This second appeal has been filed against an appellate judgment and decree of the Revenue Appellate Authority Bikaner dated 26.6.62 reversing that of the Assistant Collector, Jalore dated 23.5.61. The respondents Keria etc. were the plaintiffs in the suit giving rise to this second appeal. On 9.12.58 they instituted a suit in the court of Assistant Collector, Jalore seeking a declaration of their khatedari rights over the land in dispute and also possession by means of the ejectment of the defendant appellant before us, who it was alleged had forcibly ejected the plaintiffs in Smt. year 2012. The defendant-appellant joined the suit asserting his own title over the suit land alleging that he had been duly let out the land by the jagirdar of the land after the plaintiffs had relinquished the land in his favour. It was also pleaded on his behalf that not only had the plaintiffs surrendered the land to the jagirdar through a written deed of surrender but in a subsequent criminal dispute acknowledged the possession of the defendant in a rajinama filed before the criminal court. On these allegations of the parties the trial court framed as many as 8 issues. Those relevant for our present purpose are issue Nos. 1,2,3, 5 and 8. They are as follows: — 1. Whether the plaintiffs are the khatedars of the land known as Bera Khuniwala and whether this well had been constructed by the plaintiffs. 2. Whether the land in dispute i.e. Bera Khuniwala and the land attached to it had remained under the cultivation of the plaintiffs till Smt. year 2011. 3. Whether on Asad Sudi 8 of Smt. year 2012 the plaintiffs were forcibly ejected by the defendants from the suit land and thus defendants had committed trespass over it. 4. Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to seek a declaratory relief without asking for the relief of possession; and lastly 5. Whether the plaintiffs relinquished the land in dispute and if so what is its effect on the suit. After recording evidence of the parties the trial court found issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs to the extent that the plaintiffs were khatedars but issue No.2 was found against them. Upon issue No. 3 the finding of the trial court is against the plaintiffs. After recording evidence of the parties the trial court found issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiffs to the extent that the plaintiffs were khatedars but issue No.2 was found against them. Upon issue No. 3 the finding of the trial court is against the plaintiffs. Issue No. 5 has also been found against the plaintiffs but issue No. 8 was decided against the defendants i.e. the court refused to believe that the plaintiff had surrendered the land in question and finally it came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs were not entitled to either of the reliefs sought for by them and accordingly the suit was dismissed. On the plaintiffs appeal against this order the learned Revenue Appellate Authority came to a totally different conclusion and reversing the decision of the trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs granting them both the reliefs. It is against the [aforesaid order that this second appeal has been filed. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged three contentions before us. In the first place he has attacked the order of the learned Revenue Appellate Authority as bad in the eye of law inasmuch as the judgment does not disclose the contentions that were raised before the Appellate Court nor has the learned court discussed any evidence to support his finding. His next contention is that the learned Revenue Appellate Authority was manifestly in error of law in holding the surrender deed i.e. Ex. D.W./4/1 as void. The argument is that the document having been executed in Smt. year 2006 it should have been tested in the light of the law regarding surrender as it stood at the time of the execution of the deed and not as it came to be subsequently under the provisions of Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The next contention of the learned counsel is that the Rajinama Ex. D. 9, which is to say minimum is an admission on behalf of the plaintiffs recognising the possession of the defendant before the criminal court has been rejected by learned Revenue Appellate Authority for reasons which cannot be held to be valid or sufficient. He therefore invited us to hold that the surrender or relinquishment on behalf of the plaintiffs in Smt. year 2006 stands proved and that the defendants are in lawful possession of the land in dispute. He therefore invited us to hold that the surrender or relinquishment on behalf of the plaintiffs in Smt. year 2006 stands proved and that the defendants are in lawful possession of the land in dispute. In his reply to the above contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant Shri Hastimal appearing on behalf of the plaintiff respondent submitted that it was not necessary for the Revenue Appellate Authority to have referred to each and every issue. It was enough for him to have referred to those issues which were raised before him. As regards the surrender deed it was his contention that the surrender deed was found by the trial court to be a document not proved, because the scribe in whose handwriting it was executed was not called to prove it. As regards Ex. D/9 i.e. (he rajinama filed in the criminal court no satisfactory reply was forthcoming from the counsel but he submitted that once it had been recognised that the plaintiffs were the khatedars of the suit land there could be no question of surrender by them and the only proper thing to do in view of this finding was to have declared the title of the plaintiffs and put them in possession which the learned Revenue Appellate Authority did. Having outlined in brief the respective contentions of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties we now proceed to review the entire facts and circumstances of the case. We need not say that we have ourselves gone through the evidence carefully as the judgments of the courts below are in conflict with each other. We would first like to state the respective case of the parties with which they came to the court as we understand it after our own perusal of the record. The plaintiffs had come to the court mainly to seek a declaration of his title i.e. being a khatedar of the suit land and the prayer of the ejectment of the defendants was in the nature of consequential relief and we think the suit was properly framed and perfectly in order. We have made this observation at the outset keeping in view the finding of the trial court that inasmuch as the plaintiff had failed to sue for relief of possession the suit for title was also not maintainable. We have made this observation at the outset keeping in view the finding of the trial court that inasmuch as the plaintiff had failed to sue for relief of possession the suit for title was also not maintainable. Now coming back to the pleadings of the parties we find that the defendants had set up their own claim of being the tenants of the suit land after the execution of the alleged surrender deed i. e. Ex.D.W.4/1. In view of these pleadings the real issue which called for investigation was which of the parties was entitled to be treated as khatedar for the suit land on the date of the suit. This point was altogether missed by the trial court and that is why it came 10 obviously of contradictory finding i.e. on the one hand it held that the plaintiffs were khatedar of the suit land and on the other held that the defendants being the tenants now were neither trespassers nor could they be ejected. It appears to us that when the matter came in appeal before the learned Revenue Appellate Authority he sensed the apparent contradiction in the decision of the trial court but failed to bring it out properly as has also been conceded by Shri Hastimal. Having gone through the record ourselves we find that the so called surrender deed was correctly rejected by the trial court. The reason given by the trial court for its rejection was that the scribe in whose writing it was purported to be was not called to prove it and thus it remained a document mot proved. The conclusion which followed from this finding was that the title remained with the plaintiffs and if nobody upset their possession he could not but be held to be a trespasser. However the main difficulty for the trial court to hold this view appears to be Ex. D.9. There is no doubt that Ex. D.9 is a document about whose genuineness there could be no question. It is a document in the shape of a certified true copy from the public records of a court. However the main difficulty for the trial court to hold this view appears to be Ex. D.9. There is no doubt that Ex. D.9 is a document about whose genuineness there could be no question. It is a document in the shape of a certified true copy from the public records of a court. This is also true that it was an admission on the date it was filed before the criminal court on behalf of the plaintiffs to the effect that the land in dispute was in possession of the defendants but to our mind it does not go further than that. The plaintiffs in their anxiety to get the criminal proceedings ended against them might have produced this rajinama before the criminal court but it cannot debar them from getting their rights declared in a civil court. We therefore are unable to hold as the learned counsel for the appellant wants us to hold that this rajinama is conclusive evidence binding the plaintiffs to recognise the possession of the defendants as lawful for ever. Even after filing of this rajinama it was open to the defendants to sue for their title and establish it before a competent civil court. As regards the effect to be given by the civil courts to this document we find the trial court has failed to properly appreciate it. We also feel that the trial court was in error in proceeding on the basis of this document to hold that since 7.10.53 i.e. the date on which the Ex. D. 9 was filed the defendants became the tenants of the suit land and acquired khatedari rights over it under sec. 15 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. If the trial court had cared to pause to reconcile his finding on issue No. 1 and this finding it would have found that the position is well high impossible. It could not have held on the one hand that the plaintiffs were khatedars under Marwar Tenancy Act and the defendants were khatedars under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. We are therefore inclined to agree with the Revenue Appellate Authority that once it is held the plaintiffs are khatedars it will be no longer possible to deny them reinstatement on the suit land. We are therefore inclined to agree with the Revenue Appellate Authority that once it is held the plaintiffs are khatedars it will be no longer possible to deny them reinstatement on the suit land. The result of the above discussion is that the plaintiffs have been successful in establishing their khatedari rights over the suit land they were well within their rights to seek ejectment of the defendants within 12 years of the date of their dispossession by the defendants we therefore hold that suit has been correctly and rightly decreed by the first appellate authority in favour of the plaintiff respondents. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed.