ORDER :- This revision petition arises out of an amendment to the written statement allowed by the District judge to be raised by the respondent at the time of hearing of the appeal preferred by the respondent against the decree passed by the Munsiff against him. 2. The petitioners herein filed the suit T. S. No. 13 of 1959 against the respondent for his eviction from a certain shop and for a money decree for Rs. 1,755/4/- out of which Rs. 1,455/4/- was said to be the value of 72 bundles of cotton yarn handed over to the respondent along with the shop and Rs. 300/- being the profits in the business. The petitioners filed the suit as partners of a joint Family Firm by name Kaiyanmal Sohanlal. They were said to have been carrying on business in the said shop since 11-12-1953, having taken the shop on lease from the Imphal Municipality and when the petitioner No. 1, who was in charge of the shop was leaving for Rajasthan in 1958, tie entrusted the shop to the respondent on condition that he will carry on the business during his absence and the 72 bundles of yarn cotton in the shop were handed over to the respondent and he was to pay half the profits of the business to the petitioners. The respondent denied the plaint allegations in to and said that he was running his own business with his own stock and money in the said shop since 11-12-1953 on payment of the rent at Rs. 12/- per month. But he said that at this shop was allotted in the name of Kaiyanmal Sohanlal by the Municipality, the rent was paid in that name. On the said pleadings the case went for trial and the learned Munsiff gave a finding that the petitioners were the partners of the said Joint Family Firm, that Petitioner No. 1 was its manager, that respondent took possession of the disputed shop from petitioner No. 1 in 1958 as an agent together with the cotton yarn - worth Rs. 1,455.25 and that the petitioners were the tenants of the said shop from the Municipality and not the respondent. He therefore gave a decree on 6-9-1960 for respondents eviction together with the sum of Rs. 1,455.25, but he disallowed the claim for profits. 3. The respondent filed an appeal to the District Judge on 19-9-1960. 1,455.25 and that the petitioners were the tenants of the said shop from the Municipality and not the respondent. He therefore gave a decree on 6-9-1960 for respondents eviction together with the sum of Rs. 1,455.25, but he disallowed the claim for profits. 3. The respondent filed an appeal to the District Judge on 19-9-1960. Then on 16-11-1960, he filed 2 applications before the District Judge - One was for amendment of the memorandum of appeal by raising certain new matters. One of the points raised therein was that the respondent had asserted his right of occupancy to the stall of the shop since 11-12-1953 and again since 27-2-1960 as a direct lessee under the Municipality, that without registration under the Partnership Act, the suit should not succeed and lastly that the suit was not within the Jurisdiction of the Court under Section 154 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. This amendment was allowed by District Judge on payment of RS. 7/8/- as costs to the petitioners. 4. The other application filed on the same date was for leave to submit further written statement by way of amendment. In this application, the facts which he wanted to raise in the amendment were mentioned. But the actual amendments by the addition of fresh paragraphs in the written statement were not mentioned, ft was stated therein that when the petitioners sought for amendment of the plaint and it was allowed in the lower Court, the respondent through inadvertence did not avail of the opportunity to file further written statement and that he wanted to raise the points that he had become the direct lessee under the Imphal Municipality on 27-2-1960, that the suit must fail in the absence of the registration of the firm, that the petitioners cannot claim for eviction after infringement of the rules and regulations of the Imphal Municipality and the consequent transfer of the shop to the respondent on 27-2-1960 and lastly that the suit was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 154 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. Notice was given of this petition to the petitioners and the Court passed an order that the petition will be disposed of on the merits at the time of hearing of the appeal. Notice was given of this petition to the petitioners and the Court passed an order that the petition will be disposed of on the merits at the time of hearing of the appeal. The petitioners requested that the matter of the amendment should be disposed of even before the appeal was heard on merits, but this was rejected by the District Judge. 5. The petitioners then came in revision to this Court, but this Court dismissed the revision petition stating that this was a matter within the discretion of the District Judge. Thereafter, an application was filed to this Court for transfer of the appeal from the file of the District Judge on various grounds including this ground of his refusal to hear the amendment petition before the hearing of the appeal. But that transfer petition was also dismissed by this Court on 1-7-1961. Subsequently, after various adjournments, the appeal came on for hearing before the District Judge on 21-2-1962. On that date, the District Judge, permitted the respondent to file a regular amendment petition by way of adding paragraphs 9 to 13 to the original written statement in which fresh facts are alleged that the shop though standing in the name of the Firm Kaiyanmal Sohanlal, was occupied by the respondent since 11-12-1953 as the firm had no intention to occupy themselves, that this was done with the consent and knowledge of ten partners and the respondent continued to pay monthly rent, first at the rate of Rs. 30/-then at the rate of Rs. 15/- and afterwards at the rate or Rs. 12/- to the Municipality, that since 27-2-1960, the respondent became the direct lessee of the Imphal Municipality on payment of Rs. 500/- to the Municipality on cancellation of the previous allotment to the firm and that us has been paying the monthly rent of Rs. 12/- to the Municipality. Further questions regarding the non-registration of the firm under the Partnership Act, the cancellation of the previous allotment to the firm due to infringement of rules and regulations and the consequent transfer to the respondent on 27-2-1960 and the lack of jurisdiction under Section 154 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation were also raised by way of amendment. The petitioners strongly objected to the amendment being allowed at that stage, but the District Judge after hearing the appeal on the merits allowed the amendment. 6. The petitioners strongly objected to the amendment being allowed at that stage, but the District Judge after hearing the appeal on the merits allowed the amendment. 6. In allowing the amendment, the District Judge remarked that in paragraph 8 of the original written statement the respondent had admitted that the shop was allotted to the firm Kalyanmal Sohanlal, but alleged that he was running his independent business since 11-12-1953, but that the respondent did not clarify how he came to occupy the disputed shop, that the learned Munsiff should have got this matter clarified either by demanding further particulars under Or. 6 R. 5 C.P.C. or by examining the parties under Or. 10 R. 2 C.P.C. and that what the respondent has sought by the amendment was only to introduce the facts in order to explain para 8 of his written statement. He further said that during the pendency of the suit a new fact had come in, namely, that the respondent had become the direct lessee from the Municipality since 27-2-1960, and that the respondent must be allowed to allege this new fact in order to close the controversy between tie parties and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings as the matter should be decided once for all. With regard to the question of law raised regarding the non-registration of the firm and the lack of jurisdiction of the Court, the District Judge said that these are legal objections and it should be allowed to be raised by way of amendment. He, therefore, allowed paragraphs 9 to 13 to be raised on payment of Rs. 15/- by way of costs to the petitioners and permitted them to file a rejoinder. It is against that order that this Civil Revision petition has been filed. 7. With regard to the legal questions raised by way of amendment, namely, regarding non-registration of the firm and the lack of jurisdiction under Section 154 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, the petitioners point out that these questions had already been raised by way of amendment of the memorandum of appeal and point out that these legal questions can be argued in appeal without an amendment of the written statement and that an amendment of the written statement was quite unnecessary for the purpose. I also find that the memorandum of appeal was allowed to be amended by adding these legal questions and that the respondent had liberty to raise these points in the appeal itself. Hence, the petitioners are right in urging that the amendment for the said purpose was unnecessary. 8. The more difficult question is the amendment allowed in respect of the new facts alleged in the petition filed en 21-2-1962. I shall deal with the new fact of a direct lease being acquired by the respondent on 27-2-1960 later, we are now concerned with the new facts allege which were in existence at the time when the original written statement was filed which the learned District Judge had allowed to be raised by way of clarification. These facts were quite well-known to the respondent when he filed his original written statement stating that he was in possession of the shop in his own right from 11-12-1953. After he filed the said written statement, he had an opportunity of filing an additional written statement when the petitioners got their plaint amended by adding that the suit was filed by the firm of Kalyanmal Sohanlal. But even then the respondent did not file any additional written statement or raise these new facts. The respondent states that he had failed to do so through inadvertence. But the learned District Judge has stated that it was for the Court to have got these clarifications from the respondent. 9. I am, however, unable to agree with the learned District Judge. There was no duty on the part of the Court to get any such clarifications. Under Or. 8, R. 2, C.P.C. it was for the respondent to plead specifically all new facts by way of defence. The petitioners had alleged that the respondent got into possession of the shop in 1958 as their agent while they were in possession from 11-2-1953 of of the shop as lessee of the Municipality. If the respondent while admitting that the shop was allotted to the petitioners was contending that he was in possession in his own right from 11-12-1953, it was for him to state how he got into such possession. If he did not do so, it is at his own risk. If the respondent while admitting that the shop was allotted to the petitioners was contending that he was in possession in his own right from 11-12-1953, it was for him to state how he got into such possession. If he did not do so, it is at his own risk. In that connection it will be seen from a perusal of ms first application for amendment filed on 16-11-1960 as compared with his later application permitted to be filed on 21-2-1962 that the respondent was going on trying to improve his case at every stage. I cannot understand how the District Judge lost sight of this. An amendment of a pleading is not to be permitted to allow a party to go on improving upon his case. We have to remember that oral evidence was allowed to be let in by both the parties in the first Court, that the petitioners let in evidence to show that they were in possession from 11-12-1953 and that the respondent came into possession as their agent in 1958. It was at that stage that the respondent should have let in his own evidence showing -how he happened to be in possession in his own right, if he was in such possession from 11-12-1953. After both the parties had