JUDGMENT Ramachandra Iyer, C J.- This Second Appeal which has been referred for decision by a Bench, raises a question as to the applicability of section 9-A of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to a debt secured by an usufructuary mortgage which originated in a liability for unpaid purchase money. The appellant who was the defendant in the trial Court had sold certain properties to the first respondent in the year 1923. A sum of Rs. 3,000 out of the purchase money remained unpaid and the latter executed on 28th February, 1929 a mortgage with possession of certain of his properties to secure that amount and another sum of Rs. 1,000 received in the manner set out in the document. The appellant duly entered into possession of the properties. It is not now disputed that the first respondent is an agriculturist entitled to the benefits of the Madras Act IVof 1938. In the year 1956 the mortgagor applied under section 19-A read with section 9-A of the Act to the District Munsif, Tiruchirapalli, for a declaration of the amount due by him under the mortgage referred to above. The Court found that the mortgagor was an agriculturist, but it took the view that as a substantial part of the consideration for the mortgage debt represented unpaid purchase money the debt could not be scaled down and consequently dismissed the application. This way of disposal can hardly be regarded as correct, for even if it were to be held that the scaling down provisions of the Act would not apply to the debt in question, the first respondent being an agriculturist was entitled to obtain a declaration under section 19-A of the Act of the amount due in respect of it. Section 19-A (4) (a) makes it clear that where an applicant is found to be an agriculturist the Court should pass an order declaring the amount due by him. This cannot obviously depend upon the fact whether in regard to a particular debt the debtor was entitled to have it scaled down or not. The first respondent, thereafter, instituted the suit out of which the present Second Appeal arises for redemption, alleging that the mortgage amount had practically been wiped out by reason of the enjoyment by the appellant of the mortgage property for a period of nearly thirty years. The first respondent, thereafter, instituted the suit out of which the present Second Appeal arises for redemption, alleging that the mortgage amount had practically been wiped out by reason of the enjoyment by the appellant of the mortgage property for a period of nearly thirty years. The substantial defence to the action by the mortgagee covered two points which also form the subject-matter of consideration in this appeal. They are (1) the present claim to have the debt scaled down by applying the provisions of section 9-A of the Act is barred by res judicata by reason of the decision in O.P. No. 85 of 1956 and (2) the provisions of section 9-A of the Act will not apply to that portion of the consideration which in its origin represented the unpaid purchase money due to the appellant from the first respondent. The Courts below have answered the two questions against the mortgagee. The first question need not detain us long. Under section 19-A the Court can dismiss the application only if the applicant is not an agriculturist. If, however, he is proved to be an agriculturist the Court will have to ascertain the amount of the debt after scaling it down in case the provisions of the Act justify it. Even if the provisions of the Act do not entitle the scaling down of the debt for example, by reason of the provisions contained in section 10 (2) of the Act, the Court will still have to ascertain the amount of the debt due and declare it. The Court cannot in such a case merely dismiss the application. The order passed by the District Munsif in O.P. No. 85 of 1956 is, therefore, not one in accordance with the Act and cannot form the basis of any valid plea of res judicata even if the other conditions for the applicability of that rule were held to have been satisfied. Apart from that aspect of the matter, a mere dismissal of the application filed under section 19-A cannot preclude the mortgagor from filing a suit for redemption. Likewise if the mortgagee happens to file such an application, the dismissal of it cannot also preclude him from enforcing the mortgage. In Lakshmi Devi v. Raja Rao1an application under section 19-A was dismissed on the ground that the transaction was not a mortgage but a lease. Likewise if the mortgagee happens to file such an application, the dismissal of it cannot also preclude him from enforcing the mortgage. In Lakshmi Devi v. Raja Rao1an application under section 19-A was dismissed on the ground that the transaction was not a mortgage but a lease. This Court held that it would be open to the aggrieved party in such a case to file an appropriate suit. We are, therefore, of the opinion, that there is no substance in the first point. On the next question the contention of Mr. A. K. Sriraman turned upon the construction of section 9-A read with section 10 (2) of the Act. According to learned counsel the latter section will have the effect of removing completely certain categories of debts, from the operation of section 9-A . It is argued that a debt which had its origin as unpaid purchase money would be excluded from the operation of the Act. Support for the contention is sought from section 10 (2) (ii) which exempts from the operation of sections 8 and 9 of the Act any liability for unpaid purchase money. Reference has been made to three cases decided by this Court, namely, Athiyappa Goundan v. Ramanathan Chettiar2 , Lakshmana Aiyar v. Ramaswami Naicker3and Aravala Chinna Papi Naidu v. Imperial Bank of India4which held that liabilities in respect of which section 55 (4) (6) of the Transfer of Property Act provided a charge would not be subject to the scaling down enacted by sections 8 and 9, whatever form such liability might take subsequently and in whatever way it might be evidenced, whether it be by means of a promissory note or a mortgage document and whether even the statutory charge, was subsisting or not. We are, however, not satisfied that these cases have any bearing upon the question to be decided here as they dealt with only the applicability of sections 8 and 9 of the Act. Learned counsel, however, placed considerable reliance on the decision in B. Kanakaparameswaramma v. K. Butchi Kotayya5 which was a case coming under section 4 (A) of the Act, that is, a debt due to a woman. Learned counsel, however, placed considerable reliance on the decision in B. Kanakaparameswaramma v. K. Butchi Kotayya5 which was a case coming under section 4 (A) of the Act, that is, a debt due to a woman. It was held that the exemption in section 4 should be read as exempting from the operation of the