954. 3. In the meantime Bodakhimedi estate was taken aver by Government under the provisions of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act and the inam of the Plaintiff also was taken aver under that Act, an 1-7-1954 by an appropriate notification. Thus, the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2 ceased to be the inamdars of the village with effect from that date. 4. The present suit under appeal was brought an 5-11-1956 and the cause of action far the suit, as tasted in paragraph 19 of the plaint, arose on 4-11-1953 and 19.7.1953, those being respectively the dates on which the final order of the Magistrate, u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure and the order of the High Court dismissing the revision petition against that order, were passed. In the prayer portion of the plaint (paragraph 24) the Plaintiff asked for the following reliefs: (a) That Defendant No. 1 had no right or occupancy over the suit lands and hence he was not a raiyat under the Plaintiff. (b) That the order of the Magistrate dated 4-11-1953 must be set aside. (c) That possession be declared in favour of the Plaintiff. (b) That the order of the Magistrate dated 4-11-1953 must be set aside. (c) That possession be declared in favour of the Plaintiff. Other consequential reliefs were also asked for. 5. In view of the aforesaid facts the first question which came up for consideration before the lower courts was whether the Plaintiff had any right to sue, as his right as an inamdar had already been extinguished. Both the lower courts held against the Plaintiff. They further held that the settlement entry recording Defendant No. 1 as an occupancy raiyat was correct. 6. Mr. Panda for the Appellant-Plaintiff, urged that the two lower courts committed an error of law in holding that the Plaintiff had no right to sue. According to him though his right as an inamdar was extinguished in 1954, on the abolition of the estate, nevertheless he was entitled to sue by virtue of Clause (ii) of Sub-section (1) of Section 49 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act which says that nothing contained in that Act shall in any way affect "any cause of action arising under any of the tenancy laws prior to the date of vesting. Mr. Panda urged that his suit was essentially a suit for correction of a wrong entry in the Settlement record and for eviction of a trespasser. According to him the suit was brought in view of the enabling provision contained in the proviso to Section 179 of the Madras Estates Land Act 1908 for correction of a wrong entry made in the record of rights. He also urged that the suit would come within the scope of Section 163-A of the Madras Estates Land Act for ejectment of a trespasser. Mr. Panda therefore contended that as the Madras Estates Land Act is admittedly the tenancy law in force in Ganjam, the cause of action for the present suit arose by virtue of the aforesaid provisions of that Act and that the Plaintiff's right to sue would therefore be saved by Section 49(1)(ii) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act. 7. This argument, though ingenious, cannot bear scrutiny. 7. This argument, though ingenious, cannot bear scrutiny. The real cause of action for the present suit, as stated by the Plaintiff himself in paragraph 19 of his plaint, is the final order passed by the Magistrate on 4-11-1953 in the proceeding u/s 145 Criminal Procedure Cede in consequence of which the Plaintiff was prohibited from interfering with the possession of Defendant No. 1. He also mentioned in paragraph 19 of his plaint the date of dismissal of his revision petition by the High Court. viz, 19-7-1954 as the date on which the cause of action accrued. The recording of Defendant No. 1 as a tenant in the Settlement records may not be correct, but so long as the final order of the Magistrate in the proceeding u/s 14, Code of Criminal Procedure stands against the Plaintiff, he cannot possibly get recovery of possession. Hence, in paragraph 24 of the plaint he prayed for the main relief of a declaration that Defendant No. 1 had no right of occupancy over the suit lands. But such a mere declaratory relief could not possibly be given, because u/s 42 of the Specific Relief Act he was bound to ask for consequential relief of recovery of possession also which again depended on his asking the court to set aside the final order of the Magistrate u/s 145 Criminal Procedure Code. Hence the suit is an ordinary civil suit and not one under the enabling provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act. Section 163-A and 179 of that Act on which Mr. Panda relied will not be of help in any way because they merely recognised his right to sue provided that right existed under any other law applicable to civil litigation. '] hey do not confer an independent right of suit apart from the provisions of any other law. In fact., the proviso to Section 179 of the Madras Estates Land Act itself says that any right to sue for a declaration of his right must be under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Specific Relief Act, and Section 42 of the Act (which lies in Chapter VI) expressly says that a mere declaratory relief cannot be asked for where the Plaintiff is necessarily required to ask for a consequential relief. Moreover the Limitation Act fixes a period of limitation for filing of suits against final order u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure see Article 47. Hence, it must be held that the present suit was not a suit which arose on a cause of action under any of the tenancy laws prior to the date of vesting, so as to be saved by Clause (ii) of Sub-section (2) of Section 49 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act. 8. As regards the Plaintiff's right to sue after the abolition of his inam the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Suraj Ahir v. Prithnath Singh, concludes the matter. There their Lordships held that if an intermediary's right is taken over by the Government he will have no right to sue for recovery of possession even from a trespasser. His rights, if any, will have to be worked out under the provisions of the Estate Abolition Act itself, viz. under Sections 6, 7, 8 and 9. It is therefore unnecessary to say anything as regards the cross objection filed by Respondent No. 1. 9. Both the courts below have concurrently held that Defendant No. 1 was in actual possession of the disputed lands since 1945. This is a concurrent finding of fact which cannot be assailed in second appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs of this Court only. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed