JUDGMENT 1. In this appeal by the defendants from an appellate judgment and decree of reversal, Mr. Mullick, the learned advocate for the appellants, addresses me on three points: 2. First, section 21 read with section 18 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 10 of 1956, bars the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit out of which the instant appeal arises. Second, the aforesaid suit is barred by res judicata. Third, the court of appeal below does fall into an error of law in having ordered khas possession against the appellants before me. 3. The first point arises in the manner following: the plaintiff Moni Mohan Nashkar (now the sole respondent) applies before the bhagchas officer, Mograhat, for a direction on the defendant Kalipada (now the first appellant) for delivery of the bhag produce. The two other defendants, kanai and Palan, brothers of Kalipada (appellants 2 and 3) are not parties there. The bhagchas officer gives Moni Mohan the relief he prays the officer for. Kalipada appeals under section 19 ibid. The munsif, who hears the appeal, upsets the decision of the bhagchas officer on two grounds-one, non-joinder of Kanai and Palan, who along with Kalipada are stated to have taken barga settlement, makes the proceedings bad ; two, the relationship between the parties as one of owner and bargadar is not proved, appearances having been in favour of a tenancy right. That leads Moni Mohan to institute the suit he does for declarations that he is the owner and that the defendants have no manner of a tenancy right, and also for recovery of khas possession after eviction of the defendants. 4. A suit as that, Mr. Mullick submits, is not maintainable. Both the courts hold that it is, section 21 read with section 18 ibid not ousting the civil court's jurisdiction. In that, they appear to be plainly right. For the purposes material for this litigation the mandate of section 21 is that save as provided in section 19 by virtue of which an appeal lies to the munsif, no order passed by the bhagchas officer or the appellate officer shall be questioned in any civil court and that no civil court shall entertain any suit in respect of any matter mentioned in section 18. The proceedings Mani Mohan initiates before the bhagchas officer are proceedings for delivery of the produce [section 18 (1) (a)]. In deciding this dispute, a question arises whether Kalipada is a bargadar or not. The appellate officer (the munsif) determines that he is not [section 18 (2)]. Coming back to section 21 (1), this order of the appellate officer that Kalipada is not a bargadar shall not be questioned in any civil court. It has not been questioned either. Again, no civil court shall entertain any suit on this matter, namely, whether Kalipada is a bargadar or not. But the instant suit is nothing like that. It is a suit for, amongst others, a declaration that Kalipada and his brothers are not tenants. So it is not hit by sub-section (1) of section That seems to me to be the only conclusion that can be reached on the plain meaning of section 21 read with section 18. (1) Jadu Nath Roy and others v. Lal Mohan Malik and others, 66 C. W. N. 88, is a converse case. The unsuccessful persons before the bhagchas officer and the appellate officer who declare them to be bargadars raise an action for a declaration that they are tenants. Bhattacharya, J. applies sub-section (1) of section 21 separately in two parts. Applying the second part that no civil court shall entertain any suit in respect of any matter mentioned in section 18, he holds that the dispute on tenancy is not included in any one of the disputes section 18 lists. In a way, that may be said. Because, all that can be decided under sub-section (2) of section 18 is whether one is a bargadar or not-not whether one is a bargadar or a tenant. So, a dispute on a tenancy right is outside the jurisdiction of this special forum and inside the jurisdiction of the civil court. But, on the facts before Bhattacharya, J. a difficulty arises. The finding of the special forum is that those persons are bargadars. The order of the special forum to that end shall not be questioned in any civil court, as the first part of section 21 (1) prescribes. If that is so, what remains then of the tenancy right? In view of this difficulty, bhattacharyya, J. keeps the matter open saying that it is not necessary to decide that at that stage. The order of the special forum to that end shall not be questioned in any civil court, as the first part of section 21 (1) prescribes. If that is so, what remains then of the tenancy right? In view of this difficulty, bhattacharyya, J. keeps the matter open saying that it is not necessary to decide that at that stage. Had section 21 (1) been reckoned as a whole, the difficulty would not have arisen perhaps. To see it whole is to keep away from this difficulty. 5. But a conflict of that kind cannot arise in the case in hand. Because, here the order of the special forum, is that Kalipada is not a bargadar. No doubt, the appellate officer gives sufficient indication in his order to show that Kalipada is a tenant. But as soon as he says so, he travels outside the limits of his jurisdiction. Mr. Mullick submits: he does not. I emphasize the words in the statute over again. The words are whether a person is a bargadar or not. The words are not whether a person is a bargadar or a tenant. Indeed, that has to be so. As soon as the special tribunal finds that a certain person is not a bargadar but a tenant, it loses all its jurisdiction. That special tribunal exists to deal with bargadars and bargadars alone, not with those who happen to be non-bargadars. So, when it is said, as is said on behalf of the appellants, that the finding or the order of the appellate officer declaring in a manner Kalipada to be a tenant is final and conclusive though that tribunal loses all jurisdiction to deal with it, the contention refutes itself. 6. In fine, the special forum here has the only jurisdiction to decide whether one is a bargadar or not. As soon as it decides that he is not a bargadar, whatever else he may be, that matter falls outside its jurisdiction and inside the jurisdiction of the ordinary court. Another case Mr. Mullick cites, namely (2) Sarat Chandra Panda and others v. Sk. Amin Ali and others, 66 C. W. N. 229, cannot assist him in any way. There certain persons disgruntled by the award recorded by the bhagchas board sued for a declaration that they were not bargardars under the persons found by the board but under some others. Mullick cites, namely (2) Sarat Chandra Panda and others v. Sk. Amin Ali and others, 66 C. W. N. 229, cannot assist him in any way. There certain persons disgruntled by the award recorded by the bhagchas board sued for a declaration that they were not bargardars under the persons found by the board but under some others. That being the primary or main relief sought, it was held that the civil court's jurisdiction was completely ousted. Once the special tribunal decides that, you are bargadars under "a", it is not open to you to bring a suit for a declaration that you are bargadars under "b';. That is the keynote of the bench decision which cannot help matters forward for the appellants. I, therefore, hold that the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit it has done, and repel the first point urged upon me by Mr. Mullick. The second point admits of an easy answer. (3) Raj Lakshmi Dasi and others v. Banamali Sen and others, (1953) S. C. A. 23, holds no more than this: a land acquisition court determining the question of title with a view to arriving at a decision on the question of apportionment of compensation money is a court which has the obvious jurisdiction to decide finally what it does. That being so, on general principles of law, the plea of res judicata can be sustained. But here, for reasons set out by me, neither the bhagchas officer nor the munsif qua appellate officer has the jurisdiction to decide the tenancy right involved. All they can decide is the existence or non-existence of a barga right. So, on the basis of this authority Mr. Mullick cites, it cannot be held that the instant suit is barred by res judicata. 7. The third point is easier still. The concurrent findings of both the courts are that the appellants are not tenants. The appellants' own admission is that they are not bargadars. As a matter of fact, they have been fighting on that plea all through. Now, if you are not tenants nor bargadras, what can you be except trespassers? The appellants are just that and have rightly been evicted by the court of appeal below, no question of inconsistent pleas arises-a point on which I have been addressed by Mr. Mullick. As a matter of fact, they have been fighting on that plea all through. Now, if you are not tenants nor bargadras, what can you be except trespassers? The appellants are just that and have rightly been evicted by the court of appeal below, no question of inconsistent pleas arises-a point on which I have been addressed by Mr. Mullick. What does arise very much is that the appellants are neither tenants nor bargadars and must therefore be intruders. In the result, I see no substance in this appeal which I dismiss. Though the appellants have been perverse all along, I show an indulgence to them because of their poverty by ordering that each party will bear its costs throughout.