let in their evidence on these matters, the Munsiff, on the said evidence gave a finding in favour of the petitioners disbelieving the respondents case. All that the appellate Court can do in appeal will thereafter be only to see whether on the evidence adduced, the Munsiffs finding was correct or not. It is evident that the respondent had failed to let in evidence as to how he came into possession from 11-12-1953. If that was so, the respondent cannot be permitted in appeal to allege a new fact as to now he came into such possession on 11-12-1953. Any permission for such amendment will mean that after having failed in the original Court on certain pleas raised by him, he is to be given a fresh chance by making a new pleading which is inconsistent with his original pleading and that he is allowed another opportunity to prove the said case by being permitted to let in fresh evidence. Or. 6 R. 17 C.P.C. is certainly not intended for any such purpose. No doubt, amendments to pleadings can be allowed under Or. Or. 6 R. 17 C.P.C. is certainly not intended for any such purpose. No doubt, amendments to pleadings can be allowed under Or. 6 R. 17 is exceptional cases in appeal also though the ordinary rule is that it must be applied for in the first Court. But if a party deliberately desists from setting forth his case in the first Court and the parties go for trial with certain particular averments and if one of the parties finds that he was not able to succeed with the particular allegations made by him in the first Court, it is not permissible after a finding given by the first Court to allow the party to mate fresh allegations in order to give him an opportunity to set up and prove a fresh case, which is even inconsistent with the original case which he set up. In any case, he cannot be allowed to be improving upon his case at every stage as he has ought to do in his first petition made on 16-11-1960 and in his second petition made on 21-2-1962. The learned District Judge was, therefore, wrong in allowing amendment for the purpose of clarification at this late stags in appeal which will actually amount to permitting the party to set up a new and inconsistent case. This amendment has definitely got to be disallowed. 10. With regard to the new case of direct tenancy from the Municipality with effect from 27-2-1960, which the respondent has been allowed to set up by the District Judge in appeal, it is a pity that the District Judge dm not address himself the question why the respondent did not set up this case in the first Court. According to him. He had become the direct tenant on 27-2-1960. The Respondent has produced a receipt from the Municipality dated 27-2-1960 for Rs. 500/- as Ext. 6/9 in the lower Court. I find that the petitioners evidence in the Lower Court was closed on 28-12-1959 and the case was posted for defence evidence to 19-3-1960. It is in between these two dates that the respondent obtained this receipt and according to mm became a direct lessee under the Municipality. 500/- as Ext. 6/9 in the lower Court. I find that the petitioners evidence in the Lower Court was closed on 28-12-1959 and the case was posted for defence evidence to 19-3-1960. It is in between these two dates that the respondent obtained this receipt and according to mm became a direct lessee under the Municipality. If the respondent felt that by this document the situation had changed and that the petitioners suit should fail, one does not understand what prevented him from applying for an amendment in the lower Court at that stage. It is evident that tie deliberately did not choose to apply for amendment at that stage, probably, expecting that production of Ext. B/9 and his deposition in respect of it would be sufficient rebuttal of the petitioners case. It cannot be accepted that He did not ask for an amendment through inadvertence. If the lower Court did not accept his case and passed a decree in petitioners favour, the respondent cannot be allowed at the appeal stage after he had lost his case in the lower court to set up an additional new case and to be given a fresh chance on that case. 11. Various complications will arise if this amendment is permitted which are quite foreign to the present suit. The petitioners had come forward with the case of agency of the respondent and of a lease in their favour by the Municipality. The question will arise whether the Municipality had the right pending the suit to cancel the said lease in favour of the petitioners and to give a fresh lease to the respondent. For that the Municipality will have to be made a party and the question as between the parties and the Municipality will also fall to be decided if this new case is allowed to be set up. This cannot be permitted in the present suit. The suit has been decreed on the basis of the lease in favour of the petitioners and an agency in favour of the respondent by the petitioners. If something has transpired subsequently which would take away that case, that is a matter which the respondent should agitate in a separate suit by impleading the necessary parties. The suit has been decreed on the basis of the lease in favour of the petitioners and an agency in favour of the respondent by the petitioners. If something has transpired subsequently which would take away that case, that is a matter which the respondent should agitate in a separate suit by impleading the necessary parties. It is not a matter to be allowed to be raised at the stage of appeal in the present suit, particularly after the respondent had deliberately refraimed from raising this matter in the first Court before the decree was passed. I may also state here that the decree of the first Court has already been executed and possession taken from the respondent. 12. For the above mentioned reasons, this revision is allowed and the order of the District Judge allowing amendment is set aside. The District Judge is directed to dispose of the appeal as it stands without the amendment to the written statement. Ordered accordingly. Respondent will pay the costs to the petitioners. Advocates fee Rs. 25/-. Order accordingly.