Act all those classes of liabilities which were included therein regardless of the fact whether after the 1st of October, 1937, a fresh document had been executed by the same debtor in respect of the debt or not. The argument as presented before us mixes up two matters, namely, a case of total exemption from the operation of the Act as provided in section 4 to which the last of the cases cited belongs and a case of an exemption from certain specified provisions of the Act as provided for in sections 10 and 11 of the Act. The latter provisions do not have the same effect as section 4, namely, that of removing the category of debts specified therein from the operation of the Act altogether. Sections 10 and 11 provide merely an exception to sections 8 and 9. It will be noticed that in regard to liabilities coming within the scope of section 10 which are incurred after the coming into force of the Act, the restrictive provisions as to the rate of interest set out in section 13 will nevertheless apply. That section 10 (2) (ii) has the effect of only rendering the scaling down provisions in sections 8 and 9 not available to a debtor with respect to categories of debts specified therein, is clear from the terms of the section itself which says: — “Nothing contained in sections 8 and 9 shall affect (i) any mortgage by virtue of which the mortgagee is in possession of the property mortgaged to him where no rate of interest is stipulated for as due to the mortgagee except to the extent provided for in section 9-A and (ii) any liability for which a charge is provided under section 55, clause (4), sub-clause (b) of the Transfer of Property Act…” From the foregoing it will be seen that the question as to the genesis of the debt will become relevant only if sections 8 and 9 of the Act were to be applied. Where a debtor who is an agriculturist claims benefit under different sections, like section 9-A of the Act, section 10 will not have the effect of exempting the class of debts specified therein. Section 9-A itself does not contain any restriction in regard to its application. It has been argued that section 9-A should be read as part of section 9 and therefore when section 10 refers to section 9 it should be deemed to include such, part of it, namely, section 9-A . Support for that contention was sought in the observation contained in Seeranga Goundan v. Seeranga Goundan:1 “Pending this appeal, Act XXIII of 1948 was passed which inter alia amended section 9 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938 by inserting some provisions to give relief to the debtors in respect of usufructuary mortgages also. This was numbered as section 9-A”. With great respect to the learned Judges who decided the case, we are of opinion that section 9-A should not be regarded as a mere amendment to section 9. On the other hand, section 9-A relates to all mortgages under which possession of property has been given to the mortgagee which were executed prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act, i.e, all transactions which but for the fact that they were mortgages with possession, would have come within the purview of sections 8 and 9 and even 13 . Section 9-A is not therefore, confined to the subject-matter dealt with in section 9 alone. It deals with a class of secured debts which to a large extent were exempt from the scaling down provisions of the Act till then. It provides practically a complete code as it were, for a statutory discharge either in full or in part of the mortgage debt where possession of the property had been transferred to the mortgagee. Again sections 8 and 9 have (but for the rule of damdupat contained in the former section), the effect of statutorily discharging the whole or part of the outstanding interest only. The principal in such cases will be discharged only if there had been payment. On the other hand, sections 9-A proceeds on the assumption that possession and enjoyment of the mortgaged property for a period of thirty years would enable the mortgagee to realise the principal and an equal amount of interest. The principal in such cases will be discharged only if there had been payment. On the other hand, sections 9-A proceeds on the assumption that possession and enjoyment of the mortgaged property for a period of thirty years would enable the mortgagee to realise the principal and an equal amount of interest. That assumption is carried even to the extent of working out proportionate discharge of the debt with reference to the actual period of enjoyment. A section introduced by way of amendment, by the use of a capital letter added to the pre-existing numeral, cannot necessarily mean that it is a part of the main provision which bears the same numeral as the one subsequently introduced. The question whether the two sections are complementary to each other or that the latter is an exception to the former or they were independent provisions has got to be decided with reference to the subject-matter dealt with by them. Section 9-A , in our opinion, having regard to the subject-matter cannot be treated as a part of section 9. The reference to section 9 in. section 10 (2) of the Act cannot, therefore, mean a reference to section 9-A as well. If the Legislature had really intended that section 10 (2) should cover a case of debt falling under section 9-A nothing would have been easier for them than to refer specifically to section 9-A in section 10 itself. It is significant to note that when section 9-A was introduced into the Act, there was an amendment to section 10 (2) . If the Legislature intended that the debts falling under section 10 (2) (ii) should not be covered by the scaling down provisions contained in section 9-A , they would have referred to section 9-A in section 10. In the absence of such an indication of the legislative intent, we must assume that section 9-A was intended to deal with all mortgages whereby possession of the property is given to the mortgagee whatever the origin of the mortgage debt might be. We are, therefore, of the opinion that: except in cases provided for in section 4 , section 9-A will have operation in regard to all kinds of mortgages whereby possession of the property is delivered to the mortgagee irrespective of the fact whether consideration for the mortgage had its original in the unpaid purchase money or not. We are, therefore, of the opinion that: except in cases provided for in section 4 , section 9-A will have operation in regard to all kinds of mortgages whereby possession of the property is delivered to the mortgagee irrespective of the fact whether consideration for the mortgage had its original in the unpaid purchase money or not. We agree, therefore, with the conclusion reached by the lower Court ana dismiss the appeal with costs. P.R.N.-----Appeal dismissed.